Virgin Australia hard landings ATSB report
 

It was said that the 737 was a better jet to train on as the TC was able to intervene on their controls in case the trainee didn't do what was required at the time it was required. This report suggests that is not the case. The real problem though is the sub-contracting out of the endorsement training. Its not that the 3rd party contractor doesn't have the required skills, they would prefer to teach to the operator's SOP's but the airlines just want the aircraft type on the pilot's license and they will sort out the rest during revenue operations. So any bad habits that might have developed may not be noted until events such as this happen. The other problem is that the manufacturers have a fly by numbers mindset with landings which simulator's can accommodate but real world conditions do not.

PIC had a CC hat on not a TC hat.
This event highlights the grey a CC must live, between intervention and a check fail outcome vs intervention for safety of flight reasons.
The difference in time is minuscule and certainly less than anyone’s reaction time when weighing up the two options.

The take-over line should be the same for a Check Captain or Line Captain. Line training, is not learning how to fly, it's type and SOP's familiarization. The point at which control should be taken should be the same line regardless, and that is as soon as safety of flight becomes an issue. If the approach looks like it will end badly, make sure all the correct calls and procedures are followed, as expected of a normal line flight. If you want to see how far a candidate will go wrong, stick em in the sim again and play games, not in the aircraft.

F/O's don't do line checks at 29 hours into their training. CC are also TC, being a CC does not stop you being rostered for TC duties. Either way you don't let the student smash it onto the runway, the TC or CC if they are in a control seat, is always the PIC.

Assuming the approach was a bit wild.

a perfectly flown approach can go pear shaped in the last 30’ very easily. Very very very little time to react.

What a difference 10’ (apparently) makes. What is the process through which a third party training organisation would be delivering training different to Boeing’s recommendations and the client’s SOPs?

Anyone got a link to the actual ATSB report? From the article, it sounds to me like the ATSB is barking up the wrong tree.

What a load of crap, if a professional pilot is really saying they landed hard as they were told to flare at 20ft instead of 30ft regardless of the actual dynamics of the landing then we are in trouble. Yes the SOP technique may be to flare at a given height but clearly this relies on how the approach has shaped up, you don’t just leave the flare if your ROD is high and say ‘but the book tells me I can’t do it above 20ft.’

I think you'll find the individual involved despite the hours listed on the ATSB report has spent very minimal time in the control seat of anything other than a DA40. Not that that matters, but just for context.

Thanks, LFA.

Not criticising the crew here, criticising the report.

From the report:
Anyone who has flown and/or conducted training on a B737 would know that if a newbie tries to flare at 20 ft, they will end up flaring at 10 ft, which is exactly what happened on the subject landing, and is exactly why landing is taught as per the above quote.

However, after the external type rating, the airline conducted their own simulator sessions and:

It appears that this last simulator session may have introduced confusion (as inferred by the ATSB), followed by check-captain-itis:

The ATSB is pointing the finger at the training technique of thinking "flare" at 30 ft. Barking up the wrong tree. That is an entirely appropriate flaring technique for a B737, particularly for new pilots. I suspect that none of the authors of this report have ever flown a B737.

Regardless, the late flare was not the root cause of the hard landing*. The initial touch down was not recorded as hard, it resulted in a 3 ft bounce. This needs to then become a bounce recovery. The hard landing* (if it even was one) was actually the result of bounce recovery technique, which is not addressed by the findings of the report at all.

*Boeing provides information (not addressed in the ATSB report) that a QAR report of a hard landing and associated G-loadings are not accurate. The most accurate assessment of a hard landing comes from the crew, and the report states that neither crew regarded it as a hard landing. So this report could actually be all about nothing other than a bounce which was recovered.

​​​​​​​I think you nailed it.

I am surprised that no other issues have been mentioned with the trends in hiring now and this individual. This individual has pushed the #xxxxxxpilot card for their whole career.

A question from someone who in his career never got anywhere near heavies, but someone once told me that the 737 was one of the easiest to fly, compared to 'others.'

Any truth to that? Just asking.

In my experience of 3 x Boeing and 2 x Airbus types, the 737-800 was the far more difficult and quirky to fly - probably as a result of over 50 years of stretches, redesigns, upgrades and various bandaid fixes or legacy "features" dictated by their largest customer rather than by any other measure. Having said that - fun to fly and a really versatile machine.

You reckon anyone is going to bring that up as a factor? You'd have to be a brave person, or very close to retirement.

I just love all the social media takeoffs and landings. If it's a bloke pilot, the cameras are pointed on the throttle quadrant and outside, if it's a female pilot the cameras are pointed on the......female, no outside views.

Standby for more hard landings if VA pilots commence the flare at 20ft. Absolute dribble.

Same can be said about the 30ft and mental preparation blabla. Reduce thrust too quickly and a hard landing is on it's way... (and in my training experience this is the most common source of hard landings, especially with 0hrs previous experience on "jets").

The FCTM gives a pretty accurate description and I don't think it's necessary to explain it any differently to the trainee. Shifting eyesight to the end of the runway to asses descent rate and pitch attitude, "approaching 20ft" start the pitch up 2-3° (not more) and only then reducing the throttles to idle smoothly. Pitch control then allows to control slightly the rate of descent with some back pressure on the CC. You fly it on the runway.

Some "classic veterans" might prefer to keep some knots extra which is fine as wind corrections allow for the same corrections. If so, it is easier to control rate of descent but you have to be careful not to overcorrect the pitch to avoid floating.

THEY!

Sorry, I know it isn't particularly relevant, but the use of this term to describe an individual really does my head in. A product no doubt of appeasing the sensitive, insecure, and woke minority.

Notwithstanding the absolute destruction of basic grammar in an official document!