Falklands Crash Sites
Thread Starter
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 131
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Navaleye
I am interested in your quote:
At the time of impact on AC, Hermes was on a reciprocal to Invincible 2000 yds off her port bow. Atlantic Conveyor was 14 miles to port. Neither Hermes or Invincible were in any danger from this attack, if they had been both Exocets would have ditched. AC was defenseless but was only hit by one Exocet which did detonate.
I remember the evening of the attack vividly.
I had just been released from flying duties and had hurried down to the wardroom for the first of my rationed two pints of CSB (Courage Special Bitter) per night. The wardroom bar in HMS Hermes opened at 18:00 and closed a couple of hours later as it was the dormitory for the entire flying group onboard. (5 Deck was evacuated because of the anticipated submarine attack.)
Shortly after taking my first sip the air raid siren went off and we were all told to "Close all red openings" (Shut and clip every hatch) followed by "Everybody HIT THE DECK!!!!" Followed by more alarmingly "MAKE SURE ALL THOSE CLIPS ARE REALLY TIGHT!"
I remember the wardroom bar being closed with the shutters coming down and me cuddling my precious pint of CSB lying flat on the deck like it was the most important thing of all time! I remember the noise of chaff rockets being fired and thinking "where is this missile going to come inboard?"
The wardroom in HMS Hermes was quite close to the waterline and I could quite literally imagine the weapon coming inboard through the wardroom at any moment.
After what seemed like an eternity we were given the all clear but I remember being deeply traumatized by the being inside a confined space with absolutely no idea of what was going on outside. (Thank goodness for the pint of CSB which I am glad to report survived the situation!)
An aircraft handler from our squadron later said he saw the missile hit Atlantic Conveyer whilst he was on deck and he was so stressed he he bit through his back teeth and required dental treatment from our onboard toothwright!
If the AC was 14 miles away how could we have been so involved in the action?
ES
I am interested in your quote:
At the time of impact on AC, Hermes was on a reciprocal to Invincible 2000 yds off her port bow. Atlantic Conveyor was 14 miles to port. Neither Hermes or Invincible were in any danger from this attack, if they had been both Exocets would have ditched. AC was defenseless but was only hit by one Exocet which did detonate.
I remember the evening of the attack vividly.
I had just been released from flying duties and had hurried down to the wardroom for the first of my rationed two pints of CSB (Courage Special Bitter) per night. The wardroom bar in HMS Hermes opened at 18:00 and closed a couple of hours later as it was the dormitory for the entire flying group onboard. (5 Deck was evacuated because of the anticipated submarine attack.)
Shortly after taking my first sip the air raid siren went off and we were all told to "Close all red openings" (Shut and clip every hatch) followed by "Everybody HIT THE DECK!!!!" Followed by more alarmingly "MAKE SURE ALL THOSE CLIPS ARE REALLY TIGHT!"
I remember the wardroom bar being closed with the shutters coming down and me cuddling my precious pint of CSB lying flat on the deck like it was the most important thing of all time! I remember the noise of chaff rockets being fired and thinking "where is this missile going to come inboard?"
The wardroom in HMS Hermes was quite close to the waterline and I could quite literally imagine the weapon coming inboard through the wardroom at any moment.
After what seemed like an eternity we were given the all clear but I remember being deeply traumatized by the being inside a confined space with absolutely no idea of what was going on outside. (Thank goodness for the pint of CSB which I am glad to report survived the situation!)
An aircraft handler from our squadron later said he saw the missile hit Atlantic Conveyer whilst he was on deck and he was so stressed he he bit through his back teeth and required dental treatment from our onboard toothwright!
If the AC was 14 miles away how could we have been so involved in the action?
ES
Thread Starter
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 131
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Regarding the Atlantic Conveyer I have to relate another interesting story.
One of my instructors at RAF Valley who I had a huge regard for was one of the pilots who came down to the Falklands with The Atlantic Conveyer as a newly fledged Sea Harrier pilot. These guys had done the absolute minimum of Harrier training and had been sent down to the South Atlantic to help us out.
