Air Serbia E195 runs into runway lights at Belgrade
*sort of: for obvious reasons not included in any official published data nor usable in perfo calculations, but the airport design gave them in their mishap, 11% (~140m) more concrete with the 'lead in' taxiways in front of the runway end.
Equally, how many people have actually seen max performance takeoffs of modern jets? Just because you watch someone use 1700-1800 metres to take off as standard doesn’t mean the aircraft isn’t capable of doing a lot better. If the pilot says they can do it, who are you to disagree? For an ATCO to even police the takeoff in the way being suggested requires so many assumptions about things they’d never know - or be expected to know - that it’s not even close to being reasonable.
A large proportion of EGLC movements are still E190s (and still include E1s) and the published TORA is still 1199m. And off runway 27 the climb out needs to clear Canary Wharf, which implies a slightly better rate of climb is available on the E190 there than the E195 showed here.
A large proportion of EGLC movements are still E190s (and still include E1s) and the published TORA is still 1199m. And off runway 27 the climb out needs to clear Canary Wharf, which implies a slightly better rate of climb is available on the E190 there than the E195 showed here.
A BEG departure would have probably planned less flap, greater flex thrust reduction and speeds appropriate to this and so use a lot more runway.
By the way does anyone know if the tail was struck in this fine display of airmanship?
the ATC certainly knew the plane had PAX because it's a regular flight to Dusseldorf, the difference isn't a few meters but a kilometer, ATC may not be accountable for what happened but certainly morally responsible, some things are just clear without running any calculations
Just keep in mind that you have the full story, especially its ending, which the ATC didn't have, and it's always difficult to take a big decision like refusing a takeoff clearance, but you are more than right.
Aviation safety comes from the multiplication and superimposition of many barriers, the TEM model counts a small dozen of them.
It was very unlikely that this plane would be able to take off. Even less likely that the acceleration stop distance in case of failure at V1 would have been within the available runway distance.
Some airfields in similar configuration will ban takeoffs from such intersections.
Either because they don't offer as much runway as other intersections (even if some airplanes could takeoff with the available distance)
Or because they can be mistaken and pilots are deemed more likely to wrongly depart from there. So again, even if some airplanes could takeoff safely from there, they still ban takeoffs from there.
What most posters are missing, when they remind that ATC has no way of doing the perf calculations and that the ERJ could takeoff in only 1200m, what they are missing is that such takeoffs are planned properly from the cockpit preparation stage, at the gate. If the crew planned an intersection and they're trying to takeoff with half the runway missing, it's very different from a situation in which they plan the takeoff from the beginning on the shorter portion.
Also, we don't really have the proper timeframe in the recording, but it's likely the captain said they could takeoff from there very quickly. Whereas you need quite a long time to do a proper performance calculations.
I wouldn't be surprised if, in the near future, some changes were made in the LYBE local regulations about intersection use...
Last edited by CVividasku; 20th Feb 2024 at 23:20.
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Sorry, but he was no "more than right" than the takeoff distance remaining on this flight was "more than enough"... the controller flagged the potential problem, the controller asked the question, the crew ignored the obvious warning from ATC that perhaps the chosen intersection may not have been appropriate to depart from... there is no blame on ATC here. The "barrier" you speak of was unable to be raised any higher by the controller, who was not privy to the calculations and decisions that were made and taken on the flight deck. The choice to take off from D5 lays solely and squarely with the flight crew, who messed this up royally.
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Here are my 2 cents
First of all I have to say that in the most important part of the ATC communication recording, the pilot communication has clearly been cut. Deliberately or not, I don't know. This phrase ''Yes, TORA is two two, actually, sorry, TORA is ah One Two Seven Three Meters, I assume that is not enough.'' is said by the controller. It's the same voice, same accent, that's clear as day. There appears to be some confusion with this part.
The most plausible theory I read so far which is what I think happened in that day is this one and I will quote user V__2:
''I suspect having lined up at the wrong intersection, in haste the crew typed and searched for D5 into the EFB which spat out some numbers, but it went un-noticed that D5 was for 12R not 30L.''
