Erebus 25 years on
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Bushy Quote........"But thank god for Gordon Vette and the courts, and in particular Justice Mahon".
yeah mate!! well said...at least he was an advocate for the pilots....he took a lot of strife....but a very interesting and smart fella.....met him quite a few years back,briefly as I recognised him from photos,.......last I heard he was not doing well....anyone know
yeah mate!! well said...at least he was an advocate for the pilots....he took a lot of strife....but a very interesting and smart fella.....met him quite a few years back,briefly as I recognised him from photos,.......last I heard he was not doing well....anyone know
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Erebus: The Aftermath
Hello !
Anybody know if the TVNZ docudrama "Erebus-The Aftermath"
is available as video tape or DVD ?
Anybody know if the TVNZ docudrama "Erebus-The Aftermath"
is available as video tape or DVD ?
How did you go? Any favourable responses?
I have been trying (in vain) for several years to obtain a copy of this (award winning) TV docu-drama. I vaguely recall watching it on TV here in Australia as a youngster, probably around 1988 when it was released. I have since contacted the Australian Broadcasting Commission, who have said that they don't have the rights to this series. I've also contacted the TV station in NZ that screened it, as well as the NZ Film Commission, but have similarly had no success. It is almost as if there has been some type of intervention to prevent it from ever being released commercially (even on a small scale).
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Orchestrated?
Now what would Justice Mahon have thought of this...... 
Erebus article censor found at Air NZ
By JOHN HENZELL - The Press | Tuesday, 21 August 2007
An Air New Zealand computer was used to sanitise an online encyclopaedia article to make the airline look less culpable for its part in New Zealand's worst peacetime disaster.
An article about the 1979 Erebus crash on Wikipedia, an internet encyclopaedia able to be edited by users, was altered to state "pilots are divided to this day as to whether the responsibility ... should rest with the pilot or the flight planning department" over the deaths of 257 passengers and crew.
The alteration, which has since been deleted, was identified this month as coming from a computer using the Air New Zealand server.
An Air New Zealand spokeswoman said the company was investigating the allegation.
But Cabinet minister Jim Anderton said that, if true, the change was "outrageous (and) entirely erroneous".
It was a case of the airline – now 80 per cent owned by the Government – trying to rewrite history to make itself look better.
The airline's computers were implicated through a programme devised by self-described American "destructive technologist" Virgil Griffith to identify the computer systems used by those who made alterations to Wikipedia.
Computer experts contacted by The Press also tracked the altered entry back to Air New Zealand's computer server.
Anderton has previously called on the Government to make a formal declaration that Captain Jim Collins and co-pilot Greg Cassin were not to blame for the crash.
He said yesterday that to suggest there was disagreement over blame for the Erebus crash was unjustifiable and wrong.
Maria Collins, the widow of Jim Collins, said yesterday that it was of little importance what Wikipedia said about the crash.
"Whether Wikpedia says one thing or another and who wrote it or authorised it – so much has been written that is incorrect that I have stopped jumping up and down," she said.
The Wikipedia alteration left unchanged the findings by Justice Peter Mahon's Royal Commission that Air New Zealand executives had been behind an "orchestrated litany of lies" to cover up the cause of the accident, including disposing evidence and engaging in subterfuge.
It also made no change to the assertion that Mahon's findings remained, even though the Privy Council overturned the result because he had exceeded his powers and denied the airline a fair hearing.
Anderton said the alteration suggested that Air New Zealand remained sensitive to allegations of blame for the Erebus crash.
He said pilots' associations in New Zealand and internationally had endorsed Mahon's findings and the only dissent by pilots over the fault was from those who had a "vested interest" in upholding the original accident report overturned by the Royal Commission.
New Zealand Airline Pilots Association president Mark Rammell said there was no division among pilots.
"Justice Mahon's finding, that was the official finding of the Royal Commission and that was accepted in Parliament," Rammell said.
"Our pilots are completely happy with that finding, that it was not pilot error."
Erebus article censor found at Air NZ
By JOHN HENZELL - The Press | Tuesday, 21 August 2007
An Air New Zealand computer was used to sanitise an online encyclopaedia article to make the airline look less culpable for its part in New Zealand's worst peacetime disaster.
An article about the 1979 Erebus crash on Wikipedia, an internet encyclopaedia able to be edited by users, was altered to state "pilots are divided to this day as to whether the responsibility ... should rest with the pilot or the flight planning department" over the deaths of 257 passengers and crew.
The alteration, which has since been deleted, was identified this month as coming from a computer using the Air New Zealand server.
An Air New Zealand spokeswoman said the company was investigating the allegation.
But Cabinet minister Jim Anderton said that, if true, the change was "outrageous (and) entirely erroneous".
It was a case of the airline – now 80 per cent owned by the Government – trying to rewrite history to make itself look better.
The airline's computers were implicated through a programme devised by self-described American "destructive technologist" Virgil Griffith to identify the computer systems used by those who made alterations to Wikipedia.
