Parliamentary Questions concerning Hercules Safety
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Someone somewhere needs to have a serious history lesson...!!!!!!!!!
C130's were being shot at during Vietnam hence the intro of the "Khe Sahn Drop"
Why cant some people learn from expereince ???
And also remember the previous task the Crew of XV179 were engaged in!!!!!!!!!
Imagine the outcome if we had lost 61 of our finest let alone the gallant 11...!!
What cost would the foam be for the lost of 61 key personnel ??????
Let the fight continue !!!!!!!!
C130's were being shot at during Vietnam hence the intro of the "Khe Sahn Drop"
Why cant some people learn from expereince ???
And also remember the previous task the Crew of XV179 were engaged in!!!!!!!!!
Imagine the outcome if we had lost 61 of our finest let alone the gallant 11...!!
What cost would the foam be for the lost of 61 key personnel ??????
Let the fight continue !!!!!!!!
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Quite right Loogie Loader!
80-odd troops lost in Albert would effectively be 'endex' for BritFor in AFG/IRQ - if only for political reasons. But what about the loss of hundreds in a VC10 or Timmy?
Some of us have been saying such things for an awfully long time
. Them with 'egg on their hats' have been told plenty of times but they don't seem to push this with their political masters.
Yes, budgets are tight but their Airships should insist that the Treasury coughs up the cash for better protection for ALL AT (and SH) assets.
If they had done this, of course, the Treasury would then become liable if funding was refused.
How about including Gordon Broon in the corp manslaughter net
?
Flipster
ps Mike - all you'll get is a 'canned' reply which is not worth the paper upon which it is printed! But we ALL should keep 'pressing-to-test', so well done.
80-odd troops lost in Albert would effectively be 'endex' for BritFor in AFG/IRQ - if only for political reasons. But what about the loss of hundreds in a VC10 or Timmy?
Some of us have been saying such things for an awfully long time
. Them with 'egg on their hats' have been told plenty of times but they don't seem to push this with their political masters. Yes, budgets are tight but their Airships should insist that the Treasury coughs up the cash for better protection for ALL AT (and SH) assets.
If they had done this, of course, the Treasury would then become liable if funding was refused.
How about including Gordon Broon in the corp manslaughter net
?Flipster
ps Mike - all you'll get is a 'canned' reply which is not worth the paper upon which it is printed! But we ALL should keep 'pressing-to-test', so well done.
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I have been ploughing through VPF and safety management. It is complicated and I am getting the impression that we are paying lip service in certain areas. Would like to ask one question of the experts. What is the point of all this if a senior officer can turn round and send in crews on grounds of "military risk" thereby negating all safety management measures? Would the senior who did this at start of Afg still have to do his sums? So, would there be a record of this? We need self-protection measures in all Hercules and AT ac to protect the crews from their own commanders. Sad but true.
The canned letter from James Gray makes some surprising claims that we are looking into. He had better be sure of his facts or he will surely be in a lot of trouble. And it is not looking good so far.
The canned letter from James Gray makes some surprising claims that we are looking into. He had better be sure of his facts or he will surely be in a lot of trouble. And it is not looking good so far.
Safety
Nigel
“It is complicated and I am getting the impression that we are paying lip service in certain areas. What is the point of all this if a senior officer can turn round and send in crews on grounds of "military risk" thereby negating all safety management measures?”
While no expert, I believe the answer can be summed up as “Establishing boundaries of responsibility / accountability”.
You ask, and if you don’t get then someone’s name is on the decision. If you don’t ask, I do not believe it fair to pin the blame on a politician. Always ask. There is a simple route for doing so. Line management. Talk of shortage of funding is often a crock and should never be a reason for not asking. Everyone knows the MoD wastes hundreds of millions every year but there is no political will to improve. (On reflection, I know of one project, never mind the MoD, that does this as a matter of course; and another which is proposing to do it). It’s actually a disciplinary offence to complain about it. If I were in the Treasury, I’d freeze the defence budget for a year until DPA and DLO had complied with the recommendations of report after report from the Select Committee, Public Accounts Committee and even their own internal auditors and advisors. Radical, but you'd see an overnight change in attitude and shift in power in DPA and DLO back to those who know how to do the job.
Having said that, the whole issue (safety) is blurred because very little of it is mandated or rigorously policed, not least because corporate experience of the subject has been largely ditched. There are many examples of DPA and DLO knowingly paying off contracts and offering unsafe kit for acceptance into Service. Astonishingly, there are seemingly no rules against this. To pass either of the project “gates” one must have a Safety (and Environmental) Management Plan which says all the right words, but often the approval doesn’t come with funding to actually implement the Plan. Very often safety relies on the integrity of the project manager, and his willingness to stick his head above the parapet and declare planning blight. (A career limiting move).
