Future Carrier (Including Costs)
. I blame the Yanks, three completely different versions of the same plane!! 
Ahem.....at least we Spams know our ABC's!
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The day HMS Prince of Wales put to sea (and they day before she came to a halt) I wrote of the WESTLANT22 deployment she was set for, with SRVL trials, UAV experimentation, and being the venue for the Atlantic Future Forum 22. I also wrote of HMS Queen Elizabeth and her deployment in the NATO area, which coincides with an amphibious deployment. I also noted that:
Traditionally carriers have been very important to NATO, particularly in terms of sea control, despite all the media numpties who insisted that carriers exist to drop bombs on targets on enemy shores and nothing else. This of course has been discussed on this thread, or places like CVF and Carrier Strike - ARRSE, and Late 1970s US Congress Report - The US Sea Control Mission (carriers needed in the Atlantic for Air Defence and ASW - both then and today) - ARRSE. This last thread has a high signal to noise ratio and features insights from a former US Navy carrier flyer, as well as links to multiple official documents, including the declassified 1980s maritime strategy papers, and academic papers, and explains things in the terms of the perspectives of the Cold War front line and the implications of Geography, Physics, and Maths.
Sea control remains the primary naval mission, and one that the carrier provides greater defensive range as well as an outer layer of defence.
Today: Britain’s flagship heads for the USA ahead of autumn on European operations - Royal Navy
Britain’s flagship leaves Portsmouth today bound for the United States – and ahead of an autumn on operations and exercises in European waters.
In the coming months, HMS Queen Elizabeth will be at the heart of a powerful task group made up of thousands of sailors, up to ten ships, F-35B Lightning jets, helicopter squadrons and Royal Marines Commandos which will operate across Europe this autumn.
But the aircraft carrier will first deploy to the east coast of the United States to undertake parts of HMS Prince of Wales’ deployment – as her sister ship undergoes repairs.
HMS Queen Elizabeth’s Commanding Officer, Captain Ian Feasey, said: “After a period of maintenance it is fantastic for the Fleet Flagship to be underway again to conduct operational activity with allies and partners.”
The Royal Navy task force will work closely with allies and partners across Europe – from the Baltic all the way south to the Balkans and Black Sea region – over the coming months.
The operations are part of galvanised NATO efforts in the face of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine to safeguard security, stability and prosperity across Europe.
Traditionally carriers have been very important to NATO, particularly in terms of sea control, despite all the media numpties who insisted that carriers exist to drop bombs on targets on enemy shores and nothing else. This of course has been discussed on this thread, or places like CVF and Carrier Strike - ARRSE, and Late 1970s US Congress Report - The US Sea Control Mission (carriers needed in the Atlantic for Air Defence and ASW - both then and today) - ARRSE. This last thread has a high signal to noise ratio and features insights from a former US Navy carrier flyer, as well as links to multiple official documents, including the declassified 1980s maritime strategy papers, and academic papers, and explains things in the terms of the perspectives of the Cold War front line and the implications of Geography, Physics, and Maths.
Sea control remains the primary naval mission, and one that the carrier provides greater defensive range as well as an outer layer of defence.
Today: Britain’s flagship heads for the USA ahead of autumn on European operations - Royal Navy
Britain’s flagship leaves Portsmouth today bound for the United States – and ahead of an autumn on operations and exercises in European waters.
In the coming months, HMS Queen Elizabeth will be at the heart of a powerful task group made up of thousands of sailors, up to ten ships, F-35B Lightning jets, helicopter squadrons and Royal Marines Commandos which will operate across Europe this autumn.
But the aircraft carrier will first deploy to the east coast of the United States to undertake parts of HMS Prince of Wales’ deployment – as her sister ship undergoes repairs.
HMS Queen Elizabeth’s Commanding Officer, Captain Ian Feasey, said: “After a period of maintenance it is fantastic for the Fleet Flagship to be underway again to conduct operational activity with allies and partners.”
The Royal Navy task force will work closely with allies and partners across Europe – from the Baltic all the way south to the Balkans and Black Sea region – over the coming months.
The operations are part of galvanised NATO efforts in the face of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine to safeguard security, stability and prosperity across Europe.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 2nd Oct 2022 at 22:22.
No comment on the PoW WEBF?
