NTSB to probe Fedex/Southwest close encounter at Austin
As it appears from the audio that these were the only aircraft of frequency at the time, what was the rush? Is SW one of those airlines that has tight schedules, and usually scoots off at high speed as soon as the opportunity arises? That might have influenced the controller's 'thinking' more than the impending arrival of the Fedex ... a sort of automatic reaction.
Not excusing the controller, just trying to get my head around "WTF was he thinking?".
Not excusing the controller, just trying to get my head around "WTF was he thinking?".
The LiveATC halfhour recording contained only one other traffic leaving the freq a minute or so before FDX checked in. Only 3 parties on the frequency when they incident occurred. Not implying the controller wasn't handling other freq's.
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Tower thanking FedEx for his “Professionalism” was his attempt to hopefully avoid a report of the incident, and also perhaps, acknowledgment that FedEx saved the day, and averted a disaster. If the Southwest crew knew FedEx was on final, they should be having “Tea and biscuits” (as you Brits like to say) with their Chief Pilots and the FAA. I’m sure there will be no tea and biscuits for the Tower controller.
As an aside do ATIS in the USA include the phrase "low visibility procedures in progress" or anything similar.
Appreciate in lots of places you don't get the frequent grim weather we do.
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I do actually mean that, and in low vis situations at airports without surface movement radar, that’s how it works. It’s a good idea for everyone involved to slow down and keep a tight lock on situational awareness on days like this. One guess is we had a mixing of VFR habit and low vis procedure. Yes, sometimes carriers will rattle the cage with unnecessary holding short calls in decent wx to prompt a quick release from tower. However, in low vis the call is required to let tower know the aircraft position. In this situation the required call may have reflexively prompted tower’s VFR habit of clearing the aircraft for t/o if possible.
Last edited by Mookiesurfs; 9th Feb 2023 at 17:57.
22/04,
I fly a 767 for a large cargo operator. Been doing it now for 3 decades, plus military flying. I can’t recall an announcement that Low visibility procedures are in effect. It is assumed when the visibility decreases to the point where a Cat 2/3 approach is necessary to land. I preface this with the fact that at many airports, during low visibility conditions, the ATIS may announce that SMGCS procedures are in effect, which changes taxi routings and procedures. As I stated in a prior post, a few weeks ago we planned a CAT 1 ILS into Ontario California. About 15 minutes prior, the ATIS displayed that the RVR was 1000. We checked to see if a CAT 2 or 3 approach was available, it was, so we briefed it, and flew the approach and landed. No announcements by Tower, or special procedures required.
Also some posters asked whether calling Tower to state you’re ready for takeoff is not mandatory. About 90% of all airports I fly to, know where I am, and it’s best to not clog the tower freq with extraneous chatter.
I fly a 767 for a large cargo operator. Been doing it now for 3 decades, plus military flying. I can’t recall an announcement that Low visibility procedures are in effect. It is assumed when the visibility decreases to the point where a Cat 2/3 approach is necessary to land. I preface this with the fact that at many airports, during low visibility conditions, the ATIS may announce that SMGCS procedures are in effect, which changes taxi routings and procedures. As I stated in a prior post, a few weeks ago we planned a CAT 1 ILS into Ontario California. About 15 minutes prior, the ATIS displayed that the RVR was 1000. We checked to see if a CAT 2 or 3 approach was available, it was, so we briefed it, and flew the approach and landed. No announcements by Tower, or special procedures required.
Also some posters asked whether calling Tower to state you’re ready for takeoff is not mandatory. About 90% of all airports I fly to, know where I am, and it’s best to not clog the tower freq with extraneous chatter.
Only half a speed-brake
7110.65: ATIS must include latest weather, and instrument approach and runway in use.
AC 120-57: ATIS should include initiation of SMGCS procedures.
FAA lists KAUS as an approved SMGCS airport.
While I was unable to locate the KAUS SMGCS plan, I did look through the SMGCS plans for KRIC and KSTL (publicly available). Both plans follow the template provided by AC 120-57. I assume the KAUS SMGCS plan is similar. I did not find anything in any of the SMGCS plans or AC 120-57 that would have favorably impacted the outcome of this incident.