A final thing about safety. It is one thing to deliver safe kit in the first instance (notwithstanding the above, most Design Authorities usually try to ensure its fit for purpose) but it is quite another to maintain that safety throughout the life of the kit. This is especially so on anything that is integrated (all aircraft and their systems for example). A simple example. Systems A and B are, in isolation, safe; in that they have Certificates of Design and Performance. But fit them to the aircraft, and they become unsafe as a system of systems, perhaps due to EMC. The individual kit is safe, but the aircraft is not. Problem – system A is a DA Mod but system B is an unappraised Service Engineered Mod, so the MAR of the aircraft is probably based on a build standard which excludes system B. There is no safety audit trail from the in-use build standard (A + B) back to that of MAR. MoD will say the a/c is safe as it has MAR, but this statement only holds true for the tail number presented for MAR, at the presented build standard. For it to be true for the Fleet, they must have maintained that build standard, and incorporated design changes to it. I’ve heard this described as “splitting hairs”. Really? Understanding and knowing how to manage the difference is fundamental to maintaining safety. Pity large parts of DPA and DLO regard it as a waste of money.
“It is complicated and I am getting the impression that we are paying lip service in certain areas. What is the point of all this if a senior officer can turn round and send in crews on grounds of "military risk" thereby negating all safety management measures?”
While no expert, I believe the answer can be summed up as “Establishing boundaries of responsibility / accountability”.
You ask, and if you don’t get then someone’s name is on the decision. If you don’t ask, I do not believe it fair to pin the blame on a politician. Always ask. There is a simple route for doing so. Line management. Talk of shortage of funding is often a crock and should never be a reason for not asking. Everyone knows the MoD wastes hundreds of millions every year but there is no political will to improve. (On reflection, I know of one project, never mind the MoD, that does this as a matter of course; and another which is proposing to do it). It’s actually a disciplinary offence to complain about it. If I were in the Treasury, I’d freeze the defence budget for a year until DPA and DLO had complied with the recommendations of report after report from the Select Committee, Public Accounts Committee and even their own internal auditors and advisors. Radical, but you'd see an overnight change in attitude and shift in power in DPA and DLO back to those who know how to do the job.
Having said that, the whole issue (safety) is blurred because very little of it is mandated or rigorously policed, not least because corporate experience of the subject has been largely ditched. There are many examples of DPA and DLO knowingly paying off contracts and offering unsafe kit for acceptance into Service. Astonishingly, there are seemingly no rules against this. To pass either of the project “gates” one must have a Safety (and Environmental) Management Plan which says all the right words, but often the approval doesn’t come with funding to actually implement the Plan. Very often safety relies on the integrity of the project manager, and his willingness to stick his head above the parapet and declare planning blight. (A career limiting move).
A final thing about safety. It is one thing to deliver safe kit in the first instance (notwithstanding the above, most Design Authorities usually try to ensure its fit for purpose) but it is quite another to maintain that safety throughout the life of the kit. This is especially so on anything that is integrated (all aircraft and their systems for example). A simple example. Systems A and B are, in isolation, safe; in that they have Certificates of Design and Performance. But fit them to the aircraft, and they become unsafe as a system of systems, perhaps due to EMC. The individual kit is safe, but the aircraft is not. Problem – system A is a DA Mod but system B is an unappraised Service Engineered Mod, so the MAR of the aircraft is probably based on a build standard which excludes system B. There is no safety audit trail from the in-use build standard (A + B) back to that of MAR. MoD will say the a/c is safe as it has MAR, but this statement only holds true for the tail number presented for MAR, at the presented build standard. For it to be true for the Fleet, they must have maintained that build standard, and incorporated design changes to it. I’ve heard this described as “splitting hairs”. Really? Understanding and knowing how to manage the difference is fundamental to maintaining safety. Pity large parts of DPA and DLO regard it as a waste of money.
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I believe a practical example to prove what you are saying would be the maintenance of IRCM. Cannot go into the details here but I suggest those who still fly with it should ask a few questions. There are so many UORs flying around just now I am sure there will be other examples. However, Tucumseh, if a senior officer knowingly sends an ac into theatre without appropriate self-protection for perceived threat, under grounds of "military risk." What happens if said ac is shot down? What responsibility does that Officer bear? Nothing? If the weakness was pointed out in peace-time, does not the requirement for "Duty of Care" still exist? Throwing out crown immunity seems to have created many grey areas.....
That nice Mr Gray
Well, I’ve received my standard canned letter from Mr Gray - as have some of the relatives. It’s interesting, because mine contains no greeting and no signature, merely the printed sheets. Presumably it was sent in Gray’s absence by an assistant (perhaps the euphoniously named Catriona Sutherland-Hawes). In passing, I wonder why MPs don’t reply to emails by email - in my experience, they insist on replying by post. That impresses my local posties, because the reply arrives in a House of Commons embossed envelope, but I’d rather have an email, I think. For one thing, I can’t post a copy of his letter here - at least l don’t think I can.
Sir or Madam Moderator - can I post an attachment of my scanned letter? That would be helpful.
In the meantime, to sum up the contents of this Gray reply to my diatribe against him (posted here 051148 May):
1. He doesn’t respond to my suggestion that he should apologise to Nige.
2. He’s keen to emphasise his work on behalf of RAF Wootton Lynestoke.
3. He claims to have been doing “all I can to help the families of those who were so tragically killed in the accident.”
4. He doesn’t think ESF would “necessarily have saved the plane”,
I am awaiting some potential developments before I reply to Mr Gray.
airsound
Sir or Madam Moderator - can I post an attachment of my scanned letter? That would be helpful.
