The Chaser,
Very interesting that you should bring this incident up, although its only relation to E airspace is that E airspace would have prevented to incident, because ATC would have provided separation.
Of far more interest is the reason why the Baron pilots turned off the GA path in IMC, and what circumstances resulted him having to make the turn, or put another way, what activities of the SAAB contributed to the (a seen by the Baron pilot) need to make a turn to avoid the potential of a collision.
What could/should the SAAB (above LSA) have done, so that the Baron didn't have to deviate from the published GA below LSA.
Please try and read the whole report with an open mind (unless your mind is open at both ends) and then consider some of the guidelines in the CAAPs for the revised CAR 166.
The are some serious lessons to be learned from this incident, but from my filed observations, I doubt they have.
As to the main topic in hand, I didn't expect any of you to really understand the significance of the NAS2b incident north of Brisbane, and to repeat again that I accept the principles of risk management in all aviation decision making, but particularly in the case of ICAO CNS/ATM airspace classification or aircraft certification standards.
I love the references to ILS v. NDB and "safer", just another example of lack of knowledge of procedure design parameters, and the part played by probabilities.
Needless to say, "pilot technical error" is a significant consideration in the overall risk assessment that resulted in the design criteria.
For just one example, would any of you like to quote the probability of an NDB being available, when an aircraft diverts to a filed served by a single NDB. Or an ILS failing to transfer to backup power in the event of a failure of the primary power source ---- and so it goes on.
And by the way, there is nothing "theoretical" about "risk management", its veracity is long since proven beyond reasonable doubt, as the High Court of Australia has found.
Tootle pip!!