I’m puzzled which procedures specific to “low visibility ops” would have prevented this incident.
AC 120-57: ATIS should include initiation of SMGCS procedures.
FAA lists KAUS as an approved SMGCS airport.
While I was unable to locate the KAUS SMGCS plan, I did look through the SMGCS plans for KRIC and KSTL (publicly available). Both plans follow the template provided by AC 120-57. I assume the KAUS SMGCS plan is similar. I did not find anything in any of the SMGCS plans or AC 120-57 that would have favorably impacted the outcome of this incident.
I’m puzzled which procedures specific to “low visibility ops” would have prevented this incident.
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In some other parts of the world, the protection of the ILS beam would preclude authorising the line-up for traffic this close. Irrespective of any specific limits on minimum separation and there would be some. Probably for CAT III = 200m = 1/8 SM even the airport would be not authorised to operate without ATC ground radar, at all.
Sorry to say, the position of the departing airplane seem to have been done procedurally. That does not qualify for LVP here, but reeks of Los Rodeos instead.
Do US operators utilize (the old) CAT IIIb 75 m?
Repecting that things are being done differently mostly for good reasons, just trying to learn.
In some other parts of the world, the protection of the ILS beam would preclude authorising the line-up for traffic this close. Irrespective of any specific limits on minimum separation and there would be some. Probably for CAT III = 200m = 1/8 SM even the airport would be not authorised to operate without ATC ground radar, at all.
The above procedure is not dependent on imposition of “low visibility ops.”
Flight Dentent,
Good discussion, BFS Grad stated in so much as we (U.S.) don’t have any official announcement of “Low Vis” Ops in effect. But if the Weather is below 800-2 there are different hold short lines one must stop at to protect the ILS clear zones. I will provide a photo of the Cat 2 Hold line that we have to stop at if the wx is below 800-2. In the case of this incident in Austin, there was a Cat 2/3 hold short line on the other side of the runway, probably because that’s where the localizer antenna was located. On the side where SouthWest lined up, there was none because the localizer beam would not be affected by holding short of the runway at the normal hold short line.
The lines closest to the aircraft are the Cat 2 (also used for Cat3 ) hold lines. We hold short of this line when wx is 800-2 or lower. We are expected to know this, and no announcements are necessary.The line closest to the runway is the normal Hold line. Hope this helps.
Good discussion, BFS Grad stated in so much as we (U.S.) don’t have any official announcement of “Low Vis” Ops in effect. But if the Weather is below 800-2 there are different hold short lines one must stop at to protect the ILS clear zones. I will provide a photo of the Cat 2 Hold line that we have to stop at if the wx is below 800-2. In the case of this incident in Austin, there was a Cat 2/3 hold short line on the other side of the runway, probably because that’s where the localizer antenna was located. On the side where SouthWest lined up, there was none because the localizer beam would not be affected by holding short of the runway at the normal hold short line.
The lines closest to the aircraft are the Cat 2 (also used for Cat3 ) hold lines. We hold short of this line when wx is 800-2 or lower. We are expected to know this, and no announcements are necessary.The line closest to the runway is the normal Hold line. Hope this helps.
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Appreciate. I am certain it's all the same in essence and result, like riding a scooter vs. skateboard. Better yet, throwing a ball left or right-handed, and we are now discussing the grip differneces of opposite dexterity.
Sorry I hesitate posting better explanation about our side's *metric" way of handling lo-viz, to avoid embarrassing myself a bit of study is required to pass the message properly.
When conditions deteriorate below mark, the airport / ATC / vehicles / light and navaid crews / pilots go on a declared 'yellow alert'. The rules are specified and form Low Visibility Procedure (set) and Low Visibility Operations commence.
For instance in-trail approach spacing could change from 2.5 to 6 miles, but local procedures may vary.
The terminology is officialy AWO (all-weather operations) which nobody uses. LVO instead, using LVPs. For crews those are LVTO, CAT II/III approach, landing and rollout, and LVP taxi.
Hence reading here about FedEX calling a CAT III approach (themselves) sent the brains spinning at first. For us we double check with ATC that LVO is active (Airport is running the LVPs and ATC play their part of the game accordingly) and then fly the approach based on OpSpec and crew authorisation. No need, benefit or effect of any such call.