Computer experts contacted by The Press also tracked the altered entry back to Air New Zealand's computer server.
Anderton has previously called on the Government to make a formal declaration that Captain Jim Collins and co-pilot Greg Cassin were not to blame for the crash.
He said yesterday that to suggest there was disagreement over blame for the Erebus crash was unjustifiable and wrong.
Maria Collins, the widow of Jim Collins, said yesterday that it was of little importance what Wikipedia said about the crash.
"Whether Wikpedia says one thing or another and who wrote it or authorised it – so much has been written that is incorrect that I have stopped jumping up and down," she said.
The Wikipedia alteration left unchanged the findings by Justice Peter Mahon's Royal Commission that Air New Zealand executives had been behind an "orchestrated litany of lies" to cover up the cause of the accident, including disposing evidence and engaging in subterfuge.
It also made no change to the assertion that Mahon's findings remained, even though the Privy Council overturned the result because he had exceeded his powers and denied the airline a fair hearing.
Anderton said the alteration suggested that Air New Zealand remained sensitive to allegations of blame for the Erebus crash.
He said pilots' associations in New Zealand and internationally had endorsed Mahon's findings and the only dissent by pilots over the fault was from those who had a "vested interest" in upholding the original accident report overturned by the Royal Commission.
New Zealand Airline Pilots Association president Mark Rammell said there was no division among pilots.
"Justice Mahon's finding, that was the official finding of the Royal Commission and that was accepted in Parliament," Rammell said.
"Our pilots are completely happy with that finding, that it was not pilot error."
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Mr Rammel is taking a lot upon himself,
"New Zealand Airline Pilots Association president Mark Rammell said there was no division among pilots."
Just reading this thread and others from other forums, it is patently obvious that there is much division among many pilots from many backgrounds.
As for the opinion of Mr Anderton, it is just that, his opinion, based upon what aviation knowledge or experience?. It is of as much value in determining blame as the Townsville refuellers opinion.
"New Zealand Airline Pilots Association president Mark Rammell said there was no division among pilots."
Just reading this thread and others from other forums, it is patently obvious that there is much division among many pilots from many backgrounds.
As for the opinion of Mr Anderton, it is just that, his opinion, based upon what aviation knowledge or experience?. It is of as much value in determining blame as the Townsville refuellers opinion.
Last edited by prospector; 22nd Jan 2008 at 07:13.
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And still the debate goes on.........
Well said, Prospector. Mr Rammell is obliged to take that stance as President of NZALPA. To state otherwise would be contrary to his mandate. The fact that Parliament accepted the findings says absolutely nothing. Not one of those idiots had a background in aviation, and all had a vested interest in getting re-elected - the "lets show outrage and the public will side with us" mentality that all politicians appear to have. Mr Anderton is no different. The polls suggest he may be history this time around, so best get name in the paper......
I'm sorry, Front Pit, but I have been in this game for 30 years now, and I have yet to find one of my peers who does not have a different slant on the accident and the subsequent findings. To state that all pilots are unified on the subject is pure cowsh. So what if some AirNZ worker used the mainframe to edit the article - Wikipedia is hardly what I would call an authoritative encyclopaedia. The mere fact that ANYBODY can edit an article negates the definition. Air New Zealand is so far past the Erebus incident - the culture, training, management and operating procedures have all changed (for the better, I might add). Surely we should all be moving on.
Hope you all had a good Christmas and New Year.
400R
I'm sorry, Front Pit, but I have been in this game for 30 years now, and I have yet to find one of my peers who does not have a different slant on the accident and the subsequent findings. To state that all pilots are unified on the subject is pure cowsh. So what if some AirNZ worker used the mainframe to edit the article - Wikipedia is hardly what I would call an authoritative encyclopaedia. The mere fact that ANYBODY can edit an article negates the definition. Air New Zealand is so far past the Erebus incident - the culture, training, management and operating procedures have all changed (for the better, I might add). Surely we should all be moving on.
Hope you all had a good Christmas and New Year.
400R
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PRIVY COUNCIL FINDINGS
The Royal Commission Report convincingly clears Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin of any suggestion that negligence on their part had in any way contributed to the disaster. That is unchallenged.
It continues on to explain why Mr Chippindale’s finding of pilot error was wrong:
The judge was able to displace Mr. Chippindale's attribution of the accident to pilot error, for two main reasons. The most important was that at the inquiry there was evidence from Captain Collins' widow and daughters, which had not been available to Mr. Chippindale at the time of his investigation and was previously unknown to the management of A.N.Z., that after the briefing of 9 November 1979 Captain Collins, who had made a note of the co-ordinates of the Western Waypoint that were on the flight plan used at that briefing, had, at his own home, plotted on an atlas and upon a larger topographical chart the track from the Cape Hallett waypoint to the Western Waypoint. There was evidence that he had taken this atlas and chart with him on the fatal flight and the inference was plain that in the course of piloting the aircraft he and First Officer Cassin had used the lines that he had plotted to show him where the aircraft was when he switched from nav track to heading select in order to make a descent to 2,000 feet while still to the north of Ross Island which he reported to ATC at McMurdo and to which he received ATC's consent. That on completing this descent he switched back to nav track is incapable of being reconciled with any other explanation than that he was relying upon the line he had himself plotted of the flight track on which he had been briefed. It was a combination of his own meticulous conscientiousness in taking the trouble to plot for himself on a topographical chart the flight track that had been referred to at his briefing, and the fact that he had no previous experience of "whiteout" and had been given no warning at any time that such a deceptive phenomenon even existed, that caused the disaster.
