Originally Posted by
SASless
Does the hand full of P-8's provide sufficient ASW capability to make Helicopter ASW redundant....even for single surface Ship operations?
Originally Posted by
SASless
One would think not.
What benefit does helicopter ASW bring to the fight should hostilities kick off.....or better yet....what disadvantage is posed if there is no Helicopter ASW (dipping sonar for example)?
'No' to your first question. Even if there were more P-8s the different capabilities are complementary, and only a helicopter can deploy dipping sonar. It would also mean that the surface warship or surface force has no means to launching homing torpedoes at an enemy submarine without being in range of the submarines heavyweight torpedoes.
As to your second question, having no ASW helicopters would put a task group at a very real disadvantage, with no long range organic ASW weapons, and the advantages of modern low frequency active sonar would be largely lost - the sonars like 2087 are long range, but with increased range resolution is lost, which is why the helicopter with dipping sonar is partnered with LFAS systems. It is a bit like AWACS aircraft not making it unnecessary for fighters to have radar. In both cases a long range sensor works with a shorter range system put nearer the target.
I found this article from April 2008: UK RN exercise tests Sonar 2087 and Merlin pairing
Deployed assets from the UK Royal Navy's (RN) 'Orion 08' Task Group has completed an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise Phoenix to test and prove the pairing of the new Sonar 2087 low-frequency active/passive sonar system and the Merlin HM.1 helicopter. Exercise Pheonix marked the first time that the advanced ASW capabilities afforded by the Sonar 2087 area search sonar and Merlin has been exercised together. Pheonix involved a range of exercise serials designed to test the capability of Sonar 2087 in both active and passive modes. The tracking accuracy of Sonar 2087 gave an order of magnitude reduction in the size of the area of probability within which the Merlins were required to search to acquire the target.
You may be interested in this March 2000 report into the value of the SH-60R (now called MH-60R) and CH-60S (now MH-60S) to a carrier strike group from the Center for Naval Analyses.
From page 21:
With the retirement of the S-3, the lion's share of the middle zone tasks—ASW search, ASW contact investigation, and surface contact identification—will fall to the SH-60R. The P-3 can also contribute, but generally there will be tactical incentives not to divert the P-3 from its high-altitude surveillance role. These tasks are likely to lead to a requirement for an SH-60R continuously airborne in the middle zone for ASW search and alert helicopters for contact investigation and identification. Engagement of surface targets would be done with attack aircraft from the carrier air wing or a pair of SH-60R/CH-60S helicopters.
and
Search and surveillance. Although the P-3 will be the primary wide-area search platform, the SH-60 will play an important role in the middle zone using its advanced low-frequency active dipping sonar and employing its radar in a periscope detection mode. It can also deploy sources for IEER detection, with towed arrays on the surface combatants serving as the receivers.
Contact investigation and attack. The SH-60R will have a primary role in prosecuting ASW contacts. The ALPS dipping sonar should be very effective for contact investigation. When a contact has been identified as valid, a second SH-60 will likely be called in so that a pair of helicopters is on scene to track and attack a maneuvering, evading target.
Then there is a 1970s paper by a USN SH-3 driver:Management of ASW Systems: A Look at Rotary Wing ASW
Page 1
: One of the main functions of the US Navy is to protect our merchant shipping from attack. In order to do so, we must concentrate resources on anti submarine warfare (ASW) and seaborne anti air warfare (AAW) rather than on a major anti shipping capability to interdict sea lanes that the Soviets would not used in wartime.
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, 1979. The then Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Holloway continues...
The Soviets have the largest submarine force in the world and continue to improve its capabilities. Since the 1960s submarines armed with torpedoes and cruise missiles have presented the most severe threat to all naval surface forces and, with the other Soviet attack submarines, could pose an extremely serious threat to Western SLOCs in a protracted conflict.
The principle of engaging at range applies to both ASW and AAW, which makes carriers uniquely suited to these missions.
Page 4:
But, as "war at sea" exercises dramatically demonstrated after the Vietnam War, CVs were especially vulnerable without an effective local air ASW system. These exercises and the CNO directed reevaluation of HS effectiveness reemphasized the value of the SH-3's ASW systems; they could consistently detect and destroy submarines within the missile firing range surrounding the carriers. The failure of other air ASW units to detect these submarines (simulating Foxtrot, Echo II, Charlie
, and Victor
Soviet submarines) serves as a grim reminder that sonobouys alone will not suffice.
Local of course means around the carrier - I am confused by the description of ranges used by the author but he does refer (at the start) to a range of
ninety nautical miles from the carrier. That is a large sea area to provide safety for things like merchant ships full of military equipment, or to act as a barrier to stop the Northern Fleet SSN/SSGN from breaking out
en masse into the Atlantic via the GIUK gap.
Covert ASW operations were also in vogue at the time, and HS squadrons recorded an impressive number of detections in the high noise environment of the carrier task group. In locations with high ambient noise (eg the Mediterranean) and high reverberation shallow water conditions (eg amphibious landings), the SH-3's dipping sonar proved its effectiveness.
The Soviets placed a lot of emphasis on their ability to attack amphibious forces and to disrupt landings, as NATO operations in the Northern and Southern Flanks would help take pressure off the central front, and in the case of Norway, contributed to making life hard for Red Banner Northern Fleet and Soviet Naval Aviation.
Page 5:
Submarine skippers have been quoted as saying that the ASW system most difficult to break contact with is the sonar equipped SH-3, even with the submarine employing counter measures.
It should not be hard to see why. The helicopter can move faster than the submarine, and can rapidly move to another location to start dipping again. Today the dipping helicopter can be cued by a frigate with a towed array sonar to provide long range detection and localisation.
Here is another interesting historical document: The History of Sea based Anti Submarine Warfare 1940 - 1977
From page 114 (in the Korean War chapter):
The integration of the Dipping Sonar Helicopter as a coordinated component in the field of ASW appears to have far reaching implications in the development of new HUK concepts. It appears certain to influence existing air, surface and submarine tactics profoundly, at least in good weather and sea conditions. From the limited experience and observations, the dipping sonar appears to possess a tremendous potential in:
(a) Reduction of time late over target datum
(b) Positive and rapid identification of disappearing contacts
(c) Tenacity in holding a contact
(d) Reduction of the vulnerability of the SAU* as a torpedo target.
(e) Ability to regain contact rapidly.
There are also some interesting snippets in this DPhil thesis paper that I found via Google:
The Impact of Air Power on Navies: The United Kingdom, 1945 - 1957 by Tim Benbow
Using CTRL+F and searching for the word 'dipping':
Rear Admiral A.N.C. Bingley, Fifth Sea Lord, expected that their ability to operate in poor weather could be improved and helicopters 'will then be a better A/S vehicle in almost every way than the fixed wing aircraft'. The latter could cover a greater area but the fact that submarines now spent little time on the surface meant that aerial radar search was of limited use, while the number of sonobuoys that they could carry was restricted. The helicopter with dipping sonar had an 'overwhelming advantage', and although it could not currently carry weapons, it should be able to do so by I960.