NTSB to probe Fedex/Southwest close encounter at Austin
TV news last night had this video purporting to show the event, given the reported weather some computer generated representation?
https://www.@##[email protected]/@monster21_yt/video/7197600597493812485
https://www.@##[email protected]/@monster21_yt/video/7197600597493812485
Pegase Driver
What is next posting his real name and address ? Especially in our profession one should remember Ueberlingen and the way the controller was stabbed to death in front of his small children by someone wanting revenge for the accident. All this because a sensational newspaper had released his name and already found him guilty long before the investigation team started its work. OK here it is only an incident but the logic is the same .
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FAA Reauthorization and the Austin incident
The Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee of the House of Representatives kicked off the hearing last week (February 7) to begin the process of FAA reauthorization. (For readers not quite familiar with U.S. legislative processes, authorization creates the legal mandate for federal agencies to conduct their activities; appropriations legislation is the funding. Hence authorization (and periodic reauthorization) holds by far the heavier policy implications and effects. Sorry for the pedantic detour, but after all, this is PPRuNe, where information is cheap, cheap, yet understanding may be dear.)
The Chairman, Congressman Sam Graves, stated as follows:
However, note the comments by former NTSB Chair Robert Sumwalt, as reported by the Journal:
"the close calls didn't appear related or part of a broader trend. Both appear to have resulted from human error, [Sumwalt] said, and the outcomes point to the exceptional safety record of the U.S. air-traffic system and aviation industry. 'It shows that given there there were failures, that there was enough resiliency or enough redundancy in the system to have prevented a catastrophic event in both cases.', Mr. Sumwalt said." (emphasis in quotation added)
So, first, with regard to a video representation of the events (and/or non-events) in Austin that is highly inaccurate, count this poster as one who sees no utility or usefulness whatsoever in such a video, for informing, aiding, facilitating, or otherwise being helpful, in the nascent public policy and legislation process which ultimately will lead to FAA reauthorization. Wanting to play with computers and video programs? - fine, no problem. But posting such output here is only about ten (10) years or more behind the times (see, for example, the thread on the accident in August 2013 in Birmingham AL, UPS Fl. 1354, in which thread a good number of posters contributed very informative graphics and computational items.) And, needless to remind the serious pro's who populate this forum, the video showing Air Canada 759 in San Francisco in 2017 was indeed very informative, helpful, and so on.... but it was evidence, not fun-time.
Second, I think there is a fair question - possibly even an important question - about what meaning to take away from both incidents, whether looked at as only quite marginally related or connected to each other - or as connected in some as yet-undefined manner beyond being in close temporal proximity. Is it actually random chance that small steps in each incident - for example, the Southwest flightcrew not "aborting" their takeoff roll (if they even had heard the FedEx call) - contribued to a serious tragic accident not occuring? Or is it something other than random chance, something closer to what most people fluent enough in English to parse definitions would identify as "resiliency" or "redundancy"?
Or, . . did a previous poster make this all less interesting, by saying there are no "reserves" - the term I had tried to apply to what Chairman Sumwalt called resiliency and redundancy - but instead there are "layers and back-ups"?
The Chairman, Congressman Sam Graves, stated as follows:
"[R]ecently there have been incidents that reemphasize why getting an FAA reauthorization done on time is critical. On January 13th, a runway incursion occurred at JFK International Airport when two passenger planes nearly collided as one crossed an active runway. And just this past weekend, at Austin International Airport, a cargo plane was attempting to land on the same runway where a passenger plane was beginning to take off.
It shows that even following the safest decade in our history, our aviation system is clearly in need of urgent attention. As Mr. Boulter says in his testimony, complacency and stagnation are equal threats to a safety culture. The previous conventional wisdom for regulating safety focused on addressing concerns after aviation accidents. Now, the FAA seeks to mitigate risks before accidents happen.
In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has several open safety recommendations that warrant review. The Committee will be reviewing all such recommendations while reauthorizing the NTSB as part of the FAA bill." [Note: David Boulter is the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (Acting) of FAA.]
