- The Canberra - Unsafe in 1950, Still unsafe
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Have to agree with keithl, Flatus and M.Mouse re public grief.
On the question of Canberra safety record versus more modern aircraft, I wouldn't think the Tornado would come anywhere near it, although clearly asymmetric isn't such a problem nowadays.
In times of yore, on the Meteor as FV will testify, you had it drummed into you that anywhere close to the ground, you never let the speed get below around 125 if you were on one donk (until committed to land) and on T/O you got up to 125 a bit smartish. This of course was after the dreadful early history of asymmetric crashes during traing at places like Driffield, where one or two a month were common and invariably fatal. In squadron service the message slowly sunk in. Of course the T7 and all the NF variants had no bang seats, but I don't think we lost more than a couple due to asymmetric problems from the two NF squadrons(about 32 aircraft) at my base during a three year period
There again in 1967 when we got the C-130s, during training we used to shut down engines on T/O all the time in asymmetric training until we lost two with fatal results. The edict came out that thou shalt not stop engines for real on T/O when training.
The amazing thing was nobody had really thought of banning it before. Finally, perhaps someone could confirm/deny the apocryphal story that used to go the rounds about the Canberra doing asymmetric training with one throttled back, when on finals the pilot suddenly became aware of a long plastic nav rule sliding up from the rear and nudging the dead throttle up!
On the question of Canberra safety record versus more modern aircraft, I wouldn't think the Tornado would come anywhere near it, although clearly asymmetric isn't such a problem nowadays.
In times of yore, on the Meteor as FV will testify, you had it drummed into you that anywhere close to the ground, you never let the speed get below around 125 if you were on one donk (until committed to land) and on T/O you got up to 125 a bit smartish. This of course was after the dreadful early history of asymmetric crashes during traing at places like Driffield, where one or two a month were common and invariably fatal. In squadron service the message slowly sunk in. Of course the T7 and all the NF variants had no bang seats, but I don't think we lost more than a couple due to asymmetric problems from the two NF squadrons(about 32 aircraft) at my base during a three year period
There again in 1967 when we got the C-130s, during training we used to shut down engines on T/O all the time in asymmetric training until we lost two with fatal results. The edict came out that thou shalt not stop engines for real on T/O when training.
The amazing thing was nobody had really thought of banning it before. Finally, perhaps someone could confirm/deny the apocryphal story that used to go the rounds about the Canberra doing asymmetric training with one throttled back, when on finals the pilot suddenly became aware of a long plastic nav rule sliding up from the rear and nudging the dead throttle up!
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Pirate
The snatch unit is automatic, a vicious thing it is, takes less than a second to pull the control column(s) out of the way.
2LP
In reply to you, and if Jacko doesn't mind, I would like to refer you to his last post in answer to yours. He outlines my thoughts exactly.
Jackonicko
When I was on Canberras the procedure was that in the event of an impending and possibly unrecoverable situation the nav's hatch was always blown first, even if, in the end, the nav didn't actually need to bang out. Although supposedly frangible, it was not recommended that anyone try to go through it. In a continuing situation the nav would be instructed to go next, maybe seconds later but sometimes quite a while (relatively) before the end of the event, but he would be clear of the kite well before the pilot(s). (Sadly it was not like this in the case of the B(I)8 though as you know although the nav's were always got out first - maybe you can recall Ron Ledwidge's magnificent effort). As for going through the canopy, well, it was feasible but definitely not recommended, except in a dire and sudden emergency. Blowing the lid was/is a separate action to pulling the seat handle and it's an action that takes quite a few seconds to carry out and complete There's no bang-cord on a Canberra and their canopies shatter jaggedly not into small pieces (seen enough of them to know that).
Agree with you about the look of the kite. It does look somewhat recoverable from seeing the TV videos, I've seen worse being recoverd. But then we're not there and anything anybody says at this stage is speculation, informed maybe, but still speculation. Maybe we should, as FE suggests, bow out.
The snatch unit is automatic, a vicious thing it is, takes less than a second to pull the control column(s) out of the way.
2LP
In reply to you, and if Jacko doesn't mind, I would like to refer you to his last post in answer to yours. He outlines my thoughts exactly.
Jackonicko
When I was on Canberras the procedure was that in the event of an impending and possibly unrecoverable situation the nav's hatch was always blown first, even if, in the end, the nav didn't actually need to bang out. Although supposedly frangible, it was not recommended that anyone try to go through it. In a continuing situation the nav would be instructed to go next, maybe seconds later but sometimes quite a while (relatively) before the end of the event, but he would be clear of the kite well before the pilot(s). (Sadly it was not like this in the case of the B(I)8 though as you know although the nav's were always got out first - maybe you can recall Ron Ledwidge's magnificent effort). As for going through the canopy, well, it was feasible but definitely not recommended, except in a dire and sudden emergency. Blowing the lid was/is a separate action to pulling the seat handle and it's an action that takes quite a few seconds to carry out and complete There's no bang-cord on a Canberra and their canopies shatter jaggedly not into small pieces (seen enough of them to know that).
Agree with you about the look of the kite. It does look somewhat recoverable from seeing the TV videos, I've seen worse being recoverd. But then we're not there and anything anybody says at this stage is speculation, informed maybe, but still speculation. Maybe we should, as FE suggests, bow out.
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Aircraft Accident Analysis
This thread is now developing into a serious resume of the problems of a particular aircraft type which has particular undesireable attributes if the crew takes it beyond the edges of its handling/performance envelope. We all know that the Canberra is not alone in being unforgiving if taken beyond such established envelopes.
It just happens that accidents/failures trigger off the desires of the professional pilot in particular to rethink his/her options were he presented with the problem whatever it may be. There is never enough data in the mental data bank.
Every last one of us grieves when any of us becomes a fatality or is injured. We all want to commisserate with the families and associates. But that should not prevent the more experienced of us from having a forum which enables us to pass on to those less experienced the lessons we have learned or to exchange those lessons amongst ourselves. Are there really some of you out there who would not wish this to happen.
Perhaps already this thread has passed on some snippet which will prevent another tragedy. Perhaps note will be taken by those in decision making positions who are already being influenced by the wealth of experience that emerges from those having had lifetimes of experience. Where else is there a better place to give free uninhibited reign to such erudite discussion.