The other principal reason why the judge felt able to displace Mr. Chippindale's ascription of the cause of the accident to pilot error was that certain remarks forming part of the conversations recorded in the CVR of the crashed aircraft and attributed by Mr. Chippindale to the flight engineers had suggested to him that shortly before the crash they were expressing to the pilot and navigator uncertainty about the aircraft's position. The tape from the CVR which had been recovered from the site of the crash proved difficult to interpret. The judge, with the thoroughness that characterised him throughout his investigations, went to great pains to obtain the best possible expert assistance in the interpretation of the tape. The result was that he was able to conclude that the remarks attributed by Mr. Chippindale to the flight engineers could not have been made by them, and that there was nothing recorded in the CVR that was capable of throwing any doubt upon the confident belief of all members of the crew that the nav track was taking the aircraft on the flight path as it had been plotted by Captain Collins on his atlas and chart, and thus down the middle of McMurdo Sound well to the west of Mt. Erebus.
Then they confirm that Justice Mahon was correct in castigating the airline
The judge's report contains numerous examples and criticisms of A.N.Z.'s slipshod system of administration and absence of liaison both between sections and between individual members of sections in the branch of management that was concerned with flight operations. Grave deficiencies are exposed in the briefing for Antarctic flights; and the explanation advanced by witnesses for the airline as to how it came about that Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin were briefed on a flight path that took the aircraft over the ice-covered waters of McMurdo Sound well to the west of Mt. Erebus but were issued, for use in the aircraft's computer, as the nav track a flight path which went directly over Mt. Erebus itself, without the aircrew being told of the change, involved admissions of a whole succession of inexcusable blunders by individual members of the executive staff. None of this was challenged before their Lordships. No attempt was made on behalf of A.N.Z. to advance excuses for it.
The privy council appeal verdict did not overturn any of Justice Mahon’s conclusions as to who was to blame for the disaster. It was the airline !
What the privy council appeal verdict did do was reluctantly agree that Justice Mahon went a bit too far in paragraph 377 of his report :
**************************************************
The Royal Commission Report convincingly clears Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin of any suggestion that negligence on their part had in any way contributed to the disaster. That is unchallenged.
It continues on to explain why Mr Chippindale’s finding of pilot error was wrong:
The judge was able to displace Mr. Chippindale's attribution of the accident to pilot error, for two main reasons. The most important was that at the inquiry there was evidence from Captain Collins' widow and daughters, which had not been available to Mr. Chippindale at the time of his investigation and was previously unknown to the management of A.N.Z., that after the briefing of 9 November 1979 Captain Collins, who had made a note of the co-ordinates of the Western Waypoint that were on the flight plan used at that briefing, had, at his own home, plotted on an atlas and upon a larger topographical chart the track from the Cape Hallett waypoint to the Western Waypoint. There was evidence that he had taken this atlas and chart with him on the fatal flight and the inference was plain that in the course of piloting the aircraft he and First Officer Cassin had used the lines that he had plotted to show him where the aircraft was when he switched from nav track to heading select in order to make a descent to 2,000 feet while still to the north of Ross Island which he reported to ATC at McMurdo and to which he received ATC's consent. That on completing this descent he switched back to nav track is incapable of being reconciled with any other explanation than that he was relying upon the line he had himself plotted of the flight track on which he had been briefed. It was a combination of his own meticulous conscientiousness in taking the trouble to plot for himself on a topographical chart the flight track that had been referred to at his briefing, and the fact that he had no previous experience of "whiteout" and had been given no warning at any time that such a deceptive phenomenon even existed, that caused the disaster.
The other principal reason why the judge felt able to displace Mr. Chippindale's ascription of the cause of the accident to pilot error was that certain remarks forming part of the conversations recorded in the CVR of the crashed aircraft and attributed by Mr. Chippindale to the flight engineers had suggested to him that shortly before the crash they were expressing to the pilot and navigator uncertainty about the aircraft's position. The tape from the CVR which had been recovered from the site of the crash proved difficult to interpret. The judge, with the thoroughness that characterised him throughout his investigations, went to great pains to obtain the best possible expert assistance in the interpretation of the tape. The result was that he was able to conclude that the remarks attributed by Mr. Chippindale to the flight engineers could not have been made by them, and that there was nothing recorded in the CVR that was capable of throwing any doubt upon the confident belief of all members of the crew that the nav track was taking the aircraft on the flight path as it had been plotted by Captain Collins on his atlas and chart, and thus down the middle of McMurdo Sound well to the west of Mt. Erebus.