In the meantime, to sum up the contents of this Gray reply to my diatribe against him (posted here 051148 May):
1. He doesn’t respond to my suggestion that he should apologise to Nige.
2. He’s keen to emphasise his work on behalf of RAF Wootton Lynestoke.
3. He claims to have been doing “all I can to help the families of those who were so tragically killed in the accident.”
4. He doesn’t think ESF would “necessarily have saved the plane”,
I am awaiting some potential developments before I reply to Mr Gray.
airsound
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Nige
There are many better qualified people on these forums to explain the saftey case but I can offer my twopennorth. The majority of safety cases that you will see in the course of your investigations are predicated on peactime operations and are concerned with airworthiness within a defined operational envelope. Although recently I have seen a shift towards some assessment that includes failure impacts during hostile operations.
The difficulty is that the operational risk assessment does not have the same rigour as the safety case that underpins the MAR. To do that you need a good understanding of the capabilities of the weapons being used against you. Not only the probability of interception of the store but also the lethality of the warhead/muntion and your platforms vulnerability. You will also need to have an understanding of the prevalance of the threat. Against this you need to know how your countermeasure performs against the threat.
Industry who usually provide the safety case does not have access to this information, hence you do not have this level of information. Quantative testing is also very expensive and it is unlikely that anyone would offer to underwrite the evidence but would only offer advice.
When you read the safety cases watch out for the weasel words advice and recommendation, they have different legal connotations. Recommendations are provided as a result of evidence, whether by testing, inspection or analysis and puts an onus on the organisation that provides to underwrite the recommendion. Advice is offered on a balance of probability based on incomplete evidence and the author does not hold responsibility for that advice.
regards
retard
There are many better qualified people on these forums to explain the saftey case but I can offer my twopennorth. The majority of safety cases that you will see in the course of your investigations are predicated on peactime operations and are concerned with airworthiness within a defined operational envelope. Although recently I have seen a shift towards some assessment that includes failure impacts during hostile operations.
The difficulty is that the operational risk assessment does not have the same rigour as the safety case that underpins the MAR. To do that you need a good understanding of the capabilities of the weapons being used against you. Not only the probability of interception of the store but also the lethality of the warhead/muntion and your platforms vulnerability. You will also need to have an understanding of the prevalance of the threat. Against this you need to know how your countermeasure performs against the threat.
Industry who usually provide the safety case does not have access to this information, hence you do not have this level of information. Quantative testing is also very expensive and it is unlikely that anyone would offer to underwrite the evidence but would only offer advice.
When you read the safety cases watch out for the weasel words advice and recommendation, they have different legal connotations. Recommendations are provided as a result of evidence, whether by testing, inspection or analysis and puts an onus on the organisation that provides to underwrite the recommendion. Advice is offered on a balance of probability based on incomplete evidence and the author does not hold responsibility for that advice.
regards
retard
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It would appear that our process is flawed. You are not the first person to have pointed out that safety management mainly concerns peace time operations. What kind of basis is this to build on? Why is it that the Australian risk assessment at about the same time as the RAF assessment came to an entirely different conclusion regarding the fitting of foam, modern DAS and passenger protection? Forget Vietnam we are talking 3/4 years ago.
My only hope is that some kind of accountability will noe be delivered. This is a mess and all the time our AT assets are being exposed to unnecessary risk. Interestingly the Tornado has inerting systems. It travels twice as fast as C130 at low leve and is a much smaller target to hit. The boys have the ultimate get out an ejection seat. What a woeful state of affairs. Protection appears to be based on a lottery.
My only hope is that some kind of accountability will noe be delivered. This is a mess and all the time our AT assets are being exposed to unnecessary risk. Interestingly the Tornado has inerting systems. It travels twice as fast as C130 at low leve and is a much smaller target to hit. The boys have the ultimate get out an ejection seat. What a woeful state of affairs. Protection appears to be based on a lottery.
safety
What Eng® says is absolutely spot on (as usual). To reinforce this, I’m sure a certain Aircraft Design Authority won’t mind me quoting direct from their Safety Case Policy (as hopefully it will deflect any criticism from ADAs)…
“The UK Ministry of Defence … requires to be satisfied that an aircraft or item of aircraft equipment is adequately safe for peacetime operation. MAR recommendations are made by Boscombe Down based on information prepared by the Design Authority in the form of a Safety Case”.
The requirement to provide Safety Cases only arose during 1992, and then only in the context of modifications to existing in-service aircraft. That is why any relevant contract is prefaced with something like “The MoD acknowledges the aircraft was built to standards prevailing at the time”. That is, the MoD underwrites the safety of the aircraft at its induction build standard, and the DA undertakes not to degrade it.
It follows that a good question to ask of any aircraft delivered (contracted?) before 1992 is “Does it have a Whole Aircraft Safety Case?” not just one whose baseline is an assumption of safety + mods. I’m not familiar with Hercules, but this may be a good question on Chinook Mk2!