The transfer of Sea Harriers from Atlantic Conveyer to HMS Hermes and Invincible required a vertical take off from Atlantic Conveyer and (obviously, a vertical landing on the designated carrier)
The vertical take off in a Harrier was an interesting manoeuvre.
It required the carefull and calculated handling of a colossal amount of power delivered to you in an incredibly short period of time.
For me this is twenty years ago but if I remember correctly, it was:
Slam to 55% (check accel time) Nozzles to 40 (Check duct pressure) Nozzles to the hover stop (without delay) Back to the throtlle and slam to FULL POWER!
Those of you who have flown high performance fighters will know what it is to get 21,000 pounds of thrust in approximately one and a quarter seconds!
I believe this particular individual forgot to move his nozzles to the hover stop and took off from Alantic Conveyer with 40 degrees of nozzle selected.
Miraculously, he survived, but like Tony Penfold took no further part in the proceedings.
These were terrific guys. John Leeming was amongst them.
He got involved in combat shortly after he arrived. He, apparently closed an A4 and tried to fire his missile. Sadly, he had forgotten to turn the electronics on but the gun switches were similar to the Lightning which he had just been flying so he switched these on and fired a complete magazine of 30 mm Aden rounds at the A4 and subsequently flew through the fireball!
ES
One of my instructors at RAF Valley who I had a huge regard for was one of the pilots who came down to the Falklands with The Atlantic Conveyer as a newly fledged Sea Harrier pilot. These guys had done the absolute minimum of Harrier training and had been sent down to the South Atlantic to help us out.
The transfer of Sea Harriers from Atlantic Conveyer to HMS Hermes and Invincible required a vertical take off from Atlantic Conveyer and (obviously, a vertical landing on the designated carrier)
The vertical take off in a Harrier was an interesting manoeuvre.
It required the carefull and calculated handling of a colossal amount of power delivered to you in an incredibly short period of time.
For me this is twenty years ago but if I remember correctly, it was:
Slam to 55% (check accel time) Nozzles to 40 (Check duct pressure) Nozzles to the hover stop (without delay) Back to the throtlle and slam to FULL POWER!
Those of you who have flown high performance fighters will know what it is to get 21,000 pounds of thrust in approximately one and a quarter seconds!
I believe this particular individual forgot to move his nozzles to the hover stop and took off from Alantic Conveyer with 40 degrees of nozzle selected.
Miraculously, he survived, but like Tony Penfold took no further part in the proceedings.
These were terrific guys. John Leeming was amongst them.
He got involved in combat shortly after he arrived. He, apparently closed an A4 and tried to fire his missile. Sadly, he had forgotten to turn the electronics on but the gun switches were similar to the Lightning which he had just been flying so he switched these on and fired a complete magazine of 30 mm Aden rounds at the A4 and subsequently flew through the fireball!
ES
Suspicion breeds confidence
ES,
That was an account heard from from someone on Invincible, which is slightly misleading as this would place AC on Hermes starboard quarter. Doubtless the whole task group would close up to action stations and lay chaff for deception on receipt of a Handbrake racket. AC of course had no chaff and was allegedly hit by an Exocet which was itself seduced by Yarmouth's chaff pattern. The account of this AC attack is quite confused and in some cases contradictory. Good news that your CSB survived intact though! I guess it tasted even better after. Invincible launched 6 Sea Dart in 90 seconds during the attack at a target later assessed as Hermes first chaff pattern, which shows how confusing the attack was. This was a well planned and well executed attack by the Argentine navy. I am working on a creating a full time line for this attack in due course.
The BoI report is here.
However it is also inaccurate in some respects, believing that AC was hit by two missiles, when their is no evidence of this.
The Am39s used by the Argentines were export models and had a less sophisticated centroid homing seeker than the NATO spec weapon. Regardless, they worked well against large undefended targets.
That was an account heard from from someone on Invincible, which is slightly misleading as this would place AC on Hermes starboard quarter. Doubtless the whole task group would close up to action stations and lay chaff for deception on receipt of a Handbrake racket. AC of course had no chaff and was allegedly hit by an Exocet which was itself seduced by Yarmouth's chaff pattern. The account of this AC attack is quite confused and in some cases contradictory. Good news that your CSB survived intact though! I guess it tasted even better after. Invincible launched 6 Sea Dart in 90 seconds during the attack at a target later assessed as Hermes first chaff pattern, which shows how confusing the attack was. This was a well planned and well executed attack by the Argentine navy. I am working on a creating a full time line for this attack in due course.