What I suspect happened: The pilots turned at D5 by mistake. They suddenly realised they had lined up at the wrong intersection and in a hurry to leave the active runway instead of back tracking they immediately started to recalculate new TORA from D5. In a hurry they mistakenly selected D5 for rwy 12R where they got 2266 meters of available runway which would be more than sufficient in this case. There is no Embraer instructor captain who would consciously elect to start the take off run of a fully loaded E195 with 1200 meters of runway available. Unless they were looking for a suicide attempt.
Psychological factors come into play:
Confirmation bias: Even though we know for a fact that they were given the exact correct TORA from the ATC, my suspect is that in their mind they were convinced they had 2226 meters of TORA. They were suddenly overwhelmed trying to recalculate everything on an active runway and the ATC information which they were given didn't properly kick in. The initial confusion of the TORA from the ATC: ''Yes, TORA is two two, actually, sorry, TORA is ah One Two Seven Three Meters'' might have been an additional factor.
Tunnel vision: We know that at least the captain was based in BEG and should be very familiar with the airport. This leads to the idea that just based on the vicinity of the aircraft with the terminal building he would easily tell that this is not a correct position to depart. However in a hurry (and maybe a little embarrasment for a instructor captain to turn at the wrong intersection) and busy looking at the EFB, it is very possible that he might have missed this important hint.
There are also unconfirmed rumours that the FO was on a line check flight. CRM issues is very possible plus unfamiliar pilot with LYBE. Combination of embarrassed instructor captain trying to get out of the situation as quick as possible + unexperienced and nervous FO.
Anyone feel free to correct me whether this chain of events is possible or not, thank you.
First of all I have to say that in the most important part of the ATC communication recording, the pilot communication has clearly been cut. Deliberately or not, I don't know. This phrase ''Yes, TORA is two two, actually, sorry, TORA is ah One Two Seven Three Meters, I assume that is not enough.'' is said by the controller. It's the same voice, same accent, that's clear as day. There appears to be some confusion with this part.
The most plausible theory I read so far which is what I think happened in that day is this one and I will quote user V__2:
''I suspect having lined up at the wrong intersection, in haste the crew typed and searched for D5 into the EFB which spat out some numbers, but it went un-noticed that D5 was for 12R not 30L.''
What I suspect happened: The pilots turned at D5 by mistake. They suddenly realised they had lined up at the wrong intersection and in a hurry to leave the active runway instead of back tracking they immediately started to recalculate new TORA from D5. In a hurry they mistakenly selected D5 for rwy 12R where they got 2266 meters of available runway which would be more than sufficient in this case. There is no Embraer instructor captain who would consciously elect to start the take off run of a fully loaded E195 with 1200 meters of runway available. Unless they were looking for a suicide attempt.
Psychological factors come into play:
Confirmation bias: Even though we know for a fact that they were given the exact correct TORA from the ATC, my suspect is that in their mind they were convinced they had 2226 meters of TORA. They were suddenly overwhelmed trying to recalculate everything on an active runway and the ATC information which they were given didn't properly kick in. The initial confusion of the TORA from the ATC: ''Yes, TORA is two two, actually, sorry, TORA is ah One Two Seven Three Meters'' might have been an additional factor.
Tunnel vision: We know that at least the captain was based in BEG and should be very familiar with the airport. This leads to the idea that just based on the vicinity of the aircraft with the terminal building he would easily tell that this is not a correct position to depart. However in a hurry (and maybe a little embarrasment for a instructor captain to turn at the wrong intersection) and busy looking at the EFB, it is very possible that he might have missed this important hint.
There are also unconfirmed rumours that the FO was on a line check flight. CRM issues is very possible plus unfamiliar pilot with LYBE. Combination of embarrassed instructor captain trying to get out of the situation as quick as possible + unexperienced and nervous FO.
Anyone feel free to correct me whether this chain of events is possible or not, thank you.
Regarding this very incident here i cant stop thinking about the local policy we have here at the airport i presently work and wich our Colleagues in the ATC/Tower have regarding Intersections Take Offs.
