Virgin Australia hard landings ATSB report
The FCTM gives a pretty accurate description and I don't think it's necessary to explain it any differently to the trainee.
At the end of the day this bit of the flight is different to most other parts of the flight in that it is 100% visual. It’s nothing but flying a plane. I suspect that many people who have difficulty landing consistently are weaving in some other form of perception, ie rad alt call outs or rad alt heights or something, and that will only work in relatively benign conditions. The FCTM uses the runway end as a cue because there will always be a runway end on each landing, there may not be a rad alt call or there may be no time to check a rad alt read out. The cue to initiate the flare should come from visual peripheral perceptions and it might be at 30 ft or it might be at 15tt. If new FO’s can sneak through training with a rote technique based on something other than visual perceptions outside the aircraft then when they get to a more challenging landing condition ( gusty crosswinds etc) they won’t have the habit of looking out the window to the far end sufficiently embedded to do a nice job of it.
The FCTM uses the runway end as a cue because there will always be a runway end on each landing,
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The ATSB is pointing the finger at the training technique of thinking "flare" at 30 ft. Barking up the wrong tree. That is an entirely appropriate flaring technique for a B737, particularly for new pilots. I suspect that none of the authors of this report have ever flown a B737.
Regardless, the late flare was not the root cause of the hard landing*. The initial touch down was not recorded as hard, it resulted in a 3 ft bounce. This needs to then become a bounce recovery. The hard landing* (if it even was one) was actually the result of bounce recovery technique, which is not addressed by the findings of the report at all.
*Boeing provides information (not addressed in the ATSB report) that a QAR report of a hard landing and associated G-loadings are not accurate. The most accurate assessment of a hard landing comes from the crew, and the report states that neither crew regarded it as a hard landing. So this report could actually be all about nothing other than a bounce which was recovered.
Last edited by 43Inches; 14th Dec 2023 at 21:18.
It is true that it is much harder using simply a shorter section of centerline lights but the basic principle is the same. On the other hand, good training could also be to decide on an autoland in limited visibility... after all we train to be safe (and I hope you didn't mean 800m landing runway in training...)
To quote the FCTM it says "far end of the runway". The rate of descent assesment is done using peripheral vision. The far vision is a "locking" point for your vision, but the assesment is done by assessing how fast the shoulders (the runway sides just in front of the flightdeck) are rising in relation to that far end. Anyway, that's how I explain that part at least.
To quote the FCTM it says "far end of the runway". The rate of descent assesment is done using peripheral vision. The far vision is a "locking" point for your vision, but the assesment is done by assessing how fast the shoulders (the runway sides just in front of the flightdeck) are rising in relation to that far end. Anyway, that's how I explain that part at least.
Last edited by BraceBrace; 14th Dec 2023 at 22:26.
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Jacobson Flare anyone? https://www.jacobsonflare.com/
It is true that it is much harder using simply a shorter section of centerline lights but the basic principle is the same. On the other hand, good training could also be to decide on an autoland in limited visibility... after all we train to be safe (and I hope you didn't mean 800m landing runway in training...)
To quote the FCTM it says "far end of the runway". The rate of descent assesment is done using peripheral vision. The far vision is a "locking" point for your vision, but the assesment is done by assessing how fast the shoulders (the runway sides just in front of the flightdeck) are rising in relation to that far end. Anyway, that's how I explain that part at least.
To quote the FCTM it says "far end of the runway". The rate of descent assesment is done using peripheral vision. The far vision is a "locking" point for your vision, but the assesment is done by assessing how fast the shoulders (the runway sides just in front of the flightdeck) are rising in relation to that far end. Anyway, that's how I explain that part at least.
I agree too, that reasonable discretion would suggest that in reduced visibility an autoland, if available, would be a prudent choice - training or not.
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Sorry C441, I was lazy with my quote. What I meant was that the moment to shift your gaze to the far end of the runway, is when the threshold passes under the nose of the aircraft, and the threshold passing under the nose of the aircraft is always going to happen, on every landing. From the FCTM;
I also understand that once the basics of landing are squared away and consistent, there are other things to consider such as horizons lowering due to poor visibility.
Cheers
When the threshold passes out of sight under the airplane nose, shift the visual
sighting point to the far end of the runway
sighting point to the far end of the runway
Cheers
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Was there a committe of first officers landing the aircraft..............."they"
The ‘workers’ take full responsibility for ‘landing a plane full of people safely’ while the paper pushers wring their hands about pronouns and don’t actually understand what is important. It might even be because they don’t understand what it is like to take responsibility in a high consequence environment that they literally don’t understand what is important. Either way, I think they/them annoys people who do carry real responsibility day in day out whether that be in an aircraft, building a road, or delivering critical services because they see people fretting about something that doesn’t matter when much more important things are being neglected.
I agree too, that reasonable discretion would suggest that in reduced visibility an autoland, if available, would be a prudent choice - training or not.
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Singapore’s runway excursion in Munich would be a good example of what can go wrong if you want to take the risk.
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So, in an effort to keep up, if the autopilot did the landing we would have to say, 'It' did it with them pilots watching?
Autopilots must have feelings too, especially if they are called George.
Autopilots must have feelings too, especially if they are called George.
You are stretching reality. You can start by communicating. In this case nobody informed anybody. I had a couple of instances where with simple communication ATC was helpfull enough to keep others out of the sensitive area. There were also cases where it was unable to do so, so we simply were very go-around minded.
Yes I am well aware of that and if you wish to take that risk in deteriorating visibility that’s your choice but you will have a lot of difficulty explaining why you bent an aircraft and wound up on the front page of every newspaper in this country if you get unlucky.