Then they confirm that Justice Mahon was correct in castigating the airline
The judge's report contains numerous examples and criticisms of A.N.Z.'s slipshod system of administration and absence of liaison both between sections and between individual members of sections in the branch of management that was concerned with flight operations. Grave deficiencies are exposed in the briefing for Antarctic flights; and the explanation advanced by witnesses for the airline as to how it came about that Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin were briefed on a flight path that took the aircraft over the ice-covered waters of McMurdo Sound well to the west of Mt. Erebus but were issued, for use in the aircraft's computer, as the nav track a flight path which went directly over Mt. Erebus itself, without the aircrew being told of the change, involved admissions of a whole succession of inexcusable blunders by individual members of the executive staff. None of this was challenged before their Lordships. No attempt was made on behalf of A.N.Z. to advance excuses for it.
The privy council appeal verdict did not overturn any of Justice Mahon’s conclusions as to who was to blame for the disaster. It was the airline !
What the privy council appeal verdict did do was reluctantly agree that Justice Mahon went a bit too far in paragraph 377 of his report :
**************************************************
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...and some people appear to have trouble understanding
...but perhaps an armchair expert's opinion carries more weight than a Royal Commission Report 
(Go back and read post #88 slowly FFS
I'm with Nick on this one.)
The Royal Commission Report convincingly clears Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin of any suggestion that negligence on their part had in any way contributed to the disaster. That is unchallenged.
(Go back and read post #88 slowly FFS
I'm with Nick on this one.)
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A malevolent trick of the polar light........
It would appear some people still believe the world is flat.
400R, Thanks had a great Christmas & New Year and hope everyone else did too. No need to say sorry, in this case I’m only the messenger. However, in altering information regarding the 1979 Erebus disaster in 2007 it appears that old habits die hard with some at Air New Zealand. Quite amazing. It’s also amazing, and quite appalling that some here wish to dance on the graves of Jim Collins & Greg Cassin for not actually seeing an optical illusion!!………. What a prospect!
Thanks for your interesting posts nick charles and desert dingo.
At the end of the 1981 documentary “Flight 901 – The Erebus Disaster” and the 1987 mini-series “Erebus – The Aftermath” they make similar quote’s from Justice Mahon’s finding’s ---- “For my purposes the most definitive illustration of the hidden peril’s of the Antarctic was the wreckage which lay on the mountainside below me, showing how the forces of nature, if given the chance, can sometimes defeat the flawless technology of man. The crash was a million to one chance caused by a series of disastrous administrative blunders, but the ultimate key to the tragedy lay here in the white silence of Lewis Bay, the place to which the airliner had been unerringly guided by it’s micro electronic navigation system, only to be destroyed in clear air, and without warning, by a malevolent trick of the polar light”.
I think that say’s it all.
May they rest in peace………….FP
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"and the fact that he had no previous experience of "whiteout" and had been given no warning at any time that such a deceptive phenomenon even existed, that caused the disaster."
And that is exactly why the SOP's stated what requirements had to be met before any descent. It was because the crew did not comply, not just with some, but with none of the requirements for descent as laid down both by the company and CAA that caused the disaster.
Obviously this ground can be gone over and over again, as it has been, but for my money Mr Chippendale, who was an experienced Aviator, came up with the right conclusion as to what caused the disaster. Mr Mahon, who had never strapped an aeroplane onto his posterior was really out of his depth, and his findings were only an opinion that could not be appealed.
He admittedly came up with some new methods of ascertaining deep seated causes of mishaps, which was a breath of fresh air after years of all accidents being put down to pilot error, but in this particular case he ignored much really relevant evidence, and with no aviation background how could he ascertain what was relevant and what was not. He made very little use of the aviation expertise that was available to him in the form of a qualified consultant.
And that is exactly why the SOP's stated what requirements had to be met before any descent. It was because the crew did not comply, not just with some, but with none of the requirements for descent as laid down both by the company and CAA that caused the disaster.
Obviously this ground can be gone over and over again, as it has been, but for my money Mr Chippendale, who was an experienced Aviator, came up with the right conclusion as to what caused the disaster. Mr Mahon, who had never strapped an aeroplane onto his posterior was really out of his depth, and his findings were only an opinion that could not be appealed.
He admittedly came up with some new methods of ascertaining deep seated causes of mishaps, which was a breath of fresh air after years of all accidents being put down to pilot error, but in this particular case he ignored much really relevant evidence, and with no aviation background how could he ascertain what was relevant and what was not. He made very little use of the aviation expertise that was available to him in the form of a qualified consultant.
Last edited by prospector; 23rd Jan 2008 at 07:21.