The moderator should consider deliberately initiating an analysis thread following significant accidents seperate from a condolence thread. Otherwise the professional pilot will be reticent to contribute to a learning and transfer of experience processing out of defference to the families and friends. What accident board finding will serve to trigger off a vigorous discussion such as we have going now? By the time the findings are released motivations for discussion have gone..
It is fortunate that two threads were initiated on this occasion and we can now see the beneficial aspects of this thread. Those without the motives to transfer beneficial aspects arising from the analyses of a prang should go back to the other thread.
I probably initiated the "speculation" on Canberra asymmetrics. Reading betwen the lines on information so far then in this thread it is not unreasonable to think that the squashed remains of the T4 resulted from recovery from a developing asymmetric departure, recovery from which is only possible by almost instantaneous closing of the live engine throttle to stop the yaw whilst pushing hard nose down. If there is then inadequate height to pull out then one can readily end up with the aircraft squashing onto the ground and a photograph as we have seen..
The asymmetric vices of the Canberra are well known and are most likely to be the cause of a Canberra prang. Some years ago I could have said that about elevator trim runaway. Was weather a factor in this case? What other failure/s may have occurred to fit the facts currently existing on this thread? One could make an interesting list.
I came close to flying a Canberra once that had been sabotaged!! I was flying one in an air display once on one engine when the live one quit. It was a good glider for a while. A story for later if there is interest.
Having had a lifetime of Canberra experience involving a few close calls and having been variously involved with Canberra flight testing on multiple variants, as a Canberra QFI and military aircraft accident investigator I do not wish to be selfish with my experience. I would hope to be able to pass on some lessons to those yet to call themselves experienced. Others contributing to this thread have extensive Canberra experience. Don't hide it - I too want to learn some more.
Please tell me if this thread or PPRuNe generally is an inappropriate forum or if there is a better way of handling the situation.
This thread is now developing into a serious resume of the problems of a particular aircraft type which has particular undesireable attributes if the crew takes it beyond the edges of its handling/performance envelope. We all know that the Canberra is not alone in being unforgiving if taken beyond such established envelopes.
It just happens that accidents/failures trigger off the desires of the professional pilot in particular to rethink his/her options were he presented with the problem whatever it may be. There is never enough data in the mental data bank.
Every last one of us grieves when any of us becomes a fatality or is injured. We all want to commisserate with the families and associates. But that should not prevent the more experienced of us from having a forum which enables us to pass on to those less experienced the lessons we have learned or to exchange those lessons amongst ourselves. Are there really some of you out there who would not wish this to happen.
Perhaps already this thread has passed on some snippet which will prevent another tragedy. Perhaps note will be taken by those in decision making positions who are already being influenced by the wealth of experience that emerges from those having had lifetimes of experience. Where else is there a better place to give free uninhibited reign to such erudite discussion.
The moderator should consider deliberately initiating an analysis thread following significant accidents seperate from a condolence thread. Otherwise the professional pilot will be reticent to contribute to a learning and transfer of experience processing out of defference to the families and friends. What accident board finding will serve to trigger off a vigorous discussion such as we have going now? By the time the findings are released motivations for discussion have gone..
It is fortunate that two threads were initiated on this occasion and we can now see the beneficial aspects of this thread. Those without the motives to transfer beneficial aspects arising from the analyses of a prang should go back to the other thread.
I probably initiated the "speculation" on Canberra asymmetrics. Reading betwen the lines on information so far then in this thread it is not unreasonable to think that the squashed remains of the T4 resulted from recovery from a developing asymmetric departure, recovery from which is only possible by almost instantaneous closing of the live engine throttle to stop the yaw whilst pushing hard nose down. If there is then inadequate height to pull out then one can readily end up with the aircraft squashing onto the ground and a photograph as we have seen..
The asymmetric vices of the Canberra are well known and are most likely to be the cause of a Canberra prang. Some years ago I could have said that about elevator trim runaway. Was weather a factor in this case? What other failure/s may have occurred to fit the facts currently existing on this thread? One could make an interesting list.
I came close to flying a Canberra once that had been sabotaged!! I was flying one in an air display once on one engine when the live one quit. It was a good glider for a while. A story for later if there is interest.
Having had a lifetime of Canberra experience involving a few close calls and having been variously involved with Canberra flight testing on multiple variants, as a Canberra QFI and military aircraft accident investigator I do not wish to be selfish with my experience. I would hope to be able to pass on some lessons to those yet to call themselves experienced. Others contributing to this thread have extensive Canberra experience. Don't hide it - I too want to learn some more.
Please tell me if this thread or PPRuNe generally is an inappropriate forum or if there is a better way of handling the situation.
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In the absence of a simulator for older types still in use, do they use a vertically displaced threshold (C.5000' ?) for the riskier approach/go around procedures?. An appropriately configured GPS box would provide ILS info to the 'threshold'. Only missing reference (at night) would be the app. lights when 'breaking cloud' at 200' + 5000.
I'm sure you'll tell me if I'm talking out of my Civvy hat.
I'm sure you'll tell me if I'm talking out of my Civvy hat.
D96 - My info 15 years out of date, but doubt if it's changed much. When I instructed on them we used to demo the effect of asymmetric power at a low speed at the sort of safe height you suggest. It was sobering to see how quickly the thing would roll.
Although it doesn't affect your suggestion, on one engine you are committed at 600 ft and your ILS DH would be increased accordingly. That also is a measure of how careful you have to be going around on one engine. .
But you know how different a real approach is over the ground, with drift changes, minor corrections etc. That has to be practiced on a real approach, I'm afraid. That's just background for you - I don't suggest it has any bearing on this accident.
For the Mods - I like Milt's suggestion of two threads, one Condolences and one Tech Speculation. You're not going to stop pilots speculating about crashes, it doesn't mean they're unfeeling, it means they need to try and understand what happened. That's quite different from uninformed and damaging press speculation, which angers me, too.
When the Nimrod crashed in Toronto, one of the first things I did was get in the simulator and start speculating with it. I had to - because I couldn't just shrug it off and say "Ho hum, I'll just wait for the BoI". For the more sensitive posters here - it's actually a form of caring.
Although it doesn't affect your suggestion, on one engine you are committed at 600 ft and your ILS DH would be increased accordingly. That also is a measure of how careful you have to be going around on one engine. .
