Originally Posted by
Not_a_boffin
At what range and scale?
I've done the calcs for CAP sustainment from Leuchars/Lossie to get something as basic as a 2-ship out there, during an Ex in an underground site in NW London. It's eye-watering.
You cannot being maths into the argument! Next you will be bringing Physics and Geography into the argument! Quoting myself
from a post on a discussion about the sea control role(s) of the carrier:
It is often suggested that because land based MPA can support task groups, it is practical to do the same with land based fighters - despite the obvious difference in range. How many fighters and tankers do you need to maintain a CAP plus aircraft on alert? If the aircraft are not on CAP, can they get to an incoming raid of hostile aircraft carrying anti ship missiles before they get to missile firing range?
Little's Theorem: N =λT
N = average number of items in a queuing system
λ = average number if items arriving at the system per unit of time
T = average waiting time an item spends in the system
Quoting Appendix A of Data Communications For Engineers by Duck, Bishop, and Read:
The usefulness of this theorem is that it applies to almost every queuing system. Everyday examples spring to mind. For example, slow moving traffic (large T) generates crowded streets (large N), a fast food restaurant (small T) needs fewer tables (small N) than a normal restaurant for the same customer arrival rate (λ).
If you are operating a task group a distance away from a friendly air base and are relying on land based fighters to put a CAP in front of your task group, then you have a large transit time (large T), so the same level of CAP cover (λ) results in a large N - you need more fighters than you would if they were operating from a carrier.
Likewise if you want to do more than operate a single CAP, and/or want to push fighters forward (as in the 'outer air battle') then you simply need more of them - quantity counts as well as quality. This in turn means larger carriers, a point not understood by many critics.
On the following page of the same discussion:
New Technology and Medium Navies by Norman Friedman (1999)
Alternatively, it might be said that the use of external sensors in combination with shipboard assets can leverage the considerable investment the ships represent. For example, during the latter part of the Cold War the U.S. Navy planned to fight an Outer Air Battle to destroy the Soviet naval bombers (mainly 'Backfires') which would otherwise have destroyed NATO shipping. It was quite clear that existing NATO frigates, which were optimized for anti-submarine warfare, could not deal with the 'Backfire' threat. At best they might have fended off some of the missiles the bombers launched, without dealing with the bombers at all. The bombers would simply have come back, and destroyed the surface units whose weapons had been depleted...
FIGHTING DMO, PT. 7: THE FUTURE OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN DISTRIBUTED WARFIGHTING - CIMSEC
Air Defense and Shooting Archers:
Aside from critical information functions, there is a vital kinetic role for naval aviation to play. Naval aviation will be sorely needed to preserve the survivability of the broader surface fleet. This dependency is best illustrated through the severe tactical challenges surface warships face in defending themselves against missile salvos...
After discussing the problems involved in engaging low altitude anti ship missiles with only shipborne systems, the article discussed the launch platforms:
Naval aviation is also critical for defending against bombers, which are one of the most flexible and lethal platforms for anti-ship attacks. Because of their long range and the size of their magazines, bombers can launch substantial volume of fire against warships at distances that are well beyond the warship’s ability to launch anti-air weapons. These features make it especially difficult to destroy archers before they can fire their arrows when it comes to bombers. Aviation is the main asset that can find and intercept bombers and impose last-ditch firing dilemmas upon them before they are able to fire upon warships.
The large deck and hangar provides a platform for ASW helicopters. Although the low frequency towed array equipped sonars normally can support a Merlin or similar, with the dipping sonar providing the resolution to go with the towed array's detection range, experience shows that putting them on the same ship simplifies coordination, maintenance, logistics, and crew stopping, and allows them to fly in worse sea conditions.
But as well the maths of Queuing Theory, the physics of electromagnetic wave propagation, the geography of a non flat planet, and the history of Second World War, the Cold War, and so on, you are not allowed to bring personal experience of operations or exercises in here!
Originally Posted by A56
Let's be honest - if someone proposed buying two carriers for the RN today what would be the reaction?
Probably then we should have made the decision decades ago. It was not the carriers that led to frigate/destroyer numbers being reduced, it was the stupid assumption that state versus state conflict was a thing of the past and that the seas would never be contested again.