Paul Holmes and Erebus
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Yesterday, I was of the opinion that the blame should be apportioned 50/50 between the airline and the pilots.
Today, however, after having read Mahon's findings (thanks DozyWannabe) and read Macarthur Job's account of the accident (and his views on the Royal Commission) I now completely agree with Mahon.
The pilots were NOT at fault. They could not reasonably have been expected to do anything different to what they did. Air New Zealand and the CAA created the circumstances that made the crash inevitable.
That descent SOP - so often quoted here by prospector - was not really an SOP afterall. That was Mahon's view and it is mine too.
Sometimes, SOPs aren't really SOPs. Please refer to the post I have just written on this subject:
http://www.pprune.org/6840912-post100.html
Today, however, after having read Mahon's findings (thanks DozyWannabe) and read Macarthur Job's account of the accident (and his views on the Royal Commission) I now completely agree with Mahon.
The pilots were NOT at fault. They could not reasonably have been expected to do anything different to what they did. Air New Zealand and the CAA created the circumstances that made the crash inevitable.
That descent SOP - so often quoted here by prospector - was not really an SOP afterall. That was Mahon's view and it is mine too.
Sometimes, SOPs aren't really SOPs. Please refer to the post I have just written on this subject:
http://www.pprune.org/6840912-post100.html
Last edited by FGD135; 4th Dec 2011 at 02:14.
I think you are confusing the concepts of an instruction and a recommendation.
An SOP is an instruction as to exactly what you will do in a particular set of circumstances which may be either normal or abnormal. If the SOP contains errors of fact then the SOPS must be corrected.
A recommendation is well, nothing.
Which SOP did you contravene?
An SOP is an instruction as to exactly what you will do in a particular set of circumstances which may be either normal or abnormal. If the SOP contains errors of fact then the SOPS must be corrected.
A recommendation is well, nothing.
Which SOP did you contravene?
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DozyWannabe,
" no NDB from which to get a DME".
The NDB and DME are two entirely different systems. The DME is paired with the TACAN and uses VHF frequencies, the NDB can be either LF or MF, thst is why, depending on the power capacity it can be usedas a long range aid. VHF is only line of sight, can be picked up from up to 120 miles depending on aircraft altitude.
The rest of your statements are also nonsensical such as
" It's not home design, it was a published procedure "
I am not going to waste bandwidth replying to your statements, the only conclusion I can come to is that you have a very apt username.
" no NDB from which to get a DME".
The NDB and DME are two entirely different systems. The DME is paired with the TACAN and uses VHF frequencies, the NDB can be either LF or MF, thst is why, depending on the power capacity it can be usedas a long range aid. VHF is only line of sight, can be picked up from up to 120 miles depending on aircraft altitude.
The rest of your statements are also nonsensical such as
" It's not home design, it was a published procedure "
I am not going to waste bandwidth replying to your statements, the only conclusion I can come to is that you have a very apt username.
Prospector
I am having difficulty in agreeing with your interpretation of the briefing document which you are continually quoting and on which you appear to base your judgement.
The statement Note that the ONLY LET/DOWN procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) is primarily a warning that no IFR procedure is available. The applicability of the described VMC procedure is to an arrival over the TACAN at 16000ft. And it says Available, not mandatory. I see nothing in that statement to prohibit an en route descent below MSA before reaching the TACAN if en route conditions are judged satisfactory.
If I choose to fly an en route VMC descent I do not need a “procedure”. I will descend subject to ATC clearance maintaining my own visual terrain clearance using whatever aids are available to assist in navigation. That is a well established practice. That is what I would have planned had I been in Jim Collins position.
And this same flight briefing document has nothing more to say about the radar at McMurdo, other than to imply it is useful for traffic deconfliction ? So here is a really useful aid which could provide an additional layer of safety in monitoring or assisting the descent, but this briefing document cannot provide any recommendation or requirement as to its use or otherwise. For a supposedly mandatory document that is quite remarkable.
I have not worked for Air New Zealand nor attended their Antarctic briefings and clearly I am not aware of their SOPs of the time. so if there is a wider context which I am missing I would be interested to hear that.. But as a standalone document I do not believe it carries the weight you attach to it. If the provisions really were intended to be mandatory I can only suggest the drafting was incompetent.
Finally you claim that the reported weather was below limits. As I read it (Mahon para 322 is the reference) the reported visibility at the time at McMurdo was in excess of 40 miles,essentially meaning unlimited, compared with the quoted minima of 20 kilometers. Yes there was “some” snow reported, but with such visibility surely one is entitled to assess its real effects would have been immaterial.
I am having difficulty in agreeing with your interpretation of the briefing document which you are continually quoting and on which you appear to base your judgement.