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Here we go again
Nick,
I don't know if you have any sort of grounding in aviation. If you do, then I am surprised at some of your assertions. I suggest you read some of my previous posts, esp. regarding the responsibilities of the P-i-C. Regardless of what is on the CFP (Company Flight Plan) the Captain has the ultimate responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight. Once the aircraft is despatched (i.e. when the ground engineer signals "clear to taxi"), the Captain's decisions are the ultimate authority (see CAA regs.). It matters not what the airline has planned. What the Captain should be ultimately guided by are the SOP's. Once again, I reiterate, these were NOT adhered to (ref. Capt. Chippendale's testimony).
I am not saying that the Airline should not shoulder some of the responsibility - it should. Capt. Collins should have been advised of the change of flight plan. Having said that, he should have plotted the co-ordinates from the plan he was issued with, NOT what was done in the past - it was irrelevant. These flights were not a regular occurence and did not follow a CAA published route, therefore there was always the possibility of a routing change, and it is the duty of the flight crew to ascertain where the aircraft is going. The Reason model for accidents clearly states that there is seldom a single reason for an accident or incident, and that only by looking at ALL the causal factors, can we come up with the true cause of an accident/incident. HOWEVER, whichever way you look at it, the flight crew ARE the last line of defence. If they screw up (e.g. not following SOP's), then there are usually fatalities.
There were many factors that contributed to the loss of TE901. Both Air New Zealand and the flight crew were at fault. The fact that ANZ tried to cover up some of their errors is essentially irrelevant, because this in itself did not contribute to the accident. Shoddy management practices and poor administration did, however, and the judge was correct in pointing that out. One has to bear in mind, though, that it was NOT AirNZ who descended the aircraft below MSA (incidentally, the CFP had the aircraft crossing Erebus well above the summit), but the flight crew. HAD THE FLIGHT CREW STUCK TO THE FLIGHT PLAN, TE901 WOULD HAVE RETURNED SAFELY TO CHRISTCHURCH.
400R
PS. FP - whiteout is indeed an optical illusion, but it precludes the seeing of a visible horizon (been down to the ice enough to know). Think about the definition of VFR - clear of clouds and IN SIGHT OF GROUND OR WATER. If you can't distinguish between them, bug out, 'cause you're in a bad place. And I dance on no-ones grave - the crew were personal friends of the family.
I don't know if you have any sort of grounding in aviation. If you do, then I am surprised at some of your assertions. I suggest you read some of my previous posts, esp. regarding the responsibilities of the P-i-C. Regardless of what is on the CFP (Company Flight Plan) the Captain has the ultimate responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight. Once the aircraft is despatched (i.e. when the ground engineer signals "clear to taxi"), the Captain's decisions are the ultimate authority (see CAA regs.). It matters not what the airline has planned. What the Captain should be ultimately guided by are the SOP's. Once again, I reiterate, these were NOT adhered to (ref. Capt. Chippendale's testimony).
I am not saying that the Airline should not shoulder some of the responsibility - it should. Capt. Collins should have been advised of the change of flight plan. Having said that, he should have plotted the co-ordinates from the plan he was issued with, NOT what was done in the past - it was irrelevant. These flights were not a regular occurence and did not follow a CAA published route, therefore there was always the possibility of a routing change, and it is the duty of the flight crew to ascertain where the aircraft is going. The Reason model for accidents clearly states that there is seldom a single reason for an accident or incident, and that only by looking at ALL the causal factors, can we come up with the true cause of an accident/incident. HOWEVER, whichever way you look at it, the flight crew ARE the last line of defence. If they screw up (e.g. not following SOP's), then there are usually fatalities.
There were many factors that contributed to the loss of TE901. Both Air New Zealand and the flight crew were at fault. The fact that ANZ tried to cover up some of their errors is essentially irrelevant, because this in itself did not contribute to the accident. Shoddy management practices and poor administration did, however, and the judge was correct in pointing that out. One has to bear in mind, though, that it was NOT AirNZ who descended the aircraft below MSA (incidentally, the CFP had the aircraft crossing Erebus well above the summit), but the flight crew. HAD THE FLIGHT CREW STUCK TO THE FLIGHT PLAN, TE901 WOULD HAVE RETURNED SAFELY TO CHRISTCHURCH.
400R
PS. FP - whiteout is indeed an optical illusion, but it precludes the seeing of a visible horizon (been down to the ice enough to know). Think about the definition of VFR - clear of clouds and IN SIGHT OF GROUND OR WATER. If you can't distinguish between them, bug out, 'cause you're in a bad place. And I dance on no-ones grave - the crew were personal friends of the family.
Last edited by 400Rulz; 23rd Jan 2008 at 07:51.
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The Co-ordinates...... a 27 Mile Change
HAD THE FLIGHT CREW STUCK TO THE FLIGHT PLAN, TE901 WOULD HAVE RETURNED SAFELY TO CHRISTCHURCH.
