Future Carrier (Including Costs)

[ORAC]

R&R ship it had bars, a movie theatre and a dance hall.

with no facilities ashore it was a favoured destination.

Not sure where they got the girl# from - bu5 doubtless there were many nurses etc also ready to party .

You Tube

[SASless]

What did they want it for? I thought the US Navy was dry.

"Officially dry" aboard ship with some exceptions.....anythng but ashore!

A brief history of why this came about.......

​​​​​​​https://news.usni.org/2014/07/01/hun...nd-alcohol-sea

[SLXOwft]

I'd like to know what those who made the decisions were drinking when they decided Mildcat HMA2 would:

1. have neither dipping sonar (too heavy and would take up too much room apparently) and no tactical data link (to save money - export version has it) - any one know if they are getting the Bowman/Link 16 retrofit or is that AH1 only?
2. Lacking these is the equipment of choice for the T23s that have no towed array sonar.

[pr00ne]

Originally Posted by SLXOwft

I'd like to know what those who made the decisions were drinking when they decided Mildcat HMA2 would:

1. have neither dipping sonar (too heavy and would take up too much room apparently) and no tactical data link (to save money - export version has it) - any one know if they are getting the Bowman/Link 16 retrofit or is that AH1 only?
2. Lacking these is the equipment of choice for the T23s that have no towed array sonar.

Er, maybe because no RN small ships helicopter has ever had dipping sonar, but maybe you should drop them a line and tell them how wrong they are?

[SLXOwft]

It's a benefit of being on the outside that I don't have to bang my head against steel bulkheads and HMT's doors. So I am happy to pontificate without responsiblity.

Merlin? Or do you mean small helicopter? The RN philosphy has always been the ship's flight is part of the weapons fit but that relies on the ships sensors and communications being up to snuff. We moved on from flags, semaphore and Aldis lamps, and the world has now moved on from voice so surely a small ship's helicopter need to be networked with sensors that provide an ASW picture or has to be able to provide its own.

The French Lynx HAS2/4 (FN) had it, as did the Germans and Dutch among other operators, the RN ones had various MAD fits. The export version of the Wildcat is offered with active dipping sonar. My point is as bought Wildcat has no detection kit, isn't networked so can't share the tactical picture visually when operated from an ASW roled ship, and in some cases is being operated off lone ships without a decent sonar fit. In a world of stealthy submarines and UUVs/AUVs 'we haven't done it before so aren't going to now' doesn't make sense to me (it never did). The crew need to be sure they know with a high degree of probibilty the location and depth of the target before dropping Sting Ray or depth charges, the era of NDBs is long gone. Sadly, history shows we have to lose ships and sailors before change happens (if the San Luis had been luckier maybe it would already have).
The choice is between and ASuW helicopter in Wildcat and an ASW one in Merlin. If there was a proper ASW role fit availavble for RN Wildcat then a T23 could carry a mixed purpose flight but can't carry a Merlin and a Wildcat. MH-60R anyone? Sorry, no 'British Jobs' and HMG ain't paying to develop an equivalent, because they deem the risk is not high enough to justify the cost.

[SASless]

Does the hand full of P-8's provide sufficient ASW capability to make Helicopter ASW redundant....even for single surface Ship operations?

One would think not.

What benefit does helicopter ASW bring to the fight should hostilities kick off.....or better yet....what disadvantage is posed if there is no Helicopter ASW (dipping sonar for example)?

[SLXOwft]

I would think it comes down to layered defence but the P-8s would have to be in the right place at the right time.

The helicopter extends the range of detection and engagement from the ship; before advertising its presence with active sonar a single aircraft (rather than a screen of multiple aircraft) requires a strong certainty about the rough location of the threat. The active sonar then gives (hopefully) more accurate targeting information with out disclosing the exact position of the ship to the submarine/UUV. My envisaged situation is a ship out of Bahrain in the enclosed waters of the Gulf being threatened by a hostile state or a non-state party supplied with a UUV by such a state where the hostile party is aware of the general position of the ship so pinging doesn't significantly increase the risk.