Do I get it right, that the implicit adjustment of procedures (but not called low visibility procedures
) for <1\2 SM was not adhered to by allowing the 737 onto the runway in the incident here? Would the 'best practice' be different if the approaching airplane did call only CAT II or not called any special approche type at all? (understood that 1/8 leave only one chocie IRL)
Sorry I hesitate posting better explanation about our side's *metric" way of handling lo-viz, to avoid embarrassing myself a bit of study is required to pass the message properly.
When conditions deteriorate below mark, the airport / ATC / vehicles / light and navaid crews / pilots go on a declared 'yellow alert'. The rules are specified and form Low Visibility Procedure (set) and Low Visibility Operations commence.
For instance in-trail approach spacing could change from 2.5 to 6 miles, but local procedures may vary.
The terminology is officialy AWO (all-weather operations) which nobody uses. LVO instead, using LVPs. For crews those are LVTO, CAT II/III approach, landing and rollout, and LVP taxi.
Hence reading here about FedEX calling a CAT III approach (themselves) sent the brains spinning at first. For us we double check with ATC that LVO is active (Airport is running the LVPs and ATC play their part of the game accordingly) and then fly the approach based on OpSpec and crew authorisation. No need, benefit or effect of any such call.
Do I get it right, that the implicit adjustment of procedures (but not called low visibility procedures
) for <1\2 SM was not adhered to by allowing the 737 onto the runway in the incident here? Would the 'best practice' be different if the approaching airplane did call only CAT II or not called any special approche type at all? (understood that 1/8 leave only one chocie IRL) Last edited by FlightDetent; 9th Feb 2023 at 17:40.
Only half a speed-brake
Yes, he does, and you missed a smiley emoticon. 
Staying focused, it is the localizer signal which needs protection that results in the increased longitudinal separation under AWO.
https://aerossurance.com/safety-mana...-localiser-re/
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=139628
Staying focused, it is the localizer signal which needs protection that results in the increased longitudinal separation under AWO.
https://aerossurance.com/safety-mana...-localiser-re/
https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=139628
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Seems some of you mix up a bit CAT III and LVP , and ILS critical protection areas.
As a reminder : LVP is an ICAO procdeure appliacble when you go below CAT I minimas. The ICAO definition is here , not sure if the FAA one differs.
Low visibility take-off (LVTO) means a take-off with a Runway Visual Range (RVR) lower than 400 m but not less than 75 m. (IR-OPS Annex I)
Note that ICAO requires LVP for all departures below 550m RVR, not just LVTO.
CAT IIi definitions for once are the same for both FAA and ICAO :
Then we have the ILS critical protection areas : ICAO definition :
The exact protection area varies from airport to airrport depending on the exact location of both the Gilde ad localizer antennas, For CAT II and III Ops an additional buffer is applied . In KAUS here , on both sides there are well marked ILS CAT III protection area holding lines, clearly visible on Blancolirio video posted earlier here.
Now we can continue this very interesting discussion using facts.
As a reminder : LVP is an ICAO procdeure appliacble when you go below CAT I minimas. The ICAO definition is here , not sure if the FAA one differs.
AIR OPS Definitions
Low visibility procedures (LVP) means procedures applied at an aerodrome for the purpose of ensuring safe operations during lower than standard category I, other than standard category II, category II and III approaches and low visibility take-offs. (IR-OPS Annex I)Low visibility take-off (LVTO) means a take-off with a Runway Visual Range (RVR) lower than 400 m but not less than 75 m. (IR-OPS Annex I)
Note that ICAO requires LVP for all departures below 550m RVR, not just LVTO.
CAT III A DEFINITIONS
ICAO and FAA definition. A category III A approach is a precision instrument approach and landing with no decision height or a decision height lower than 100ft (30m) and a runway visual range not less than 700ft (200m).
ICAO and FAA definition. A category III A approach is a precision instrument approach and landing with no decision height or a decision height lower than 100ft (30m) and a runway visual range not less than 700ft (200m).
the ILS critical area is an area of defined dimensions about the localizer and glide path antennas where vehicles, including aircraft, are excluded during all ILS operations. The critical area is protected because the presence of vehicles and/or aircraft inside its boundaries will cause unacceptable disturbance to the ILS signal-in-space;
Now we can continue this very interesting discussion using facts.
