Paul Holmes and Erebus
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DC-10 seating
Dozy,
The Chippindale report mentions that 21 seats were left empty. The DC-10, as configured by most airlines at the time, was for 250-300. 330-350 may have been closer to the norm in more recent years, but in 1979 the standard was for 8-abreast seating and more seat pitch than in later years (versus 9 beginning in the early 80s or so) That suggests ANZ's were normally configured for 258 pax.
BTW, when ANZ started these flights, would anyone recall if they ever used a DC-8? I'm pretty sure that would have stretched its range, and with fewer windows per seat row, I would be surprised.
The Chippindale report mentions that 21 seats were left empty. The DC-10, as configured by most airlines at the time, was for 250-300. 330-350 may have been closer to the norm in more recent years, but in 1979 the standard was for 8-abreast seating and more seat pitch than in later years (versus 9 beginning in the early 80s or so) That suggests ANZ's were normally configured for 258 pax.
BTW, when ANZ started these flights, would anyone recall if they ever used a DC-8? I'm pretty sure that would have stretched its range, and with fewer windows per seat row, I would be surprised.
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ozywannabe,
From Gordon Vette "Impact Erebus"
Here we have a descent below MSA before the AINS was fine tuned with the available ground aids, and accepting it as infallible in a descent to 1,500ft, the decision for this descent to this altitude would appear to be Captain Collins alone. No one is disputing it was done with the best intentions, giving the pax their monies worth, but it was the crew's mistake, and I do not believe they can be held blameless.
If one does not comply with the rules then one must be responsible for the consequences, in this case many people took the consequences.
That would appear to be the governing factor in all your statements, and as you appear to be a firm believer of Mahon it is easy to understand why, any fact that did not suit his theories he completely disregarded.
.
We've been over this before, but just because the rules state that the pilot is responsible for navigation under VMC rules, it does not automatically follow that the pilot should be blamed for an accident if one or more outside factors for which they are not prepared are the root cause of said misidentification.
Like other pilots, Captain Collins had implicit faith in the DC10's navigation system. implicit within the bounds of good airmanmship, which means counter-checking where possible, and never accepting it as infallible.
The AINS would guide the machine accurately- within a mile each side of track for every hour flown- until the aircraft descended to a lower altitude, then the crew would fine tune its position using ground aids. The AINS was relied on absolutely for cruising at altitude-it is the passage maker
If one does not comply with the rules then one must be responsible for the consequences, in this case many people took the consequences.
just because the rules state that the pilot is responsible for navigation under VMC rules
.
Last edited by prospector; 16th Dec 2011 at 03:49.
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Agree prospector. 
That is how all tour pilots are trained, to positively identify your current position, Captain Collins was never to my knowledge given adequate training for the mission.
No point in the exercise? What's wrong with staying above MSA until his position was confirmed by radar, turning left towards Mac Station, and descending through the cloud base under radar guidance? After all, that was how the military pilots did it.
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prospector,
I have the feeling most lay people familiar with the accident tend to agree with the Royal Commission's conclusion, but that pilots, in general, tend not to. Is this impression yours too? If so, would you care to give some sense of how much consensus there might be.
Thanks
I have the feeling most lay people familiar with the accident tend to agree with the Royal Commission's conclusion, but that pilots, in general, tend not to. Is this impression yours too? If so, would you care to give some sense of how much consensus there might be.
Thanks
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chris lz
The many people that agree with the Commissioners findings are for the most part as you say lay people. There are pilots and ex pilots with many thousands of hours experience who agree with Ron Chippendale, himself a very experienced aviator, and well trained in aircraft accident investigation.
Air New Zealand made mistakes in the Nav dept. There is no disputing that. But a Captain is not a Captain just to wear four stripes.
When statements are made such
Then I shudder, if that is the case what is the point of many experienced people getting together and using that experience to make rules to be complied with by less experienced people until they are themselves experienced. We all know rules are bent sometimes, but only if there is absolute certainty that by so doing the safety of the operation is not jeopardised.
In this case people had carried out descents not as directed by the rules, but they had Erebus, Ross Island, Beaufort Island in sight for many many miles and were absolutely certain of their position. The one flight that had bad weather prior to 901 diverted, and as the end result of 901 shows, with the weather they had, below requirements for the approved descent, they should also have diverted.
The many people that agree with the Commissioners findings are for the most part as you say lay people. There are pilots and ex pilots with many thousands of hours experience who agree with Ron Chippendale, himself a very experienced aviator, and well trained in aircraft accident investigation.
Air New Zealand made mistakes in the Nav dept. There is no disputing that. But a Captain is not a Captain just to wear four stripes.