[tucumseh]

Originally Posted by SLXOwft

I'd like to know what those who made the decisions were drinking when they decided Mildcat HMA2 would:

1. have neither dipping sonar (too heavy and would take up too much room apparently) and no tactical data link (to save money - export version has it) - any one know if they are getting the Bowman/Link 16 retrofit or is that AH1 only?
2. Lacking these is the equipment of choice for the T23s that have no towed array sonar.

There was certainly a requirement post-Falklands for what became known as 'Sonics Lynx', but it was ill-defined. There were a lot of ASW requirements being bandied about and endorsed at the time, but we could never get an answer on whether a dipping sonar was planned. If it was, we thought it would arise out of the Project Merryman trials around 1984/5. (From memory, a fly-off between HELRAS, Cormorant, and an updated 195 which was already in SK and Wx). I do remember HELRAS wouldn't deploy properly, and then had a battery fire and failed in Merlin.

At that time, the FAA was getting 108 Merlins, which was a substantial uplift in ASW. (All fitted for and with). So Lynx tended to take the hit when programmes were being chopped. Its 360 degree radar was a good example, with full development completed around 1989, then suddenly cancelled; and then a rush to sort out long standing problems when GW1 kicked off. The tipping point was cutting the 3>8 conversions from 84 to 48. At that point, around 1993/4, MoD(PE) had a clear-out of all the tasks that had been drifting for over a decade without a decision. In 1992 the RAF's Director of Flight Safety called Chinook the 'Cinderella' of the RAF. I always thought Lynx was the FAA equivalent. Oddly, in MoD(PE) it was the opposite. Chinook and Lynx teams were mob-handed, while other bigger programmes were one-man shows.

Regarding BOWMAN, Lynx HAS8 was one of 13 types planned and funded. But only one (Sea King HC4) realised that there were technical and contractual pre-requisites that BOWMAN wouldn't deliver (as it hadn't thought of them), and was the only design to incorporate an upgrade path. MoD dealt with this in its usual way, by ignoring that one aircraft was done and dusted (too embarrassing), refusing to learn lessons, and 're-setting' in 1998 by starting a bunfight as to who should set up an entire Integrated Project Team to do what one guy had done in his spare time, as a minor task. No doubt there were similar machinations after that!

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Originally Posted by SASless

Does the hand full of P-8's provide sufficient ASW capability to make Helicopter ASW redundant....even for single surface Ship operations?

Originally Posted by SASless

One would think not.

What benefit does helicopter ASW bring to the fight should hostilities kick off.....or better yet....what disadvantage is posed if there is no Helicopter ASW (dipping sonar for example)?

'No' to your first question. Even if there were more P-8s the different capabilities are complementary, and only a helicopter can deploy dipping sonar. It would also mean that the surface warship or surface force has no means to launching homing torpedoes at an enemy submarine without being in range of the submarines heavyweight torpedoes.

As to your second question, having no ASW helicopters would put a task group at a very real disadvantage, with no long range organic ASW weapons, and the advantages of modern low frequency active sonar would be largely lost - the sonars like 2087 are long range, but with increased range resolution is lost, which is why the helicopter with dipping sonar is partnered with LFAS systems. It is a bit like AWACS aircraft not making it unnecessary for fighters to have radar. In both cases a long range sensor works with a shorter range system put nearer the target.

I found this article from April 2008: UK RN exercise tests Sonar 2087 and Merlin pairing

Deployed assets from the UK Royal Navy's (RN) 'Orion 08' Task Group has completed an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise Phoenix to test and prove the pairing of the new Sonar 2087 low-frequency active/passive sonar system and the Merlin HM.1 helicopter. Exercise Pheonix marked the first time that the advanced ASW capabilities afforded by the Sonar 2087 area search sonar and Merlin has been exercised together. Pheonix involved a range of exercise serials designed to test the capability of Sonar 2087 in both active and passive modes. The tracking accuracy of Sonar 2087 gave an order of magnitude reduction in the size of the area of probability within which the Merlins were required to search to acquire the target.

You may be interested in this March 2000 report into the value of the SH-60R (now called MH-60R) and CH-60S (now MH-60S) to a carrier strike group from the Center for Naval Analyses.