The BoI report is here.
However it is also inaccurate in some respects, believing that AC was hit by two missiles, when their is no evidence of this.
The Am39s used by the Argentines were export models and had a less sophisticated centroid homing seeker than the NATO spec weapon. Regardless, they worked well against large undefended targets.
Last edited by Navaleye; 3rd Jan 2009 at 14:51.
Join Date: Nov 2008
Location: Spain
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi again:
Thanks for Snapshot words. Nice to read them.
Returning to 8 june action I found this link to Morgan book:
Hostile Skies
There are two interesting paragraphs:
1ş: Unbeknownst to me, on my entry into the fight, I had mistaken the third Skyhawk for the rearmost man, a mistake that should have cost me my life. As I was about to line up my sights on the second A4, the rear man was manoeuvring in an attempt to spoil my whole day with a stream of 20 mm high explosive rounds. I had made the classic mistake of barrelling into the fight without total situational awareness. As a result, I had nearly collided with the fourth Skyhawk and was now directly in front of him. Purely by chance, Primer Teniente Hector Sanchez had taken some ground fire a few minutes earlier, which had damaged his gun in such a way that it would not fire. He had to watch, helplessly, as his formation fell prey to my deadly missiles.
2ş: Suddenly, over the radio came an urgent shout from Dave Smith, "Pull up, Pull up, you're being fired at!" All he had seen of the fight up until now, because of the failing light, was two missile launches followed by two explosions. He then saw an aircraft, only feet above the water, flying through a hail of explosions and assumed it to be me. By now I had run out of ammunition and at Dave's cry, I pulled up into the vertical, through the setting sun and in a big lazy looping manoeuvre, rolled out at twelve thousand feet heading northeast for Hermes with my heart racing.
Is Morgan taking some literary license?
According to him, it seems as if you have intercepted a row of planes in the third step. The forth one, Sánchez, would have kept unseen in a forth place. According to FAA webpage, he saw the interception from upper and right, so he was on the left. This would place him ina left rear position. In fact, interception began before argentinean pilots get their objetive. Morgan describes how while is making his hard dive, he sees the first plane to attack and miss. Then the second scoring a hit. And the third taking a paralel course just on his left. He´s the one to be fired and the one to be shot down. Does it mean that Sánchez really was behind you on the left?
I agree that it´s impossible he to be behind and finally ahead. I think when he mentions to be fired, it could be the small arms that fired at him when overflew land during the ingress. Mazo and Martillo flights came from the west towards east. Overflew Fitzroy where were fired and damaged and then made, under Malvinas radar indications, a 180ş right turn to look for the target. This put them on a west course over sea, heading for the landing craft. That´s just the moment in which Morgan saw them and began the interception. If they were flying an arrow formation, the ones on the left side probably placed in the rear after the right turn. Sánchez was probably one of them.
What do you think? In the second paragraph he says you thought he was the pilot flying betwen shots. What is not logical at all cause you indeed fired at that plane what hadn´t happened if you really had thought it was Morgan.
Navaleye ,about 30th may raid, my source, a crewmember named Andrew Mawman, told me that Exeter was 12,5 miles NW from Avenger. So someone´s is wrong, or both
. And Invencible 24 miles east from them.
Argentineans used no french bombs during the war. The ones were Mk-17 (1000 lb) and BR-250 (250 Kg). The Naval aviation spent american Mk-82 with snakeye tails
Regards
Thanks for Snapshot words. Nice to read them.
Returning to 8 june action I found this link to Morgan book:
Hostile Skies
There are two interesting paragraphs:
1ş: Unbeknownst to me, on my entry into the fight, I had mistaken the third Skyhawk for the rearmost man, a mistake that should have cost me my life. As I was about to line up my sights on the second A4, the rear man was manoeuvring in an attempt to spoil my whole day with a stream of 20 mm high explosive rounds. I had made the classic mistake of barrelling into the fight without total situational awareness. As a result, I had nearly collided with the fourth Skyhawk and was now directly in front of him. Purely by chance, Primer Teniente Hector Sanchez had taken some ground fire a few minutes earlier, which had damaged his gun in such a way that it would not fire. He had to watch, helplessly, as his formation fell prey to my deadly missiles.