Thread Starter
HMS Queen Elizabeth is currently heading across the Atlantic to pick up some of the WESTLANT22 tasking, including acting as the platform for the Atlantic Future Forum, before returning to European waters as part of NATO deterrence activities. She was launched by HM Queen Elizabeth The Second, who also was present for her commissioning, and spoke to personnel aboard prior to sailing for the CSG21 deployment, despite having recently lost her beloved Prince Phillip. Her steadfast dedication to duty is an example to us all. Her Majesty also launched the lead ship of the previous class of RN carriers, HMS Invincible, in 1980.Those who have met Her Majesty said that they were always impressed by her grasp of the details and the way she did her homework - qualities shared with our new King.
Unfortunately many of the politicians involved in drawing up defence policy and making decisions, and many staff officers, have not been willing to do their homework and have not had much of s sense of duty. Unlike a Monarch who seeks to unite, politicians inevitably divide. Here is an official Royal Navy document that makes it plan that the carriers will have a NATO role, including gaining and retaining the necessary degree of sea control to ensure Freedom of Manoeuvre.
MARITIME OPERATING CONCEPT - THE MARITIME FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTEGRATED OPERATING CONCEPT
Under section 5 - Force Level Outputs - page 50
The Maritime Force will be organised around four Force Level Outputs: Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic; Persistent Engagement; Carrier Strike; Littoral Strike
Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic - page 52
An integrated Maritime Force, with NATO at its heart, protecting our homeland and our allies. Homeland Defence/Warfighting. Includes the attribution of CASD, Carrier Strike, and Littoral Strike capabilities (LRG(N)) to NATO as a pillar of Defence and Deterrence in the Euro Atlantic; seeks a more assertive posture which regains operational advantage.
Key outcomes:
• Protection of strategic interests and CNI, including Maritime Counter Terrorism and Maritime Security in the UK’s TTW and EEZ.
• Ensure freedom of manoeuvre in the North Atlantic.
• Maintain CASD for UK and NATO.
• Lead nation in NATO MARCOM.
Carrier Strike - page 54
The heart of the Maritime Force’s – and NATO’s – warfighting capability Built around the Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers. Carrier Strike: Homeland Defence/Contingency/ Warfighting. Contribute to OANA. Through deployments to strategic locations across the globe, promote UK interests, deter adversaries and prevent conflict.
• Project decisive air power from a protected maritime task group, including gaining and retaining the necessary degree of sea control to ensure Freedom of Manoeuvre.
• Demonstrate Global Britain, with regular deployments openly demonstrating British will to engage and resolve to act.
• Contribute to UK/NATO warfighting capability, as a more lethal and more integrated Maritime Force.
• Enable and execute Special Operations
Asturias56
I commented on Prince of Wales and her issues on the previous page.
Unfortunately many of the politicians involved in drawing up defence policy and making decisions, and many staff officers, have not been willing to do their homework and have not had much of s sense of duty. Unlike a Monarch who seeks to unite, politicians inevitably divide. Here is an official Royal Navy document that makes it plan that the carriers will have a NATO role, including gaining and retaining the necessary degree of sea control to ensure Freedom of Manoeuvre.
MARITIME OPERATING CONCEPT - THE MARITIME FORCE CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTEGRATED OPERATING CONCEPT
Under section 5 - Force Level Outputs - page 50
The Maritime Force will be organised around four Force Level Outputs: Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic; Persistent Engagement; Carrier Strike; Littoral Strike
Homeland and Operational Advantage in the North Atlantic - page 52
An integrated Maritime Force, with NATO at its heart, protecting our homeland and our allies. Homeland Defence/Warfighting. Includes the attribution of CASD, Carrier Strike, and Littoral Strike capabilities (LRG(N)) to NATO as a pillar of Defence and Deterrence in the Euro Atlantic; seeks a more assertive posture which regains operational advantage.
Key outcomes:
• Protection of strategic interests and CNI, including Maritime Counter Terrorism and Maritime Security in the UK’s TTW and EEZ.
• Ensure freedom of manoeuvre in the North Atlantic.
• Maintain CASD for UK and NATO.
• Lead nation in NATO MARCOM.
Carrier Strike - page 54
The heart of the Maritime Force’s – and NATO’s – warfighting capability Built around the Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers. Carrier Strike: Homeland Defence/Contingency/ Warfighting. Contribute to OANA. Through deployments to strategic locations across the globe, promote UK interests, deter adversaries and prevent conflict.
• Project decisive air power from a protected maritime task group, including gaining and retaining the necessary degree of sea control to ensure Freedom of Manoeuvre.
