Future Carrier (Including Costs)
todays Times says the bill for the PoW fix is now over £ 20mm (original estimate £ 3mm) - and she's stuck in the dock until 23rd May due to tides and delays on the fix
What you ought to have added was that "the bill" has risen because the package will now include upgrade work that was going to be done in Portsmouth.
Thread Starter
In my previous ASW related post, I forgot to include this video - an interview with someone who had an interesting career after joining the Royal Navy partly to escape academia, opted for an Engineering route as he would get a degree that way, and they as an Air Engineer Officer applied to become a Maintenance Test Pilot and ended up doing front line tours on the ASW Sea King and the Lynx:
He mentions his time flying the ASW Sea King from HMS Hermes in the days before Sea Harrier, when she was being used as an ASW carrier. If less had been made of carriers operating in the Indian Ocean and Far East back then, and more of their NATO role then we all would have been better off. The staff work relating to the proposed new carriers in the early 1960s was all based around East of Suez scenarios which was one of the reasons they were vulnerable to the politicians' axe, which led the the axing of the large carriers, yet the need to put multiple ASW helicopters aboard a single ship as part of NATO ASW capabilities led to the through deck cruiser idea, which was large enough to carry a few V/STOL aircraft to deal with the Soviet Bears that aided the Soviet submarines with reconnaissance and long range targeting - and luckily enough we had Harrier which could be converted to Sea Harrier and given a radar.
The Americans committed over half their carriers to the NATO theatre. It has been discussed at length in various places, not just PPRuNe: Discussion regarding the Sea Control role of the carrier - starting with NATO and the Cold War
The interview also mentions the teaming of carrier based helicopters doing the hunting, and the frigate/destroyer based Wasps/Lynx (and Wildcat these days) to deliver the weapons.
He mentions his time flying the ASW Sea King from HMS Hermes in the days before Sea Harrier, when she was being used as an ASW carrier. If less had been made of carriers operating in the Indian Ocean and Far East back then, and more of their NATO role then we all would have been better off. The staff work relating to the proposed new carriers in the early 1960s was all based around East of Suez scenarios which was one of the reasons they were vulnerable to the politicians' axe, which led the the axing of the large carriers, yet the need to put multiple ASW helicopters aboard a single ship as part of NATO ASW capabilities led to the through deck cruiser idea, which was large enough to carry a few V/STOL aircraft to deal with the Soviet Bears that aided the Soviet submarines with reconnaissance and long range targeting - and luckily enough we had Harrier which could be converted to Sea Harrier and given a radar.
The Americans committed over half their carriers to the NATO theatre. It has been discussed at length in various places, not just PPRuNe: Discussion regarding the Sea Control role of the carrier - starting with NATO and the Cold War
The interview also mentions the teaming of carrier based helicopters doing the hunting, and the frigate/destroyer based Wasps/Lynx (and Wildcat these days) to deliver the weapons.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 3rd Apr 2023 at 07:51.
WEBF I don't disagree with a lot of what you say but 'A hae ma doots' about the wisdom of all this. IMO the purpose of ASW Frigates (of which we will be losing another one - Montrose - next month ) in a CSG is to extend the detection range; with the probability of long range sub-launched hypersonic missiles in the not too distant future they need the best RW ASW available as part of their weapons fit. With an increasing threat from AUVs, which are likely to be more numerous and harder to detect the ASW screen is going to need to be more comprehensive, 360 degree and extend further out. To me ASW UAVs only make real sense as ''Loyal Pingmen' multiplying the effectiveness of the manned cabs, I am still unaware of ASW UAVs being armed - so as you say the manned cab would have to prosecute in a conflict situation and where does the decision to change to CERTSUB sit with the O arriving on scene (at max chat) or on the controlling ship ? I understand the 814 NAS supports 3 ship's flights and 3 a/c for defence of home waters so Merlins have to be rationed between the FFs. With the OCU 824 NAS having 8 and an average 5 in maintenance, the front-line numbers availilable in the MPH role are IMHO are ridiculously limited. I do feel that the UAV push is weighted to cost and addressing aircrew recruitment, training and retention problems as opposed to increased opertaional effectiveness.