2ş: Suddenly, over the radio came an urgent shout from Dave Smith, "Pull up, Pull up, you're being fired at!" All he had seen of the fight up until now, because of the failing light, was two missile launches followed by two explosions. He then saw an aircraft, only feet above the water, flying through a hail of explosions and assumed it to be me. By now I had run out of ammunition and at Dave's cry, I pulled up into the vertical, through the setting sun and in a big lazy looping manoeuvre, rolled out at twelve thousand feet heading northeast for Hermes with my heart racing.
Is Morgan taking some literary license?
According to him, it seems as if you have intercepted a row of planes in the third step. The forth one, Sánchez, would have kept unseen in a forth place. According to FAA webpage, he saw the interception from upper and right, so he was on the left. This would place him ina left rear position. In fact, interception began before argentinean pilots get their objetive. Morgan describes how while is making his hard dive, he sees the first plane to attack and miss. Then the second scoring a hit. And the third taking a paralel course just on his left. He´s the one to be fired and the one to be shot down. Does it mean that Sánchez really was behind you on the left?
I agree that it´s impossible he to be behind and finally ahead. I think when he mentions to be fired, it could be the small arms that fired at him when overflew land during the ingress. Mazo and Martillo flights came from the west towards east. Overflew Fitzroy where were fired and damaged and then made, under Malvinas radar indications, a 180ş right turn to look for the target. This put them on a west course over sea, heading for the landing craft. That´s just the moment in which Morgan saw them and began the interception. If they were flying an arrow formation, the ones on the left side probably placed in the rear after the right turn. Sánchez was probably one of them.
What do you think? In the second paragraph he says you thought he was the pilot flying betwen shots. What is not logical at all cause you indeed fired at that plane what hadn´t happened if you really had thought it was Morgan.
Navaleye ,about 30th may raid, my source, a crewmember named Andrew Mawman, told me that Exeter was 12,5 miles NW from Avenger. So someone´s is wrong, or both
. And Invencible 24 miles east from them.Argentineans used no french bombs during the war. The ones were Mk-17 (1000 lb) and BR-250 (250 Kg). The Naval aviation spent american Mk-82 with snakeye tails
Regards
Suspicion breeds confidence
Jaulbo,
That just goes to show how confusing the fog of war can be when trying recreate an action, even official documents are frequently wrong. Its also hard to synchronise exact positions especially with aircraft where a time difference of two minutes can lead difference of several miles. I would need to see the track chart of each ship to ascertain the precise position of course. These are not readily available though.
That just goes to show how confusing the fog of war can be when trying recreate an action, even official documents are frequently wrong. Its also hard to synchronise exact positions especially with aircraft where a time difference of two minutes can lead difference of several miles. I would need to see the track chart of each ship to ascertain the precise position of course. These are not readily available though.
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Not quite where I'd like to be
Age: 65
Posts: 103
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Navaleye / KG86
I’ve followed your posts with respect to the two Skyhawks lost in the Jasons on the 9th May 1982 with interest. A couple of points, in the spirit of debate, if I may:
I’ve followed your posts with respect to the two Skyhawks lost in the Jasons on the 9th May 1982 with interest. A couple of points, in the spirit of debate, if I may:
- There is definitely at least one A-4 on South Jason Island, at approximately 51 12 21.67S 60 53 27.18W. I first visited this wreck on 29th December 1993 – I remember it well because I had to be winched from a Sea King onto the hillside! I was trying to determine if it was one or two aircraft, but I didn’t have long enough on the hill to decide. On the 12th January 2001 an EOD team visited the island to dispose of any live ordnance that had become apparent since their last visit (those visits were annual then), in our Sea King we were able to land on the ridge to drop them off but you wouldn’t have got a Chinook on there. The EOD team actually set fire to the island by mistake – it created a real upset with the conservationists, and questions were asked in the British Parliament. I (and many others) spent the next 5 days trying to water-bomb the fire out, together with the Chinook crew from 78 Sqn with their very impressive bucket!
