PIC command authority
My previous company had a paragraph in its OMA and FCOMs that stated something to the effect that the PIC was allowed to do whatever he/she thought needed to be done in the event of an emergency, and should not feel constrained by either document. So if I had an uncontrollable fire/bomb on board etc, I wasn't constrained by speed limits, landing weights, stabilisation criteria etc but could exercise good judgement and do pilot stuff. Training of this was even conducted during recurrent training. Sometimes following all the rules and procedures isn't in the best interest of safety. But knowing and understanding all the rules and procedures gives you an idea of how far you can go without compromising safety.
Is this what you mean, or am I barking up the wrong tree again?
Is this what you mean, or am I barking up the wrong tree again?
Having a potentially available defence to a prosecution for breach of a rule is a bit different - actually, vastly different - to having authority to 'vary regs' when we 'deem it necessary in an emergency'. But I'm mindful that I'm here drifting into legal issues rather than the simple task of location of the requested regulation.
Here is the US version for reference...
https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-1...A/section-91.3
My company OM, like most I would assume, has a similar paragraph. It goes so far as to say, "believing to be the correct action in the event..." So in following my company manual "accepted" by CASA, do I gain some protection?
Whenever Australian pilots talk about being caned by CASA for a transgression I am reminded of the inability of CASA to find anyone to cane when a Qantas aircraft took off from Hobart without having the runway lights turned on. Then followed up by a Jetstar aircraft at the same airport a few years later.
https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-1...A/section-91.3
A paragraph in an operator's OMA or FCOM (stating the obvious) is not a CAR or a CASR.
Whenever Australian pilots talk about being caned by CASA for a transgression I am reminded of the inability of CASA to find anyone to cane when a Qantas aircraft took off from Hobart without having the runway lights turned on. Then followed up by a Jetstar aircraft at the same airport a few years later.
A paragraph in an operator's OMA or FCOM (stating the obvious) is not a CAR or a CASR. The OP asked for the CASR, and implied there was a CAR equivalent, that allowed the PIC to vary regs/procedures/limitations if they deem it necessary in an emergency.
Having a potentially available defence to a prosecution for breach of a rule is a bit different - actually, vastly different - to having authority to 'vary regs' when we 'deem it necessary in an emergency'. But I'm mindful that I'm here drifting into legal issues rather than the simple task of location of the requested regulation.
Having a potentially available defence to a prosecution for breach of a rule is a bit different - actually, vastly different - to having authority to 'vary regs' when we 'deem it necessary in an emergency'. But I'm mindful that I'm here drifting into legal issues rather than the simple task of location of the requested regulation.
So if you follow company guidance as published in an approved Ops manual, which is approved by the regulatory authority, you aren't protected? Is this what you are suggesting?
The QF and VB fuel policies don't entirely conform with regulations. But those companies have applied for and received exemption on the basis that they have a policy that provides equivalent safety. Crews operate in accordance with their respective OPS manuals, and not the MOS or CAR. For example. It also means that those company's can maximize commercial load,. Something the MOS doesn't really do.
Anyhoo, this is very far away from what the original poster asked. Sorry for the thread drift.
Again, the questions merely expose the underlying complexities. An exemption from compliance with a regulation is not the same as the approval of an Ops Manual paragraph. The Renmark tragedy illustrates that CASA sometimes approves Ops Manuals with dangerous procedures in them. That’s why CASA is sometimes a defendant in negligence claims arising from aviation accidents.
I’ll try to explain it like this. Captain Sullenberger and his crew suffered an emergency and ditched into a river (probably above MLW). He did what he judged necessary in the circumstances. No lives were lost.
Nonetheless, Captain Sullenberger was ‘put through the ringer’ by, among other agencies, the NTSB. The NSTB didn’t shrug and say, oh well, Sully had authority to vary the rules as he deemed necessary so we’ll just move on.
The few defences built into the Australian rules – which no PIC has the authority to ‘vary’ when the PIC ‘deems necessary in an emergency’ – are a tiny, withered fig-leaf over the PIC’s exposures that have nothing to do with prosecution action. If I’m involved in accident – touch wood – the least of my worries would be prosecution action.
But I'm again mindful that I'm drifting into legal issues rather than the simple task of location of the requested regulation.
