AA5342 Down DCA
Pegase Driver
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Really do not physically have the time to listen to all the tapes .and watch all the videos, In case someone did , was there anything of relevance , ( e.g. new) from the ATC staff interviews ?. Was the missing traffic info discussed , the phraseology used , why previous incidents were not followed by changes in procedures ? That sort of things. Thanks in advance,
Pegase Driver
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The United States needs a new FAA organization,......[with] , a new organizational structure, ethos, culture, set of career pathways, and everything else that is not fit for purpose for the imminent and dramatic changes dead-ahead
On July 17 the White House nominated former Delta Airlines Capt. and U.S. Navy aviator Jeffrey Anderson to the position of Permanent Representative to ICAO with the rank of Ambassador.
A diplomat with civilian airline background fits better the post. A Military's background is of absolute zero use in ICAO.
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Really do not physically have the time to listen to all the tapes .and watch all the videos, In case someone did , was there anything of relevance , ( e.g. new) from the ATC staff interviews ?. Was the missing traffic info discussed , the phraseology used , why previous incidents were not followed by changes in procedures ? That sort of things. Thanks in advance,
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No , of course not, they can start the work right now.if they got the political will and budget .BUT :
And that is they key , that must come first in my view, first the new structure then the road map to your "new" airspace infrastructure and governance , with new guys and fresh ideas, and yes, some can be copied on what Europe is trying to do .
Good news that the chair will not be empty but I am not sure an airline guy is the best choice for the job , I do not know the guy but as an airline Capt he might be OPS orientated so he will, just like Sully did , become extremely frustrated on discovering how ICAO works. It is by consensus , the best ideas can be rejected by a few States and then discussions and negotiations must start again , even obvious solutions will; take years to be implemented , not weeks. In ICAO the USA has the same voice as a small State with no airline.
A diplomat with civilian airline background fits better the post. A Military's background is of absolute zero use in ICAO.
And that is they key , that must come first in my view, first the new structure then the road map to your "new" airspace infrastructure and governance , with new guys and fresh ideas, and yes, some can be copied on what Europe is trying to do .
Good news that the chair will not be empty but I am not sure an airline guy is the best choice for the job , I do not know the guy but as an airline Capt he might be OPS orientated so he will, just like Sully did , become extremely frustrated on discovering how ICAO works. It is by consensus , the best ideas can be rejected by a few States and then discussions and negotiations must start again , even obvious solutions will; take years to be implemented , not weeks. In ICAO the USA has the same voice as a small State with no airline.
A diplomat with civilian airline background fits better the post. A Military's background is of absolute zero use in ICAO.
But, that having been said, the Board's investigation appears primed to result in recommendations, supported by factual findings and analysis, for arguably significant changes in certain basic aspects of the ATM architecture. I'm relying here on the fact that the Board issued, very soon after January 29, an emergency directive to FAA with regard to the design of the DCA airspace and specifically the use of the helicopter routes. While I would not wish to assert familiarity with the actual world of ATC, the tenor and content of the Board's actions to date as well as of the three days of hearings strongly suggest that the Board will make recommendations for significant change in at least certain areas. Among these are the structure of airspace in which helicopters (civil, law enforcement, and military) interact with commerical traffic - it should be noted that a review of these airspace structures was ordered after the accident. Also, the way in which military aviation is conducted in Class B airspace especially adjacent to airports (of a certain size, presumably) appears likely to be covered by recommendations. None of this is to say that the new ATC system cannot be undertaken unless and until the Board report is issued (again, "necessary" was imprecise) but to the degree that recommendations for particular substantial reconfigurations of the NAS design are coming, the architects of the new ATC system certainly will not want to have to backtrack and redo their work.
On the drive to bring "FAA 2.0" into being, I would not associate myself with any claim that the United States ATM should "copy" European activities. I think the Memorandum of Cooperation between the SESAR authorities on one hand, and the FAA on the other, is the correct framework. And under that framework, "harmonization" appears to be the principal objective. It happens to be the case that although three formal joint reports on the status of harmonization have been completed and published over the past couple of decades, the most recent one was published several years ago. It is not as if nothing much has changed or advanced in the intervening years, but no further report is anywhere to be found.