- This A-4 hit the North West side of the ridge heading Easterly. In my (unprofessional) opinion it was a CFIT by an aircraft heading INBOUND to the islands – this was supported in my mind by the EOD team I spoke to after my first visit in 1993 who informed me South Jason was the location of at least one unexploded 1000-pounder on their list of “interesting things to find”.
- I can’t see the “distinctive tail, debris field, and poss drop tanks” you refer to on Steeple Jason (19 miles away to the NW). I have to say though, I can’t see any of these items on the crash site on South Jason either, so I’d be surprised if you could see them on Google Earth
- KG86 – could you have been hovering on the South Jason ridge? Your description of a “circular saw” is classic South Jason.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Sargs,
Thank you very much for your post, I had a look on Google at your position and believe I can see the debris you refer to. Strangely, I did a complete look at South Jason and missed it. It only deepens the mystery. If these wrecks are indeed related to Coventry's 9th May engagement. In my opinion they were not as they would have been undetectable, so a bad weather CFIT fits the bill. I guess we may never know what unit they belonged to and when they were launched.
Jualbo, the Bomb Disposal expert on Antelope did report a French bomb/fuse and had no knowledge of how to defuse it. More fog....
Thank you very much for your post, I had a look on Google at your position and believe I can see the debris you refer to. Strangely, I did a complete look at South Jason and missed it. It only deepens the mystery. If these wrecks are indeed related to Coventry's 9th May engagement. In my opinion they were not as they would have been undetectable, so a bad weather CFIT fits the bill. I guess we may never know what unit they belonged to and when they were launched.
Jualbo, the Bomb Disposal expert on Antelope did report a French bomb/fuse and had no knowledge of how to defuse it. More fog....
Navaleye wrote
Argentine Aircraft Lost - Falklands War 1982
' Two A-4C Skyhawks of FAA Grupo 4 lost. Possibly damaged by Sea Darts from HMS Coventry or crashed in bad weather, with one aircraft found on South Jason Island. Lt Casco and Lt Farias killed.'
Argentine Skyhawks in the Malvinas
'Grupo 4 attempted to strike the British ships but deteriorating weather forces most Skyhawks to abort. One flight attempting to complete the mission lost two Skyhawks. Teniente Jorge Farias flying C-303 simply disappeared, and C-313 flown by Teniente Jorge Casco crashed into cliffs of South Jason Island. Teniente Casco's body was found in the wreckage.'
TJ
I guess we may never know what unit they belonged to and when they were launched.
' Two A-4C Skyhawks of FAA Grupo 4 lost. Possibly damaged by Sea Darts from HMS Coventry or crashed in bad weather, with one aircraft found on South Jason Island. Lt Casco and Lt Farias killed.'
Argentine Skyhawks in the Malvinas
'Grupo 4 attempted to strike the British ships but deteriorating weather forces most Skyhawks to abort. One flight attempting to complete the mission lost two Skyhawks. Teniente Jorge Farias flying C-303 simply disappeared, and C-313 flown by Teniente Jorge Casco crashed into cliffs of South Jason Island. Teniente Casco's body was found in the wreckage.'
TJ
Join Date: Nov 2008
Location: Spain
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As I told in a previous post, Coventrys´ Sea Dart were launched on 9th may against Learjets not against Skyhawks and all missed. Three missiles were detected and avoided by the argentineans decoy Learjets.
Lt Casco and Lt Farias A-4Cs Skyhawks were lost in bad weather the same day on Jason islands. There is even a letter from 1st Lt Vázquez, later killed on 30th may, in which describes the impossible conditions to fly that morning cause he also flew another flight that had to abort after reaching West Falkland. It´s suposed that they could crash in the air, falling one to land and the other to sea. Both planes carried one solitary Mk-17 1000 pound bomb, so the bomb may be from them.
About debris field in Steeple Jason island, I have some reports on argentine planes that aborted missions and threw his bombs, as a practice, over the islands they found on their way home. I remember one mission on 29th may in which two Daggers (1st Lt Román and Lt Aguirre), after aborting for a CAP presence jettisonned his bombs on islas Salvajes (in english Grand Jason and Steeple Jason islands).