Talking about LPFR, Faro, Southern Portugal.
Basically NO T/O is allowed by our local ATC from any taxiway intersection, be it a 747 or a Piper Cub...only allowed from normal rwy beginning, be it 28 or 10.
We have two twys by 90 degrees angles with the RWY in use, F or C, and two rapid exit, G and D.
Rwy 2.490 meters, good enough for almost every living plane out there, and also some nice RESA//CWY.
For instance, recently a team of very light planes (those who do Acrobatics at night with lights and flares and bla bla bla) were denied to TO from any intersection, despite the fact both pilots explained their very machines could TO and land within "a mail / postage stamp"
Last summer a super STOL Quest Kodiak wich we all know can land in a Pizza, was also denied for the very surprise of both pilots...wich they calmly then accepted and taxied till the very beginning of 28.
The reason given by ATC, and totally accepted and understood by all pilots without further discussions on the frequency, is the fact LPFR has no published declared distances from any instersection, except those published for the entire RWY, even though some cases are more than obvious to be feasible and doable.
So, im not trying to input any fault here to pilots or atc'ers in this BEG incident, however i thought it could be curious this fact here, wich for sure could also be used by other Airports Authorities and ATC services around the world, in some particular cases.
About those colleagues above who wrote about London City, i think its more peculiar the case of Santos Dumont in Rio, wich one rwy is 1260 meters and the other 1323 mts, and used by AZUL embraers similar to BEG incident, and even GOL 737-800 and also TAM/LATAM Airbuses 319s.
Talking about LPFR, Faro, Southern Portugal.
Basically NO T/O is allowed by our local ATC from any taxiway intersection, be it a 747 or a Piper Cub...only allowed from normal rwy beginning, be it 28 or 10.
We have two twys by 90 degrees angles with the RWY in use, F or C, and two rapid exit, G and D.
Rwy 2.490 meters, good enough for almost every living plane out there, and also some nice RESA//CWY.
For instance, recently a team of very light planes (those who do Acrobatics at night with lights and flares and bla bla bla) were denied to TO from any intersection, despite the fact both pilots explained their very machines could TO and land within "a mail / postage stamp"
Last summer a super STOL Quest Kodiak wich we all know can land in a Pizza, was also denied for the very surprise of both pilots...wich they calmly then accepted and taxied till the very beginning of 28.
The reason given by ATC, and totally accepted and understood by all pilots without further discussions on the frequency, is the fact LPFR has no published declared distances from any instersection, except those published for the entire RWY, even though some cases are more than obvious to be feasible and doable.
So, im not trying to input any fault here to pilots or atc'ers in this BEG incident, however i thought it could be curious this fact here, wich for sure could also be used by other Airports Authorities and ATC services around the world, in some particular cases.
About those colleagues above who wrote about London City, i think its more peculiar the case of Santos Dumont in Rio, wich one rwy is 1260 meters and the other 1323 mts, and used by AZUL embraers similar to BEG incident, and even GOL 737-800 and also TAM/LATAM Airbuses 319s.
Last edited by JanetFlight; 21st Feb 2024 at 03:22.
You're not comparing like with like here. A LCY departure has flaps , v speeds and thrust settings determined by the runway length, obstacles and conditions. Typically most types would use a greater flap setting than on a long runway. Canary Wharf does not have to be cleared, there is an emergency turn to the right.
A BEG departure would have probably planned less flap, greater flex thrust reduction and speeds appropriate to this and so use a lot more runway.
A BEG departure would have probably planned less flap, greater flex thrust reduction and speeds appropriate to this and so use a lot more runway.
Again, from the ATCO perspective, Canary Wharf doesn’t have to be cleared if it starts going wrong, but 99.9% of 27 deps will climb above it. In terms of plausibility the performance is there.
In the case of this incident, it seems fairly obvious that it was never going to work from D5 with the cockpit setup the way they did. I’m quite happy for the pilots to pin down whether it would actually have worked had it been done correctly. Either way I think far too much of this thread has been dedicated to a non-existent ATCO “moral responsibility” which only became apparent with hindsight and knowledge of variables an ATCO has no way of knowing.