Another, relating to new models of existing types (e.g. J/K or Mk1/2) would be “How much read across was permitted from old type to new, how was this validated and verified, and was a Whole Aircraft Safety Case retrospectively prepared for the older type?”
It also begs the question, alluded to by Eng, that if the a/c is “safe” for peacetime ops, what are the rules relating to assessing safety for non-peacetime, or if the boundary set by the Use Study moves? Lesser mortals like me never get to see these.
I’m sure there’s more, but footie calls.
“The UK Ministry of Defence … requires to be satisfied that an aircraft or item of aircraft equipment is adequately safe for peacetime operation. MAR recommendations are made by Boscombe Down based on information prepared by the Design Authority in the form of a Safety Case”.
The requirement to provide Safety Cases only arose during 1992, and then only in the context of modifications to existing in-service aircraft. That is why any relevant contract is prefaced with something like “The MoD acknowledges the aircraft was built to standards prevailing at the time”. That is, the MoD underwrites the safety of the aircraft at its induction build standard, and the DA undertakes not to degrade it.
It follows that a good question to ask of any aircraft delivered (contracted?) before 1992 is “Does it have a Whole Aircraft Safety Case?” not just one whose baseline is an assumption of safety + mods. I’m not familiar with Hercules, but this may be a good question on Chinook Mk2!
Another, relating to new models of existing types (e.g. J/K or Mk1/2) would be “How much read across was permitted from old type to new, how was this validated and verified, and was a Whole Aircraft Safety Case retrospectively prepared for the older type?”
It also begs the question, alluded to by Eng, that if the a/c is “safe” for peacetime ops, what are the rules relating to assessing safety for non-peacetime, or if the boundary set by the Use Study moves? Lesser mortals like me never get to see these.
I’m sure there’s more, but footie calls.
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tuc - "very little of it is mandated or rigorously policed" - I think it is well enough mandated - JSP550, JSP553, Def Stan 00-56, BP1201 but I agree on the policing.
Eng - interested in your definition of advice vs recommendation. Boscombe Down provide RTS advice which contains recommendations, so how do you perceive that? An IPTL is not bound to implement this advice, but I wouldn't say that it was "offered on a balance of probability based on incomplete evidence ". Often the advice is based on more comprehensive evidence than industry offer and I'm sure that's how you would have viewed your work. What is different these days is that it is better seen as (to avoid using either advice or recommendation for a moment) expert independent safety assessment that the duty holder should consider. It is not regulatory direction as was often seen, and to be fair, often internally generated. As someone said, "we must stop using pseudo-regulatory terminology".
Nige, but we buy peace-planes, not warplanes! Industry (quite fairly in some sense) don't provide for more than a training role or 'delivery of a capability'. ie fighter x is delivered with the capability to deliver a wide range of ordnance but as industry can't predict how it is going to be used (flexibility the key to airpower) they can't say that it is safe in every environment. So, you can go off and shoot and the bad guys, but if the bad guys shoot back......
So this leads to operational safety assessment (which needs to be covered as the RTS needs to consider peace and war - CTW as one may say). Someone has to sit down and look at how platform x is actually going to be used / threatened. And UK plc isn't very good at that - it's a cultural thing. Those that *do* safety assessment are often seen as scaremongers (right up to the point where proven correct, by which time, sadly it is too late) and that sorting it out is too expensive and we'll just take the risk.
sw
Eng - interested in your definition of advice vs recommendation. Boscombe Down provide RTS advice which contains recommendations, so how do you perceive that? An IPTL is not bound to implement this advice, but I wouldn't say that it was "offered on a balance of probability based on incomplete evidence ". Often the advice is based on more comprehensive evidence than industry offer and I'm sure that's how you would have viewed your work. What is different these days is that it is better seen as (to avoid using either advice or recommendation for a moment) expert independent safety assessment that the duty holder should consider. It is not regulatory direction as was often seen, and to be fair, often internally generated. As someone said, "we must stop using pseudo-regulatory terminology".
Nige, but we buy peace-planes, not warplanes! Industry (quite fairly in some sense) don't provide for more than a training role or 'delivery of a capability'. ie fighter x is delivered with the capability to deliver a wide range of ordnance but as industry can't predict how it is going to be used (flexibility the key to airpower) they can't say that it is safe in every environment. So, you can go off and shoot and the bad guys, but if the bad guys shoot back......
So this leads to operational safety assessment (which needs to be covered as the RTS needs to consider peace and war - CTW as one may say). Someone has to sit down and look at how platform x is actually going to be used / threatened. And UK plc isn't very good at that - it's a cultural thing. Those that *do* safety assessment are often seen as scaremongers (right up to the point where proven correct, by which time, sadly it is too late) and that sorting it out is too expensive and we'll just take the risk.
sw
Last edited by Safeware; 13th May 2006 at 14:14.
That nice Mr Gray Part 2
Thanks Mike - that is helpful!
Here are (separately) page 1 and page 2 of Mr Gray's standard canned letter as received by airsound. Note no greeting and no signature.