But you know how different a real approach is over the ground, with drift changes, minor corrections etc. That has to be practiced on a real approach, I'm afraid. That's just background for you - I don't suggest it has any bearing on this accident.
For the Mods - I like Milt's suggestion of two threads, one Condolences and one Tech Speculation. You're not going to stop pilots speculating about crashes, it doesn't mean they're unfeeling, it means they need to try and understand what happened. That's quite different from uninformed and damaging press speculation, which angers me, too.
When the Nimrod crashed in Toronto, one of the first things I did was get in the simulator and start speculating with it. I had to - because I couldn't just shrug it off and say "Ho hum, I'll just wait for the BoI". For the more sensitive posters here - it's actually a form of caring.
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As a schoolboy I watched, horrified, as a Canberra crashed into a housing estate in Huntingdon. I'll never forget the bright orange fireball and thick black smoke. The graves of the three children and two young air crew who died are nearby. Strangely it was my captivation at the news coverage in the following days that set me on my career path, even though my father was an raf pilot with plenty of experience of the Canberra.
I believe that crash, (in May 1976) was indeed during a practise asymmetric approach, but was attributed to a 'newly discovered phenomenon fin stall'...can anyone shed any light?
Years later (93 I think), as a reporter I was sent to a crash two miles closer to Wyton. A well liked Station Commander and two of his colleagues were killed as their Canberra crashed on take off. Another practise asymmetric.
It is difficult for an outsider like me to see so many lives lost to the same type of incident without knowing that a lot of work has been done to try and prevent them. The news that 0/0 seats were considered but rejected on cost grounds is appalling
We do things on the cheap in this country (although it seems to cost us a fortune in the process).
I always thought an raf edict was that you can make a mistake once - but to repeat it is unacceptable. It's a shame that doesn't seem to apply to the procurement dept of MoD.
IR
I believe that crash, (in May 1976) was indeed during a practise asymmetric approach, but was attributed to a 'newly discovered phenomenon fin stall'...can anyone shed any light?
Years later (93 I think), as a reporter I was sent to a crash two miles closer to Wyton. A well liked Station Commander and two of his colleagues were killed as their Canberra crashed on take off. Another practise asymmetric.
It is difficult for an outsider like me to see so many lives lost to the same type of incident without knowing that a lot of work has been done to try and prevent them. The news that 0/0 seats were considered but rejected on cost grounds is appalling
We do things on the cheap in this country (although it seems to cost us a fortune in the process).
I always thought an raf edict was that you can make a mistake once - but to repeat it is unacceptable. It's a shame that doesn't seem to apply to the procurement dept of MoD.
IR
Last edited by Instrument Ranting; 8th Sep 2004 at 15:08.
Like you, I was a schoolboy when the PR9 went in on that housing estate. I seem to remember that when Boscombe Down attempted to recreate the circumstances (with a borrowed PR9 being flown solo) they also lost the aircraft!
I remember the other accident, too, which cost me a former chum from UAS days - Cameron Locke, who I will always remember as a thoroughly decent and motivated bloke with an epic sense of fun.
The Canberra has killed some very, very good blokes, but then so has every other FJ type in RAF service, and so has the M4.
I remember the other accident, too, which cost me a former chum from UAS days - Cameron Locke, who I will always remember as a thoroughly decent and motivated bloke with an epic sense of fun.
The Canberra has killed some very, very good blokes, but then so has every other FJ type in RAF service, and so has the M4.
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Instrument Ranting
Canberra Fin Stalling.
Good question.
Firstly fins are just double sided aerofoils that will stall given enough alpha. Not a new phenomenon.
Some aircraft in flight test come close to fin stall under the worst conditions and this is often corrected by adding more fin area which may then require a change to rudder design.
Then there is sometimes an additional complication which may occur at high fin alphas where the rudder force does a rapid decline at high rudder angles leading to rudder overbalance.
Given that this can be followed by a lock over of the rudder requiring a large force to unlock, TPs are very wary of this condition and approach the condition very warily. Often with a deployable tail chute
In my experience with multiple Mks of Canberra including flying all of the conventional aerobatics not involving negative g I feel I have never come close to stalling the fin. Flight test instrumentation would be required to determine how close and this would have been checked by English Electric and or Boscombe Down..
If I am right then the only time one will definitely get fin stalling will be following departure from a high thrust asymmetric and a slow reaction in pulling off the thrust.
This is sometimes demonstrated by a QFI showing Vmca (min speed to retain control following an engine failure) It is a normal test procedure in establishing that speed to fail an engine and wait an obligatory 2 seconds before taking any recovery action. If one does this procedure at too low a speed in the Canberra you rapidly roll inverted with an extreme angle and rate of yaw which can only be possible with a stalled fin. The fin will quickly unstall as thrust comes off leaving you to revover in the safe height you have allowed.
It's really not all that much fun.
Can someone expand on this?
Canberra Fin Stalling.
Good question.
Firstly fins are just double sided aerofoils that will stall given enough alpha. Not a new phenomenon.
Some aircraft in flight test come close to fin stall under the worst conditions and this is often corrected by adding more fin area which may then require a change to rudder design.
Then there is sometimes an additional complication which may occur at high fin alphas where the rudder force does a rapid decline at high rudder angles leading to rudder overbalance.
Given that this can be followed by a lock over of the rudder requiring a large force to unlock, TPs are very wary of this condition and approach the condition very warily. Often with a deployable tail chute
In my experience with multiple Mks of Canberra including flying all of the conventional aerobatics not involving negative g I feel I have never come close to stalling the fin. Flight test instrumentation would be required to determine how close and this would have been checked by English Electric and or Boscombe Down..
If I am right then the only time one will definitely get fin stalling will be following departure from a high thrust asymmetric and a slow reaction in pulling off the thrust.
This is sometimes demonstrated by a QFI showing Vmca (min speed to retain control following an engine failure) It is a normal test procedure in establishing that speed to fail an engine and wait an obligatory 2 seconds before taking any recovery action. If one does this procedure at too low a speed in the Canberra you rapidly roll inverted with an extreme angle and rate of yaw which can only be possible with a stalled fin. The fin will quickly unstall as thrust comes off leaving you to revover in the safe height you have allowed.
It's really not all that much fun.
Can someone expand on this?