• Demonstrate Global Britain, with regular deployments openly demonstrating British will to engage and resolve to act.
• Contribute to UK/NATO warfighting capability, as a more lethal and more integrated Maritime Force.
• Enable and execute Special Operations
Asturias56
I commented on Prince of Wales and her issues on the previous page.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 14th Sep 2022 at 09:39.
"Freedom of Maneuver in the North Atlantic"......who is she thumbing her nose at that is challenging said maneuvering? Iceland?????
Assume its the same for UK but Australian navy personal have been notified they should be referring to as His, as its reference to the current Monarch and charles has already formally ascended in australia
Thread Starter
Admiral Warns America’s East Coast Is No Longer A “Safe Haven” Thanks To Russian Subs - The War Zone, 5 Feb 2020
Re-Crafting North Atlantic Defense: The Impact of the 2nd Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk - SLDInfo, 15 March 2021
Russia revises naval strategy in hopes of curtailing US supremacy at sea - Stars and Stripes, 5 August 2022
Fire and Ice - A New Maritime Strategy for NATO's Northern Flank - Human Security Centre, December 2018
Yep——have either read them or the eqivalent as I am a member of the USNI and stay current on Navy and other news-
How effective is the Carrier and its handful of F-35’s in the ASW sector as compared to the P-8’s and ASW Frigates?
if the Russians elect to challenge us on the East Coast of the US….might not you find yourself with pressing needs in your own home waters and with a max effort you can put to sea two carrier based task forces but only for a relatively short period.
Numbers or the lack of them does figure into the metrics.
The Russians have made improvements in the quality of the Subs over the years and do pose a threat but it would be more a Sub to Sub fight that will decide the outcomeI am thinking aided by ASW surface or ASW air assets.
You notice our Maine Corps has been talking about it having a role to play in the ASW business.
Traditional ASW forces must a bit like Jimmy Durante.
How effective is the Carrier and its handful of F-35’s in the ASW sector as compared to the P-8’s and ASW Frigates?
if the Russians elect to challenge us on the East Coast of the US….might not you find yourself with pressing needs in your own home waters and with a max effort you can put to sea two carrier based task forces but only for a relatively short period.
Numbers or the lack of them does figure into the metrics.
The Russians have made improvements in the quality of the Subs over the years and do pose a threat but it would be more a Sub to Sub fight that will decide the outcomeI am thinking aided by ASW surface or ASW air assets.
You notice our Maine Corps has been talking about it having a role to play in the ASW business.
Traditional ASW forces must a bit like Jimmy Durante.
Russia has what? Maybe 7-10 modern subs - it's not the same threat it was 50 years ago
Thread Starter
How effective is the Carrier and its handful of F-35’s in the ASW sector as compared to the P-8’s and ASW Frigates?
if the Russians elect to challenge us on the East Coast of the US….might not you find yourself with pressing needs in your own home waters and with a max effort you can put to sea two carrier based task forces but only for a relatively short period.
Numbers or the lack of them does figure into the metrics.
The Russians have made improvements in the quality of the Subs over the years and do pose a threat but it would be more a Sub to Sub fight that will decide the outcomeI am thinking aided by ASW surface or ASW air assets.
You notice our Maine Corps has been talking about it having a role to play in the ASW business.
Traditional ASW forces must a bit like Jimmy Durante.
1. Carriers do not just carry jets. The RN and USN carriers also carry ASW helicopters. The Royal Navy decided in the 1950s that the ASW helicopter should replace carrier borne fixed wing ASW types, and throughout the Cold War used and equipped ASW helicopters differently, at greater range, equipped with radar (something the SH-3 lacked) and an Observer doing pretty much the same job as the TACCO in an S-3 Viking. The ASW helicopter has a unique contribution - dipping sonar. This can hold contacts for protracted periods, move from one location to another rapidly (pull the sonar out of the water, move, and then lower it again), and get under the thermal layer.
Surface warships usually have sonar for ASW - but long range detection means low frequency active sonar, which are towed array systems. As with any long range system there is a trade off between range and resolution, so the towed array equipped frigate will usually carry a dipping sonar equipped helicopter. If you want dipping around the clock, or for protracted periods then you need multiple helicopters, and collocating them aboard a carrier simplifies command, control, and support. This has been proven by real world experience.
The SSNs are perhaps the primary ASW platform, but they will often work in conjunction with surface warships, helicopters, and MPA.