Page 1
http://i79.photobucket.com/albums/j1...ayletbuck1.jpg
Page 2
http://i79.photobucket.com/albums/j1...rayletter2.jpg
airsound
Here are (separately) page 1 and page 2 of Mr Gray's standard canned letter as received by airsound. Note no greeting and no signature.
Page 1
http://i79.photobucket.com/albums/j1...ayletbuck1.jpg
Page 2
http://i79.photobucket.com/albums/j1...rayletter2.jpg
airsound
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I am doing this whilst watching footie....
Let's talk A400m. 2 weeks ago, A400M was in line for 9 sets of DAS out of 25 and no fuel tank inerting. I have done some digging and discovered what I believe to be the rationale behind this thinking.
When the original bid was put in for the aircraft all 25 were to be equipped with the full suite, However, when the MOD (I think), realised the full cost they said no as it would be too expensive and so scrapped the idea for all of the aircraft and said that the aircraft would not be put in harm's way by limiting their military tasks! ( I can testify the flaw behind that thinking).
Not wanting to be put out, the DEC tried to think of scenarios where DAS would be required on non-military tasks and it came down to humanitarian airlift. When asked how many aircaft would be required for this task at any one time they said 9! It seems the fuel inerting study was done (well before 179) where the risk of loss of aircraft due to a hostile system which could not be defeated by the DASS was very small and so it was shelved.
All this saving on self-protection looked good until, erm a certain person got involved. These decisions on A400M changed last week, funny old thing. On what basis? Probably a dose of old fashioned bad publicity. Amazing!!!
Anyone who thinks we should let it lie please read this post carefully. It needs a health warning.
Let's talk A400m. 2 weeks ago, A400M was in line for 9 sets of DAS out of 25 and no fuel tank inerting. I have done some digging and discovered what I believe to be the rationale behind this thinking.
When the original bid was put in for the aircraft all 25 were to be equipped with the full suite, However, when the MOD (I think), realised the full cost they said no as it would be too expensive and so scrapped the idea for all of the aircraft and said that the aircraft would not be put in harm's way by limiting their military tasks! ( I can testify the flaw behind that thinking).
Not wanting to be put out, the DEC tried to think of scenarios where DAS would be required on non-military tasks and it came down to humanitarian airlift. When asked how many aircaft would be required for this task at any one time they said 9! It seems the fuel inerting study was done (well before 179) where the risk of loss of aircraft due to a hostile system which could not be defeated by the DASS was very small and so it was shelved.
All this saving on self-protection looked good until, erm a certain person got involved. These decisions on A400M changed last week, funny old thing. On what basis? Probably a dose of old fashioned bad publicity. Amazing!!!
Anyone who thinks we should let it lie please read this post carefully. It needs a health warning.
Nige - I'm not sure anyone who thinks 'we should let it lie' reads this forum. If he did, I don't imagine he would have been writing the way he has......
I'm doing this while not watching the footie
I'm doing this while not watching the footie
safety
Safeware
I do agree with you that the process and procedures are well documented, but as I have been told when trying to get funding to implement them "They are not mandatory". Strangely enough, no-one with airworthiness delegation ever said that to me - it was always a beancounter or some other prat with plenty of authority but no responsibility. But of course they run the MoD so they must be right.
My view is;
If I am asked to procure say, a Missile Approach Warner, what on earth is the point of bolting it into the aircraft and then, along with the contractor, being allowed to walk away without integrating it and proving that it works, safely, as part of the whole aircraft? But, because a MAW (hopefully) is not required during peacetime ops, that's precisely what is permitted. It doesn't always happen, because some of us ignore the "rules" and make it safe.
One assumes the Transition to War plans, in addition to the prior RTS work you mention, adequately cover the inevitable safety assessments and remedial/update work which may be needed to ensure a required level of safety for forthcoming ops. And they have sufficient notice to do this. I suspect not, nor do I really believe that the senior staffs who have to make these decisions really understand that the baseline aircraft they are provided with is not necessarily safe. Perhaps they just assume it is because it has MAR? I don't envy them their position. If you are put on a weeks notice of deployment and topbean says it will take 3 months to let an assessment contract, what do you do?
Another interesting fact.... (at least to me)
"A Safety Case is required for all aircraft that are proposed for a change of role or operational use (i.e. of the aircraft or any part of its fit) which was not envisaged in the previous Safety Case, even where there is to be no change of aircraft configuration". I always found this quite significant and VERY wide ranging, but you'd have to ask an in-service aircraft IPT how often they actually do it. Not a lot I suspect.
I do agree with you that the process and procedures are well documented, but as I have been told when trying to get funding to implement them "They are not mandatory". Strangely enough, no-one with airworthiness delegation ever said that to me - it was always a beancounter or some other prat with plenty of authority but no responsibility. But of course they run the MoD so they must be right.
My view is;
If I am asked to procure say, a Missile Approach Warner, what on earth is the point of bolting it into the aircraft and then, along with the contractor, being allowed to walk away without integrating it and proving that it works, safely, as part of the whole aircraft? But, because a MAW (hopefully) is not required during peacetime ops, that's precisely what is permitted. It doesn't always happen, because some of us ignore the "rules" and make it safe.