From page 21:

With the retirement of the S-3, the lion's share of the middle zone tasks—ASW search, ASW contact investigation, and surface contact identification—will fall to the SH-60R. The P-3 can also contribute, but generally there will be tactical incentives not to divert the P-3 from its high-altitude surveillance role. These tasks are likely to lead to a requirement for an SH-60R continuously airborne in the middle zone for ASW search and alert helicopters for contact investigation and identification. Engagement of surface targets would be done with attack aircraft from the carrier air wing or a pair of SH-60R/CH-60S helicopters.

and

Search and surveillance. Although the P-3 will be the primary wide-area search platform, the SH-60 will play an important role in the middle zone using its advanced low-frequency active dipping sonar and employing its radar in a periscope detection mode. It can also deploy sources for IEER detection, with towed arrays on the surface combatants serving as the receivers.

Contact investigation and attack. The SH-60R will have a primary role in prosecuting ASW contacts. The ALPS dipping sonar should be very effective for contact investigation. When a contact has been identified as valid, a second SH-60 will likely be called in so that a pair of helicopters is on scene to track and attack a maneuvering, evading target.

Then there is a 1970s paper by a USN SH-3 driver:Management of ASW Systems: A Look at Rotary Wing ASW

Page 1: One of the main functions of the US Navy is to protect our merchant shipping from attack. In order to do so, we must concentrate resources on anti submarine warfare (ASW) and seaborne anti air warfare (AAW) rather than on a major anti shipping capability to interdict sea lanes that the Soviets would not used in wartime.

Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, 1979. The then Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Holloway continues...

The Soviets have the largest submarine force in the world and continue to improve its capabilities. Since the 1960s submarines armed with torpedoes and cruise missiles have presented the most severe threat to all naval surface forces and, with the other Soviet attack submarines, could pose an extremely serious threat to Western SLOCs in a protracted conflict.

The principle of engaging at range applies to both ASW and AAW, which makes carriers uniquely suited to these missions.

Page 4: But, as "war at sea" exercises dramatically demonstrated after the Vietnam War, CVs were especially vulnerable without an effective local air ASW system. These exercises and the CNO directed reevaluation of HS effectiveness reemphasized the value of the SH-3's ASW systems; they could consistently detect and destroy submarines within the missile firing range surrounding the carriers. The failure of other air ASW units to detect these submarines (simulating Foxtrot, Echo II, Charlie, and Victor Soviet submarines) serves as a grim reminder that sonobouys alone will not suffice.

Local of course means around the carrier - I am confused by the description of ranges used by the author but he does refer (at the start) to a range of ninety nautical miles from the carrier. That is a large sea area to provide safety for things like merchant ships full of military equipment, or to act as a barrier to stop the Northern Fleet SSN/SSGN from breaking out en masse into the Atlantic via the GIUK gap.

Covert ASW operations were also in vogue at the time, and HS squadrons recorded an impressive number of detections in the high noise environment of the carrier task group. In locations with high ambient noise (eg the Mediterranean) and high reverberation shallow water conditions (eg amphibious landings), the SH-3's dipping sonar proved its effectiveness.

The Soviets placed a lot of emphasis on their ability to attack amphibious forces and to disrupt landings, as NATO operations in the Northern and Southern Flanks would help take pressure off the central front, and in the case of Norway, contributed to making life hard for Red Banner Northern Fleet and Soviet Naval Aviation.

Page 5: Submarine skippers have been quoted as saying that the ASW system most difficult to break contact with is the sonar equipped SH-3, even with the submarine employing counter measures.

It should not be hard to see why. The helicopter can move faster than the submarine, and can rapidly move to another location to start dipping again. Today the dipping helicopter can be cued by a frigate with a towed array sonar to provide long range detection and localisation.

Here is another interesting historical document: The History of Sea based Anti Submarine Warfare 1940 - 1977

From page 114 (in the Korean War chapter):

The integration of the Dipping Sonar Helicopter as a coordinated component in the field of ASW appears to have far reaching implications in the development of new HUK concepts. It appears certain to influence existing air, surface and submarine tactics profoundly, at least in good weather and sea conditions. From the limited experience and observations, the dipping sonar appears to possess a tremendous potential in:

(a) Reduction of time late over target datum

(b) Positive and rapid identification of disappearing contacts

(c) Tenacity in holding a contact

(d) Reduction of the vulnerability of the SAU* as a torpedo target.