For the record, the FAA specifies LOC-critical protection areas only at the far end of the runway (between the antennas and the runway end). See page 33 of the .pdf (page 2-11 of the document).
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...ing%5B1%5D.pdf
Therefore an aircraft holding on the approach end (piano keys) of the runway is not in a localizer-critical area - at least in the US.
Of note, KAUS has exactly one (1) ILS-critical ladder-marking on the entire airport - across the dedicated taxiway east of the incident runway leading to/from the TxDOT ramp.
https://www.google.com/maps/search/A.../data=!3m1!1e3
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...ing%5B1%5D.pdf
Therefore an aircraft holding on the approach end (piano keys) of the runway is not in a localizer-critical area - at least in the US.
Of note, KAUS has exactly one (1) ILS-critical ladder-marking on the entire airport - across the dedicated taxiway east of the incident runway leading to/from the TxDOT ramp.
https://www.google.com/maps/search/A.../data=!3m1!1e3
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Worth mentioning that LVPs do have commercial impact though as fewer aircraft can be handled. Typically at Heathrow BA will pre-emptively cancel ( or be asked to be the operator to cancel) if they are forecast to persist. Guess that may happen in U.S. and happens when snow is forecast?
Still seems to me the U.S. leaves more decision making to aircrew and ATC controls a bit less.
Still seems to me the U.S. leaves more decision making to aircrew and ATC controls a bit less.
Originally Posted by pattern_is_full
For the record, the FAA specifies LOC-critical protection areas only at the far end of the runway(between the antennas and the runway end). See page 33 of the .pdf (page 2-11 of the document).
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Respectfully, at least the first definition posted is EASA IR, not ICAO.
We need to understand without an inferiority complex, US aviation as a whole is the global technology leader in aeronautics. What usually happens is their empirical habits are studied, adjusted, formalised, and later ICAO guidance comes out of it. The world audience then can enjoy a structured regulation package, but the experienced pioneers don't have the imminent need to adopt that word by word anymore.
Indeed, most of the all-weather ops expertise is actually a UK+French-born science and does not really fit the above storyline. However, the main document https://store.icao.int/en/manual-of-...tions-doc-9365 is built on top of EASA and FAA harmonized practice.
A free copy: https://www.skybrary.aero/sites/defa...shelf/2983.pdf. Other parts of the world implement accordingly, for example here: https://www.caas.gov.sg/docs/default...operations.pdf
Among other guidance, EASA issues CS (certification specification, equivalent of FARs with a standalone legal status) for the airborne hardware https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/docume...cs-awo-issue-2
ATC Watcher kindly check the latest developments https://www.easa.europa.eu/community...r-Operations-0, notably, LVTO now starts at 550 meters.
But I agree, the feeling of 'hey look guys, really, you don't seem to understand what you are doing' is hard to push aside when reading about how this incident unfolded.
We need to understand without an inferiority complex, US aviation as a whole is the global technology leader in aeronautics. What usually happens is their empirical habits are studied, adjusted, formalised, and later ICAO guidance comes out of it. The world audience then can enjoy a structured regulation package, but the experienced pioneers don't have the imminent need to adopt that word by word anymore.
Indeed, most of the all-weather ops expertise is actually a UK+French-born science and does not really fit the above storyline. However, the main document https://store.icao.int/en/manual-of-...tions-doc-9365 is built on top of EASA and FAA harmonized practice.
A free copy: https://www.skybrary.aero/sites/defa...shelf/2983.pdf. Other parts of the world implement accordingly, for example here: https://www.caas.gov.sg/docs/default...operations.pdf
Among other guidance, EASA issues CS (certification specification, equivalent of FARs with a standalone legal status) for the airborne hardware https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/docume...cs-awo-issue-2
ATC Watcher kindly check the latest developments https://www.easa.europa.eu/community...r-Operations-0, notably, LVTO now starts at 550 meters.
But I agree, the feeling of 'hey look guys, really, you don't seem to understand what you are doing' is hard to push aside when reading about how this incident unfolded.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 10th Feb 2023 at 08:22.