In reporting on the opening reauthorization hearing, the Wall Street Journal (Feb. 8) noted that current NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy (in an interview) had cautioned against, with regard to the two runway incursion incidents, saying "this is a trend." The WSJ article also quoted a former investigator for FAA and NTSB as saying, "two incidents so close together is more of a coincidence than an indication of a systemic problem." (This SLF/attorney isn't using that person's name here since he is not afaik a public official or public figure.)However, note the comments by former NTSB Chair Robert Sumwalt, as reported by the Journal:
"the close calls didn't appear related or part of a broader trend. Both appear to have resulted from human error, [Sumwalt] said, and the outcomes point to the exceptional safety record of the U.S. air-traffic system and aviation industry. 'It shows that given there there were failures, that there was enough resiliency or enough redundancy in the system to have prevented a catastrophic event in both cases.', Mr. Sumwalt said." (emphasis in quotation added)
So, first, with regard to a video representation of the events (and/or non-events) in Austin that is highly inaccurate, count this poster as one who sees no utility or usefulness whatsoever in such a video, for informing, aiding, facilitating, or otherwise being helpful, in the nascent public policy and legislation process which ultimately will lead to FAA reauthorization. Wanting to play with computers and video programs? - fine, no problem. But posting such output here is only about ten (10) years or more behind the times (see, for example, the thread on the accident in August 2013 in Birmingham AL, UPS Fl. 1354, in which thread a good number of posters contributed very informative graphics and computational items.) And, needless to remind the serious pro's who populate this forum, the video showing Air Canada 759 in San Francisco in 2017 was indeed very informative, helpful, and so on.... but it was evidence, not fun-time.
Second, I think there is a fair question - possibly even an important question - about what meaning to take away from both incidents, whether looked at as only quite marginally related or connected to each other - or as connected in some as yet-undefined manner beyond being in close temporal proximity. Is it actually random chance that small steps in each incident - for example, the Southwest flightcrew not "aborting" their takeoff roll (if they even had heard the FedEx call) - contribued to a serious tragic accident not occuring? Or is it something other than random chance, something closer to what most people fluent enough in English to parse definitions would identify as "resiliency" or "redundancy"?
Or, . . did a previous poster make this all less interesting, by saying there are no "reserves" - the term I had tried to apply to what Chairman Sumwalt called resiliency and redundancy - but instead there are "layers and back-ups"?
Only half a speed-brake
There is a trend. The top managers and leaders lying to their superiors (and ultimately the public) about the successes.
What that NTSB person aired, about resiliency and redundancy on these specific two cases is so wrong that it does not even warrant a curse word.
This last one turned out as a non-accident due to pure coincidence. And the incident happened without really breaching much if anything at all. Now, THAT happens, although one should hope not on PK8303 level, and will keep happening. And yes someone will always abuse the merit based qualification system.
The problematic layer that harness all the small ailings toghether is the key stakeholders not exercising their responsibilities in favour of political acceptance (in borader sense of the word).
Exhibit the latest: Right here, that NTBS Chairmen's statement.
What that NTSB person aired, about resiliency and redundancy on these specific two cases is so wrong that it does not even warrant a curse word.
This last one turned out as a non-accident due to pure coincidence. And the incident happened without really breaching much if anything at all. Now, THAT happens, although one should hope not on PK8303 level, and will keep happening. And yes someone will always abuse the merit based qualification system.
The problematic layer that harness all the small ailings toghether is the key stakeholders not exercising their responsibilities in favour of political acceptance (in borader sense of the word).
Exhibit the latest: Right here, that NTBS Chairmen's statement.
That's why, if applicable and when in doubt, ", ready for an immediate ?" was invented for ATC...
And the even bigger difference is between "cleared for take off" and "cleared for an immediate take off", and when acknowledged, the latter is a clearance with a commitment
And the even bigger difference is between "cleared for take off" and "cleared for an immediate take off", and when acknowledged, the latter is a clearance with a commitment
When one is from the school, that only absolute and proven info can be posted at PP, of course, this is a false narrative. Though, that also implies, only official accident reports can be posted here, all other info is unproven and potentially wrong.