(e) Ability to regain contact rapidly.

There are also some interesting snippets in this DPhil thesis paper that I found via Google:

The Impact of Air Power on Navies: The United Kingdom, 1945 - 1957 by Tim Benbow

Using CTRL+F and searching for the word 'dipping':

Rear Admiral A.N.C. Bingley, Fifth Sea Lord, expected that their ability to operate in poor weather could be improved and helicopters 'will then be a better A/S vehicle in almost every way than the fixed wing aircraft'. The latter could cover a greater area but the fact that submarines now spent little time on the surface meant that aerial radar search was of limited use, while the number of sonobuoys that they could carry was restricted. The helicopter with dipping sonar had an 'overwhelming advantage', and although it could not currently carry weapons, it should be able to do so by I960.

[SLXOwft]

SASless although written in the wake of the UK government's Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010 (for which read desparate money saving measures) this commentary written for RUSI in 2011 addresses the problems that were likely to arise in the 'capability gap' between the cancellation and destruction of Nimrod MR4 and the arrival of the UK's P-8s. It also assumes a Merlin HM fleet of 40 not 30 (less the ones fitted for the ASACS role at any particular time).

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-res...are-capability

Anti-Submarine Warfare: A Layered Capability

Developing an effective ASW capability requires the inter-weaving of several layers of capability. Each layer fulfils a particular function, making a particular contribution to the overall effectiveness of the ASW web. Yet, with the submarine threat to the UK much reduced since the Cold War and with the UK now focused elsewhere, some argue that the ASW requirement has also reduced. Certainly, the UK's ASW capability has dwindled in terms of significance as well as systems and skills sets.

The UK's ASW layers have thus been steadily eroded. The Nimrod decision, however, has highlighted quite starkly and suddenly the consequences of this. Despite MoD statements that Nimrod's roles will be covered by other assets, no other assets deliver its specific capabilities. The UK's ASW web hence has a particular, and significant, hole in it.

[Asturias56]

well we banged on on here for years about that disgraceful abdication of a key role - then they finally decided to fill it

But only 9 airframes - makes you weep TBH

[Imagegear]

Well it would appear that things are going well south if this report by the Mail on Sunday is accurate.

POW for Scrap?

Britain's £3.2 billion aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales has been reduced to acting as a scrap-yard. Essential pieces of equipment are being ripped out of the stricken warship, a move that raises questions over its long-term future. The UK's second carrier has been in dry dock since breaking down off Portsmouth in August 2022.

Now Navy top brass have begun stripping the carrier – a process known as 'cannibalisation' – which will render HMS Prince of Wales inoperable for much longer. Lift chains, which allow fighter jets to be raised from below deck, electrical systems and sections of the ship's gas turbines have been taken out.

These parts, without which it cannot function fully, are being fitted to her sister ship, HMS Queen Elizabeth, as replacements for parts that have aged or malfunctioned. HMS Prince of Wales broke down due to issues with her starboard propeller, which is being replaced as part of a £25million refit – the cost has risen by £5million in the past month.

The Mail on Sunday can report for the first time today that the warship's port propeller also needs to be replaced as it is suffering from the same issues. HMS Prince of Wales – launched in 2017 – is expected to spend at least a year in dock due to the additional workload.

According to insiders, the Navy is also spending millions on replacement fuel pumps for both carriers.

Last night, a Navy source said: 'It is one disaster after another. To lose both propellers so soon into her lifespan is ridiculous. As she's out of action, inevitably her good parts are being stripped off to support HMS Queen Elizabeth.

'Whatever the bosses need to keep the first carrier afloat and operational, they take from the second. HMS Prince of Wales is being mothballed, unofficially at least.'

Both ships cost £6 billion – before a single fighter jet was purchased. The decision to build two carriers is being questioned inside the cash-strapped Ministry of Defence.