One assumes the Transition to War plans, in addition to the prior RTS work you mention, adequately cover the inevitable safety assessments and remedial/update work which may be needed to ensure a required level of safety for forthcoming ops. And they have sufficient notice to do this. I suspect not, nor do I really believe that the senior staffs who have to make these decisions really understand that the baseline aircraft they are provided with is not necessarily safe. Perhaps they just assume it is because it has MAR? I don't envy them their position. If you are put on a weeks notice of deployment and topbean says it will take 3 months to let an assessment contract, what do you do?
Another interesting fact.... (at least to me)
"A Safety Case is required for all aircraft that are proposed for a change of role or operational use (i.e. of the aircraft or any part of its fit) which was not envisaged in the previous Safety Case, even where there is to be no change of aircraft configuration". I always found this quite significant and VERY wide ranging, but you'd have to ask an in-service aircraft IPT how often they actually do it. Not a lot I suspect.
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I would be extremely interested to see the Herc CMk3 Safety Case for the ac being put into hostile environments like Iraq and Afghanistan in 2002. I suspect that if there is one at all, it would be a bit thin on details! 
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Actually, no that isn't permitted, not in the contract with whichever responsible prime contractor is doing the job (can't speak for SEMs cos I dunno)
A MAW, for example, would be integrated and proved to work, safely, as part of the whole a/c before being signed off to the customer. What you need to ask, though, is how do you define, and prove, "works". If you have lots of time and money you can go and fire real missiles and see if it detects them, if you've integrated some reaponse, eg jammer, chaff, flares, you can test those at the same time. If you haven't got enough dosh to pay for that, then you need to start making a compromise and that is were the bigboys and their advisers have to stand up and be counted because everything that isn't tested becomes a risk which the head honcho of an IPT has to sign for as a risk he's willing to take - or rather he's willing to let you take. Now, you could use a missile simulator but you take the risk that it is a good representation of all the missiles the system is designed to detect. Of course all this can only be done in a peacetime environment, no-one can be expected to contract that it will work just the same in a war - for a start you can't count on the enemy to use exactly what you specified as the threat. What you can prve is that the installation and integration is safe from an operator point of view e.g when you turn it on the bombs don't go off due to EMC, but you can never "prove" safety in an operational i.e wartime environment
>>>>
If I am asked to procure say, a Missile Approach Warner, what on earth is the point of bolting it into the aircraft and then, along with the contractor, being allowed to walk away without integrating it and proving that it works, safely, as part of the whole aircraft? But, because a MAW (hopefully) is not required during peacetime ops, that's precisely what is permitted. It doesn't always happen, because some of us ignore the "rules" and make it safe.
>>>>
A MAW, for example, would be integrated and proved to work, safely, as part of the whole a/c before being signed off to the customer. What you need to ask, though, is how do you define, and prove, "works". If you have lots of time and money you can go and fire real missiles and see if it detects them, if you've integrated some reaponse, eg jammer, chaff, flares, you can test those at the same time. If you haven't got enough dosh to pay for that, then you need to start making a compromise and that is were the bigboys and their advisers have to stand up and be counted because everything that isn't tested becomes a risk which the head honcho of an IPT has to sign for as a risk he's willing to take - or rather he's willing to let you take. Now, you could use a missile simulator but you take the risk that it is a good representation of all the missiles the system is designed to detect. Of course all this can only be done in a peacetime environment, no-one can be expected to contract that it will work just the same in a war - for a start you can't count on the enemy to use exactly what you specified as the threat. What you can prve is that the installation and integration is safe from an operator point of view e.g when you turn it on the bombs don't go off due to EMC, but you can never "prove" safety in an operational i.e wartime environment
>>>>
If I am asked to procure say, a Missile Approach Warner, what on earth is the point of bolting it into the aircraft and then, along with the contractor, being allowed to walk away without integrating it and proving that it works, safely, as part of the whole aircraft? But, because a MAW (hopefully) is not required during peacetime ops, that's precisely what is permitted. It doesn't always happen, because some of us ignore the "rules" and make it safe.
>>>>
ASE Engineer
While we both agree on what SHOULD happen, I have it in writing and confirmed separately under FOI that what I describe is permitted and condoned. And can quote the contract numbers, equipment and aircraft. As I said, it doesn't happen too often because most of us do as you describe, but if you choose not to then fear not.
Best wishes
While we both agree on what SHOULD happen, I have it in writing and confirmed separately under FOI that what I describe is permitted and condoned. And can quote the contract numbers, equipment and aircraft. As I said, it doesn't happen too often because most of us do as you describe, but if you choose not to then fear not.