Though originally on QNLZ the three CSG21 Junglies from 845 NAS B flt were operated from Fort Victoria in as you say COD/Taxi Service (MITLE), SAR ('Plane Guard') and CSAR roles.
As a side note on Crowsnest: the plan is/was for all Merlins HM2s to be fitted for but not with (which will include additional Link 16 functionality at some point) and for 10 kits IOC Q2 2023, FOC in 24/25 and, as far as I know, (Crowsnest) OSD and replacement with ASaC UAV is still c.2030,
Anyway enough incoherent Saturday morning ramblings.
Though originally on QNLZ the three CSG21 Junglies from 845 NAS B flt were operated from Fort Victoria in as you say COD/Taxi Service (MITLE), SAR ('Plane Guard') and CSAR roles.
As a side note on Crowsnest: the plan is/was for all Merlins HM2s to be fitted for but not with (which will include additional Link 16 functionality at some point) and for 10 kits IOC Q2 2023, FOC in 24/25 and, as far as I know, (Crowsnest) OSD and replacement with ASaC UAV is still c.2030,
Anyway enough incoherent Saturday morning ramblings.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 6th Apr 2023 at 09:25. Reason: Dervish politely pointing out my mistake re Link 16
Thread Starter
WEBF I don't disagree with a lot of what you say but 'A hae ma doots' about the wisdom of all this. IMO the purpose of ASW Frigates (of which we will be losing another one - Montrose - next month ) in a CSG is to extend the detection range; with the probability of long range sub-launched hypersonic missiles in the not too distant future they need the best RW ASW available as part of their weapons fit. With an increasing threat from AUVs, which are likely to be more numerous and harder to detect the ASW screen is going to need to be more comprehensive, 360 degree and extend further out. To me ASW UAVs only make real sense as ''Loyal Pingmen' multiplying the effectiveness of the manned cabs, I am still unaware of ASW UAVs being armed - so as you say the manned cab would have to prosecute in a conflict situation and where does the decision to change to CERTSUB sit with the O arriving on scene (at max chat) or on the controlling ship ? I understand the 814 NAS supports 3 ship's flights and 3 a/c for defence of home waters so Merlins have to be rationed between the FFs. With the OCU 824 NAS having 8 and an average 5 in maintenance, the front-line numbers availilable in the MPH role are IMHO are ridiculously limited. I do feel that the UAV push is weighted to cost and addressing aircrew recruitment, training and retention problems as opposed to increased opertaional effectiveness.
Though originally on QNLZ the three CSG21 Junglies from 845 NAS B flt were operated from Fort Victoria in as you say COD/Taxi Service (MITLE), SAR ('Plane Guard') and CSAR roles.
As a side note on Crowsnest: the plan is/was for all Merlins HM2s to be fitted for but not with (which will include Link 16 at some point) and for 10 kits IOC Q2 2023, FOC in 24/25 and, as far as I know, (Crowsnest) OSD and replacement with ASaC UAV is still c.2030,
Anyway enough incoherent Saturday morning ramblings.
Though originally on QNLZ the three CSG21 Junglies from 845 NAS B flt were operated from Fort Victoria in as you say COD/Taxi Service (MITLE), SAR ('Plane Guard') and CSAR roles.
As a side note on Crowsnest: the plan is/was for all Merlins HM2s to be fitted for but not with (which will include Link 16 at some point) and for 10 kits IOC Q2 2023, FOC in 24/25 and, as far as I know, (Crowsnest) OSD and replacement with ASaC UAV is still c.2030,
Anyway enough incoherent Saturday morning ramblings.
A lot to reply to there! In the old days we used to have two ASW Sea King squadrons for carrier deployment, but these days we only have one carrier designated Merlin squadron, having only upgraded thirty Merlin HM1s. If the two/three Merlins aboard HMS Prince of Wales had been sent aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth for CSG21...