What you and other’s here sadly fail to come to grip’s with is that this was not a regular commercial flight from Auckland to LA at 35000 it was a SIGHTSEEING FLIGHT at low level for the enjoyment of all on board and with ample evidence from other pilot’s testimony and newspaper article’s confirming the flight’s were conducted, where permissible, at low level. Jim Collins and other pilot’s had been briefed, on the same day, of a flight plan down the flat ice of McMurdo Sound. The difference with the 28 Nov flight was that the co-ordinates had been changed and the Captain was NOT INFORMED when he quite obviously should have been. The family’s testimony was that the night before the flight Jim Collins examined his briefing notes and map’s and was showing them of the flight plan down from Cape Hallett across the flat ice to McMurdo……..well away from Mt. Erebus.
Yes the P-i-C is responsible for the safety of all on board, however, I do not believe you can be so rigid in enforcing that in light of the extraordinary set of circumstances involved with this flight. Circumstances bordering on disbelief that they could happen……but regrettably they did. And I for one won’t blame Jim with pilot error for not seeing an optical illusion. If Jim or the crew could have “seen” Mount Erebus then he would have taken the appropriate action and 257 people would have returned to NZ safely, however, the combination of a remarkable set of circumstances conspired against them, and is now history.
It appears we will just have to agree to disagree.
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Oh Bollocks
Come on, FP. You don't really believe that do you? Yes, it was a sight-seeing flight, but it was NOT planned at low level, at any stage. The company laid down strict criteria for a descent below minimum safety altitude. Not one of those criteria was fully satisfied, and therefore the flight should not have descended, and the crew not buckled to commercial pressure. My old man flew one of the flights to McMurdo, so I'm not just surmising. The flights were conducted under IFR, with the proviso that a let-down was acceptable in VFR conditions, in other words, NO VISUAL REFERENCE, NO DESCENT. And, as with any visual approach, if you lose visual reference, you go around. Had the crew initiated a go-around the moment they could no longer be sure of the horizon, there would have been no impact. This was ascertained in trials in the simulator following the accident.
I have no problem with agreeing to disagree, but if you are going to have an opinion, it should be informed.
400R
I have no problem with agreeing to disagree, but if you are going to have an opinion, it should be informed.
400R
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400 -- Bollocks yourself, a sightseeing flight which is not planned at low level at any stage, yeah right, how exciting would that be? People would be clambering over themselves to pay to see Antarctica from 35,000!!....or for that matter even 16,000... They saw the horizon but unfortunately for them it was an optical illusion, until you take the blinkers off and accept the facts, and the umpire's decision that the pilot's were not responsible, then there's no hope for you. Poor soul.
They saw the horizon but unfortunately for them it was an optical illusion, until you take the blinkers off and accept the facts, and the umpire's decision that the pilot's were not responsible, then there's no hope for you. Poor soul.
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Bollocks indeed
400Rulz says:
CVR said:
35:36 “Presently through FL130. VMC. Intention to descend to 10,000”
38:23 “I’ve got to stay VMC, so I’ll be doing another orbit.”
42:49 “We’re VMC around this way, so I’m going to do another turn.”
45:00 “Now at 6000, descending to 2000, VMC.”
And you argue that he was not maintaining VMC?
400Rulz says:
So when was it they could no longer be sure of the horizon?
CVR said:
00:46:39z “Where is Erebus in relation to us at the moment?” “Left, about 20 or 25 miles…about 11 o’clock.”
00:47:43z “Might have to drop down to 1500 feet here, I think”
00:48:46z “Actually, these conditions don’t look very good at all.”
00:49:24z “I don’t like this.”
00:49:30z “We’re 26 miles north. We’ll have to climb out of this.
00:49:40z GPWS
00:49:49z “Go-around power please”
00:49:50z Impact
Surely the whole point is that because of the whiteout visual illusion the crew believed that they were in VMC and did have visual references.
Note the 9 second delay from the GPWS and calling for Go-around power. Yes, if the reaction had been instantaneous AND they had turned in the correct direction the crash may have been avoided, as shown by the later simulator exercises.
However, as they believed they were over the flat surface of McMurdo sound, I think they should be allowed some WTF? reaction time. I know I would have needed it.
The flights were conducted under IFR, with the proviso that a let-down was acceptable in VFR conditions, in other words, NO VISUAL REFERENCE, NO DESCENT
35:36 “Presently through FL130. VMC. Intention to descend to 10,000”
38:23 “I’ve got to stay VMC, so I’ll be doing another orbit.”
42:49 “We’re VMC around this way, so I’m going to do another turn.”
45:00 “Now at 6000, descending to 2000, VMC.”
And you argue that he was not maintaining VMC?
400Rulz says:
And, as with any visual approach, if you lose visual reference, you go around. Had the crew initiated a go-around the moment they could no longer be sure of the horizon, there would have been no impact
CVR said:
00:46:39z “Where is Erebus in relation to us at the moment?” “Left, about 20 or 25 miles…about 11 o’clock.”
00:47:43z “Might have to drop down to 1500 feet here, I think”
00:48:46z “Actually, these conditions don’t look very good at all.”
00:49:24z “I don’t like this.”