Best wishes
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hello one and all,
i'm sorry for my absence, not that i would have been able to add anything worthwhile as it's all technical. i'm writing this feeling like the football that you boys watched.....or did'nt. having ended up in hospital overnight whilst at work i have been given strict instructions to take things easy. i am dutifully obeying....ish! i'm not a good patient, show me a nurse who is though! the reality of the loss of all those fine men is so far reaching. as i said before the loss of bob has cost me my family and i feel like i'm losing them. i have tried hard to keep things going but the stress got too much i got too run down one headache, one CT scan and LP later i'm finally home. but if any of you are in doubt this is the reality that we are trying to fight bloody hard not to happen again.
as for james gray MP which no doubt stands for muppet of the highest order he is talking out of his ***. i'm not sure exactly what it is he feels he is doing for the families. i can assure you it is diddly!
we...the families are not done yet. you might not hear from us but please be aware that there is much appreciation.
i have written my letter to blair and des. i will let you know what happens. anyway time to go as feeling pants of the highest order i'm sure that this little man lives inside my head. until i'm more in the land of the living.....see you.
i'm sorry for my absence, not that i would have been able to add anything worthwhile as it's all technical. i'm writing this feeling like the football that you boys watched.....or did'nt. having ended up in hospital overnight whilst at work i have been given strict instructions to take things easy. i am dutifully obeying....ish! i'm not a good patient, show me a nurse who is though! the reality of the loss of all those fine men is so far reaching. as i said before the loss of bob has cost me my family and i feel like i'm losing them. i have tried hard to keep things going but the stress got too much i got too run down one headache, one CT scan and LP later i'm finally home. but if any of you are in doubt this is the reality that we are trying to fight bloody hard not to happen again.
as for james gray MP which no doubt stands for muppet of the highest order he is talking out of his ***. i'm not sure exactly what it is he feels he is doing for the families. i can assure you it is diddly!
we...the families are not done yet. you might not hear from us but please be aware that there is much appreciation.
i have written my letter to blair and des. i will let you know what happens. anyway time to go as feeling pants of the highest order i'm sure that this little man lives inside my head. until i'm more in the land of the living.....see you.
Chappie - hope that you'll soon be feeling better. The stress and mental anguish you are suffering is awful; your vocation is helping others and you are indeed doing so by staying the course and refusing to let go. You are one very gutsy lady! But don't forget to keep your legal team informed of the detrimental effect the lacklustre behaviour of the MoD is clearly having on your health.
Some translation of the terms used in the preceding posts:
A full Defensive Aids Sub System needs something to warn the crew that a hostile device is being aimed at them. Radar-aimed missiles can be detected before being fired, due to the radar which is tracking the aircraft. But such a device (termed a Radar Warning Receiver - RWR) can't tell if a heat-seeking missile, rocket-propelled grenade or machine gun is being aimed. For a heat seeking missile (and possibly a rocket-propelled grenade, but I don't know), a device mounted on the aircraft can detect the approach of the missile - this is called a Missile Approach Warner (MAW). It can then either fire off decoying flares, or direct an active laser to kill the missile's guidance system. If no MAW is fited, an aircraft can use old 1970s technology and simply try to emit an infra-red signal during take-off and landing which will, perhaps, spoof the inbound missile by jamming its clever bits. But such things are highly reliant on knowing the specific type of missile being used - and are worse than useless against other missiles. Of course, both an infra-red jammer and a MAW-directed laser turret are useless against rocket-propelled grenades or bullets. So protection is needed in the aircraft itself. The rocket propelled grenade has relatively low range and is a one-shot thing; it is also difficult to aim and fire against an aircraft travelling at normal speed - although sadly helicopters are vulnerable to the wretched things, particularly if the enemy are perched on high rise buildings overlooking the landing site. But machine gun bullets have a much higher chance of hitting a vulnerable aircraft, so it is vital that not just detection devices and active defence systems are fitted, but also that the likelihood of a low-tech bullet hitting vital parts of the aircraft is taken into consideration when the aircraft is designed.
A civil Airbus transport was hit by an infra-red missile after take-off a year or so ago. The missile didn't hit the engine; it missed and hit the wing. This caused an intense fire and explosion in the outer wing tank, severing the hydraulics which left the crew with NO flying controls. By exemplary skill, the crew got the aircraft back on the ground by juggling with the engines to turn and descend.
However, most research still seems to be on trying to avoid detection. What the boffins have to take on board (as I've told them in words of half a syllable) is that there is still a possibility that, no matter how good the detection and defence devices fitted to the aircraft are, a bullet will still get through. The A400M, the next generation tactical transport aircraft, is designed with some damage tolerance built in. The aircraft wiring and major systems are so designed that damage in one area will not be fatal. But other systems, such as armoured cockpit seats and a system which fills the fuel tank 'air' space with inerting gas are 'optional'.....
There is an absolute need for ALL future large aircraft to have a comprehensive system of protection. Also, all current large aircraft used in hostile areas MUST have whatever protection can be fitted. If the MoD can't afford it, then the crews don't go. PERIOD.
Too much emphasis is placed on fast, pointy aircraft by the top brass. The 'fast jet-centric' RAF has GOT to wake up to the fact that the likelihood of EuropHoons being used in anger is microscopic when compared to Hercs, A400M, Nimrod, VC10, TriStar, FSTA, RW various etc. The money needs to go where there is the greatest REAL need..... But, of course, if the RAF doesn't show interest in a British Waste-of-Space design, how can BWoS and the government-sponsored gun-runners (DESO) shmooze the embassies to persuade oil-sheiks that they need to buy the new BWoS toy?