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BI8
You appear to be rather out of date on your T4 tech exam. The hatch is not frangible, it is solid, and jettisoned by explosive bolts. This requires no separate action, provided that the hatch safety switch is made live; the hatch is then jettisoned by the intial handle pull. As it departs, it withdraws a restrictor from the seat, allowing the seat gun to fire in sequence as the pull is continued. The pilots canopy is indeed jettisoned, but again this is automatic once the canopy/snatch master switch is set to live (as is firing of the snatch unit to sever and withdraw the control columns).
None of this, of course, tells us anything about thursday's tragic events. However, it is evident from the photographs that:
The Navigator's hatch has jettisoned and the seat has fired (I know - talk about stating the bleedin' obvious).
The pilots' canopy has jettisoned.
Both pilots' seats have fired.
Can't vouch for the snatch unit, but the BoI will know by now.
There is no command ejection system, each takes his turn in sequence by his own actions. It is recommended that the pilots avoid, if possible, simultaneous ejection. Not that you have too much time to worry about the niceties.
Posted to head off more uninformed speculation. Forgive me, but as a former colleague of one of the guys and an acquaintance of the other two, I am finding it difficult to keep my temper. Yes, of course we all want to know - but we are achieving nothing useful here.
Ginseng
None of this, of course, tells us anything about thursday's tragic events. However, it is evident from the photographs that:
The Navigator's hatch has jettisoned and the seat has fired (I know - talk about stating the bleedin' obvious).
The pilots' canopy has jettisoned.
Both pilots' seats have fired.
Can't vouch for the snatch unit, but the BoI will know by now.
There is no command ejection system, each takes his turn in sequence by his own actions. It is recommended that the pilots avoid, if possible, simultaneous ejection. Not that you have too much time to worry about the niceties.
Posted to head off more uninformed speculation. Forgive me, but as a former colleague of one of the guys and an acquaintance of the other two, I am finding it difficult to keep my temper. Yes, of course we all want to know - but we are achieving nothing useful here.
Ginseng
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As Boff implies, I found the Canberra T4 less tiring on one than the Meatbox (electric trimmers - such luxury!). But the principles were the same - you obeyed simple rules about mnimum IAS until you committed for landing. Compared to the Meatbox the Canberra only had one problem - the speed with which the idled engine could be spooled up for a touch-and-go and the risk of compressor stalls. Since I was only giving experience to ex-fighter, transport and maritime jocks going through CFS, I always used to take over control after touch-down on one and do the roller myself. Soon after I left Rissington, I believe one of the staff instructors or his stu stalled a compressor on go-round. He did the right thing and aborted, raising the gear. Two red faces but nobody was hurt. After that, I seem to remember, they had to full-stop off an asymmetric approach. 
PR9 and T4 differences
Firstly, as a humble light-aircraft pilot and long-time Canberra fan, my most sincere condolences to those left behind in the aftermath of this very sad accident.
I get the impression from reading this thread that the T4 and PR9 are decidedly different. Have I got the wrong end of the stick? If not, it would be very interesting to learn a little more about what the differences are. Is it just a matter of cockpit ergonomics, or are there major differences in handling and performance?
John
I get the impression from reading this thread that the T4 and PR9 are decidedly different. Have I got the wrong end of the stick? If not, it would be very interesting to learn a little more about what the differences are. Is it just a matter of cockpit ergonomics, or are there major differences in handling and performance?
John
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In answer to some of the questions asked previously:
Jackonico:
Cameron locke was not killed at Wyton (kinloss but in the same year), he suffered a common cause of one engine winding up whilst the other stalled during an overshoot, both he & his nav ejected, the nav survived albeit badly injured, unfortunately cameron's seat was outside it's limits (anyone see a common thread here). As for me infering about more being killed practising asymmetric, it is true, I spent 5 years on Canberra's, I flew all 7 types (3 different type of engines, 4 different type of cockpits, 3 different type of fuel systems, PR9's with some powered flying controls, the list goes on) as you can see there are ,many variants & most were different. The Zero/Zero seat study was last year after an incident on a PR9, but with only a few more years to go, cost was more of an issue than the safety of crews.....
Beeayeate;
What special night landing techniques do you know of that the rest of us don't?
The statement about the column is correct, part of the ejection sequence was to blow the control column connection to the "Torque tubes" running to the control surfaces, the column would then go forward under spring pressure, then the seats would fire. If it didn't happen in this sequence then the pilot/s would lose their knees.
Fast Erect, as you know nothing of Canberra's nor of the individuals sadly lost in this accident "wind your neck in". A lot of us have professional reasons and/or personal; reasons to discuss this issue, maybe something said here will one day prove useful to someone.
Inst Rating;
The Fin Stall only happened on the PR9 due to the size of the Fin against the amount of thrust. The T4 in this accident had @ 5500lbs thrust per-side, the PR9 11,250 per-side (unreheated lightning engines). When I flew it we always took off with 90% as this would help in the asymmetric case but also stop wear on the elevator. The crash at Wyton (PR9) was fin stall, the Test pilots decided to try to disprove this & took one over salisbury plain (minus it's nav); the test pilot managed to fin stall it and could not recover even given a surplus! of height & so ejected; to my knowledge he is the only pilot to have survived ejection from a PR9 - food for thought.... The crash in 1993 occured during a practice EFATO, a good reason for a sim....methinks
For those not familiar with the canberra's asymmetric handling. The T4 was the most benign with only a 15kt "graveyard" gap after rotation (The difference between rotation & V2). The E4 & PR7 had 45kt gaps!!!!!!!!! I suffered 3 engine failures & one engine fire in 5 years, 2 of them in the circuit. If you lost an engine in the circuit below @500' you were commited to land as overshooting took @450' of height loss to gather enough speed to be able to select full power, until then full power would cause loss of control due to insufficient rudder authority at low speed. In the old days all asymmetric circuits were flown at normal circuit speeds, when it was realised that adding speed made the exercise more controllabe the accident rate dropped considerably.
Jackonico:
Cameron locke was not killed at Wyton (kinloss but in the same year), he suffered a common cause of one engine winding up whilst the other stalled during an overshoot, both he & his nav ejected, the nav survived albeit badly injured, unfortunately cameron's seat was outside it's limits (anyone see a common thread here). As for me infering about more being killed practising asymmetric, it is true, I spent 5 years on Canberra's, I flew all 7 types (3 different type of engines, 4 different type of cockpits, 3 different type of fuel systems, PR9's with some powered flying controls, the list goes on) as you can see there are ,many variants & most were different. The Zero/Zero seat study was last year after an incident on a PR9, but with only a few more years to go, cost was more of an issue than the safety of crews.....
