I think the one thing that stood out and was a constant surprise to us was the way they flew tactical formation at low level. They generally flew as a fairly tight finger or arrow formation at very low level and at relatively high speed (500kts plus.) This meant they had little or no mutual support or cross cover which would have been provided by the battle spread we would have flown in similar circumstances. They would probably argue that they wanted to be close so that they could all pass over the same target together (Col Raul Diaz' email to me indicated this.) If this was the case they should have provided a card escort behind the attacking force of, say, two Daggers armed with Shaffrir. This would have put an entirely different perspective on the situation for us.
I believe in many of our intercepts we were unsighted until our first missile had struck home. (Certainly so on 24 May against 'Oro' flight.) If there had been a card escort a couple of miles behind the main attack force our attacks would have been much more difficult to execute with impunity.
Even in the first true air to air encounter between Steve Thomas/Paul Barton against Cuerva/Perona it appears Perona was flying in arrow when he should have been way out on Cuerva's 90 at a different altitude. This would have enabled him to pass Paul Barton head on and start a decent fight. As it was it seems he rolled conveniently into Paul's 12 o'clock!
Interesting to hear what the other tacticians out there might think about this.
ES