As you note the Russian submarines have got better - but so have NATO naval capabilities.
2. The build up of the RN/RAF F-35B Lightning force is disappointing slow - but as far as I know then plan is to put 24 aboard the carrier. Leaving aside the issue of fending off attacks by the Russian Air Force and Russian Naval Aviation, they will have a role in countering reconnaissance aircraft that support the submarines and provide targeting information for long range missiles. The Russians (and others like the Chinese) like to boost about their long range missiles, but hope that nobody will point out that these things rely on third party assets like aircraft for targeting.
3. The USN Admiral who wrote of Russian submarines operating off the US East Coast was making a point - the Russian submarine threat still exists.
I thought that the idea of involving USMC assets was for delivering ASW torpedoes from USMC helicopters?
This might interest you: The Yasen-M and the Future of Russian Submarine Forces - RUSI
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 20th Sep 2022 at 19:19.
Back in the October 2021 there was an article entitled "Use Emerging Technology for ASW" in the Proceedings Magazine that discussed some ideas about using F-35's in a limited ASW role.
The Soviets and Chinese are including long range missile and even perhaps hyper-sonic missiles into their array of offensive weapons.
All can be fired from beyond the operating radius of ASW Helicopters flying from surface vessels.
The article notedt deficiencies of current assets and strategy asserting that rethinking the threat, surveying current assets and strategy....then developing much more effective systems and procedures must be done in light of the growing capabilities of Peer Level Navies.
It describes the short comings of current assets....an example was a Russian Sub fires a missile from two hundred nautical miles from the Task Force....and the question is how does the Task Force protect itself...and then prosecute the destruction of the Sub that fired the missile.
The Helicopter would take about an hour to reach the Datum Point....where the Sub was thought to be but surely is not any longer....and air dropped sonobuoys are stationary and cannot move with the Target should one be detected by the buoy.
The writer envisioned equipping F-35's and even some F/A 18's for quick reaction ASW to include air defense of the Task Force and some limited ASW capability mentioning the L3 Harris Sonobuoy Dispenser System (SDS) and Drone Wingman weapons.
What I got from the article was we face a changing threat that is growing....not decreasing and legacy assets and strategy are failing to meet the challenges.
Under Commandant Berger, the US Marine Corps has undertaken a major shift in its defining its core Mission....and there is much concern that it may not have defined the correct strategy or has not thought it through carefully enough.
Part of that is the details naturally are classified and thus not available to satisfy those raising relevant questions.
Precision Weapons, information warfare, and going to a defense oriented posture versus the traditional offensive posture and the assets that will be part of that strategy remains a topic of debate.
Amongst that shift was inclusion of some but limited role in ASW involving land based assets (The Navy no doubt cares not to. shift any such responsibility to the USMC for any shipboard ASW operations).
We got a some relief from the Russian threat due to their Ukraine Invasion....but the Chinese are still growing their capabilities apace.
The old adage of militaries always preparing to fight the last War must not be how we do approach the near peer Nation threats.
The Soviets and Chinese are including long range missile and even perhaps hyper-sonic missiles into their array of offensive weapons.
All can be fired from beyond the operating radius of ASW Helicopters flying from surface vessels.
The article notedt deficiencies of current assets and strategy asserting that rethinking the threat, surveying current assets and strategy....then developing much more effective systems and procedures must be done in light of the growing capabilities of Peer Level Navies.
It describes the short comings of current assets....an example was a Russian Sub fires a missile from two hundred nautical miles from the Task Force....and the question is how does the Task Force protect itself...and then prosecute the destruction of the Sub that fired the missile.
The Helicopter would take about an hour to reach the Datum Point....where the Sub was thought to be but surely is not any longer....and air dropped sonobuoys are stationary and cannot move with the Target should one be detected by the buoy.
The writer envisioned equipping F-35's and even some F/A 18's for quick reaction ASW to include air defense of the Task Force and some limited ASW capability mentioning the L3 Harris Sonobuoy Dispenser System (SDS) and Drone Wingman weapons.
What I got from the article was we face a changing threat that is growing....not decreasing and legacy assets and strategy are failing to meet the challenges.
Under Commandant Berger, the US Marine Corps has undertaken a major shift in its defining its core Mission....and there is much concern that it may not have defined the correct strategy or has not thought it through carefully enough.
Part of that is the details naturally are classified and thus not available to satisfy those raising relevant questions.