Beeayeate;
What special night landing techniques do you know of that the rest of us don't?
The statement about the column is correct, part of the ejection sequence was to blow the control column connection to the "Torque tubes" running to the control surfaces, the column would then go forward under spring pressure, then the seats would fire. If it didn't happen in this sequence then the pilot/s would lose their knees.
Fast Erect, as you know nothing of Canberra's nor of the individuals sadly lost in this accident "wind your neck in". A lot of us have professional reasons and/or personal; reasons to discuss this issue, maybe something said here will one day prove useful to someone.
Inst Rating;
The Fin Stall only happened on the PR9 due to the size of the Fin against the amount of thrust. The T4 in this accident had @ 5500lbs thrust per-side, the PR9 11,250 per-side (unreheated lightning engines). When I flew it we always took off with 90% as this would help in the asymmetric case but also stop wear on the elevator. The crash at Wyton (PR9) was fin stall, the Test pilots decided to try to disprove this & took one over salisbury plain (minus it's nav); the test pilot managed to fin stall it and could not recover even given a surplus! of height & so ejected; to my knowledge he is the only pilot to have survived ejection from a PR9 - food for thought.... The crash in 1993 occured during a practice EFATO, a good reason for a sim....methinks
For those not familiar with the canberra's asymmetric handling. The T4 was the most benign with only a 15kt "graveyard" gap after rotation (The difference between rotation & V2). The E4 & PR7 had 45kt gaps!!!!!!!!! I suffered 3 engine failures & one engine fire in 5 years, 2 of them in the circuit. If you lost an engine in the circuit below @500' you were commited to land as overshooting took @450' of height loss to gather enough speed to be able to select full power, until then full power would cause loss of control due to insufficient rudder authority at low speed. In the old days all asymmetric circuits were flown at normal circuit speeds, when it was realised that adding speed made the exercise more controllabe the accident rate dropped considerably.
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Just wanted to give thanks for some more very good posts on this thread. One of the best things about PPRuNe is that we gain insight from each other.
Should we be mute after a fatality while grief might still hang in the air ?
Accidents are not good news, and this thread has highlighted that some would prefer discussion not to proceed, out of respect. Again I apologise for starting this thread with a forthright and provocative post at such a critical time. That was my personal reaction to the fact of the Canberra still claiming lives all these years since I flew it.
The resulting thread would seem to show considerable support for the view that a good time and place to discuss an issue is when it is topical. Thanks, Milt and wheelbarrow, for your thoughts on shared experience being of value to others despite possible insensitivity at a difficult time.
Most of us pilots seem to be able to get on with our lives during and after crises, but I doubt if any of us are totally insensitive. It is probably on balance worth continuing the discussion a little further. Sorry, Fast Erect
Canberra Engine problems
There is ample evidence of the fickleness of the Avon 100 series engines on the earlier Canberras. Not everyone met the problem - thanks Pindi for pointing out that it was possible to have a great tour without engines misbehaving. However, wheelbarrow's eloquent statement mirrors my experience. Some anecdotal evidence follows:
One vaguely remembers trying to get airborne in strongish crosswinds- you just couldn't put the power on until rolling fast down the runway because the downwind engine would just surge and blow out. One equally vaguely remembers the things going out when you decided to do a turn at high altitude, N-over-root-T surge springs to mind as the name of the cause.
The asymmetric difficulty was clear in the 70s when Bassingbourne with its shorter runway had closed, and someone had the bright idea, now that there was 9000ft available nearly everywhere, of doing all single-engined appproaches flapless to avoid any short-finals trauma, only deploying the flap when landing was assured. That they needed to change an SOP because the single-stage-flap asymmetric configuration was dangerous was recognised then.
Those of us who were later glued to the T4 every second Tuesday or Thursday night for night asymmetrics recurrents got to know just how gentle you needed to be with the throttles during roller landings. You actually had plenty of time, even on only a 6000ft runway, to get it wrong once on a roller landing, throttle back, then painfully inch the throttles open again and get airborne: if you didn't get it right the second time, you would have been glad of the rule requiring you to use a 9000 foot runway! However, if you only flew the T4 twice in 6 months, your feel for the throttles tended to be awry at first, based on how the PR9 throttles felt, not a safe situation at all. A solution was for the trainee to steer on the runway while the trainer could finesse the throttles through the roller - the start of what us civvies would call CRM. But all of this could be done completely safely in a simulator.
A classic example of the 100-series Avon's ability to cause mayhem was the early 80s low-level display practice when an engine surged without any accompanying throttle movement or other obvious cause. Unfortunately this happened during a stabilised medium-power 2G 60-degree bank turn with full flap and gear, 150kts, brilliant way to do a tight turn in front of a crowd. Except that, as the engine blew out the aircraft suddenly rolled upright even as the pilot frantically kicked in the rudder. Good job it was the upper engine that surged, the lower one would have rolled them upside down - they were only at 250 feet. And that was only the start of their problem: - with barn-door flap and gear down, on one engine, trying to do a go-around from 250 feet from what had now become an unintended approach into a set of ploughed fields. For the record, the flaps eventually came up and they proved that if you have the right speed at the start, you don't need to start your asymmetric overshoot at 600 feet MDH to get away with it.
Milt - "I came close to flying a Canberra once that had been sabotaged!! I was flying one in an air display once on one engine when the live one quit. It was a good glider for a while. A story for later if there is interest." Amazing similarity - Please tell us more, Milt !
A PR7 had engine surges on take-off during the late 70s, in the 45 knot gap that Wheelbarrow mentioned below V2, and the crew ejected, leaving behind a jump-seat junior navigator to crash into brick walls alone.
As another example of the early Avon's surge problems, during an OCU course in the 60s, a colleague, far better and smoother pilot than I, was caught by an engine surge during a Canberra practice stall recovery over the North Sea. One engine went to full power, the other blew out to none: close to stall speed anyway, the aircraft quickly spun, down into cloud. Disoriented, he ordered his Nav to eject, then after the bang and before he could eject himself, he came out of cloud with enough height and horizon to visually recover and fly home. "Sorry about that" - the poor Nav without a goon suit nearly died in the cold sea, luckily had parachuted down near a boat that saved him.