820NAS had a lot of aircrew during CSG21 - sixty aircrew for seven cabs.
As you say the ASW UAV is intended to augment the Merlins by dropping sonobuoys at range from the Pinger and acting as a radio relay. It cannot replace capabilities such as dipping sonar, and is not intended to carry weapons.
At the time when we are meant to be growing the Navy losing two frigates seems odd, but things like refit costs and personnel numbers came into play, and the general idea is to get as many ships properly manned and to sea. Although the Type 23 was designed for ASW, both Montrose and Monmouth were ones that did not get the update with 2087 sonar and Merlin capability.
ASW went out of fashion during the 'state versus state conflict is a thing of the past' era.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 6th Apr 2023 at 08:29.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
👀👀
Royal Marines have been deployed to the Korean peninsula for the first time since the Korean War.
B Coy, 40 Commando conducted amphibious exercises near Pohang with 🇺🇸USMC and 🇰🇷Republic of Korea Marine Corps.
Royal Marines have been deployed to the Korean peninsula for the first time since the Korean War.
B Coy, 40 Commando conducted amphibious exercises near Pohang with 🇺🇸USMC and 🇰🇷Republic of Korea Marine Corps.
Posting partly to mention my Link 16 correction in #6784.
WEBF, I'm not sure that is a lot to support 24/7 operations on a 6+ month deployment; my assumption is that they were using formed crews, min-3 for the baggers and min-4 for the pingers; so no more than 2 crews per cab plus 20%.
Although lacking 2087 the GP T23s did retain some ASW capability. Operating a role like pre-WW2 cruisers, I would think a ship acting alone should carry the most capable ASW aircraft it can, the problem being Merlin doesn't' mount AS(u)Ms so can only rely on the ship against a surface threats. Given the inability to carry a mixed flight and engagement with a surface threat more likely, Wildcat with Martlet/Sea Venom has the priority. I think Montrose had a Merlin (HM.1 ?) flight at some point.
'820NAS had a lot of aircrew during CSG21 - sixty aircrew for seven cabs.'
WEBF, I'm not sure that is a lot to support 24/7 operations on a 6+ month deployment; my assumption is that they were using formed crews, min-3 for the baggers and min-4 for the pingers; so no more than 2 crews per cab plus 20%.
Although lacking 2087 the GP T23s did retain some ASW capability. Operating a role like pre-WW2 cruisers, I would think a ship acting alone should carry the most capable ASW aircraft it can, the problem being Merlin doesn't' mount AS(u)Ms so can only rely on the ship against a surface threats. Given the inability to carry a mixed flight and engagement with a surface threat more likely, Wildcat with Martlet/Sea Venom has the priority. I think Montrose had a Merlin (HM.1 ?) flight at some point.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Happy beer day!
Happy #NationalBeerDay. In 1944, the minelayer HMS Menestheus was converted into a floating brewery for British personnel in the Pacific, producing 250 barrels of Davy Jones ale a week. The Royal Navy rejected an offer from the U.S. Navy to buy Menestheus for £1 million…
Happy #NationalBeerDay. In 1944, the minelayer HMS Menestheus was converted into a floating brewery for British personnel in the Pacific, producing 250 barrels of Davy Jones ale a week. The Royal Navy rejected an offer from the U.S. Navy to buy Menestheus for £1 million…
Happy beer day!
Happy #NationalBeerDay. In 1944, the minelayer HMS Menestheus was converted into a floating brewery for British personnel in the Pacific, producing 250 barrels of Davy Jones ale a week. The Royal Navy rejected an offer from the U.S. Navy to buy Menestheus for £1 million.
Happy #NationalBeerDay. In 1944, the minelayer HMS Menestheus was converted into a floating brewery for British personnel in the Pacific, producing 250 barrels of Davy Jones ale a week. The Royal Navy rejected an offer from the U.S. Navy to buy Menestheus for £1 million.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
R&R ship it had bars, a movie theatre and a dance hall.
with no facilities ashore it was a favoured destination.