The statement Note that the ONLY LET/DOWN procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) is primarily a warning that no IFR procedure is available. The applicability of the described VMC procedure is to an arrival over the TACAN at 16000ft. And it says Available, not mandatory. I see nothing in that statement to prohibit an en route descent below MSA before reaching the TACAN if en route conditions are judged satisfactory.
If I choose to fly an en route VMC descent I do not need a “procedure”. I will descend subject to ATC clearance maintaining my own visual terrain clearance using whatever aids are available to assist in navigation. That is a well established practice. That is what I would have planned had I been in Jim Collins position.
And this same flight briefing document has nothing more to say about the radar at McMurdo, other than to imply it is useful for traffic deconfliction ? So here is a really useful aid which could provide an additional layer of safety in monitoring or assisting the descent, but this briefing document cannot provide any recommendation or requirement as to its use or otherwise. For a supposedly mandatory document that is quite remarkable.
I have not worked for Air New Zealand nor attended their Antarctic briefings and clearly I am not aware of their SOPs of the time. so if there is a wider context which I am missing I would be interested to hear that.. But as a standalone document I do not believe it carries the weight you attach to it. If the provisions really were intended to be mandatory I can only suggest the drafting was incompetent.
Finally you claim that the reported weather was below limits. As I read it (Mahon para 322 is the reference) the reported visibility at the time at McMurdo was in excess of 40 miles,essentially meaning unlimited, compared with the quoted minima of 20 kilometers. Yes there was “some” snow reported, but with such visibility surely one is entitled to assess its real effects would have been immaterial.
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Tagron,
"The statement Note that the ONLY LET/DOWN procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) is primarily a warning that no IFR procedure is available."
That mandatory requirement was to satisfy both the Company and CAA. All other operaters to the AntArctic, RNZAF, USN, USAF all had to have had a minimum exposure to AntArctic conditions prior to operating as P1 to the ice.
ANZ were given a dispensation to this requirement, but, only by complying with what would appear to be a very restrictive descent procedure. The 6,000ft minimum was imposed because it was known that above that height, and with all other parameters being complied with, whiteout, sector or otherwise, would not have presented a problem.
There were flights that did not comply with these requirements granted, but they had CAVU conditions, in which Erebus can be seen from 100 odd miles away, the fact that some pilots elected to descend lower at the request of controllers at McMurdo is understood, but should have been stopped.
This crew went down there with crappy weather conditions, they were advised that Ross Island was under a low overcast with a base of 2,000ft.
To even consider going down to an altitude to get below this cloud base, on your first trip to the area, in a DC10 that could not go below 265 kts beggars belief, especially when they had been advised that the alternative sight seeing area was clear of all cloud and unlimited visiblity. The pax had been prewarned that the flights were governed by Wx conditions and would no doubt been disappointed, not to see McMurdo, but they would have got home.
"The statement Note that the ONLY LET/DOWN procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) is primarily a warning that no IFR procedure is available."
That mandatory requirement was to satisfy both the Company and CAA. All other operaters to the AntArctic, RNZAF, USN, USAF all had to have had a minimum exposure to AntArctic conditions prior to operating as P1 to the ice.
ANZ were given a dispensation to this requirement, but, only by complying with what would appear to be a very restrictive descent procedure. The 6,000ft minimum was imposed because it was known that above that height, and with all other parameters being complied with, whiteout, sector or otherwise, would not have presented a problem.
There were flights that did not comply with these requirements granted, but they had CAVU conditions, in which Erebus can be seen from 100 odd miles away, the fact that some pilots elected to descend lower at the request of controllers at McMurdo is understood, but should have been stopped.
This crew went down there with crappy weather conditions, they were advised that Ross Island was under a low overcast with a base of 2,000ft.
To even consider going down to an altitude to get below this cloud base, on your first trip to the area, in a DC10 that could not go below 265 kts beggars belief, especially when they had been advised that the alternative sight seeing area was clear of all cloud and unlimited visiblity. The pax had been prewarned that the flights were governed by Wx conditions and would no doubt been disappointed, not to see McMurdo, but they would have got home.
Question for everyone but I´m particularly interested in hearing the answers that FGD and Tagron give.
In what situation, under what circumstances, would you, as Captain of an airliner weighing 150 tonnes, feel comfortable doing 250 knots, clean, straight and level, below 1500 feet?
Please give examples eg ¨at my home base, day VMC on a normal scheduled passenger flight¨etc etc
In what situation, under what circumstances, would you, as Captain of an airliner weighing 150 tonnes, feel comfortable doing 250 knots, clean, straight and level, below 1500 feet?