I’ll try to explain it like this. Captain Sullenberger and his crew suffered an emergency and ditched into a river (probably above MLW). He did what he judged necessary in the circumstances. No lives were lost.
Nonetheless, Captain Sullenberger was ‘put through the ringer’ by, among other agencies, the NTSB. The NSTB didn’t shrug and say, oh well, Sully had authority to vary the rules as he deemed necessary so we’ll just move on.
The few defences built into the Australian rules – which no PIC has the authority to ‘vary’ when the PIC ‘deems necessary in an emergency’ – are a tiny, withered fig-leaf over the PIC’s exposures that have nothing to do with prosecution action. If I’m involved in accident – touch wood – the least of my worries would be prosecution action.
But I'm again mindful that I'm drifting into legal issues rather than the simple task of location of the requested regulation.
I’ll try to explain it like this. Captain Sullenberger and his crew suffered an emergency and ditched into a river (probably above MLW).
Thanks for that, Lookleft. My use of the word "probably" was evidently not sufficient to make clear to you that I was not making a categorical assertion and the reference to MLW was evidently lost on you as an ironic link to the OP's reference to CAR 235 and landing overweight. Good to see I'm still living rent free in your head, though. BTW: You do know the aircraft's fuel state on ditching is in the NTSB's report, don't you?
Only a lawyer could point out that a pilot "landed" above MLW (possibly, allegedly, or ironically) in case of a power-off ditching. Should have been fined for not having floats too. Was it the NTSB lawyers that put Sully 'through the wringer' or the NTSB Ops guys?
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OMG. Yet another one that can't see the ironic link to the OP.
Yes: The only thing that NTSB was concerned about - at the NSTB lawyers' urging - was that Sully's airplane was above MLW when it ditched. That's why he was put through the ringer.
(I think I'm going to have to start using coloured font, as they do on US fora...)
Yes: The only thing that NTSB was concerned about - at the NSTB lawyers' urging - was that Sully's airplane was above MLW when it ditched. That's why he was put through the ringer.
(I think I'm going to have to start using coloured font, as they do on US fora...)
Good to see I'm still living rent free in your head, though. BTW: You do know the aircraft's fuel state on ditching is in the NTSB's report, don't you?
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I have read the report and I know it says, at page 10: "“the airplane’s weight when it was ditched on the Hudson River was estimated to be about 150,000 pounds”. My amateur, non-commercial pilot research indicates that the maximum landing weight of a ‘vanilla’ A320-214 is 142,198 pounds. (Sarcasm alert!) By my maths 150,000 pounds is greater – quite a bit greater – than 142,198 pounds.
Could you give me the benefit of your commercial pilot expertise and express an opinion as to the accuracy of the following statement: “Captain Sullenberger and his crew suffered an emergency and ditched into a river (probably above MLW).”
(For the benefit of the OP: The bracketed words included in my post were an evidently failed attempt at irony.)
(In case you haven’t watched it, Lookleft, I’d commend the Young Sheldon series to you. There’s an episode in which psychologists submit Sheldon and his twin sister to a bunch of tests. The tests reveal the genius Sheldon’s weak spots – characterised by his maternal grandmother as Sheldon’s ‘kryptonite’. He’s entirely oblivious to sarcasm and irony.
Your weak spots include whatever it is that makes you obsessed with reminding everyone that I’m not a commercial pilot and proving how much you know, to the extent that you’re blinded to the points I’m making.)
Could you give me the benefit of your commercial pilot expertise and express an opinion as to the accuracy of the following statement: “Captain Sullenberger and his crew suffered an emergency and ditched into a river (probably above MLW).”
(For the benefit of the OP: The bracketed words included in my post were an evidently failed attempt at irony.)
(In case you haven’t watched it, Lookleft, I’d commend the Young Sheldon series to you. There’s an episode in which psychologists submit Sheldon and his twin sister to a bunch of tests. The tests reveal the genius Sheldon’s weak spots – characterised by his maternal grandmother as Sheldon’s ‘kryptonite’. He’s entirely oblivious to sarcasm and irony.
Your weak spots include whatever it is that makes you obsessed with reminding everyone that I’m not a commercial pilot and proving how much you know, to the extent that you’re blinded to the points I’m making.)
BTW: You do know the aircraft's fuel state on ditching is in the NTSB's report, don't you?
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Here is the US version for reference...