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What I suspect happened: The pilots turned at D5 by mistake. They suddenly realised they had lined up at the wrong intersection and in a hurry to leave the active runway instead of back tracking they immediately started to recalculate new TORA from D5. In a hurry they mistakenly selected D5 for rwy 12R where they got 2266 meters of available runway
Anyone feel free to correct me whether this chain of events is possible or not, thank you.
Anyone feel free to correct me whether this chain of events is possible or not, thank you.
The fact ( from the pax video) that it looks like they did not take off with more flaps and power tend to go in that direction too. But for me , the cockpit authority gradient mots certainly also played a role if the crew set up given by the local media is correct.
As to the Faro example, yes this is the old German way and belief : :" Prohibit everything possibility unsafe and you will not get accidents" . But part of our job is flexibility and expedition and ATC is also about accommodating pilots requests, . Glad I could exercise all that in my career. .
I thought ATC was fabulous in picking up on the aircraft type and limited distance available for takeoff and bringing it to the Captain's attention. That is not the normal job and certainly not the responsibility of the ATC controller.
It's also very unfortunate that in this instance that the Swiss cheese line up of holes of errors made by the accident crew in selecting the D5 departure was not realised by them, even when they were challenged by ATC.
It would seem that eventually that airports will need to mandate certain aircraft types or models to be forbidden from certain intersection departures...to protect errant flight crews and their passengers.
It's also very unfortunate that in this instance that the Swiss cheese line up of holes of errors made by the accident crew in selecting the D5 departure was not realised by them, even when they were challenged by ATC.
It would seem that eventually that airports will need to mandate certain aircraft types or models to be forbidden from certain intersection departures...to protect errant flight crews and their passengers.
I am fascinated by the ardent belief that ATC has zero responsibility in this accident. It was and will always be the PiC’s ultimate responsibility, this is not a question. But when the report comes out I hope that a causal factor will include ATCs clear doubts about the situation. And to be clear, again, ATC are not to blame. But they could have acted differently.
Thought experiment; if ATC did everything correctly, do you think LYBE ATC would behave in the exact same way in the exact same scenario tomorrow with the benefit of the knowledge of this accident?
If you think yes; then ATC are not a causal factor.
If you think they would behave differently; then ATC are a causal factor.
And again for the more emotional posters; PiC is always ultimately responsible. But there are always causal contributory factors to any incident/accident.
I standby for the usual ad hominem attacks
Thought experiment; if ATC did everything correctly, do you think LYBE ATC would behave in the exact same way in the exact same scenario tomorrow with the benefit of the knowledge of this accident?
If you think yes; then ATC are not a causal factor.
If you think they would behave differently; then ATC are a causal factor.
And again for the more emotional posters; PiC is always ultimately responsible. But there are always causal contributory factors to any incident/accident.
I standby for the usual ad hominem attacks
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Not exactly the same, but similar and using the performance tool by Embraer:
https://onderzoeksraad.nl/wp-content...e_the_risk.pdf
The fact that you select runway and intersection at the same time might be supportive of a D5 12R calculation.
https://onderzoeksraad.nl/wp-content...e_the_risk.pdf
The fact that you select runway and intersection at the same time might be supportive of a D5 12R calculation.
Yes I do. I go back to the earlier question I asked that wasn’t answered. In another situation, a controller witnesses an approach in crosswinds that they thought looked dodgy, left the pilot to it, then they had a tailstrike/went off the runway. Would you now expect the controller in the future to send around any approach they thought looked marginal, just because one went wrong once? It was in the controllers power to do something about it, so they now have a responsibility to make that decision on the pilots behalf?
some things are just too common sense regardless if they are your job or not
I agree with AreOut. The Faro situation is a farcical for example. You won’t allow a light aircraft from a tarmaced 2,000+ runway but you’ll allow an E195 depart from D5?
Which is it ATC?
We are on the exact same team. I don’t understand the eagerness to blame the crew entirely and to deny ANY culpability on ATC.