When one takes into account the many and varied data-gathering and reporting functions of EUROCONTROL, the activities of the FABs, the ATM Master Plan, and informed expert groups such as the Wise Persons Group, at least from the cheap seats from which I see these it appears clear that European ATM is advancing quickly into the future. Whereas, in the United States, despite good people in certain technical roles in agencies and supporting organizations, the sorry state of the overall system speaks for itself. So to learn from our European allies and partners (and I do continue to view those States as allies and partners despite the view being out of vague in certain ignoramus precincts here) is not just wise, but necessary. But not to copy, rather to learn and adapt what will work best on this side of the transatlantic air-bridge.
On ICAO and the nomination of Mr. Anderson - and I do not know the gent either. Perhaps frustration with ICAO's immutable process of seeking consensus is what drove Sullenberger from Montreal, but I have my doubts. An experienced and by-then famous airline captain would be expected to have enough sophistication to realize, in advance, the unsurprising fact that ICAO is part of the UN. It should not have been any surprise, and that is without wondering whether the lucrative guest-speaker circuit was also a major factor.
I don't agree (respectfully) that each and every Member State, even small States lacking an airline, have equal voice. In Assembly votes, yes, they do. But not in the Council, given its three levels of membership and the process by which States gain membership on Council. And, though I am not an ATC professional (as you know), my understanding is that in the Air Navigation Commission, there are States with the experience and credibility to understand evolving state-of-the-art, even though they may disagree on how to proceed with it. And not every Member State has that level of experience and credibility. It's impolitic perhaps to say this out loud but that does not negate its validity or truth.
As for Mr. Anderson, the profile he has up on LinkedIn indicates that he has had quite significant labor relations experience. And governement relations responsibilities for the pilots' labor organization as well. His military career was, it appears, where he learned to aviate, and is not the approach the White House expects him to apply at ICAO. (In my view, sovereignty of every Member State's airspace is so fundamental, not only as reality of international flying but also under the Chicago Convention that a military career actually is fabulously relevant background for ICAO Permenent Rep, but reasonable minds can differ.) The labor relations experience could well turn out to be just what the doctor ordered for dealing with - as you say - the sometimes infintesimal pace of ICAO efforts to actually do something.
Of course, with ALPA having promptly denounced the nomination, because Mr. Anderson split from the labor organization over raising the age limit, perhaps the Senate confirmation process will not be accelerated before the Assembly convenes in third week of September. Whether the U.S. will be represented by a proper Permanent Representative, even one without Senate confirmation as Ambassador, is just not clear on the scope yet.
[...apologies for thread drift, but right now the NTSB DCA midair investigation is "the only game in town" in U.S. aviation policy - town as in Washington that is, not Montreal, QC, CA. ]
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I don't agree (respectfully) that each and every Member State, even small States lacking an airline, have equal voice. In Assembly votes, yes, they do. But not in the Council, given its three levels of membership and the process by which States gain membership on Council. And, though I am not an ATC professional (as you know), my understanding is that in the Air Navigation Commission, there are States with the experience and credibility to understand evolving state-of-the-art, even though they may disagree on how to proceed with it. And not every Member State has that level of experience and credibility. It's impolitic perhaps to say this out loud but that does not negate its validity or truth.
(I am sure that you are aware of that, but some of our participants need to have that spelled out).
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From the Seattle Times today https://archive.ph/7td29
WASHINGTON — The relationship between the National Transportation Safety Board, the government entity that investigates civilian airplane accidents, and the Federal Aviation Administration, the agency responsible for aviation safety, can frequently be contentious, especially after a major national tragedy.
Last week, a rift between those two main regulators of aviation safety spilled into public view.
Frustrations — and sometimes tempers — flared in uncommonly raw fashion during the board’s marathon of investigative hearings into the deadly midair crash between a military helicopter and a commercial jet near Ronald Reagan National Airport in January. Board members grilled witnesses, including air traffic controllers and FAA managers, over three days and 30 hours of public testimony.