An inquiry into issues suffered by HMS Prince of Wales has uncovered evidence the second carrier was rushed into service, seemingly to serve a political agenda.

Last night, the Royal Navy said: 'We remain committed to ensuring HMS Prince of Wales commences her operational programme, as planned, in August 2023.

'It is not unusual for equipment to be transferred between ships to ensure operational availability and to avoid delays.'

[Asturias56]

Reminds me of the "Bristol"

[SLXOwft]

If I were to hazard a wild guess:

• negative briefing by someone pushing their own agenda
• need to keep HMSQNLZ available so taking steps to enable, should they become necessary, a delay in the timing of the planned switch to HMSPOW as the Very High Readiness Strike Carrier in 2024 and pushing back the scheduled refit of HMSQNLZ

Further proof that, IMO, we only have 2/3 of a carrier capability.

[pr00ne]

Originally Posted by SLXOwft

If I were to hazard a wild guess:

• negative briefing by someone pushing their own agenda
• need to keep HMSQNLZ available so taking steps to enable, should they become necessary, a delay in the timing of the planned switch to HMSPOW as the Very High Readiness Strike Carrier in 2024 and pushing back the scheduled refit of HMSQNLZ

Further proof that, IMO, we only have 2/3 of a carrier capability.

Seems appropriate seeing as we currently have less than 2/3 of an air group!

[Not_a_boffin]

It's the Mail FFS.

They also seem to be using the gobby steward from Chris Terrill's series as their "naval source". "Both propellers" indeed.....

Definitely someone has an agenda. A more accurate view can be found in MinDPs letter to the HCDC on their website....

[Asturias56]

hmm - now there's a tough choice

who is more likely to tell the truth - the Mail or the MoD?

I'll tick "none of the above" I think - lets see how it pans out in August.

[Not_a_boffin]

Originally Posted by Asturias56

hmm - now there's a tough choice

who is more likely to tell the truth - the Mail or the MoD?

I'll tick "none of the above" I think - lets see how it pans out in August.

Perhaps you should try reading the letter. Surprisingly informative. If you understand the subject.

[SLXOwft]

To aid further understanding here are some extracts from and a link to the minister's letter.

The causal factor identified in this instance was that PWLS starboard shaft was misaligned from build, and that the incorrect installation of key components resulted in the defect suffered.

Several contributory factors lead to the misalignment and the subsequent incorrect assessment that the starboard shaft and couplings would perform as required. Following reviews of the impact of the shaft misalignment, a decision was made that PWLS should proceed to sea for trials and that further monitoring would be conducted.

During PWLS’ sea trials, both shafts were extensively tested over several weeks and thousands of nautical miles in the Northern North Sea and UK South Coast Exercise Areas. Vibration readings remained within limits at all times. Accordingly, no issues, conditions of class or actionable items were transferred into service from the Aircraft Carrier Alliance (ACA) to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in 2019 at Vessel Acceptance.
(...)
Thereafter, during PWLS’ subsequent operational time at sea, which included exercising and NATO tasking in the Mediterranean in June 2022, no abnormalities associated with either shaft were reported.

Following the coupling failure in August 2022, an alignment issue was also identified with her port shaft. Rectification work was initiated and is expected to be completed in time for PWLS to commence her operational programme, as planned, this autumn.

PWLS was always scheduled to be alongside and undergo upgrade work for the majority of 2023 in preparation for taking over as the UK Very High Readiness Strike Carrier in 2024. Such work includes updates to the flight deck to expand F35 operations upgrades to communications and information systems and upgrades to combat management systems architectures. Consequently, over this period capability upgrades have been conducted in parallel to the shaft repairs to ensure efficiency and value for money.
(...)
The financial cost is estimated to be approximately £25 million. Responsibility for payment has not yet been established therefore it would be inappropriate to comment further at this stage.

Letter dated 3rd April from the Minister of State for Defence Procurement to Chair regarding HMS Prince of Wales' Defect Investigation Outcome

[Asturias56]

"The causal factor identified in this instance was that PWLS starboard shaft was misaligned from build,"

well it only seem s to affect the one vessel.................................