00:49:30z “We’re 26 miles north. We’ll have to climb out of this.
00:49:40z GPWS
00:49:49z “Go-around power please”
00:49:50z Impact
Surely the whole point is that because of the whiteout visual illusion the crew believed that they were in VMC and did have visual references.
Note the 9 second delay from the GPWS and calling for Go-around power. Yes, if the reaction had been instantaneous AND they had turned in the correct direction the crash may have been avoided, as shown by the later simulator exercises.
However, as they believed they were over the flat surface of McMurdo sound, I think they should be allowed some WTF? reaction time. I know I would have needed it.
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Nick,
I don't know if you have any sort of grounding in aviation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
400Rulz,
Some 35 years experience in the military and on domestic and international RPT routes, 25 years as PIC - and even a short period in Antarctia. I'm really not interested in debating the issue any more.
Any operator that deems it necessary to break into the homes of pilots and remove private property does not meet the characteristics required by the holder of an AOC.
I don't know if you have any sort of grounding in aviation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
400Rulz,
Some 35 years experience in the military and on domestic and international RPT routes, 25 years as PIC - and even a short period in Antarctia. I'm really not interested in debating the issue any more.
Any operator that deems it necessary to break into the homes of pilots and remove private property does not meet the characteristics required by the holder of an AOC.
Last edited by nick charles; 24th Jan 2008 at 01:04.
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Whiteout
FP
Here is an extract from the Canadian AIP:
Whiteout (also called milky weather) is defined in the ‘Glossary of Meteorology’
published by the American Meteorological Society as an atmospheric optical
phenomenon of the Polar Regions, in which the observer appears to be engulfed
in a uniformly white glow. Neither shadows, horizon, nor clouds are discernible;
sense of depth and orientation is lost; and only very dark, nearby, objects can be
seen. Whiteout occurs over an unbroken snow cover and beneath a uniformly
overcast sky when, with the aid of the snowblink effect, the light from the sky is
about equal to that from the snow surface. Blowing snow may be an additional
cause. Light carries depth perception messages to the brain in the form of colour,
glare, shadows, and so on. These elements have one thing in common: they are
all modified by the direction of the light, and changes in light intensity. For
example, when shadows occur on one side of objects, we subconsciously become
aware that the light is coming from the other. Thus, nature provides many visual
cues to assist us in discerning objects and judging distances. But what happens if
all these clues are removed? Suppose these objects on the ground and the ground
itself are all white. Add to that a diffused light source through an overcast, which
is reflected back in all directions by the white surface, so that shadows disappear.
The terrain is now virtually devoid of visual clues, and the eye no longer discerns
the surface or terrain features. Since the light is so diffused, it is likely that the sky
and terrain will blend imperceptibly into each other, obliterating the horizon. The
real hazard in whiteout is the pilot not suspecting the phenomenon, because he is
in clear air. In numerous whiteout accidents pilots have flown into snow-covered
surfaces unaware that they have been descending, and confident that they could
‘see’ the ground. Consequently, whenever a pilot encounters the whiteout
conditions described above, or even a suspicion of them, he should immediately
climb if at low level, or level off and turn towards an area where sharp terrain
features exist. The flight should not proceed unless the pilot is prepared, and
competent, to traverse the whiteout area on instruments.
I have underlined the relevant point(s).
Nick, point taken, I agree with you re. the break in. Nasty stuff. And un-necessary. I didn't mean to imply you had no aviation knowledge, just wondered how you reached your conclusions.
DD.: The Company brief specified "Gin clear weather" not 1/8th or even 2/8th cloud. The mere fact that the aircraft had to orbit in order to find a way to remain VMC says it all. The crew did not meet the requirements as laid down by either the company or CAA. But in this case all were culpable, from CAA to the airline and finally to the crew on the day. All must share responsibility for an accident that should not have happened. The blame cannot be attributed to any single factor, but a multitude of errors that resulted in the loss of TE901. All I am trying to say here is that the crew CANNOT be exonerated, because if they had followed procedures, the "line of errata" would have been terminated, without the sad consequences. Suggest you read Brian Abraham's posting earlier on in the thread.
The problem with this issue is that it still remains a highly emotive subject. Most people made their minds up about culpability years ago. Developments in accident modelling since then have demonstrated that it is rarely the fault of a single individual that causes accidents, but usually a string of events that when "lined up" results in a situation where the crew are set up for an accident. In the final analysis, the crew are the last line of defence. If they fail to follow SoP's, give in to commercial pressure etc., then an accident is the result.
Pool Boy: Interesting one-liner. Hope you have the intelligence to back it up. Now go clean that skimming basket...
This will be my last post, but I will read any further discussion with interest.