When statements are made such
but just because the rules state that the pilot is responsible for navigation under VMC rules, it does not automatically follow that the pilot should be blamed for an accident
In this case people had carried out descents not as directed by the rules, but they had Erebus, Ross Island, Beaufort Island in sight for many many miles and were absolutely certain of their position. The one flight that had bad weather prior to 901 diverted, and as the end result of 901 shows, with the weather they had, below requirements for the approved descent, they should also have diverted.
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Dreamland #264: I would have thought that Capt Collins didn't need any training in that regard. He was an RNZAF flying officer for at least four years, and then he joined TEAL in 1958 - well before INS and even route briefings. In the 1960s he would have been strapping himself into a DC8 at Auckland, heading for places as far away as Honolulu, Singapore and Hong Kong, with nothing but a navigatior, beacons, and stars. He would have had to deal with a myriad of navigation issues and would have had to make numerous difficult approaches, including the now-legendary Checkerboard approach to Kai Tak. If anyone knew the importance of making sure where you are before going below the height of that hill you might hit, it would have been him.
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Yes, fully agree, had this been a passenger flight to a VFR only airport destination, I have no doubt that it would have been handled in a completely professional manner.
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prospecter,
I came to read Vette's book before talking to pilots, and I have to say he had me convinced. It was only later that I felt I could not defend my positions while debating with pilots on another forum. It actually took me quite a while after the fact to accept this. Vette glides over the issue of whether INS is suitable for descents below MSA by never even alerting his readers to the objections we have seen again and again on this thread. Interesting that he notes how Collins was very careful to stay on the programmed track even after he was visual -
(p135)
Vette may be trying to point out how carefull Collins was, but Collins' keeping to the track might also be interpreted as indicating that he wasn't really prepared to go it eyes alone?
So let me play the other side for a moment. Part of Collins' certainty must have rested on the assumption that even in the unlikely event they were off course, he would be in VMC once under the clouds, and that fact alone would count as certainty of terrain avoidance. Except for the unanticipated effects of white out, would this normally have been a sound assumption?
Thank again.
I came to read Vette's book before talking to pilots, and I have to say he had me convinced. It was only later that I felt I could not defend my positions while debating with pilots on another forum. It actually took me quite a while after the fact to accept this. Vette glides over the issue of whether INS is suitable for descents below MSA by never even alerting his readers to the objections we have seen again and again on this thread. Interesting that he notes how Collins was very careful to stay on the programmed track even after he was visual -
"It is an [in]escapable conclusion that Collins believed that there was some inherent protection or safety provided to the aircraft by its adherence to navigation track. There is no other explanation for adhering to it while flying visually."
Vette may be trying to point out how carefull Collins was, but Collins' keeping to the track might also be interpreted as indicating that he wasn't really prepared to go it eyes alone?
So let me play the other side for a moment. Part of Collins' certainty must have rested on the assumption that even in the unlikely event they were off course, he would be in VMC once under the clouds, and that fact alone would count as certainty of terrain avoidance. Except for the unanticipated effects of white out, would this normally have been a sound assumption?
Thank again.
Last edited by chris lz; 16th Dec 2011 at 05:45.
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Except for the unanticipated effects of white out, would this normally have been a sound assumption?
Without any of the AntArctic problems, going below a 2,000ft overcast at 260kts+ in an area you have never before been would to most aviators be a very rash move. Perhaps no problem in a light aircraft on your own, but in a heavy jet with 257 souls aboard, a very rash move. At sometime they would have had to turn to come out of McMurdo base area, the ground would be coming up, and at 1,500ft 260 kts, 200 ton aircraft would not be a position many would like to line up for themselves.
Perhaps no problem in a light aircraft on your own, but in a heavy jet with 257 souls aboard, a very rash move. At sometime they would have had to turn to come out of McMurdo base area, the ground would be coming up, and at 1,500ft 260 kts, 200 ton aircraft would not be a position many would like to line up for themselves.
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Originally Posted by framer
You can only get so much out of books.
Not to be ganging up on Dozy, but I do know the "spell" that Vette's book can have on lay readers. Sometimes an unstated assumption drives a belief. For me, perhaps it was the fact that Vette paints Collins as of the highest possible experience and calibre, and indeed it seems likely this is how he was regarded by everyone pre- Erebus. How can one argue with that?
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@ampan - There are several good reasons not to trust Chippindale's version of the transcript, but I don't want to go back into that again. RNZAF training does not apply here - thanks to technology, line crews of the late '70s operated in an entirely different manner from line crews of the '60s, let alone miltary operations of the late '50s.