Precision Weapons, information warfare, and going to a defense oriented posture versus the traditional offensive posture and the assets that will be part of that strategy remains a topic of debate.
Amongst that shift was inclusion of some but limited role in ASW involving land based assets (The Navy no doubt cares not to. shift any such responsibility to the USMC for any shipboard ASW operations).
We got a some relief from the Russian threat due to their Ukraine Invasion....but the Chinese are still growing their capabilities apace.
The old adage of militaries always preparing to fight the last War must not be how we do approach the near peer Nation threats.
Last edited by SASless; 18th Sep 2022 at 18:49.
Some good points there SAS -
Thread Starter
Back in the October 2021 there was an article entitled "Use Emerging Technology for ASW" in the Proceedings Magazine that discussed some ideas about using F-35's in a limited ASW role.
The Soviets and Chinese are including long range missile and even perhaps hyper-sonic missiles into their array of offensive weapons.
All can be fired from beyond the operating radius of ASW Helicopters flying from surface vessels.
The article notedt deficiencies of current assets and strategy asserting that rethinking the threat, surveying current assets and strategy....then developing much more effective systems and procedures must be done in light of the growing capabilities of Peer Level Navies.
It describes the short comings of current assets....an example was a Russian Sub fires a missile from two hundred nautical miles from the Task Force....and the question is how does the Task Force protect itself...and then prosecute the destruction of the Sub that fired the missile.
The Helicopter would take about an hour to reach the Datum Point....where the Sub was thought to be but surely is not any longer....and air dropped sonobuoys are stationary and cannot move with the Target should one be detected by the buoy.
The writer envisioned equipping F-35's and even some F/A 18's for quick reaction ASW to include air defense of the Task Force and some limited ASW capability mentioning the L3 Harris Sonobuoy Dispenser System (SDS) and Drone Wingman weapons.
What I got from the article was we face a changing threat that is growing....not decreasing and legacy assets and strategy are failing to meet the challenges.
Under Commandant Berger, the US Marine Corps has undertaken a major shift in its defining its core Mission....and there is much concern that it has defined the correct strategy.
Precision Weapons, information warfare, and going to a defense oriented posture versus the traditional offensive posture and the assets that will be part of that strategy remains a topic of debate.
Amongst that shift was inclusion of some but limited role in ASW involving land based assets (The Navy no doubt cares not to. shift any such responsibility to the USMC for any shipboard ASW operations).
We got a some relief from the Russian threat due to their Ukraine Invasion....but the Chinese are still growing their capabilities apace.
The old adage of militaries always preparing to fight the last War must not be how we do approach the near peer Nation threats.
The Soviets and Chinese are including long range missile and even perhaps hyper-sonic missiles into their array of offensive weapons.
All can be fired from beyond the operating radius of ASW Helicopters flying from surface vessels.
The article notedt deficiencies of current assets and strategy asserting that rethinking the threat, surveying current assets and strategy....then developing much more effective systems and procedures must be done in light of the growing capabilities of Peer Level Navies.
It describes the short comings of current assets....an example was a Russian Sub fires a missile from two hundred nautical miles from the Task Force....and the question is how does the Task Force protect itself...and then prosecute the destruction of the Sub that fired the missile.
The Helicopter would take about an hour to reach the Datum Point....where the Sub was thought to be but surely is not any longer....and air dropped sonobuoys are stationary and cannot move with the Target should one be detected by the buoy.
The writer envisioned equipping F-35's and even some F/A 18's for quick reaction ASW to include air defense of the Task Force and some limited ASW capability mentioning the L3 Harris Sonobuoy Dispenser System (SDS) and Drone Wingman weapons.
What I got from the article was we face a changing threat that is growing....not decreasing and legacy assets and strategy are failing to meet the challenges.
Under Commandant Berger, the US Marine Corps has undertaken a major shift in its defining its core Mission....and there is much concern that it has defined the correct strategy.
Precision Weapons, information warfare, and going to a defense oriented posture versus the traditional offensive posture and the assets that will be part of that strategy remains a topic of debate.
Amongst that shift was inclusion of some but limited role in ASW involving land based assets (The Navy no doubt cares not to. shift any such responsibility to the USMC for any shipboard ASW operations).
We got a some relief from the Russian threat due to their Ukraine Invasion....but the Chinese are still growing their capabilities apace.
The old adage of militaries always preparing to fight the last War must not be how we do approach the near peer Nation threats.