So there are a number of pointers to the unreliability of the Avon 100 series engines, which are of course the key to why there is any need to practice asymmetric approaches in the first place. In 13000 hours on Boeings and Airbus kit since then I have never had an engine out. My record on 2000 hours on Canberras was similar to Wheelbarrow's, a number of failures. To my mind, anyone who wants to dig a T4 out of maintenance and resurrect it ought to prove that it is safe and necessary to do so. No doubt all the accident stats are available, somewhere. To me, the case is beyond doubt : they were unsafe in the '50s, and they are still unsafe.
So - Unsafe ? Should they ground them all ?
Despite loving the "Queen of the Skies" as we all do, the title to this thread appears well founded.
On the whole though, we don't know what we don't know, only what we do know. So I'm grateful for well-reasoned posts from Beeayeate and Milt, Instrument Ranting and others, and enlightenment from Jackonicko who said "...the damned things are of pivotal importance, and offer a unique capability. Useful they most assuredly are."
If that is correct, Jacko, I'll happily modify my stance. I'm amazed that nothing else in our or the US inventory can carry the same electro-optical oblique sensors, but the operational requirement for PR9s is definitely beyond my pay grade. If the people who decide do so on the basis that the PR9 might save another 9/11, there is clearly a trade-off against safety. I'll leave that trade for those of you who know better than me to make. So rest easy, Sir Brian and Buff.
The T4s are a very different matter. I'm not so sure that the case has been made here for continuing to risk pilots' lives by using dodgy first-generation Avon 100-series engines in 50-year old airframes with ancient seats and instrumentation to do roller or asymmetric practice landings. And simply no-one here has made the case for risking Navigators' lives as well. The T4s seem to be clearly unsafe, and probably unnecessary.
Anyone have a nice used T4 brass starter cartridge ? Expect it to start having historic value soon.
____
ACW599 - John - PR9/ T4 differences : you might start by looking here :
http://www.rafmarham.co.uk/organisat...n/canberra.htm
Cheers
Should we be mute after a fatality while grief might still hang in the air ?
Accidents are not good news, and this thread has highlighted that some would prefer discussion not to proceed, out of respect. Again I apologise for starting this thread with a forthright and provocative post at such a critical time. That was my personal reaction to the fact of the Canberra still claiming lives all these years since I flew it.
The resulting thread would seem to show considerable support for the view that a good time and place to discuss an issue is when it is topical. Thanks, Milt and wheelbarrow, for your thoughts on shared experience being of value to others despite possible insensitivity at a difficult time.
Most of us pilots seem to be able to get on with our lives during and after crises, but I doubt if any of us are totally insensitive. It is probably on balance worth continuing the discussion a little further. Sorry, Fast Erect
Canberra Engine problems
There is ample evidence of the fickleness of the Avon 100 series engines on the earlier Canberras. Not everyone met the problem - thanks Pindi for pointing out that it was possible to have a great tour without engines misbehaving. However, wheelbarrow's eloquent statement mirrors my experience. Some anecdotal evidence follows:
One vaguely remembers trying to get airborne in strongish crosswinds- you just couldn't put the power on until rolling fast down the runway because the downwind engine would just surge and blow out. One equally vaguely remembers the things going out when you decided to do a turn at high altitude, N-over-root-T surge springs to mind as the name of the cause.
The asymmetric difficulty was clear in the 70s when Bassingbourne with its shorter runway had closed, and someone had the bright idea, now that there was 9000ft available nearly everywhere, of doing all single-engined appproaches flapless to avoid any short-finals trauma, only deploying the flap when landing was assured. That they needed to change an SOP because the single-stage-flap asymmetric configuration was dangerous was recognised then.
Those of us who were later glued to the T4 every second Tuesday or Thursday night for night asymmetrics recurrents got to know just how gentle you needed to be with the throttles during roller landings. You actually had plenty of time, even on only a 6000ft runway, to get it wrong once on a roller landing, throttle back, then painfully inch the throttles open again and get airborne: if you didn't get it right the second time, you would have been glad of the rule requiring you to use a 9000 foot runway! However, if you only flew the T4 twice in 6 months, your feel for the throttles tended to be awry at first, based on how the PR9 throttles felt, not a safe situation at all. A solution was for the trainee to steer on the runway while the trainer could finesse the throttles through the roller - the start of what us civvies would call CRM. But all of this could be done completely safely in a simulator.
A classic example of the 100-series Avon's ability to cause mayhem was the early 80s low-level display practice when an engine surged without any accompanying throttle movement or other obvious cause. Unfortunately this happened during a stabilised medium-power 2G 60-degree bank turn with full flap and gear, 150kts, brilliant way to do a tight turn in front of a crowd. Except that, as the engine blew out the aircraft suddenly rolled upright even as the pilot frantically kicked in the rudder. Good job it was the upper engine that surged, the lower one would have rolled them upside down - they were only at 250 feet. And that was only the start of their problem: - with barn-door flap and gear down, on one engine, trying to do a go-around from 250 feet from what had now become an unintended approach into a set of ploughed fields. For the record, the flaps eventually came up and they proved that if you have the right speed at the start, you don't need to start your asymmetric overshoot at 600 feet MDH to get away with it.
Milt - "I came close to flying a Canberra once that had been sabotaged!! I was flying one in an air display once on one engine when the live one quit. It was a good glider for a while. A story for later if there is interest." Amazing similarity - Please tell us more, Milt !
A PR7 had engine surges on take-off during the late 70s, in the 45 knot gap that Wheelbarrow mentioned below V2, and the crew ejected, leaving behind a jump-seat junior navigator to crash into brick walls alone.
As another example of the early Avon's surge problems, during an OCU course in the 60s, a colleague, far better and smoother pilot than I, was caught by an engine surge during a Canberra practice stall recovery over the North Sea. One engine went to full power, the other blew out to none: close to stall speed anyway, the aircraft quickly spun, down into cloud. Disoriented, he ordered his Nav to eject, then after the bang and before he could eject himself, he came out of cloud with enough height and horizon to visually recover and fly home. "Sorry about that" - the poor Nav without a goon suit nearly died in the cold sea, luckily had parachuted down near a boat that saved him.
