Sarcs,
I'd say no serious investigative journalist is listening or in fact typing in fear of sitting in economy & failing to secure an "upgrade" on their next booked service on whichever carrier they may chose to fly in the future.
Having been around aviation for near thirty years may I suggest the holes in the swiss cheese are aligning. I have regurgitated the old "tick tock" comment in the past, but James Reason & the latent deficiencies may be the only opportunity the industry has in stopping those holes aligning.
In no way do I cast I wide net amongst the professional airmen & women amongst us, whether it be mainline, subsidiary or otherwise. But I truly believe airline management practices & new "worlds best practice" principles have edged us as an aviation community closer to the unimaginable.
Why?
Ask yourselves, why were the crew on the service to Singapore there?
Not, what lead a crew to find themselves in that situation. But how has an industry, have we allowed or pushed ourselves to find us in this current predicament?
The crew were there in Singapore on that night, not configured, unstable & unaware, because the current direction of airline management allowed it to happen.
IT IS NOT THE CREWS FAULT, IT IS A FAULT BY MANAGEMENT.
Looking at Reasons model of latent deficiencies, lets look at how we got to the current state. This is directed at an industry at large rather than at individuals.
Recruitment:
* There are no Educational requirements as far as attaining a HSC to be an airline pilot.
* The entry requirements to becoming an Airline Pilot have been "dumbed down". Read Bruce Buchanan's comments that "everybody" should have the "opportunity" to be an Airline Pilot.
* There is NO recognition of experience. In days gone by, entry to airlines as direct entry First Officers would require 2500 to 3000 hours of flight time. Now, Airline CEO's actually state that experience is a negative thing.
* Airline employment & entry is not entirely MERIT based. Under a Merit based system, where airlines would recruit the best & brightest then pay for that individuals training. The calibre of entrants would be at the high water mark.
* A non MERIT based system & pay for your own training allows a "small proportion" of people to be in the seat of an airliner that should never had been there!
* Industry rumours have circulated that the entry standard required in the past is not the current required standard. If we look at behavioural markers like Situational Awareness, Decision Making & Leadership. It makes sense that if we are recruiting to a lower standard the product we are experiencing is a lower standard.
Training
* There is a lack of focus on real world previous aviation experience.
* No amount of time in a simulator or accelerated course can replace the real world experience attained in real life commercial operations.
* Airlines should never transfer the responsibility of aircrew training to third party providers. The standard, or latent deficiencies will surface at some unexpected time perhaps years in the future.
* Airlines introduce artificial limitations on aircrew to mitigate against lack of experience. In my opinion all checked to line First Officers should be capable of landing an aircraft to the manufacturers crosswind limitations. If they can't they shouldn't be sitting in the right hand seat. Introducing a lower crosswind limit of say 15kts & stating it's an insurance requirement doesn't cut the mustard with me. It's because the FO only has 250 hours that the insurer wont cover them to land in a crosswind greater than 15 kts.
Fatigue:
* If an airline has created an environment, where crew feel pressured or coerced to continue a duty once it is evident fatigue related errors have occurred. That airline has failed to meet the responsibilities of an AOC holder.
* Conversely, if a crew have experienced fatigue related errors (and have discussions of such an occurrence postflight) Then continuing an operation on another sector without holding themselves from service. For whatever reason, they have exposed an operation to a risk & one must question the decision making process of that crew & what commercial pressures have been placed on that crew to get the job done.
* If an airline does have a user friendly FRMS policy, then such policy & management support would allow a crew to with hold themselves from service in order to obtain adequate rest before launching with fare paying passengers again.
Reporting:
* I will be brief here, but a have reservations as to how "open" reporting cultures are within airlines. Management expectations & crew professionalism would dictate that reports are factual and accurate. If a "punitive" management culture is evident crew may be gun shy to report the facts.
Investigation:
How the f&*k could it take two years to investigate a go round? Delaying or introducing new safety based outcomes as a result of such an investigation.
MC