Please give examples eg ¨at my home base, day VMC on a normal scheduled passenger flight¨etc etc
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In what situation, ... , feel comfortable doing 250 knots, clean, straight and level, below 1500 feet?
An SOP is an instruction as to exactly what you will do ...
If you had, you would well know that the written directives underlying the SOPs are frequently flawed. So flawed in fact, that the question as to whether the "SOP" is truly an SOP cannot be resolved by mere pilots, but requires a court judgement.
This is what happened in the case of TE901. There was a set of descent instructions contained in a "briefing note". Those instructions are regarded as an SOP by those insisting that the pilots were partly responsible.
The Royal Commission, however, found that this "SOP" was not really an SOP afterall. Their reason was no. 4 on my list of reasons why SOPs sometimes aren't SOPs. Please see my post on the subject of SOPs (#100 in this thread).
If the SOP contains errors of fact then the SOPS must be corrected.
In a perfect world, every directive would be correct, unambiguous, reasonable, not out-of-date and respected.
The simple reality is that rather than 100% black and white, the directives that constitute SOPs frequently contain considerable grey.
.. in a DC10 that could not go below 265 kts beggars belief ..
Was this the fault of the crew? Or was it ANZ and the CAA that put them there?
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" but it tells us that the crew had got themselves into a situation about which they had no awareness."
With the most modern Nav equipment, a Lat and Long readout immediately available, a set of rules that were formulated to prevent just such an occurence as this for guidance, and many years experience in the front seats, and they got themselves into a situation of which they had no awareness????
If that then is the fault of CAA and the Company then the sooner the world develops passenger carrying UAV's the safer the pax will be.
With the most modern Nav equipment, a Lat and Long readout immediately available, a set of rules that were formulated to prevent just such an occurence as this for guidance, and many years experience in the front seats, and they got themselves into a situation of which they had no awareness????
If that then is the fault of CAA and the Company then the sooner the world develops passenger carrying UAV's the safer the pax will be.
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Missing The Point
We have discussed the techical details of the accident. We still need learn what management will do to protect themselves. We are simply collaterial damage.
ANZ management did it then and also in 2001 with Ansett. Protected themselves.
ANZ management did it then and also in 2001 with Ansett. Protected themselves.
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If that then is the fault of CAA and the Company then the sooner the world develops passenger carrying UAV's the safer the pax will be.
a Lat and Long readout immediately available
Oh if only he'd been given http://usarc.usgs.gov/drgs/dir1/c77190s1.jpg and http://usarc.usgs.gov/drgs/dir1/c76191s1.jpg
Last edited by compressor stall; 4th Dec 2011 at 05:05.
Ah come on Grusome keep it real. What has fast jet low level navs got to do with getting grandmothers and wives and childeren around in an airliner?
We are talking about an airliner. The only time I can imagine that it would be appropriate to be clean and straight and level in a heavy full of pax at 1500ft is if ATC gave you a hold down as you departed a busy airport but even then you probably wouldn't be clean and it would just be a neccessity due traffic.
I honestly can't think of one other scenario where it'd be wise to do it.
Can you?
We are talking about an airliner. The only time I can imagine that it would be appropriate to be clean and straight and level in a heavy full of pax at 1500ft is if ATC gave you a hold down as you departed a busy airport but even then you probably wouldn't be clean and it would just be a neccessity due traffic.
I honestly can't think of one other scenario where it'd be wise to do it.
Can you?
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grusome,
.
" and what was that you said about DME frequency? "
A US Air Force TACAN Antenna.
TACAN in general can be described as the military version of the VOR/DME system. It operates in the frequency band 960-1215 MHz. The bearing unit of TACAN is more accurate than a standard VOR since it makes use of a two frequency principle, with 15 Hz and 135 Hz components.
The distance measurement component of TACAN operates with the same specifications as civil DMEs. Therefore to reduce the number of required stations, TACAN stations are frequently co-located with VOR facilities. These co-located stations are known as VORTACs. This is a station composed of a VOR for civil bearing information and a TACAN for military bearing information and military/civil distance measuring information. The TACAN transponder performs the function of a DME without the need for a separate, co-located DME. Because the rotation of the antenna creates a large portion of the azimuth signal, if the antenna fails, the azimuth component is no longer available and the TACAN downgrades to a DME only mode.
.
" and what was that you said about DME frequency? "
A US Air Force TACAN Antenna.
TACAN in general can be described as the military version of the VOR/DME system. It operates in the frequency band 960-1215 MHz. The bearing unit of TACAN is more accurate than a standard VOR since it makes use of a two frequency principle, with 15 Hz and 135 Hz components.
