Prospector again about the MSA requirements:
It was certainly part of the briefing for the flight, a copy was found in the cockpit after the accident, so the crew certainly were aware of it.
No. It was not found in the cockpit after the accident.
342. This instruction by the chief executive for the collection of all Antarctica documents had some unfortunate repercussions. Captain Gemmell. the chief pilot had gone to Antarctica with the Chief Inspector of Air Accidents, and with other officials, at about midday on 29 November 1979. It was alleged by counsel for ALPA that while Captain Gemmell was at Antarctica he had collected a quantity of documents from the crash site and brought them back to Auckland.
It was pointed out that of the documents collected at the wreckage site and produced to the Commission, there were only three which had been part of the flight documents carried by Captain Collins.
These three documents were:
(a) The RNC chart which set out track and distance diagrams for QANTAS and for Air Force flights but not for Air New Zealand. and which conveyed information as to various radio frequencies.
(b) A sample flight plan printed in October 1977 which contained among the list of co-ordinates the latitude and longitude of the NDB at McMurdo.
(c) The piece of paper containing Captain Johnson's notification on 8 November 1979 that the NDB facility was withdrawn and including a notification that the minimum safe altitude in the McMurdo area was 6000 feet.
343. It was suggested by counsel for ALP A that it was curious to find that the only flight documents recovered from the ice were each in favour of. the case which the airline was now attempting to advance. The RNC chart gave information about radio frequencies. The 2-year-old sample flight plan gave the co-ordinates of the McMurdo NDB. Captain Johnson's memorandum contained a reminder that the minimum safe altitude was 6000 feet.
344. It was pointed out that the following documents, which clearly had been carried in the flight bag of Captain Collins, along with the three just specified, had not been recovered:
(a) A map or maps upon which he had been working with plotting instruments the night before the fatal flight.
{b) The thick and heavy atlas upon which he had been working with plotting instruments the night before the fatal flight.
{c) The large topographical map issued to him by Flight Despatch on the morning of the .flight.
(d) The briefing documents handed to Captain Collins on 9 November 1979, which would have contained his own notations.
(e) The notebook which he almost certainly brought with him to the briefing of 9 November 1979 along with his atlas.
{f) The track and distance diagram showing the flight path to be down McMurdo Sound (Annex G to the chief inspector's report).
{g) Another track and distance diagram also showing the flight path to be down McMurdo Sound (AnnexH to the chief inspector's report).
(h) The Antarctica Strip Chart showing the military track down the centre of McMurdo Sound (Annex I to the chief inspector's report).
It was suggested that each of the documents just listed, but not located, would have tended to support the proposition that Captain Collins had relied upon the incorrect co-ordinates.
Strange that. If you like a conspiracy theory you could also wonder why FO Cassin’s briefing notes were collected by the company from his house and never seen again, why all the pages were missing from Captain Collin’s notebook, why the company became so enthusiastic about shredding documents, and who was behind the alleged burglaries at Captain Collins and Justice Mahon’s houses.
Prospector:
"But in practice the airline disregarded those minimum altitudes, and in my opinion were justified in doing so."
Are you suggesting that an OPINION held by Justice Mahon is of more importance than the requirements of both the Company and the CAA??
It was the
Airline that disregarded the CAA minimum altitude requirement in their briefing to pilots. Justice Mahon then had an opinion that they were justified in doing so. The importance or otherwise of his opinion does not change the fact that “in practice the airline disregarded those minimum altitudes”. He suggests in his report that the CAA should take it up with the airline and not try to blame the pilots.
Prospector:
Once again, are you suggesting that the opinion of Justice Mahon, which incidentally could not be appealed, it was not a law court he was presiding over, is of more importance then the already mentioned many times, MANDATORY requirements for descent??
It was not mandatory. The company had specifically authorised descent below 6000 feet in VMC.
"there can be no doubt, upon all the evidence, that the pilots were in fact authorised at the RCU briefings in 1978 and 1979 to descend below 6000 feet in VMC conditions to any altitude authorised by McMurdo Air Traffic Control."