I did hear of the idea of using the F-35B to deliver homing torpedoes or sonobouys and considered it similar to ideas of using the A-6 Intruder or A-7 Corsair II for a similar role back in the 1970s - which came to nothing. In the 1980s someone even suggested that the Royal Navy could do the same with the Sea Harrier! As I understand the idea was (and is) to augment the ASW helicopters with a faster moving option. However, the trick is to use the various assets to make sure that the task group knows where the enemy submarines are - which modern towed array sonars are invaluable for. The ASW helicopter with dipping sonar works with the towed array and provides capability up threat from the carrier and other high value units - such as amphibious assault ships or crisis response shipping. As the CSG21 deployment proved, the combination of frigates, ASW helicopters with dipping sonar, (and SSN) allows you to keep tabs on hostile submarines.
With respect to Russia, NATO puts considerable efforts into keeping tabs on their submarines - such as that described by a now retired RN Officer in 2016.
Welllll
Using 5 Eyes Intel we would know when a sub is working up, when it is about to patrol and when it sails. We can then track it using "things" as it makes its way south.
In the meantime we send out the best sub hunting platform there is - a SSN. It gets vectored in using a collection of allied sources and then follows - quietly.
As our Russian sub approaches the UK it would have been tracked from space, by SIGINT and by stuff underwater. Fellow NATO countries would have used their ASW assets to track and pass on the next country.
Finally it arrives in the UK AOR, to be pinged to **** by Merlin and followed by a SSN and the Duty TAPS.
In the future we will send out a P8 and add to the picture.
I once played this game from a location in Cornwall. In the years I was there we knew the location of every Russian submarine. Every one. I know some don't fully understand this maritime warfare stuff but the Royal Navy is rather good at it.
Long range missiles will depend on third party assets such as aircraft for targeting, so dealing with these aircraft interrupts the kill chain.
Kamikazes - The Soviet Legacy
SSGNs were evidently considered in the West to be the safest asset of the Soviet Navy during an attack, but it was not the case. The problem was hiding in the radio communications required: two hours prior to the launch, all the submarines of the PAD were forced to hold periscope depth and lift their high frequency-radio and satellite communication antennas up into the air, just to get the detailed targeting data from reconnaissance assets directly (not via the staffs ashore or afloat); targeting via low- or very-low-frequency cable antennas took too much time and necessarily involved shore transmitting installations, which could be destroyed at any moment. There was little attention paid to buoy communication systems (because of the considerable time under Arctic ice usual for Soviet submarines). Thus the telescoping antennas in a row with the periscopes at the top of the conning tower were the submarine’s only communication means with the proper radio bandwidth. Having all ten or fifteen boats in a PAD at shallow depth long before the salvo was not the best way to keep them secure. Also, the salvo itself had to be carried out in close coordination with the surface fleet and MRA divisions.
So that was two hours in which the Bear could be intercepted, and two hours in which the submarines were at periscope depth with masts up, and vulnerable to detection by airborne radars. The late Professor Eric Grove mentioned airborne radar keeping the Soviet boats down in his talk to the IISS. He even mentioned the AEW Sea King, as well as dedicated ASW aircraft. The fighters would also have protected ASW helicopters and fixed wing aircraft in places such as the Norwegian Sea. I think that the Tomcat's Phoenix missile was also meant to be able to splash missiles fired from submarines and surface warships as well as from aircraft - in one of his interviews, former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman refers to trials to see if the Tomcat and its weapons could shoot down Exocet. The air defence and ASW missions were related, as was the anti ship role.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 18th Sep 2022 at 21:38.
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Back in the dreamtime A4Gs were envisaged to tear out to a surfaced submarine (perhaps damaged by S2s/Wessex 31bs) to sink it (maybe drop a torpedo?). As mentioned nothing seemed to eventuate - WEBF says also.
Use Emerging Technology For ASW - October 2021 Proceedings Vol. 147/10/1,424
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proce...technology-asw
OR
PDF of above article: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/ha...gs-10-2021.pdf (2.5Mb)
Use Emerging Technology For ASW - October 2021 Proceedings Vol. 147/10/1,424
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proce...technology-asw
OR
PDF of above article: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/ha...gs-10-2021.pdf (2.5Mb)
Given that ships change their names when changing owners I wounder as the H(er) MS QNLZ is now H(is) MS QNLZ it has changed owner so the ship could be renamed HMS King Charles? ?
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It is also wrong to call RN vessels 'the' HMS. Just HMS.