The distance measurement component of TACAN operates with the same specifications as civil DMEs. Therefore to reduce the number of required stations, TACAN stations are frequently co-located with VOR facilities. These co-located stations are known as VORTACs. This is a station composed of a VOR for civil bearing information and a TACAN for military bearing information and military/civil distance measuring information. The TACAN transponder performs the function of a DME without the need for a separate, co-located DME. Because the rotation of the antenna creates a large portion of the azimuth signal, if the antenna fails, the azimuth component is no longer available and the TACAN downgrades to a DME only mode.
That'd be this one - ZPG in the bottom left of the ND. However I can't tell you that it is exactly the same frequency after 30 odd years. Its position does change slightly every year though along with the runway 
Also note the dates on my maps I linked to earlier. They predate the flight by sixteen years. Why weren't they given to the crew? I am sure than the crew would have drawn the tracks on the map and the most cursory cross check of lat/lon (note this is not map reading at 265 kts) on descent would likely have alerted them to the longitudinal displacement error.
And through my highlighting of this link in the chain, I don't mean to undermine or reduce in value the other errors made on all sides in this accident.
Also note the dates on my maps I linked to earlier. They predate the flight by sixteen years. Why weren't they given to the crew? I am sure than the crew would have drawn the tracks on the map and the most cursory cross check of lat/lon (note this is not map reading at 265 kts) on descent would likely have alerted them to the longitudinal displacement error.
And through my highlighting of this link in the chain, I don't mean to undermine or reduce in value the other errors made on all sides in this accident.
Last edited by compressor stall; 4th Dec 2011 at 22:09.
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In this case I don't think there was a co-located VOR, just the TACAN. If they dialled it in. you'd get a DME, but no directional information. In any case it would have been no use to them until they rounded the south of Ross Island had they been on the course they were expecting to be on. McMurdo had an NDB at the ice runway, but it was officially withdrawn in 1978.
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compressor stall,
The charts that you have indicated would appear to be better quality then the charts issued to the crew. One would have thought the Nav Dept would have been able to procure these charts, surely the US of A aircraft going down there would have had them. But the Lat and Long could still be established on the charts they were issued with, enough to show up the longtitude error between where they were and where they thought they were.
The map reading comment was a bit tongue in cheek.
The charts that you have indicated would appear to be better quality then the charts issued to the crew. One would have thought the Nav Dept would have been able to procure these charts, surely the US of A aircraft going down there would have had them. But the Lat and Long could still be established on the charts they were issued with, enough to show up the longtitude error between where they were and where they thought they were.
The map reading comment was a bit tongue in cheek.
I was always under the impression that Capt Collins' atlas was not terribly detailed - but I could be wrong. I can't recall seeing a copy of the relevant Antarctic pages anywhere; do they exist?
I'd be intrigued to know just how easy it would have been to read lat/long compared to a 1:250k map.
Mind you, in any case a pilot should not have been supplying his own maps from an atlas at home!
And as for plotting the position on IFR charts, the closeness of the longitudes there does take a bit of getting used to, especially for first timers (1 degree of longitude is about 12 nm at the northern end of Ross Is) A quick glance at my 1:3000000 McMudro map here at home shows that they were about two degrees of longitude out. It also has the longitude lines labelled every 5 degrees of longitude, but only at 75s and not on the bottom of the map. It takes a fair bit of work to accurately plot a position, and there are many ways to get it a bit wrong. Again, I don't know what chart they actually had, but again I'd be interested in seeing how easy it was to plot the position given the chart design.
I'd be intrigued to know just how easy it would have been to read lat/long compared to a 1:250k map.
Mind you, in any case a pilot should not have been supplying his own maps from an atlas at home!
And as for plotting the position on IFR charts, the closeness of the longitudes there does take a bit of getting used to, especially for first timers (1 degree of longitude is about 12 nm at the northern end of Ross Is) A quick glance at my 1:3000000 McMudro map here at home shows that they were about two degrees of longitude out. It also has the longitude lines labelled every 5 degrees of longitude, but only at 75s and not on the bottom of the map. It takes a fair bit of work to accurately plot a position, and there are many ways to get it a bit wrong. Again, I don't know what chart they actually had, but again I'd be interested in seeing how easy it was to plot the position given the chart design.
Last edited by compressor stall; 5th Dec 2011 at 00:32.
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Gordon Vette's publication "Impact Erebus" has copies of charts issued. They are of limited value being shrunk so much to fit the page, but the strip chart would be sufficient to detect the Longtitude error I would think.
Even on that miniscule scale there is 11mm between impact point and track they thought they were on.
Even on that miniscule scale there is 11mm between impact point and track they thought they were on.
Last edited by prospector; 5th Dec 2011 at 00:46.