Regards
PD: Don´t know if the fuses were french but the bombs used that day were Mk-17 (A-4 B from FAA) and Mk-82 (A-4Q from Navy)
Lt Casco and Lt Farias A-4Cs Skyhawks were lost in bad weather the same day on Jason islands. There is even a letter from 1st Lt Vázquez, later killed on 30th may, in which describes the impossible conditions to fly that morning cause he also flew another flight that had to abort after reaching West Falkland. It´s suposed that they could crash in the air, falling one to land and the other to sea. Both planes carried one solitary Mk-17 1000 pound bomb, so the bomb may be from them.
About debris field in Steeple Jason island, I have some reports on argentine planes that aborted missions and threw his bombs, as a practice, over the islands they found on their way home. I remember one mission on 29th may in which two Daggers (1st Lt Román and Lt Aguirre), after aborting for a CAP presence jettisonned his bombs on islas Salvajes (in english Grand Jason and Steeple Jason islands).
Regards
PD: Don´t know if the fuses were french but the bombs used that day were Mk-17 (A-4 B from FAA) and Mk-82 (A-4Q from Navy)
Join Date: Nov 2008
Location: Spain
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
On 25th may two Skyhawks were downed by Sea Dart from Coventry while flying over north West Falkland. One of the pilots ejected and was later found dead on Golding island some years after. He was Captain García. The other pilot was captain Palaver and was never found (I think). Do you know if there are rests of their planes or probably fell to sea?
Thread Starter
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 131
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just This Once:
The shot was directly astern. It was a very long range shot for low level. I estimate I was at about 50 feet doing approximately 615 knots. I couldn't put the A4 on the horizon so he must have been at 30 feet or so. I thought the range to be a good mile and a half and can only assume it reached the target because of my substantial overtake. In fact, I saw the motor flame out well before impact.
Jualbo:
Yes, I would say a fair degree of literary licence! But nonetheless, a good read.
ES
The shot was directly astern. It was a very long range shot for low level. I estimate I was at about 50 feet doing approximately 615 knots. I couldn't put the A4 on the horizon so he must have been at 30 feet or so. I thought the range to be a good mile and a half and can only assume it reached the target because of my substantial overtake. In fact, I saw the motor flame out well before impact.
Jualbo:
Yes, I would say a fair degree of literary licence! But nonetheless, a good read.
ES
Last edited by Edmund Spencer; 4th Jan 2009 at 04:45.
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Burgess Hill
Posts: 149
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Atlantic Conveyor
I was in the 899/800 readyroom ( you know the big one on 4 deck where Des hung out and Neil Thomas slept ) trying to glean what had or had not worked on returning SHAR's and Dave Morgan came in ( it was late in the afternoon/early evening - but dark - and he must have just returned from CAP ) " Conveyor is out there" he said " - and its going up like November 5th ". DM always was a cheerful /upbeat kind of a pilot which I always thought percolated through to the deck crew to good effect
As far as the attack on AC - popular rumor mill/urban myth was that the down range Lynx installed I band transponder did the trick as far as saving Hermes and Invincible.
As far as the attack on AC - popular rumor mill/urban myth was that the down range Lynx installed I band transponder did the trick as far as saving Hermes and Invincible.
Join Date: Nov 2008
Location: Spain
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I found on Military photos phorum a news about one of Antelope´s bombs:
Falklands 25 - Page 36 - Military Photos
The one that exploded was a british Mk-17.
Still mistery about the second one.
Falklands 25 - Page 36 - Military Photos
The one that exploded was a british Mk-17.
Still mistery about the second one.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 125
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If the AC was 14 miles away how could we have been so involved in the action?
ES
Better still Dave, that is amazing eyesight from your aircraft handler being able to see the AC if it was at 14nm distance on a rolling deck at that time of the day!
ES
Better still Dave, that is amazing eyesight from your aircraft handler being able to see the AC if it was at 14nm distance on a rolling deck at that time of the day!
Last edited by Willoz269; 6th Jan 2009 at 01:06.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 131
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My sentiments entirely, Will!