While I can't fault your reasoning, your arguments are based around an ideal-world interpretation of what they could and should have done, rather than what they were required to do in the real-world situation. For example, you state the fact that neither Collins or Cassin picked up on the 166E change as they were keying it in. This is because SOP did not require them to - it was designed to catch a mis-keying of the waypoints by way of reading the data, keying it in and reading it back - it was not designed to catch a change of waypoint from the briefing to pre-flight, and to cover that eventuality, all changes to the computerised flight plans were required to be notified to ops via a NOTAM. This was not done. In your ideal-world scenario they should have taken it upon themselves to check, but the real-world situation did not require them to. A coda to this is that the way you put it, the digit change was one of three, when in fact it was one of five - from 164.48E at the briefing to 166.48E at the pre-flight check. As they were not required to check the briefing co-ordinates against the pre-flight co-ordinates (unless they were notified of a change - which, and sorry to bang on about this point, they weren't) the only way they could have picked up on it would be if they had memorised the whole set of numbers and noticed a discrepancy - I do not think it is reasonable to have expected them to do so.
@chris_lz - In my experience pilots are split on the matter. If you look back over the thread there are more numerous posts from those who oppose Mahon's findings either partially or wholly, but the number of pilot users on here who do not feel that way are roughly equal (for the vast and sweeping majority the findings don't bother them one way or the other, but the revolutionary aspect of Mahon's approach to the investigation is still a model of it's kind).
I find the suggestion that as a lay person I must have been "taken in" by Vette's argument a little insulting. Any pilot looking at the network of circumstances that led to this accident would like to believe that they would have done things differently - in this way, assigning a degree of responsibility to the crew is comforting ("Well, even with all this other stuff going on, he broke the regs and went below MSA - I wouldn't have done that, so I'm OK"). I suspect that at that time and in that place with the prevailing aviation and company culture at the time, most if not all would have ended up with Collins on the slopes of Erebus.
The destination they were flying to was unusual, but by the time Collins and Simpson's crews attended the briefing they were regularly scheduled flights - the company had set up a series of extra safeguards because of the nature of the trip, but otherwise - as far as they knew* - it was just another day at the office. They took off believing that even if something went wrong those safeguards would protect them, but unbeknownst to them every single one of those safeguards had been defeated by pressing a few keys in on a computer terminal in Auckland only a few hours before they left.
The debate among the piloting fraternity will always go on regarding this incident because every pilot has his or her own opinion of what it was reasonable to expect the crew to do with the information they were given. It is that word - "reasonable" - that defines the difference of opinion.
[* - Allegedly the NZCA did indeed complain about the apparent busting of minima in the press reports, but this complaint never made it as far as the briefing room.]
While I can't fault your reasoning, your arguments are based around an ideal-world interpretation of what they could and should have done, rather than what they were required to do in the real-world situation. For example, you state the fact that neither Collins or Cassin picked up on the 166E change as they were keying it in. This is because SOP did not require them to - it was designed to catch a mis-keying of the waypoints by way of reading the data, keying it in and reading it back - it was not designed to catch a change of waypoint from the briefing to pre-flight, and to cover that eventuality, all changes to the computerised flight plans were required to be notified to ops via a NOTAM. This was not done. In your ideal-world scenario they should have taken it upon themselves to check, but the real-world situation did not require them to. A coda to this is that the way you put it, the digit change was one of three, when in fact it was one of five - from 164.48E at the briefing to 166.48E at the pre-flight check. As they were not required to check the briefing co-ordinates against the pre-flight co-ordinates (unless they were notified of a change - which, and sorry to bang on about this point, they weren't) the only way they could have picked up on it would be if they had memorised the whole set of numbers and noticed a discrepancy - I do not think it is reasonable to have expected them to do so.
@chris_lz - In my experience pilots are split on the matter. If you look back over the thread there are more numerous posts from those who oppose Mahon's findings either partially or wholly, but the number of pilot users on here who do not feel that way are roughly equal (for the vast and sweeping majority the findings don't bother them one way or the other, but the revolutionary aspect of Mahon's approach to the investigation is still a model of it's kind).
I find the suggestion that as a lay person I must have been "taken in" by Vette's argument a little insulting. Any pilot looking at the network of circumstances that led to this accident would like to believe that they would have done things differently - in this way, assigning a degree of responsibility to the crew is comforting ("Well, even with all this other stuff going on, he broke the regs and went below MSA - I wouldn't have done that, so I'm OK"). I suspect that at that time and in that place with the prevailing aviation and company culture at the time, most if not all would have ended up with Collins on the slopes of Erebus.