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy led other board members in accusing the FAA of knowingly stymieing efforts to improve safety at Reagan National Airport and stonewalling parts of the board’s investigation into the crash. And Homendy directly accused the agency of fostering a culture among the air traffic control operation that discouraged employees from raising legitimate safety concerns, including by wielding the threat of retaliation.
Last week, a rift between those two main regulators of aviation safety spilled into public view.
Frustrations — and sometimes tempers — flared in uncommonly raw fashion during the board’s marathon of investigative hearings into the deadly midair crash between a military helicopter and a commercial jet near Ronald Reagan National Airport in January. Board members grilled witnesses, including air traffic controllers and FAA managers, over three days and 30 hours of public testimony.
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy led other board members in accusing the FAA of knowingly stymieing efforts to improve safety at Reagan National Airport and stonewalling parts of the board’s investigation into the crash. And Homendy directly accused the agency of fostering a culture among the air traffic control operation that discouraged employees from raising legitimate safety concerns, including by wielding the threat of retaliation.
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From the Seattle Times today https://archive.ph/7td29
Tensions Flare Between Two Federal Agencies Charged With Aviation Safety - The New York Times
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.....@Winemaker - thanks for posting the archived article. Which prompts some further comments and "general overviews on the investigation" as Annex 13 continues to provoke concerns in other ICAO Member States.
1. Producing documents just a short time before a scheduled deposition or, in this instance, a scheduled session before an investigatory board at which witnesses from the producing party or entity will testify under oath, is a classic sign of intentional failure to cooperate. Perhaps there were valid reasons for the last-minute production of documents the Board had requested; there is no way I could know whether valid reasons existed or not. But absent an articulable basis in fact, the late disclosure of requested documents means that the FAA officials responsible intended to delay, deflect, or otherwise interfere with the Board's processes. It is not obstruction of justice as such - but having had a litigation practice which involved many instances of needing to produce, or conversely wanting to receive, significant document disclosures with enough time to evaluate them prior to taking (or defending) depositions, if there were legit reasons for FAA's timing....well, they would need to be pretty good ones, given the appearance of intent to delay and so on.
2. As to retaliation, it is understandable that FAA would have moved people from DCA in the aftermath of the accident, and not necessarily for retaliatory motives. Or, not necessarily only for retaliatory motives. That particular set of personnel changes in the immediate aftermath of the accident, however, does not actually address the larger issue of the existence of a retaliatory mindset within the agency, or at least the perception of such a mindset, which also would inhibit or discourage speaking up about changes needed for safety's sake.
3. Is there an investigation process by the Army which will be (or already is) publicly available, in whole or in part?
4. The perhaps unusual or even surprising extent to which the hearings appeared to approach an adversarial context suggested it was time to check on the status of the preliminary litigation activities. (Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which is pertinent to claims against the FAA and the U.S. Army, a preliminary type of claim must first be filed with the federal entities, who have some defined time period in which to respond, or not. This was filed in mid-February.) One of the prominent attorneys specializing in representing families of accident victims, in a video segment on the firm's website, described the status of the matter. What I had not (perhaps inexcusably) anticipated was a description of likely, or at least possible, claims against the airline, and Sikorsky. About the airline, the attorney asserted that it appears the airline knew that flight operations into DCA were especially risky, that there had been several instances of cause for heightened alarm or concern, and that in the past what he called special training had been required for flying into DCA but which had been discontinued - all in the context of proximity of helicopter flight operations.
I get it. Under the FTCA, claims against the federal entities may well be challenged on the basis of the exception to waiver of sovereign immunity for (so-called) discretionary functions (a case involving Varig Airlines is a well-known example). And even if the claims go forward, there are no punitive damages allowed by the FTCA. And FTCA claims are tried to the court (judge) only, not to a jury. But claims against the airline and manufacturer, as implausible as they may appear, would allow recovery of punitive damages, and would be tried to a jury. So it isn't just a case of deeper pockets and insurers, it's also leverage given the different avenues of legal redress.