Not sure where they got the girl# from - bu5 doubtless there were many nurses etc also ready to party .
with no facilities ashore it was a favoured destination.
Not sure where they got the girl# from - bu5 doubtless there were many nurses etc also ready to party .
What did they want it for? I thought the US Navy was dry.
A brief history of why this came about.......
https://news.usni.org/2014/07/01/hun...nd-alcohol-sea
I'd like to know what those who made the decisions were drinking when they decided Mildcat HMA2 would:
- have neither dipping sonar (too heavy and would take up too much room apparently) and no tactical data link (to save money - export version has it) - any one know if they are getting the Bowman/Link 16 retrofit or is that AH1 only?
- Lacking these is the equipment of choice for the T23s that have no towed array sonar.
I'd like to know what those who made the decisions were drinking when they decided Mildcat HMA2 would:
- have neither dipping sonar (too heavy and would take up too much room apparently) and no tactical data link (to save money - export version has it) - any one know if they are getting the Bowman/Link 16 retrofit or is that AH1 only?
- Lacking these is the equipment of choice for the T23s that have no towed array sonar.
It's a benefit of being on the outside that I don't have to bang my head against steel bulkheads and HMT's doors. So I am happy to pontificate without responsiblity.
Merlin? Or do you mean small helicopter?
The RN philosphy has always been the ship's flight is part of the weapons fit but that relies on the ships sensors and communications being up to snuff. We moved on from flags, semaphore and Aldis lamps, and the world has now moved on from voice so surely a small ship's helicopter need to be networked with sensors that provide an ASW picture or has to be able to provide its own.
The French Lynx HAS2/4 (FN) had it, as did the Germans and Dutch among other operators, the RN ones had various MAD fits. The export version of the Wildcat is offered with active dipping sonar. My point is as bought Wildcat has no detection kit, isn't networked so can't share the tactical picture visually when operated from an ASW roled ship, and in some cases is being operated off lone ships without a decent sonar fit. In a world of stealthy submarines and UUVs/AUVs 'we haven't done it before so aren't going to now' doesn't make sense to me (it never did). The crew need to be sure they know with a high degree of probibilty the location and depth of the target before dropping Sting Ray or depth charges, the era of NDBs is long gone. Sadly, history shows we have to lose ships and sailors before change happens (if the San Luis had been luckier maybe it would already have).
The choice is between and ASuW helicopter in Wildcat and an ASW one in Merlin. If there was a proper ASW role fit availavble for RN Wildcat then a T23 could carry a mixed purpose flight but can't carry a Merlin and a Wildcat. MH-60R anyone? Sorry, no 'British Jobs' and HMG ain't paying to develop an equivalent, because they deem the risk is not high enough to justify the cost.
Merlin? Or do you mean small helicopter?
The RN philosphy has always been the ship's flight is part of the weapons fit but that relies on the ships sensors and communications being up to snuff. We moved on from flags, semaphore and Aldis lamps, and the world has now moved on from voice so surely a small ship's helicopter need to be networked with sensors that provide an ASW picture or has to be able to provide its own.The French Lynx HAS2/4 (FN) had it, as did the Germans and Dutch among other operators, the RN ones had various MAD fits. The export version of the Wildcat is offered with active dipping sonar. My point is as bought Wildcat has no detection kit, isn't networked so can't share the tactical picture visually when operated from an ASW roled ship, and in some cases is being operated off lone ships without a decent sonar fit. In a world of stealthy submarines and UUVs/AUVs 'we haven't done it before so aren't going to now' doesn't make sense to me (it never did). The crew need to be sure they know with a high degree of probibilty the location and depth of the target before dropping Sting Ray or depth charges, the era of NDBs is long gone. Sadly, history shows we have to lose ships and sailors before change happens (if the San Luis had been luckier maybe it would already have).
The choice is between and ASuW helicopter in Wildcat and an ASW one in Merlin. If there was a proper ASW role fit availavble for RN Wildcat then a T23 could carry a mixed purpose flight but can't carry a Merlin and a Wildcat. MH-60R anyone? Sorry, no 'British Jobs' and HMG ain't paying to develop an equivalent, because they deem the risk is not high enough to justify the cost.