Possibly the result of an overactive imagination but I definitely remember his account of this.
With all the noise and excitement going on in HMS Hermes we could have been forgiven for thinking the action was a bit closer. I was surprised to hear from Navaleye that the AC was so far away.
ES
Possibly the result of an overactive imagination but I definitely remember his account of this.
With all the noise and excitement going on in HMS Hermes we could have been forgiven for thinking the action was a bit closer. I was surprised to hear from Navaleye that the AC was so far away.
ES
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 125
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
On another note Dave, and this probably opens up a can of worms so you can reserve your opinion if you so wish.
But knowing today what you know of the Argentinian Air Force, what could they have done differently? I am asking as I re-read some of the books of the time, and found a quote from one of the GR3 pilots who didnt have many kind words as to the performance of the FAA in the conflict. Particularly in the Air to Air environment.
I read a few days ago a report in Spanish that the FAA did indeed have an Israeli instructor in the months prior to the conflict, to impart some tactics and techniques of modern aviation warfare.
Would the fact that they had no airborne radar, RWR, or HUD really have tipped the scales significantly? Again, you don't have to answer if you don't feel like it, I respect that.
But knowing today what you know of the Argentinian Air Force, what could they have done differently? I am asking as I re-read some of the books of the time, and found a quote from one of the GR3 pilots who didnt have many kind words as to the performance of the FAA in the conflict. Particularly in the Air to Air environment.
I read a few days ago a report in Spanish that the FAA did indeed have an Israeli instructor in the months prior to the conflict, to impart some tactics and techniques of modern aviation warfare.
Would the fact that they had no airborne radar, RWR, or HUD really have tipped the scales significantly? Again, you don't have to answer if you don't feel like it, I respect that.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Hong Kong
Posts: 131
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think the one thing that stood out and was a constant surprise to us was the way they flew tactical formation at low level. They generally flew as a fairly tight finger or arrow formation at very low level and at relatively high speed (500kts plus.) This meant they had little or no mutual support or cross cover which would have been provided by the battle spread we would have flown in similar circumstances. They would probably argue that they wanted to be close so that they could all pass over the same target together (Col Raul Diaz' email to me indicated this.) If this was the case they should have provided a card escort behind the attacking force of, say, two Daggers armed with Shaffrir. This would have put an entirely different perspective on the situation for us.
I believe in many of our intercepts we were unsighted until our first missile had struck home. (Certainly so on 24 May against 'Oro' flight.) If there had been a card escort a couple of miles behind the main attack force our attacks would have been much more difficult to execute with impunity.
Even in the first true air to air encounter between Steve Thomas/Paul Barton against Cuerva/Perona it appears Perona was flying in arrow when he should have been way out on Cuerva's 90 at a different altitude. This would have enabled him to pass Paul Barton head on and start a decent fight. As it was it seems he rolled conveniently into Paul's 12 o'clock!
Interesting to hear what the other tacticians out there might think about this.
ES
I believe in many of our intercepts we were unsighted until our first missile had struck home. (Certainly so on 24 May against 'Oro' flight.) If there had been a card escort a couple of miles behind the main attack force our attacks would have been much more difficult to execute with impunity.
Even in the first true air to air encounter between Steve Thomas/Paul Barton against Cuerva/Perona it appears Perona was flying in arrow when he should have been way out on Cuerva's 90 at a different altitude. This would have enabled him to pass Paul Barton head on and start a decent fight. As it was it seems he rolled conveniently into Paul's 12 o'clock!
Interesting to hear what the other tacticians out there might think about this.
ES
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia
Posts: 125
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Could it be Israeli tactics?
An interesting snippet from "My experiences in the Malvinas", I have condensed the content:
"In 1978 the need to purchase a Fighter Bomber for the fleet was identified. Israel was the only realistic provider due to the European and American embargo in place at the time. An initial order of 24 IAI Nesher was placed, the aeroplanes received the name "Dagger" which really was the code name for the project to purchase the aeroplanes from Israel!
With a view to accelerate the acceptance into service of the new aeroplance, pilots were sent to:
-VIII Brigade to train with the Mirage III contingent
-Quinones Gonzalez Air Base (Peruvian Air Force) to train with Squadron 611 equipped with Mirage 5P.