Whenever Australian pilots talk about being caned by CASA for a transgression I am reminded of the inability of CASA to find anyone to cane when a Qantas aircraft took off from Hobart without having the runway lights turned on. Then followed up by a Jetstar aircraft at the same airport a few years later.
Whenever Australian pilots talk about being caned by CASA for a transgression I am reminded of the inability of CASA to find anyone to cane when a Qantas aircraft took off from Hobart without having the runway lights turned on. Then followed up by a Jetstar aircraft at the same airport a few years later.
Whenever Australian pilots talk about this alleged transgression, I am reminded of the inability of certain individuals to be able to distinguish ‘Hobart’ from ‘Launceston’, while still assuming they have any sort of credibility to be able to comment on said alleged transgression…
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Whenever Australian pilots talk about this alleged transgression, I am reminded of the inability of certain individuals to be able to distinguish ‘Hobart’ from ‘Launceston’, while still assuming they have any sort of credibility to be able to comment on said alleged transgression…
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In any case the Hudson river incident highlights the point. Sully did what he thought was best, the outcome was optimal with no loss of life or even serious injury. He was then put through the ringer in court to prove what he did was justified, even to the point they tried to hang him by saying a split second decision could have been made to fly over built up areas and try to make a runway. Luckily reality was on his side and it was proven very unlikely that aiming for a runway would have been a good choice. Then there is Tuninter 1153, the wrong fuel sensor was installed in the aircraft, it ran out of fuel mid Mediterranean, the crew became confused about why both engines flamed out, even though fuel was indicated, were preoccupied with inflight restarts and missed an opportunity to just glide to two airports just in range at the time of failure. The ditching itself was considered textbook but being an ATR it still broke up and pasengers died. The PIC was charged with manslaughter and sentenced to 10 years prison, even the FO was charged and given jail time.
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I'm glad at least one person gets the actual point of my example, 43. (It was the NTSB, not a court, that put Sully through the ringer. There's no right to silence in front of the NTSB! And no amount of defences to a prosecution protect us from civil liability or administrative action.)
I'm pretty sure their A320 FCOM had an AFM procedure for overweight landings for any number of reasons, including emergency, for which the effective loss of both donks would qualify.
I stand corrected if not, but I do not recall the over MLW being a factor in the report, but I also don't have an insight into the NTSB actions/thoughts. Would appreciate a link LB/CM if the case.
I stand corrected if not, but I do not recall the over MLW being a factor in the report, but I also don't have an insight into the NTSB actions/thoughts. Would appreciate a link LB/CM if the case.
Last edited by compressor stall; 8th Jan 2024 at 22:15.
In any case the Hudson river incident highlights the point. Sully did what he thought was best, the outcome was optimal with no loss of life or even serious injury. He was then put through the ringer in court to prove what he did was justified, even to the point they tried to hang him by saying a split second decision could have been made to fly over built up areas and try to make a runway. ...
I'm glad at least one person gets the actual point of my example, 43. (It was the NTSB, not a court, that put Sully through the ringer. There's no right to silence in front of the NTSB! And no amount of defences to a prosecution protect us from civil liability or administrative action.)
When it comes to a shoot-out between Hollywood and a primary source document, I tend to lean towards the latter.
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I think taking an excerpt from a report that was produced after everything was nutted out is misleading to say the least. The NTSB was highly critical of Sullys' decision to land on the Hudson and the initial simulator exercises lent weight to their argument after 7 of 13 attempts landed successfully at La Guardia, it was only after it was argued that there needed to be a 'startle' delay added to the simulations that it was proved that any attempt to return to land was not the right course. Now whilst the NTSB may have eventually said the simulations were unrealistic, who originally conducted the simulations to prove it could be done? They were also critical of why the double engine failure checklist was not completed.
Sully still had to defend himself before the NTSB that his actions were correct, there was no "oh you were PIC so everything you did was appropriate given it was an emergency", so no law covered him without test.
Sully still had to defend himself before the NTSB that his actions were correct, there was no "oh you were PIC so everything you did was appropriate given it was an emergency", so no law covered him without test.
I'm glad at least one person gets the actual point of my example, 43. (It was the NTSB, not a court, that put Sully through the ringer. There's no right to silence in front of the NTSB! And no amount of defences to a prosecution protect us from civil liability or administrative action.)