It will get . . . intense. And if the Board report ultimately follows suit to the main take-aways from the hearings, well.
1. Producing documents just a short time before a scheduled deposition or, in this instance, a scheduled session before an investigatory board at which witnesses from the producing party or entity will testify under oath, is a classic sign of intentional failure to cooperate. Perhaps there were valid reasons for the last-minute production of documents the Board had requested; there is no way I could know whether valid reasons existed or not. But absent an articulable basis in fact, the late disclosure of requested documents means that the FAA officials responsible intended to delay, deflect, or otherwise interfere with the Board's processes. It is not obstruction of justice as such - but having had a litigation practice which involved many instances of needing to produce, or conversely wanting to receive, significant document disclosures with enough time to evaluate them prior to taking (or defending) depositions, if there were legit reasons for FAA's timing....well, they would need to be pretty good ones, given the appearance of intent to delay and so on.
2. As to retaliation, it is understandable that FAA would have moved people from DCA in the aftermath of the accident, and not necessarily for retaliatory motives. Or, not necessarily only for retaliatory motives. That particular set of personnel changes in the immediate aftermath of the accident, however, does not actually address the larger issue of the existence of a retaliatory mindset within the agency, or at least the perception of such a mindset, which also would inhibit or discourage speaking up about changes needed for safety's sake.
3. Is there an investigation process by the Army which will be (or already is) publicly available, in whole or in part?
4. The perhaps unusual or even surprising extent to which the hearings appeared to approach an adversarial context suggested it was time to check on the status of the preliminary litigation activities. (Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which is pertinent to claims against the FAA and the U.S. Army, a preliminary type of claim must first be filed with the federal entities, who have some defined time period in which to respond, or not. This was filed in mid-February.) One of the prominent attorneys specializing in representing families of accident victims, in a video segment on the firm's website, described the status of the matter. What I had not (perhaps inexcusably) anticipated was a description of likely, or at least possible, claims against the airline, and Sikorsky. About the airline, the attorney asserted that it appears the airline knew that flight operations into DCA were especially risky, that there had been several instances of cause for heightened alarm or concern, and that in the past what he called special training had been required for flying into DCA but which had been discontinued - all in the context of proximity of helicopter flight operations.
I get it. Under the FTCA, claims against the federal entities may well be challenged on the basis of the exception to waiver of sovereign immunity for (so-called) discretionary functions (a case involving Varig Airlines is a well-known example). And even if the claims go forward, there are no punitive damages allowed by the FTCA. And FTCA claims are tried to the court (judge) only, not to a jury. But claims against the airline and manufacturer, as implausible as they may appear, would allow recovery of punitive damages, and would be tried to a jury. So it isn't just a case of deeper pockets and insurers, it's also leverage given the different avenues of legal redress.
It will get . . . intense. And if the Board report ultimately follows suit to the main take-aways from the hearings, well.
Pegase Driver
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From: Europe
@WillowRun6-3 : First a couple of replies to your earlier comments :
No the FAA cannot copy Europe, in fact the initial Single sky (SES) plan was the other way around, copying what the US had, based on a biased report that the US system was better and more productive than Europe . a single airspace structure under a single authority, When they realized it would not be possible, they then invented the FABs ( airspace blocks) that did not work either , so they went for technical harmonization , that is how SESAR grew . . Yes the current US-Europe discussions are about harmonization between NextGen ( what is left of it ) and SESAR . No-one wants to "copy" the other today but I suspect that the FAA 2.0 will most probably "copy" the technological path of Europe , with an ambitious master plan etc...Do not rock the boat just believe technology/ automation, now AI, will eventually solve all the problems.
on the NTSB powers :
As Lonewolf 50 correctly said and reminded us, the FAA does not have to follow NTSB recommendations . In fact they mostly don't , I have been told or read some time ago that over the last decades there were a few hundreds NTSB recommendations that remained open unactioned., But that is not a US alone issue, same in many other countries. An Investigation Board is not a Regulator, which is what is missing in the US.