In late October, the rest of the personnel were sent to Eitam Air Base in Sinai for training with the Israeli Air Force. Eight of those pilots underwent training in aeroplanes marked for the FAA with no markings as the whole operation was still under a cloud of secrecy. (It appears most of these pilots were ex-MIII)
Argentina was the first Latin country to receive Air Warfare instruction by Israel. The same course was later available to FAA pilots at Tandil base in Argentina, under the Israeli instructor Shlomo Erez.
The first batch of Nesher was loaded on 26th November 1978 on the "Jaspers" to Buenos Aires."
An interesting snippet from "My experiences in the Malvinas", I have condensed the content:
"In 1978 the need to purchase a Fighter Bomber for the fleet was identified. Israel was the only realistic provider due to the European and American embargo in place at the time. An initial order of 24 IAI Nesher was placed, the aeroplanes received the name "Dagger" which really was the code name for the project to purchase the aeroplanes from Israel!
With a view to accelerate the acceptance into service of the new aeroplance, pilots were sent to:
-VIII Brigade to train with the Mirage III contingent
-Quinones Gonzalez Air Base (Peruvian Air Force) to train with Squadron 611 equipped with Mirage 5P.
In late October, the rest of the personnel were sent to Eitam Air Base in Sinai for training with the Israeli Air Force. Eight of those pilots underwent training in aeroplanes marked for the FAA with no markings as the whole operation was still under a cloud of secrecy. (It appears most of these pilots were ex-MIII)
Argentina was the first Latin country to receive Air Warfare instruction by Israel. The same course was later available to FAA pilots at Tandil base in Argentina, under the Israeli instructor Shlomo Erez.
The first batch of Nesher was loaded on 26th November 1978 on the "Jaspers" to Buenos Aires."
Suspicion breeds confidence
A quick note on the visual detection ranges, particularly in the South Atlantic. I should mention that I'm on a ship down to the Canaries lecturing and one of the other lecturers is none other than Michael Nicholson, ex-ITN who covered the campaign with Brain Hanrahan on Hermes and other ships at the time. I had a very pleasant chat about his voyage which I will expand on when i get a cheaper internet connection. Its $1 a minute on board.
Anyway back to visual detection ranges for those interested. The longest recorded visual detection of one ship by another was in 1939 by the Graf Spee when she detected a contact visually at 53,000 meters (!) which she subsequently sank. I able to put this partially to the test today and with a good pair of bins on a murky overcast January day. I could easily make out container ships at 11 miles and beyond.
The South Atlantic is so clear and un-polluted that this is possible, although I am not claiming this to be so in the case of AC given the time of day and the time of year. My dead reckoning position for AC may also be out as it is taken from Alacrity's track chart. Her satnav system was inoperable from Ascension southwards, so there may be some margin for error depending on when her last Astral fix was taken. Also as you get near to the poles, spurious radar targets become more common. I understand that at least two ships engaged targets beleived to be enemy surface vessels with guns which turned out to be anaprop.
Anyhow a nice sunny day in Lisbon beckons tomorrow. If anyone remembers Michael Nicholson, I'd be very pleased to say hello for you.
Anyway back to visual detection ranges for those interested. The longest recorded visual detection of one ship by another was in 1939 by the Graf Spee when she detected a contact visually at 53,000 meters (!) which she subsequently sank. I able to put this partially to the test today and with a good pair of bins on a murky overcast January day. I could easily make out container ships at 11 miles and beyond.
The South Atlantic is so clear and un-polluted that this is possible, although I am not claiming this to be so in the case of AC given the time of day and the time of year. My dead reckoning position for AC may also be out as it is taken from Alacrity's track chart. Her satnav system was inoperable from Ascension southwards, so there may be some margin for error depending on when her last Astral fix was taken. Also as you get near to the poles, spurious radar targets become more common. I understand that at least two ships engaged targets beleived to be enemy surface vessels with guns which turned out to be anaprop.
Anyhow a nice sunny day in Lisbon beckons tomorrow. If anyone remembers Michael Nicholson, I'd be very pleased to say hello for you.