Virgin Australia hard landings ATSB report
The following users liked this post:
It was said that the 737 was a better jet to train on as the TC was able to intervene on their controls in case the trainee didn't do what was required at the time it was required. This report suggests that is not the case. The real problem though is the sub-contracting out of the endorsement training. Its not that the 3rd party contractor doesn't have the required skills, they would prefer to teach to the operator's SOP's but the airlines just want the aircraft type on the pilot's license and they will sort out the rest during revenue operations. So any bad habits that might have developed may not be noted until events such as this happen. The other problem is that the manufacturers have a fly by numbers mindset with landings which simulator's can accommodate but real world conditions do not.
PIC had a CC hat on not a TC hat.
This event highlights the grey a CC must live, between intervention and a check fail outcome vs intervention for safety of flight reasons.
The difference in time is minuscule and certainly less than anyone’s reaction time when weighing up the two options.
This event highlights the grey a CC must live, between intervention and a check fail outcome vs intervention for safety of flight reasons.
The difference in time is minuscule and certainly less than anyone’s reaction time when weighing up the two options.
The take-over line should be the same for a Check Captain or Line Captain. Line training, is not learning how to fly, it's type and SOP's familiarization. The point at which control should be taken should be the same line regardless, and that is as soon as safety of flight becomes an issue. If the approach looks like it will end badly, make sure all the correct calls and procedures are followed, as expected of a normal line flight. If you want to see how far a candidate will go wrong, stick em in the sim again and play games, not in the aircraft.
PIC had a CC hat on not a TC hat.
What a difference 10’ (apparently) makes. What is the process through which a third party training organisation would be delivering training different to Boeing’s recommendations and the client’s SOPs?
What a load of crap, if a professional pilot is really saying they landed hard as they were told to flare at 20ft instead of 30ft regardless of the actual dynamics of the landing then we are in trouble. Yes the SOP technique may be to flare at a given height but clearly this relies on how the approach has shaped up, you don’t just leave the flare if your ROD is high and say ‘but the book tells me I can’t do it above 20ft.’
The following users liked this post:
What a load of crap, if a professional pilot is really saying they landed hard as they were told to flare at 20ft instead of 30ft regardless of the actual dynamics of the landing then we are in trouble. Yes the SOP technique may be to flare at a given height but clearly this relies on how the approach has shaped up, you don’t just leave the flare if your ROD is high and say ‘but the book tells me I can’t do it above 20ft.’
Last edited by junior.VH-LFA; 13th Dec 2023 at 01:44.
Thanks, LFA.
Not criticising the crew here, criticising the report.
From the report:
Anyone who has flown and/or conducted training on a B737 would know that if a newbie tries to flare at 20 ft, they will end up flaring at 10 ft, which is exactly what happened on the subject landing, and is exactly why landing is taught as per the above quote.
However, after the external type rating, the airline conducted their own simulator sessions and:
It appears that this last simulator session may have introduced confusion (as inferred by the ATSB), followed by check-captain-itis:
The ATSB is pointing the finger at the training technique of thinking "flare" at 30 ft. Barking up the wrong tree. That is an entirely appropriate flaring technique for a B737, particularly for new pilots. I suspect that none of the authors of this report have ever flown a B737.
Regardless, the late flare was not the root cause of the hard landing*. The initial touch down was not recorded as hard, it resulted in a 3 ft bounce. This needs to then become a bounce recovery. The hard landing* (if it even was one) was actually the result of bounce recovery technique, which is not addressed by the findings of the report at all.
*Boeing provides information (not addressed in the ATSB report) that a QAR report of a hard landing and associated G-loadings are not accurate. The most accurate assessment of a hard landing comes from the crew, and the report states that neither crew regarded it as a hard landing. So this report could actually be all about nothing other than a bounce which was recovered.
Not criticising the crew here, criticising the report.
From the report:
The training provider who trained the pilot of the occurrence landing stated that they used the Boeing 737 NG/MAX flight crew training manual (FCTM) when training pilots to land. However, they taught pilots to mentally prepare for the flare at 30 ft and to flare at 25 ft rather than 20 ft.
However, after the external type rating, the airline conducted their own simulator sessions and:
As part of their OCC, the operator conducted 8 simulator training sessions with FOs. During the last training session, the operator trained the pilots to begin flaring the aircraft at 20 ft and went through the steps for the recovery of bounced landings.
After the occurrence, the FO reported that although the operator’s training manuals and the OCC training required pilots to flare the aircraft at 20 ft, they were more comfortable flaring at 30 ft as originally trained. They advised that during all landings conducted prior to the occurrence flight, flare was initiated at 30 ft. The FO recalled that on the day of the occurrence, due to flying with a check captain, they made a last-minute decision to follow the operator’s procedures to initiate flaring the aircraft at a height of 20 ft.