The destination they were flying to was unusual, but by the time Collins and Simpson's crews attended the briefing they were regularly scheduled flights - the company had set up a series of extra safeguards because of the nature of the trip, but otherwise - as far as they knew* - it was just another day at the office. They took off believing that even if something went wrong those safeguards would protect them, but unbeknownst to them every single one of those safeguards had been defeated by pressing a few keys in on a computer terminal in Auckland only a few hours before they left.
The debate among the piloting fraternity will always go on regarding this incident because every pilot has his or her own opinion of what it was reasonable to expect the crew to do with the information they were given. It is that word - "reasonable" - that defines the difference of opinion.
[* - Allegedly the NZCA did indeed complain about the apparent busting of minima in the press reports, but this complaint never made it as far as the briefing room.]
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DozyWannabe,
My apology. In hindsight that what I wrote above was (unintentionally) insenstive and presumptuous. I was referring more to me, because I was, in in fact, "taken in" by Vette in the past. But maybe not you. My position is one of caution. I've been through these arguments before and been found wrong (I think), so as a layman, I'm not about proclaim that this time round, I have the definitive truth.
Which leads me to
So the case against Vette/Mahon is a reasonable one? I wrote what I wrote because I was getting the impression from you that this isn't so- that only the Vette position is reasonable.
Cheers
My apology. In hindsight that what I wrote above was (unintentionally) insenstive and presumptuous. I was referring more to me, because I was, in in fact, "taken in" by Vette in the past. But maybe not you. My position is one of caution. I've been through these arguments before and been found wrong (I think), so as a layman, I'm not about proclaim that this time round, I have the definitive truth.
Which leads me to
It is that word - "reasonable" - that defines the difference of opinion.
Cheers
Any pilot looking at the network of circumstances that led to this accident would like to believe that they would have done things differently - in this way, assigning a degree of responsibility to the crew is comforting ("Well, even with all this other stuff going on, he broke the regs and went below MSA - I wouldn't have done that, so I'm OK").
I suspect that at that time and in that place with the prevailing aviation and company culture at the time, most if not all would have ended up with Collins on the slopes of Erebus.
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DozyW #273:
There is no issue with the transcript as regards Capt Collins and F/O Cassin: "When I listened to the tape recording myself, which I did on two occasions in New Zealand, it became clear that the only two voices which could be heard without difficulty were those of Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin" (Royal Commission's Report, page 36). Mahon did not take issue with anything in the transcript that was attributed to the captain or the F/O.
Of course it's very easy with the benefit of hindsight, but the issues with the VMC/AINS plan were known to Captain Collins before he went below MSA. Although he had not experienced sector whiteout before, he knew that visual perception could be affected. That is probably why he locked back onto the nav track - but in doing that, he also knew that he had received conflicting information about the waypoint and hadn't checked it.
A good pictorial summary of what happened is at Annex D, Appendix 3, of Chippendale's report:
Chippindale Report
If you look at that 3D presentation, it's difficult to understand why he decided to go down in that situation, even if he thought Erebus was 20nm to his left. (Ironically, the track of his two descending orbits is engraved onto the flight safety award named in his honour.)
There is no issue with the transcript as regards Capt Collins and F/O Cassin: "When I listened to the tape recording myself, which I did on two occasions in New Zealand, it became clear that the only two voices which could be heard without difficulty were those of Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin" (Royal Commission's Report, page 36). Mahon did not take issue with anything in the transcript that was attributed to the captain or the F/O.
Of course it's very easy with the benefit of hindsight, but the issues with the VMC/AINS plan were known to Captain Collins before he went below MSA. Although he had not experienced sector whiteout before, he knew that visual perception could be affected. That is probably why he locked back onto the nav track - but in doing that, he also knew that he had received conflicting information about the waypoint and hadn't checked it.
A good pictorial summary of what happened is at Annex D, Appendix 3, of Chippendale's report:
Chippindale Report
If you look at that 3D presentation, it's difficult to understand why he decided to go down in that situation, even if he thought Erebus was 20nm to his left. (Ironically, the track of his two descending orbits is engraved onto the flight safety award named in his honour.)
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but the revolutionary aspect of Mahon's approach to the investigation is still a model of it's kind).
From New Zealand Tragedies Aviation. John King.
Because the findings of the Royal Commissionof Inquiry on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike the Office of Air Accidents investigation which remains the sole official account- and has never been officially challenged
The Court of Appeal addressed several aspects that were brought to the commissioners notice during the enquiry but ignored by him. The five judges unanimously quashed the $150,000 costs order, imposed as punishment for the alledged conspiracy.