Does the hand full of P-8's provide sufficient ASW capability to make Helicopter ASW redundant....even for single surface Ship operations?
One would think not.
What benefit does helicopter ASW bring to the fight should hostilities kick off.....or better yet....what disadvantage is posed if there is no Helicopter ASW (dipping sonar for example)?
One would think not.
What benefit does helicopter ASW bring to the fight should hostilities kick off.....or better yet....what disadvantage is posed if there is no Helicopter ASW (dipping sonar for example)?
I would think it comes down to layered defence but the P-8s would have to be in the right place at the right time.
The helicopter extends the range of detection and engagement from the ship; before advertising its presence with active sonar a single aircraft (rather than a screen of multiple aircraft) requires a strong certainty about the rough location of the threat. The active sonar then gives (hopefully) more accurate targeting information with out disclosing the exact position of the ship to the submarine/UUV. My envisaged situation is a ship out of Bahrain in the enclosed waters of the Gulf being threatened by a hostile state or a non-state party supplied with a UUV by such a state where the hostile party is aware of the general position of the ship so pinging doesn't significantly increase the risk.
The helicopter extends the range of detection and engagement from the ship; before advertising its presence with active sonar a single aircraft (rather than a screen of multiple aircraft) requires a strong certainty about the rough location of the threat. The active sonar then gives (hopefully) more accurate targeting information with out disclosing the exact position of the ship to the submarine/UUV. My envisaged situation is a ship out of Bahrain in the enclosed waters of the Gulf being threatened by a hostile state or a non-state party supplied with a UUV by such a state where the hostile party is aware of the general position of the ship so pinging doesn't significantly increase the risk.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 21st Apr 2023 at 10:33. Reason: spelling
I'd like to know what those who made the decisions were drinking when they decided Mildcat HMA2 would:
- have neither dipping sonar (too heavy and would take up too much room apparently) and no tactical data link (to save money - export version has it) - any one know if they are getting the Bowman/Link 16 retrofit or is that AH1 only?
- Lacking these is the equipment of choice for the T23s that have no towed array sonar.
At that time, the FAA was getting 108 Merlins, which was a substantial uplift in ASW. (All fitted for and with). So Lynx tended to take the hit when programmes were being chopped. Its 360 degree radar was a good example, with full development completed around 1989, then suddenly cancelled; and then a rush to sort out long standing problems when GW1 kicked off. The tipping point was cutting the 3>8 conversions from 84 to 48. At that point, around 1993/4, MoD(PE) had a clear-out of all the tasks that had been drifting for over a decade without a decision. In 1992 the RAF's Director of Flight Safety called Chinook the 'Cinderella' of the RAF. I always thought Lynx was the FAA equivalent. Oddly, in MoD(PE) it was the opposite. Chinook and Lynx teams were mob-handed, while other bigger programmes were one-man shows.
Regarding BOWMAN, Lynx HAS8 was one of 13 types planned and funded. But only one (Sea King HC4) realised that there were technical and contractual pre-requisites that BOWMAN wouldn't deliver (as it hadn't thought of them), and was the only design to incorporate an upgrade path. MoD dealt with this in its usual way, by ignoring that one aircraft was done and dusted (too embarrassing), refusing to learn lessons, and 're-setting' in 1998 by starting a bunfight as to who should set up an entire Integrated Project Team to do what one guy had done in his spare time, as a minor task. No doubt there were similar machinations after that!
Thread Starter
'No' to your first question. Even if there were more P-8s the different capabilities are complementary, and only a helicopter can deploy dipping sonar. It would also mean that the surface warship or surface force has no means to launching homing torpedoes at an enemy submarine without being in range of the submarines heavyweight torpedoes.