Regardless, the late flare was not the root cause of the hard landing*. The initial touch down was not recorded as hard, it resulted in a 3 ft bounce. This needs to then become a bounce recovery. The hard landing* (if it even was one) was actually the result of bounce recovery technique, which is not addressed by the findings of the report at all.
*Boeing provides information (not addressed in the ATSB report) that a QAR report of a hard landing and associated G-loadings are not accurate. The most accurate assessment of a hard landing comes from the crew, and the report states that neither crew regarded it as a hard landing. So this report could actually be all about nothing other than a bounce which was recovered.
The following 5 users liked this post by Xhorst:
Regardless, the late flare was not the root cause of the hard landing*. The initial touch down was not recorded as hard, it resulted in a 3 ft bounce. This needs to then become a bounce recovery. The hard landing* (if it even was one) was actually the result of bounce recovery technique, which is not addressed by the findings of the report at all.
I am surprised that no other issues have been mentioned with the trends in hiring now and this individual. This individual has pushed the #xxxxxxpilot card for their whole career.
What a load of crap, if a professional pilot is really saying they landed hard as they were told to flare at 20ft instead of 30ft regardless of the actual dynamics of the landing then we are in trouble. Yes the SOP technique may be to flare at a given height but clearly this relies on how the approach has shaped up, you don’t just leave the flare if your ROD is high and say ‘but the book tells me I can’t do it above 20ft.’
Man Bilong Balus long PNG
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: Looking forward to returning to Japan soon but in the meantime continuing the never ending search for a bad bottle of Red!
Age: 69
Posts: 2,971
Received 96 Likes
on
55 Posts
A question from someone who in his career never got anywhere near heavies, but someone once told me that the 737 was one of the easiest to fly, compared to 'others.'
Any truth to that? Just asking.
Any truth to that? Just asking.
In my experience of 3 x Boeing and 2 x Airbus types, the 737-800 was the far more difficult and quirky to fly - probably as a result of over 50 years of stretches, redesigns, upgrades and various bandaid fixes or legacy "features" dictated by their largest customer rather than by any other measure. Having said that - fun to fly and a really versatile machine.
I am surprised that no other issues have been mentioned with the trends in hiring now and this individual. This individual has pushed the #xxxxxxpilot card for their whole career.
I just love all the social media takeoffs and landings. If it's a bloke pilot, the cameras are pointed on the throttle quadrant and outside, if it's a female pilot the cameras are pointed on the......female, no outside views.
Same can be said about the 30ft and mental preparation blabla. Reduce thrust too quickly and a hard landing is on it's way... (and in my training experience this is the most common source of hard landings, especially with 0hrs previous experience on "jets").
The FCTM gives a pretty accurate description and I don't think it's necessary to explain it any differently to the trainee. Shifting eyesight to the end of the runway to asses descent rate and pitch attitude, "approaching 20ft" start the pitch up 2-3° (not more) and only then reducing the throttles to idle smoothly. Pitch control then allows to control slightly the rate of descent with some back pressure on the CC. You fly it on the runway.
Some "classic veterans" might prefer to keep some knots extra which is fine as wind corrections allow for the same corrections. If so, it is easier to control rate of descent but you have to be careful not to overcorrect the pitch to avoid floating.
The FCTM gives a pretty accurate description and I don't think it's necessary to explain it any differently to the trainee. Shifting eyesight to the end of the runway to asses descent rate and pitch attitude, "approaching 20ft" start the pitch up 2-3° (not more) and only then reducing the throttles to idle smoothly. Pitch control then allows to control slightly the rate of descent with some back pressure on the CC. You fly it on the runway.
Some "classic veterans" might prefer to keep some knots extra which is fine as wind corrections allow for the same corrections. If so, it is easier to control rate of descent but you have to be careful not to overcorrect the pitch to avoid floating.
Last edited by BraceBrace; 14th Dec 2023 at 14:57.
The following users liked this post:
THEY!
Sorry, I know it isn't particularly relevant, but the use of this term to describe an individual really does my head in. A product no doubt of appeasing the sensitive, insecure, and woke minority.
Notwithstanding the absolute destruction of basic grammar in an official document!
Sorry, I know it isn't particularly relevant, but the use of this term to describe an individual really does my head in. A product no doubt of appeasing the sensitive, insecure, and woke minority.
Notwithstanding the absolute destruction of basic grammar in an official document!