Citing his own action when alledged to be in the wrong, Morrie Davis called on Mahon to resign as a High Court Judge, which he did.
In their judgement delivered opn 20th Oct 1983, the five Law Lords of the Privy Council dismissed the commissioners appeal, which upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal decision, which set aside the costs order against the airline, on the grounds that Mahon had committed clear breaches of natural justice.
THEY DEMOLISHED HIS CASE ITEM BY ITEM INCLUDING EXHIBIT 164 WHICH COULD NOT "BE UNDERSTOOD BY ANY EXPERIENCED PILOT TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF NAVIGATION.
THEY DEMOLISHED HIS CASE ITEM BY ITEM INCLUDING EXHIBIT 164 WHICH COULD NOT "BE UNDERSTOOD BY ANY EXPERIENCED PILOT TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF NAVIGATION.
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@prospector - We're educated and polite men here, sir - there's no need to shout.
At this point the best we can do is agree to disagree, because ultimately the whole mess is tied up in tales of missing evidence, break-ins, acrimony and the end of careers. If you choose to take that as your conclusion then that's none of my business just as the reasons behind mine are none of yours.
Vette saw Mahon after the whole thing had worked it's way through the grinder, and asked him what had happened and why he did not continue to press his case beyond the Privy Council's findings (which in fact only upheld the complaint of the conspiracy charge and nothing else, despite what you say - even if you say it in caps). Mahon's enigmatic reply was "Politics boy, deep politics".
Once you're into that mess then even the best reasoning can come to nothing.
At this point the best we can do is agree to disagree, because ultimately the whole mess is tied up in tales of missing evidence, break-ins, acrimony and the end of careers. If you choose to take that as your conclusion then that's none of my business just as the reasons behind mine are none of yours.
Vette saw Mahon after the whole thing had worked it's way through the grinder, and asked him what had happened and why he did not continue to press his case beyond the Privy Council's findings (which in fact only upheld the complaint of the conspiracy charge and nothing else, despite what you say - even if you say it in caps). Mahon's enigmatic reply was "Politics boy, deep politics".
Once you're into that mess then even the best reasoning can come to nothing.
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and why he did not continue to press his case beyond the Privy Council's findings
[quote]
Their Lordships cannot close this lengthy judgement without expressing their conviction that the time has come for all parties to let bygones be bygones as far as the aftermath of the Mt Erebus disaster is concerned.
There were what in retrospect can be recognised as having been faults or mistakes at the enquiry but which,in the circumstances in which the enquiry had to be held and the Judges report prepared, appear to their Lordships for the most part to have been manifestations of human fallibility that are easy to understand and excuse. The time has surely come by now for them to be allowed to be forgotten[/QUOTe
There were what in retrospect can be recognised as having been faults or mistakes at the enquiry but which,in the circumstances in which the enquiry had to be held and the Judges report prepared, appear to their Lordships for the most part to have been manifestations of human fallibility that are easy to understand and excuse. The time has surely come by now for them to be allowed to be forgotten[/QUOTe
No need to answer that, it was to create a bit of controversy to help the sale of his book.
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I have to admit I find it amusing that you speak of the man with such reverence, yet consistently misspell his surname. It's "Chippindale".
The joy of free speech and a free press is that any damn fool can say or print anything they wish, and taking offence on behalf of the dead is a fool's errand. No matter which way you slice it - to run the Antarctic flights the way ANZ did was a mistake. You blame the unions for taking it out of the hands of management captains and you blame Captain Collins and his crew for not being able to unravel the dreadful situation that the poor management and communications practice in the company put them in - fine, that's your lookout.
But as with many disasters of this type the truth of the matter went beyond piloting and aviation skills and showed a flawed system that promised the crews several redundant layers of safety - every single one of which was defeated by a late-night flight plan alteration at a computer terminal which was unannounced and undetected.
Everyone's going to have their own opinion - it's the way of things. I don't think theres any further resolution beyond this point.
The joy of free speech and a free press is that any damn fool can say or print anything they wish, and taking offence on behalf of the dead is a fool's errand. No matter which way you slice it - to run the Antarctic flights the way ANZ did was a mistake. You blame the unions for taking it out of the hands of management captains and you blame Captain Collins and his crew for not being able to unravel the dreadful situation that the poor management and communications practice in the company put them in - fine, that's your lookout.
But as with many disasters of this type the truth of the matter went beyond piloting and aviation skills and showed a flawed system that promised the crews several redundant layers of safety - every single one of which was defeated by a late-night flight plan alteration at a computer terminal which was unannounced and undetected.
Everyone's going to have their own opinion - it's the way of things. I don't think theres any further resolution beyond this point.