So there are a number of pointers to the unreliability of the Avon 100 series engines, which are of course the key to why there is any need to practice asymmetric approaches in the first place. In 13000 hours on Boeings and Airbus kit since then I have never had an engine out. My record on 2000 hours on Canberras was similar to Wheelbarrow's, a number of failures. To my mind, anyone who wants to dig a T4 out of maintenance and resurrect it ought to prove that it is safe and necessary to do so. No doubt all the accident stats are available, somewhere. To me, the case is beyond doubt : they were unsafe in the '50s, and they are still unsafe.
So - Unsafe ? Should they ground them all ?
Despite loving the "Queen of the Skies" as we all do, the title to this thread appears well founded.
On the whole though, we don't know what we don't know, only what we do know. So I'm grateful for well-reasoned posts from Beeayeate and Milt, Instrument Ranting and others, and enlightenment from Jackonicko who said "...the damned things are of pivotal importance, and offer a unique capability. Useful they most assuredly are."
If that is correct, Jacko, I'll happily modify my stance. I'm amazed that nothing else in our or the US inventory can carry the same electro-optical oblique sensors, but the operational requirement for PR9s is definitely beyond my pay grade. If the people who decide do so on the basis that the PR9 might save another 9/11, there is clearly a trade-off against safety. I'll leave that trade for those of you who know better than me to make. So rest easy, Sir Brian and Buff.
The T4s are a very different matter. I'm not so sure that the case has been made here for continuing to risk pilots' lives by using dodgy first-generation Avon 100-series engines in 50-year old airframes with ancient seats and instrumentation to do roller or asymmetric practice landings. And simply no-one here has made the case for risking Navigators' lives as well. The T4s seem to be clearly unsafe, and probably unnecessary.
Anyone have a nice used T4 brass starter cartridge ? Expect it to start having historic value soon.
____
ACW599 - John - PR9/ T4 differences : you might start by looking here :
http://www.rafmarham.co.uk/organisat...n/canberra.htm
Cheers
Last edited by 2 Liter Peter; 8th Sep 2004 at 15:22.
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Watch this space for the extract from memoires describing the Canberra sabotage and the adrenalin pumping when setting up for a dead stick with no engines.
Meanwhile the other major cause of Canberra losses was that infernal problem with elevator trim runaways. We flew with trepidation for a period thinking that one could occur at ANY time.
The fix in my time was a double pole trim switch with one pole isolating all electrical power to the elevator trimmer.
Was the root cause of those runaways ever determined and what was it? I either don't remember or never did find out.
Lesson from that incidently relates to anyone who somehow finds himself in an uncontrollable nose down pitch. DON'T just dive into the ground with the stick hard back. Much better to push gently under and roll out up the other side at much lower speed. OR if not enough air under you then roll hard until you are able to see the ground going away. Intent then is to get the speed down so that you can sort it or leave it.
Meanwhile the other major cause of Canberra losses was that infernal problem with elevator trim runaways. We flew with trepidation for a period thinking that one could occur at ANY time.
The fix in my time was a double pole trim switch with one pole isolating all electrical power to the elevator trimmer.
Was the root cause of those runaways ever determined and what was it? I either don't remember or never did find out.
Lesson from that incidently relates to anyone who somehow finds himself in an uncontrollable nose down pitch. DON'T just dive into the ground with the stick hard back. Much better to push gently under and roll out up the other side at much lower speed. OR if not enough air under you then roll hard until you are able to see the ground going away. Intent then is to get the speed down so that you can sort it or leave it.
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Canberra Sabotage with a little Preamble
ETPS at Farnborough 1955
Such was the general approach to test flying during those days that it was considered highly desirable that as many pilots as possible, get experience in as many aircraft as possible with a minimum of prior formal conversion. This approach did much to evolve standard requirements for aircraft design and handling in an era when aircraft were developing at a very rapid rate. The constrained restrictions imposed on present generation test pilots arise from a much slower rate of development and an enormous increase in capital costs of aircraft and equipment.
So it was that one day we had a visiting RN Captain fly off in one of our Seahawks. He flew some aerobatics and during the recovery from a loop experienced a terrific bang as a goodly portion of the left side of the cockpit disappeared. He was left with little control over engine power with only a portion of the throttle linkage remaining and was only just able to limp back to Farnborough. He had not seen any other aircraft in the vicinity of the incident but presumed that he had been involved in a mid air collision. The story soon pieced together. A report was made by the pilot of a Hunter who had been flying straight and level at the time that another aircraft had plunged down on his aircraft striking it on the side of the front fuselage and taking out some of his right wing leading edge.
On the side of the Hunter's fuselage was a clear impression of a mirror image of the triangular red sign painted on the sides of aircraft cockpits having ejection seats - "Danger Ejection Seat". This had transfered from the Seahawk to the Hunter during the collision. It became an interesting exercise to subsequently use two models of the aircraft involved to attempt to reproduce the precise sequence of movement of the two aircraft as they became enmeshed for that split second of time. That both aircraft and their pilots survived is indeed remarkable.
At about this time, ETPS took delivery of a B2 Canberra No 867 which had just come through a major overhaul with English Electric at Warton. It was flown into Farnborough by one of the tutors. It was a normal practice then for the TPS engineers to do an acceptance inspection. The senior engineer was meticulous which was as well in that we all placed abnormal reliance on the reliability of the aircraft he and his team maintained and serviced.
Part of his inspection involved climbing through a hatch beneath the rear fuselage to examine the rudder and elevator control push-pull rods which ran along the left side of the fuselage through bearings at about 4 feet intervals. The rods connected directly with the flying controls in the cockpit. They were made from alloy tubing about 1 inch in diameter. The engineer discovered some metal particles scattered down the side of the fuselage in the vicinity of one of the bearings. He initially thought that one of the bearings may have seized and this may have been the source of the metal particles.
On the ground, the mass balance of the Canberra elevator control system caused the elevators to raise to their upper stops so that the control column on the ground was always fully back . The engineer used a piece of cord to tie the control column forward so that he could then inspect the complete run of the control rods. On climbing back into the rear fuselage, he was appalled to find that one of the elevator rods had been cut almost right through. The saw cut had been made so that it would be concealed by a bearing with the controls in their normal ground position.
All hell broke loose. Following an initial ETPS investigation, the police and Scotland Yard commenced a vigorous investigation at the English Electric plant at Wharton.