As an aside; I’ve visited every tower in every airport I’ve even been based in to bring coffee, tea & biscuits to see things from their perspective. I’ve also been to Oceanic in two different FIRs. And attended TRUCE in NATS three times.
I’ve never seen an ATCO on the jumpseat to see it from our perspective. In more than 15 years of ops.
Which is it ATC?
We are on the exact same team. I don’t understand the eagerness to blame the crew entirely and to deny ANY culpability on ATC.
As an aside; I’ve visited every tower in every airport I’ve even been based in to bring coffee, tea & biscuits to see things from their perspective. I’ve also been to Oceanic in two different FIRs. And attended TRUCE in NATS three times.
I’ve never seen an ATCO on the jumpseat to see it from our perspective. In more than 15 years of ops.
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Basically NO T/O is allowed by our local ATC from any taxiway intersection, be it a 747 or a Piper Cub...only allowed from normal rwy beginning, be it 28 or 10.
We have two twys by 90 degrees angles with the RWY in use, F or C, and two rapid exit, G and D.
Rwy 2.490 meters, good enough for almost every living plane out there, and also some nice RESA//CWY.
For instance, recently a team of very light planes (those who do Acrobatics at night with lights and flares and bla bla bla) were denied to TO from any intersection, despite the fact both pilots explained their very machines could TO and land within "a mail / postage stamp"
Last summer a super STOL Quest Kodiak wich we all know can land in a Pizza, was also denied for the very surprise of both pilots...wich they calmly then accepted and taxied till the very beginning of 28.
The reason given by ATC, and totally accepted and understood by all pilots without further discussions on the frequency, is the fact LPFR has no published declared distances from any instersection, except those published for the entire RWY, even though some cases are more than obvious to be feasible and doable.
So, im not trying to input any fault here to pilots or atc'ers in this BEG incident, however i thought it could be curious this fact here, wich for sure could also be used by other Airports Authorities and ATC services around the world, in some particular cases.
We have two twys by 90 degrees angles with the RWY in use, F or C, and two rapid exit, G and D.
Rwy 2.490 meters, good enough for almost every living plane out there, and also some nice RESA//CWY.
For instance, recently a team of very light planes (those who do Acrobatics at night with lights and flares and bla bla bla) were denied to TO from any intersection, despite the fact both pilots explained their very machines could TO and land within "a mail / postage stamp"
Last summer a super STOL Quest Kodiak wich we all know can land in a Pizza, was also denied for the very surprise of both pilots...wich they calmly then accepted and taxied till the very beginning of 28.
The reason given by ATC, and totally accepted and understood by all pilots without further discussions on the frequency, is the fact LPFR has no published declared distances from any instersection, except those published for the entire RWY, even though some cases are more than obvious to be feasible and doable.
So, im not trying to input any fault here to pilots or atc'ers in this BEG incident, however i thought it could be curious this fact here, wich for sure could also be used by other Airports Authorities and ATC services around the world, in some particular cases.
Yes, I've heard all sorts of arguments why I could/should start the TO from some mid-point, from time, fuel burn, tyre wear and whatever. But I will always insist on havin as much RWY ahead as I can. I see it as a matter of self-discipline. So I find the LPFR approach very reasonable and do not see why LYBE, or any other airport, could not do the same.
BD99, When I was an active flight manager, I set up a scheme with UK NATS whereby we arranged for training pilots to give talks to trainee ATCOs and also for famil flights in the jump seats of our aircraft. Whether the scheme is still in operation after 9/11, I don't know.
Unfortunately your argument has no validity whatsoever. You don't seem to be able to grasp the fundamental point which is that, further to what he already did, it was not the controller's call to fly the airplane on behalf of the pilot. Please try hard to understand that and stop flogging a dead horse.
If things had turned out slightly differently & all lives were lost do you think the controller would have shrugged their shoulders & walked away feeling good about their actions, or do you think they may have wanted to try a bit harder?
Person falls into a waterway & is drowning, competent swimmer who could have saved them "it's not my responsibility".....