400R
Here is an extract from the Canadian AIP:
Whiteout (also called milky weather) is defined in the ‘Glossary of Meteorology’
published by the American Meteorological Society as an atmospheric optical
phenomenon of the Polar Regions, in which the observer appears to be engulfed
in a uniformly white glow. Neither shadows, horizon, nor clouds are discernible;
sense of depth and orientation is lost; and only very dark, nearby, objects can be
seen. Whiteout occurs over an unbroken snow cover and beneath a uniformly
overcast sky when, with the aid of the snowblink effect, the light from the sky is
about equal to that from the snow surface. Blowing snow may be an additional
cause. Light carries depth perception messages to the brain in the form of colour,
glare, shadows, and so on. These elements have one thing in common: they are
all modified by the direction of the light, and changes in light intensity. For
example, when shadows occur on one side of objects, we subconsciously become
aware that the light is coming from the other. Thus, nature provides many visual
cues to assist us in discerning objects and judging distances. But what happens if
all these clues are removed? Suppose these objects on the ground and the ground
itself are all white. Add to that a diffused light source through an overcast, which
is reflected back in all directions by the white surface, so that shadows disappear.
The terrain is now virtually devoid of visual clues, and the eye no longer discerns
the surface or terrain features. Since the light is so diffused, it is likely that the sky
and terrain will blend imperceptibly into each other, obliterating the horizon. The
real hazard in whiteout is the pilot not suspecting the phenomenon, because he is
in clear air. In numerous whiteout accidents pilots have flown into snow-covered
surfaces unaware that they have been descending, and confident that they could
‘see’ the ground. Consequently, whenever a pilot encounters the whiteout
conditions described above, or even a suspicion of them, he should immediately
climb if at low level, or level off and turn towards an area where sharp terrain
features exist. The flight should not proceed unless the pilot is prepared, and
competent, to traverse the whiteout area on instruments.
I have underlined the relevant point(s).
Nick, point taken, I agree with you re. the break in. Nasty stuff. And un-necessary. I didn't mean to imply you had no aviation knowledge, just wondered how you reached your conclusions.
DD.: The Company brief specified "Gin clear weather" not 1/8th or even 2/8th cloud. The mere fact that the aircraft had to orbit in order to find a way to remain VMC says it all. The crew did not meet the requirements as laid down by either the company or CAA. But in this case all were culpable, from CAA to the airline and finally to the crew on the day. All must share responsibility for an accident that should not have happened. The blame cannot be attributed to any single factor, but a multitude of errors that resulted in the loss of TE901. All I am trying to say here is that the crew CANNOT be exonerated, because if they had followed procedures, the "line of errata" would have been terminated, without the sad consequences. Suggest you read Brian Abraham's posting earlier on in the thread.
The problem with this issue is that it still remains a highly emotive subject. Most people made their minds up about culpability years ago. Developments in accident modelling since then have demonstrated that it is rarely the fault of a single individual that causes accidents, but usually a string of events that when "lined up" results in a situation where the crew are set up for an accident. In the final analysis, the crew are the last line of defence. If they fail to follow SoP's, give in to commercial pressure etc., then an accident is the result.
Pool Boy: Interesting one-liner. Hope you have the intelligence to back it up. Now go clean that skimming basket...
This will be my last post, but I will read any further discussion with interest.
400R
Last edited by 400Rulz; 23rd Jan 2008 at 23:10.
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400Rulz
do you believe in the Easter Bunny as well..........................?
The company laid down strict criteria for a descent below minimum safety altitude.
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'And you argue that he was not maintaining VMC? "
This is not relevant, the requirements for descent were laid down both by the company and CAA. As has been stated ad infinitum, none of the requirements for descent were met. There is no doubt that the crew were in full knowledge of the requirements for descent, the requirements were there to prevent just such a disaster from taking place.
This was not an aircraft owned by the crew to do with as they wished, the Company owned it, held the AOC, and prescribed though SOP's how they wanted their aircraft operated. The CAA also laid down their requirements for these operations to take place. These requirements were ignored and we have all seen the results.
For anyone who has not yet seen these requirements here they are.
1. Vis 20 Km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degrees Grid through 360 degrees grid to 270 degrees grid from McMurdo Field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
As has been stated many times not one of these requirements was adhered to. They were mandatory requirements, not as some would have us believe to be complied with if it suited but ignored if it did not suit.
This is not relevant, the requirements for descent were laid down both by the company and CAA. As has been stated ad infinitum, none of the requirements for descent were met. There is no doubt that the crew were in full knowledge of the requirements for descent, the requirements were there to prevent just such a disaster from taking place.
This was not an aircraft owned by the crew to do with as they wished, the Company owned it, held the AOC, and prescribed though SOP's how they wanted their aircraft operated. The CAA also laid down their requirements for these operations to take place. These requirements were ignored and we have all seen the results.
For anyone who has not yet seen these requirements here they are.
1. Vis 20 Km plus.
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degrees Grid through 360 degrees grid to 270 degrees grid from McMurdo Field, within 20nm of TACAN CH29.
4. Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
As has been stated many times not one of these requirements was adhered to. They were mandatory requirements, not as some would have us believe to be complied with if it suited but ignored if it did not suit.
Last edited by prospector; 24th Jan 2008 at 01:05.