Some months previously, the wiring looms in the main electronics equipment bay of a Canberra being overhauled at Wharton had been extensively cut by someone using wire cutters. The culprit had not been found. Examination of work records showed that three workmen had worked on both aircraft during the periods in question. Close questioning eventually brought forth a confession by one fitter to both acts of sabotage.
Prior to the sabotage, the culprit had been working on night shifts for which there was an extra pay loading. He was transferred against his wishes to day shifts and decided to take out his resentment by deliberately damaging aircraft on which he was working. He was arrested, charged with sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment. Hope he served the full term.
I have always taken great care with pre-flight inspections ever since and it was not the last case of aircraft sabotage to cross my path.
ETPS at Farnborough 1955
Such was the general approach to test flying during those days that it was considered highly desirable that as many pilots as possible, get experience in as many aircraft as possible with a minimum of prior formal conversion. This approach did much to evolve standard requirements for aircraft design and handling in an era when aircraft were developing at a very rapid rate. The constrained restrictions imposed on present generation test pilots arise from a much slower rate of development and an enormous increase in capital costs of aircraft and equipment.
So it was that one day we had a visiting RN Captain fly off in one of our Seahawks. He flew some aerobatics and during the recovery from a loop experienced a terrific bang as a goodly portion of the left side of the cockpit disappeared. He was left with little control over engine power with only a portion of the throttle linkage remaining and was only just able to limp back to Farnborough. He had not seen any other aircraft in the vicinity of the incident but presumed that he had been involved in a mid air collision. The story soon pieced together. A report was made by the pilot of a Hunter who had been flying straight and level at the time that another aircraft had plunged down on his aircraft striking it on the side of the front fuselage and taking out some of his right wing leading edge.
On the side of the Hunter's fuselage was a clear impression of a mirror image of the triangular red sign painted on the sides of aircraft cockpits having ejection seats - "Danger Ejection Seat". This had transfered from the Seahawk to the Hunter during the collision. It became an interesting exercise to subsequently use two models of the aircraft involved to attempt to reproduce the precise sequence of movement of the two aircraft as they became enmeshed for that split second of time. That both aircraft and their pilots survived is indeed remarkable.
At about this time, ETPS took delivery of a B2 Canberra No 867 which had just come through a major overhaul with English Electric at Warton. It was flown into Farnborough by one of the tutors. It was a normal practice then for the TPS engineers to do an acceptance inspection. The senior engineer was meticulous which was as well in that we all placed abnormal reliance on the reliability of the aircraft he and his team maintained and serviced.
Part of his inspection involved climbing through a hatch beneath the rear fuselage to examine the rudder and elevator control push-pull rods which ran along the left side of the fuselage through bearings at about 4 feet intervals. The rods connected directly with the flying controls in the cockpit. They were made from alloy tubing about 1 inch in diameter. The engineer discovered some metal particles scattered down the side of the fuselage in the vicinity of one of the bearings. He initially thought that one of the bearings may have seized and this may have been the source of the metal particles.
On the ground, the mass balance of the Canberra elevator control system caused the elevators to raise to their upper stops so that the control column on the ground was always fully back . The engineer used a piece of cord to tie the control column forward so that he could then inspect the complete run of the control rods. On climbing back into the rear fuselage, he was appalled to find that one of the elevator rods had been cut almost right through. The saw cut had been made so that it would be concealed by a bearing with the controls in their normal ground position.
All hell broke loose. Following an initial ETPS investigation, the police and Scotland Yard commenced a vigorous investigation at the English Electric plant at Wharton.
Some months previously, the wiring looms in the main electronics equipment bay of a Canberra being overhauled at Wharton had been extensively cut by someone using wire cutters. The culprit had not been found. Examination of work records showed that three workmen had worked on both aircraft during the periods in question. Close questioning eventually brought forth a confession by one fitter to both acts of sabotage.
Prior to the sabotage, the culprit had been working on night shifts for which there was an extra pay loading. He was transferred against his wishes to day shifts and decided to take out his resentment by deliberately damaging aircraft on which he was working. He was arrested, charged with sabotage and sentenced to life imprisonment. Hope he served the full term.
I have always taken great care with pre-flight inspections ever since and it was not the last case of aircraft sabotage to cross my path.
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Just to set the record straight - the last crash at Wyton, where the Station Cdr was killed, was in March 1991, not 1993. It was the week after Wyton personnel returned from the First Gulf war. It was as a result of practice asy, but there were a number of unusual factors which I am privi to but do not intend to discuss.
And visual committal height [where you were committed to land following an engine failure] was 600ft agl.
And visual committal height [where you were committed to land following an engine failure] was 600ft agl.
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Having flown Meteors in the 50s and Canberras in the 60s, I thought 2 Liter Peter was being a bit over the top when he suggested that the Canberra was/is inherently dangerous. He, and various others on this thread, have more hours on the type than I do, but during my 1000 odd hours, on the B2 with the old Avons, and the B15 with the slightly newer ones, I never had the problems others encountered.
I do remember that only the Sqn QFIs were allowed to do roller landings with the T4, because of the possibility of surge, particularly in a crosswind. I can't remember if we did rollers in the B15s.
There have been a wealth of very informative and well argued posts from Milt, Wheelbarrow, FV, Jackonicko, Beeayeate and others, and not least from 2 Litre Peter himself. I suppose that, in the end, while we have manned aeroplanes, we will have tragic accidents.
So far as this one is concerned, all is conjecture until the BoI publishes its findings, and makes recommendations for change or otherwise to training requirements. I imagine there will still be a need for a T4 on strength until the PR9s are replaced, if ever. Though in this day and age I am tending toward 2 Liter Peters point of view.
I do remember that only the Sqn QFIs were allowed to do roller landings with the T4, because of the possibility of surge, particularly in a crosswind. I can't remember if we did rollers in the B15s.
There have been a wealth of very informative and well argued posts from Milt, Wheelbarrow, FV, Jackonicko, Beeayeate and others, and not least from 2 Litre Peter himself. I suppose that, in the end, while we have manned aeroplanes, we will have tragic accidents.
So far as this one is concerned, all is conjecture until the BoI publishes its findings, and makes recommendations for change or otherwise to training requirements. I imagine there will still be a need for a T4 on strength until the PR9s are replaced, if ever. Though in this day and age I am tending toward 2 Liter Peters point of view.