As to your second question, having no ASW helicopters would put a task group at a very real disadvantage, with no long range organic ASW weapons, and the advantages of modern low frequency active sonar would be largely lost - the sonars like 2087 are long range, but with increased range resolution is lost, which is why the helicopter with dipping sonar is partnered with LFAS systems. It is a bit like AWACS aircraft not making it unnecessary for fighters to have radar. In both cases a long range sensor works with a shorter range system put nearer the target.
I found this article from April 2008: UK RN exercise tests Sonar 2087 and Merlin pairing
Deployed assets from the UK Royal Navy's (RN) 'Orion 08' Task Group has completed an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise Phoenix to test and prove the pairing of the new Sonar 2087 low-frequency active/passive sonar system and the Merlin HM.1 helicopter. Exercise Pheonix marked the first time that the advanced ASW capabilities afforded by the Sonar 2087 area search sonar and Merlin has been exercised together. Pheonix involved a range of exercise serials designed to test the capability of Sonar 2087 in both active and passive modes. The tracking accuracy of Sonar 2087 gave an order of magnitude reduction in the size of the area of probability within which the Merlins were required to search to acquire the target.
You may be interested in this March 2000 report into the value of the SH-60R (now called MH-60R) and CH-60S (now MH-60S) to a carrier strike group from the Center for Naval Analyses.
From page 21:
With the retirement of the S-3, the lion's share of the middle zone tasks—ASW search, ASW contact investigation, and surface contact identification—will fall to the SH-60R. The P-3 can also contribute, but generally there will be tactical incentives not to divert the P-3 from its high-altitude surveillance role. These tasks are likely to lead to a requirement for an SH-60R continuously airborne in the middle zone for ASW search and alert helicopters for contact investigation and identification. Engagement of surface targets would be done with attack aircraft from the carrier air wing or a pair of SH-60R/CH-60S helicopters.
and
Search and surveillance. Although the P-3 will be the primary wide-area search platform, the SH-60 will play an important role in the middle zone using its advanced low-frequency active dipping sonar and employing its radar in a periscope detection mode. It can also deploy sources for IEER detection, with towed arrays on the surface combatants serving as the receivers.
Contact investigation and attack. The SH-60R will have a primary role in prosecuting ASW contacts. The ALPS dipping sonar should be very effective for contact investigation. When a contact has been identified as valid, a second SH-60 will likely be called in so that a pair of helicopters is on scene to track and attack a maneuvering, evading target.
Then there is a 1970s paper by a USN SH-3 driver:Management of ASW Systems: A Look at Rotary Wing ASW
Page 1: One of the main functions of the US Navy is to protect our merchant shipping from attack. In order to do so, we must concentrate resources on anti submarine warfare (ASW) and seaborne anti air warfare (AAW) rather than on a major anti shipping capability to interdict sea lanes that the Soviets would not used in wartime.
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, 1979. The then Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Holloway continues...
The Soviets have the largest submarine force in the world and continue to improve its capabilities. Since the 1960s submarines armed with torpedoes and cruise missiles have presented the most severe threat to all naval surface forces and, with the other Soviet attack submarines, could pose an extremely serious threat to Western SLOCs in a protracted conflict.
The principle of engaging at range applies to both ASW and AAW, which makes carriers uniquely suited to these missions.
Page 4: But, as "war at sea" exercises dramatically demonstrated after the Vietnam War, CVs were especially vulnerable without an effective local air ASW system. These exercises and the CNO directed reevaluation of HS effectiveness reemphasized the value of the SH-3's ASW systems; they could consistently detect and destroy submarines within the missile firing range surrounding the carriers. The failure of other air ASW units to detect these submarines (simulating Foxtrot, Echo II, Charlie, and Victor Soviet submarines) serves as a grim reminder that sonobouys alone will not suffice.
Local of course means around the carrier - I am confused by the description of ranges used by the author but he does refer (at the start) to a range of ninety nautical miles from the carrier. That is a large sea area to provide safety for things like merchant ships full of military equipment, or to act as a barrier to stop the Northern Fleet SSN/SSGN from breaking out en masse into the Atlantic via the GIUK gap.