as to how ICAO works :
I have been attending ICAO meetings . part of Panels and various working group ( still do it today ) The ANC is where the decisions are voted but not when the work is done and proposals are made. . There is not like in the UN , no State has a priority seat there, all equals , big and small.. And that causes difficulties My example was correct , for instance in Europe there are 2 large non-EU States both with very large international airlines and a dozen smaller ones , also both aircrfat manufacturers which are constantly blocked by very small countries with no airline but members of the EU. ( PM me if you want the names)
Military background, no use for me because we do not discuss Military matters in ICAO ( the "C" in ICAO is sacred ) and over-playing the sovereignty card is creating opposition , not consensus . Some States think it is is a nice retirement present to send a former Air Force General to ICAO : big mistake . You lose influence, not gain any, in my experience at least , but I will give Mr Anderson my full attention and will judge him on his actions , not his past .He might prove to be excellent in that role , who knows,
now about retaliation :
Not sure if this is the case., In Europe we do not do this .We suspend people involved in accidents, this is standard , some need retraining ,some come back to work ( almost always in the same facility) and some want to change jobs, but they are generally seen more as victims than culprits.
Here from what we know so far, the controllers and their supervisors were trained to work on local procedures made long before they came to the facility . Those procedures were or became unsafe but if this is how they were trained to work , you can't blame the operators for faulty procedures . OK but what about supervision ? 10 managers in 10 years, 5 in the last 5 years , show that some possibly felt vey uncomfortable with what they were seeing. But for me they also were kind of victims of the system
On the drive to bring "FAA 2.0" into being, I would not associate myself with any claim that the United States ATM should "copy" European activities. I think the Memorandum of Cooperation between the SESAR authorities on one hand, and the FAA on the other, is the correct framework. And under that framework, "harmonization" appears to be the principal objective
on the NTSB powers :
the three days of hearings strongly suggest that the Board will make recommendations for significant change in at least certain areas.
as to how ICAO works :
I have been attending ICAO meetings . part of Panels and various working group ( still do it today ) The ANC is where the decisions are voted but not when the work is done and proposals are made. . There is not like in the UN , no State has a priority seat there, all equals , big and small.. And that causes difficulties My example was correct , for instance in Europe there are 2 large non-EU States both with very large international airlines and a dozen smaller ones , also both aircrfat manufacturers which are constantly blocked by very small countries with no airline but members of the EU. ( PM me if you want the names)
Military background, no use for me because we do not discuss Military matters in ICAO ( the "C" in ICAO is sacred ) and over-playing the sovereignty card is creating opposition , not consensus . Some States think it is is a nice retirement present to send a former Air Force General to ICAO : big mistake . You lose influence, not gain any, in my experience at least , but I will give Mr Anderson my full attention and will judge him on his actions , not his past .He might prove to be excellent in that role , who knows,
now about retaliation :
As to retaliation, it is understandable that FAA would have moved people from DCA in the aftermath of the accident, and not necessarily for retaliatory motives. Or, not necessarily only for retaliatory motives. That particular set of personnel changes in the immediate aftermath of the accident, however, does not actually address the larger issue of the existence of a retaliatory mindset within the agency, or at least the perception of such a mindset, which also would inhibit or discourage speaking up about changes needed for safety's sake.
Here from what we know so far, the controllers and their supervisors were trained to work on local procedures made long before they came to the facility . Those procedures were or became unsafe but if this is how they were trained to work , you can't blame the operators for faulty procedures . OK but what about supervision ? 10 managers in 10 years, 5 in the last 5 years , show that some possibly felt vey uncomfortable with what they were seeing. But for me they also were kind of victims of the system
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From: Rocket City
Mr. Braddom is with SRD (https://www.avmc.army.mil/Directorates/SRD/ (formerly AED)) which is the Army airworthiness authority. Basically the Army's version of the FAA (like NAVAIR for the Navy and TAA for the Air Force)
Mr. Rosengren is the Chief Engineer with the Utility Helicopter Project Office which buys the UH-60 and all the equipment installed on it.