A 'UOR' (Urgent Operational Requirement) is something which is generated in response to a new, allegedly unanticipated, operational need. Very probably because the need was already considered, but the cash-strapped MoD couldn't afford to meet it. But when Bliar and his cronies elect to commit forces in support of yet another of Mad George's many wars, the lack of equipment becomes crucial. So a UOR can then be raised - but this is only a short term expedient and the new equipment is fitted to lower levels of engineering rigour than would be required had it been installed when the aircraft was first accepted into service.
Some translation of the terms used in the preceding posts:
A full Defensive Aids Sub System needs something to warn the crew that a hostile device is being aimed at them. Radar-aimed missiles can be detected before being fired, due to the radar which is tracking the aircraft. But such a device (termed a Radar Warning Receiver - RWR) can't tell if a heat-seeking missile, rocket-propelled grenade or machine gun is being aimed. For a heat seeking missile (and possibly a rocket-propelled grenade, but I don't know), a device mounted on the aircraft can detect the approach of the missile - this is called a Missile Approach Warner (MAW). It can then either fire off decoying flares, or direct an active laser to kill the missile's guidance system. If no MAW is fited, an aircraft can use old 1970s technology and simply try to emit an infra-red signal during take-off and landing which will, perhaps, spoof the inbound missile by jamming its clever bits. But such things are highly reliant on knowing the specific type of missile being used - and are worse than useless against other missiles. Of course, both an infra-red jammer and a MAW-directed laser turret are useless against rocket-propelled grenades or bullets. So protection is needed in the aircraft itself. The rocket propelled grenade has relatively low range and is a one-shot thing; it is also difficult to aim and fire against an aircraft travelling at normal speed - although sadly helicopters are vulnerable to the wretched things, particularly if the enemy are perched on high rise buildings overlooking the landing site. But machine gun bullets have a much higher chance of hitting a vulnerable aircraft, so it is vital that not just detection devices and active defence systems are fitted, but also that the likelihood of a low-tech bullet hitting vital parts of the aircraft is taken into consideration when the aircraft is designed.
A civil Airbus transport was hit by an infra-red missile after take-off a year or so ago. The missile didn't hit the engine; it missed and hit the wing. This caused an intense fire and explosion in the outer wing tank, severing the hydraulics which left the crew with NO flying controls. By exemplary skill, the crew got the aircraft back on the ground by juggling with the engines to turn and descend.
However, most research still seems to be on trying to avoid detection. What the boffins have to take on board (as I've told them in words of half a syllable) is that there is still a possibility that, no matter how good the detection and defence devices fitted to the aircraft are, a bullet will still get through. The A400M, the next generation tactical transport aircraft, is designed with some damage tolerance built in. The aircraft wiring and major systems are so designed that damage in one area will not be fatal. But other systems, such as armoured cockpit seats and a system which fills the fuel tank 'air' space with inerting gas are 'optional'.....
There is an absolute need for ALL future large aircraft to have a comprehensive system of protection. Also, all current large aircraft used in hostile areas MUST have whatever protection can be fitted. If the MoD can't afford it, then the crews don't go. PERIOD.
Too much emphasis is placed on fast, pointy aircraft by the top brass. The 'fast jet-centric' RAF has GOT to wake up to the fact that the likelihood of EuropHoons being used in anger is microscopic when compared to Hercs, A400M, Nimrod, VC10, TriStar, FSTA, RW various etc. The money needs to go where there is the greatest REAL need..... But, of course, if the RAF doesn't show interest in a British Waste-of-Space design, how can BWoS and the government-sponsored gun-runners (DESO) shmooze the embassies to persuade oil-sheiks that they need to buy the new BWoS toy?
A 'UOR' (Urgent Operational Requirement) is something which is generated in response to a new, allegedly unanticipated, operational need. Very probably because the need was already considered, but the cash-strapped MoD couldn't afford to meet it. But when Bliar and his cronies elect to commit forces in support of yet another of Mad George's many wars, the lack of equipment becomes crucial. So a UOR can then be raised - but this is only a short term expedient and the new equipment is fitted to lower levels of engineering rigour than would be required had it been installed when the aircraft was first accepted into service.
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Beags, thank you for neatly summarising the story so far. I am sure Chappie will not be the only one to benefit from an excellent insight into how we managed to get into this mess. I agree entirely about the fastjetcentric air force ignoring the plight of helos and AT ac. I was assured by AOC 2 that there is now a recognition that priorities need to change. Hopefully we will see movement towards this new thinking in the way of more funding, probably in 2007-08. Barring UORs, there is no new money on the table. And the big philosophical divide occurs where decisions have to be made about sending crews into danger without proper equipment. I am in the "no" camp. I also believe that "night" should be used as much as possible to reduce risk. Period. This is where we agreed to disagree. I do not think US or RAAF would ask their guys to do this. We should take a lesson from them.
Chappie, wish you a rapid recovery!
Chappie, wish you a rapid recovery!