Covert ASW operations were also in vogue at the time, and HS squadrons recorded an impressive number of detections in the high noise environment of the carrier task group. In locations with high ambient noise (eg the Mediterranean) and high reverberation shallow water conditions (eg amphibious landings), the SH-3's dipping sonar proved its effectiveness.
The Soviets placed a lot of emphasis on their ability to attack amphibious forces and to disrupt landings, as NATO operations in the Northern and Southern Flanks would help take pressure off the central front, and in the case of Norway, contributed to making life hard for Red Banner Northern Fleet and Soviet Naval Aviation.
Page 5: Submarine skippers have been quoted as saying that the ASW system most difficult to break contact with is the sonar equipped SH-3, even with the submarine employing counter measures.
It should not be hard to see why. The helicopter can move faster than the submarine, and can rapidly move to another location to start dipping again. Today the dipping helicopter can be cued by a frigate with a towed array sonar to provide long range detection and localisation.
Here is another interesting historical document: The History of Sea based Anti Submarine Warfare 1940 - 1977
From page 114 (in the Korean War chapter):
The integration of the Dipping Sonar Helicopter as a coordinated component in the field of ASW appears to have far reaching implications in the development of new HUK concepts. It appears certain to influence existing air, surface and submarine tactics profoundly, at least in good weather and sea conditions. From the limited experience and observations, the dipping sonar appears to possess a tremendous potential in:
(a) Reduction of time late over target datum
(b) Positive and rapid identification of disappearing contacts
(c) Tenacity in holding a contact
(d) Reduction of the vulnerability of the SAU* as a torpedo target.
(e) Ability to regain contact rapidly.
There are also some interesting snippets in this DPhil thesis paper that I found via Google:
The Impact of Air Power on Navies: The United Kingdom, 1945 - 1957 by Tim Benbow
Using CTRL+F and searching for the word 'dipping':
Rear Admiral A.N.C. Bingley, Fifth Sea Lord, expected that their ability to operate in poor weather could be improved and helicopters 'will then be a better A/S vehicle in almost every way than the fixed wing aircraft'. The latter could cover a greater area but the fact that submarines now spent little time on the surface meant that aerial radar search was of limited use, while the number of sonobuoys that they could carry was restricted. The helicopter with dipping sonar had an 'overwhelming advantage', and although it could not currently carry weapons, it should be able to do so by I960.
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SASless although written in the wake of the UK government's Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010 (for which read desparate money saving measures) this commentary written for RUSI in 2011 addresses the problems that were likely to arise in the 'capability gap' between the cancellation and destruction of Nimrod MR4 and the arrival of the UK's P-8s. It also assumes a Merlin HM fleet of 40 not 30 (less the ones fitted for the ASACS role at any particular time).
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-res...are-capability
The UK's ASW layers have thus been steadily eroded. The Nimrod decision, however, has highlighted quite starkly and suddenly the consequences of this. Despite MoD statements that Nimrod's roles will be covered by other assets, no other assets deliver its specific capabilities. The UK's ASW web hence has a particular, and significant, hole in it.
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-res...are-capability
Anti-Submarine Warfare: A Layered Capability
Developing an effective ASW capability requires the inter-weaving of several layers of capability. Each layer fulfils a particular function, making a particular contribution to the overall effectiveness of the ASW web. Yet, with the submarine threat to the UK much reduced since the Cold War and with the UK now focused elsewhere, some argue that the ASW requirement has also reduced. Certainly, the UK's ASW capability has dwindled in terms of significance as well as systems and skills sets.The UK's ASW layers have thus been steadily eroded. The Nimrod decision, however, has highlighted quite starkly and suddenly the consequences of this. Despite MoD statements that Nimrod's roles will be covered by other assets, no other assets deliver its specific capabilities. The UK's ASW web hence has a particular, and significant, hole in it.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 21st Apr 2023 at 10:34. Reason: Merlin comment
well we banged on on here for years about that disgraceful abdication of a key role - then they finally decided to fill it
But only 9 airframes - makes you weep TBH
But only 9 airframes - makes you weep TBH