Last edited by ST Dog; 6th August 2025 at 01:29.
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Beyond the Army reps that were at the hearing? Day 1 first panel had "CW4 Kylene Lewis, Department of Evaluation and Standardization with the U.S. Army. Mr. Steve Braddom, chief airworthiness engineer with the U.S. Army. And Mr. Scott Rosengren, the chief engineer with the U.S. Army."
Mr. Braddom is with SRD (https://www.avmc.army.mil/Directorates/SRD/ (formerly AED)) which is the Army airworthiness authority. Basically the Army's version of the FAA (like NAVAIR for the Navy and TAA for the Air Force)
Mr. Rosengren is the Chief Engineer with the Utility Helicopter Project Office which buys the UH-60 and all the equipment installed on it.
Mr. Braddom is with SRD (https://www.avmc.army.mil/Directorates/SRD/ (formerly AED)) which is the Army airworthiness authority. Basically the Army's version of the FAA (like NAVAIR for the Navy and TAA for the Air Force)
Mr. Rosengren is the Chief Engineer with the Utility Helicopter Project Office which buys the UH-60 and all the equipment installed on it.
My inquiry was meant to refer to an internal investigation process, possibly with witness testimony. Or does the NTSB investigation in effect preempt any internal Army investigation and reporting functions which presumably are conducted when there is no civilian involvement in an Army aviation accident?
It wasn't mentioned (afaik) in the NTSB hearings but does the Policy Board on Federal Aviation (which I understand is situated within DoD) have any investigation role in this accident? Or in deciding upon and possibly implementing recommendations the NTSB presumably will make when its report is complete, to the extent the recommendations are directed to Army aviation specifically (or other types of military aviation generally) as these operate in the NAS?
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 6th August 2025 at 02:49.
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@WillowRun6-3 : Here from what we know so far, the controllers and their supervisors were trained to work on local procedures made long before they came to the facility . Those procedures were or became unsafe but if this is how they were trained to work , you can't blame the operators for faulty procedures .
Not that the NTSB are going to apportion blame in their report, that isn’t their function. But it’s quite clear there were (and are) unsafe practices going on among controllers and operators in FAA/DOD land. Read the docket testimony here from page 463 onwards to about 468 or until you get bored.
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Documen...dacted-Rel.pdf
Clearly Army pilots are calling visual on very distant traffic which they haven’t actually identified and can’t see, and controllers are believing them and contracting responsibility for collision avoidance to them. The Standards pilot being interviewed here (the most experienced Army pilot NTSB spoke to) even says ‘..I know it’s bad…’ but condones the practice because otherwise the PAT helos would have to hold!
The logic displayed here is totally crazy.
If ATC have taken the trouble to issue a traffic advisory to a helo, why does the helo pilot think it’s reasonable to assume the traffic (which they haven’t seen!) will be no factor. The Controller has called out that particular traffic to the helo pilot for a reason he’s become aware of, like the traffic’s intended flight path will shortly become a collision risk to the helo.
Last edited by Stagformation; 6th August 2025 at 14:33.
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If ATC have taken the trouble to issue a traffic advisory to a helo, why does the helo pilot think it’s reasonable to assume the traffic (which they haven’t seen!) will be no factor. Surely the Controller has called out that particular traffic to the helo for a reason he knows, like the traffic’s intended flight path will shortly become a collision risk.
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Yes, it was functional and activated during the accident sequence. The DCA CA system is discussed extensively in the ATC interviews.
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Because, due to the proximity of Route 4 to runway 1 traffic, 12th AB pilots much more frequently received traffic calls for runway 1 traffic coupled with visual separation, traffic for which there would never be a collision threat. And if there was 33 landing traffic, ATC would just issue a hold. I’m still reading through the interviews, but have yet to find an example of a 12th AB pilot that, while on Route 4 with visual separation for 33 landing traffic, actually had to track the aircraft and maneuver to avoid.
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Documen...dacted-Rel.pdf
Last edited by Stagformation; 7th August 2025 at 07:57.