When one understands that items "develop" from something potentially partly wrong, into something correct, such a video is just the first step to come to a better result/understanding. It gives all readers the opportunity to "learn" what happened, based on the video and the comments about its correctness (keep in mind, I myself did write a note about the SWA speed compared to the Fedex still in the air). Most people will simply need something visual to understand the closeness of this call, not being able to create a mental picture of this happening.
So, feel free to provide a better video yourself ;-)
When one understands that items "develop" from something potentially partly wrong, into something correct, such a video is just the first step to come to a better result/understanding. It gives all readers the opportunity to "learn" what happened, based on the video and the comments about its correctness (keep in mind, I myself did write a note about the SWA speed compared to the Fedex still in the air). Most people will simply need something visual to understand the closeness of this call, not being able to create a mental picture of this happening.
So, feel free to provide a better video yourself ;-)
In the video, the FedEx B767 is shown "going around" flying essentially level along the runway for a period of time while the gear is retracted. This tells me the video maker has no idea how to fly a go-around (15º pitch up, positive climb, gear up, etc) and just throws the whole presentation into question. The poorly executed go-around in the video makes the encounter seem a lot worse than it probably was. The problem is that this video is getting spread around as if it is somehow factual when it is anything but (I've seen it in other non-aviation forums and it is not always understood to be fake). It has no place here.
Only half a speed-brake
When first ATC Watcher used the 'I'-word, I had the brief idea of running a survey.
"There is a specific and exact meaning of physical nature to the word IMMEDIATE when used in connection with a take-off clearance by ATC or pilots.
Do you know what it is?
Are you confident the prevalent majority of flightdeck colleagues at your operator do? "
But then, not everyone enjoys fun trivia challenges.
"There is a specific and exact meaning of physical nature to the word IMMEDIATE when used in connection with a take-off clearance by ATC or pilots.
Do you know what it is?
Are you confident the prevalent majority of flightdeck colleagues at your operator do? "
But then, not everyone enjoys fun trivia challenges.
Listened to comms before/after widely-publicized tower comm segment associated with this incident. Here’s what I learned:
Austin approach/departure positions were combined (same voice) and not busy.
Female voice on ground control. Tower/ground positions were not combined.
ATIS India (WN708 reported receiving, assume FDX1432 received same) stated ‘arrivals expect ILS approach 18 right, 18 left, simultaneous approaches in use.’ No mention of ‘low visibility ops’ other than reported weather.
WN708 taxi instructions were G2, G, B, report turning onto G.
About 1 minute later WN708 reports reaching G. Ground then directs WN708 to contact tower on 121.0 upon reaching 18L. Assumption is that WN708 continues to monitor ground until reaching 18L at B. About 2.5 minutes later (assuming that LiveATC files are time synchronized), WN708 contacts tower and reports ready at 18L.
After go around, FDX contacts approach and requests ‘long vectors for Cat III ILS 18L.’ Sometimes approach will ask reason for go around. Not this time.
After landing and contacting ground, Fedex receives taxi instructions but no further discussion with ground regarding incident (post-local controller apology on tower freq).
About 2 minutes after FDX1432 reports clear of 18L, same local controller withholds a takeoff clearance for an AA reporting ready for departure at 18L with another AA reported on a 2-mile final Cat III ILS for 18L.
No further discussion of incident after WN708 checks in with departure.
Same local controller issues ‘turn right when able’ instruction (twice) to AA after landing on 18L. IMO, this supports theory that, when local controller used identical instruction for WN708, he thought that WN708 had aborted his takeoff.
Regarding comment that “ready” call upon reaching runway is inappropriate, all of the departing aircraft reported “ready,” “ready for departure,” or “in sequence” upon reaching the assigned departure runway.
About 17 minutes after the FDX/WN incident, a new voice appeared on the tower frequency; i.e., local position was changed.
Austin approach/departure positions were combined (same voice) and not busy.
Female voice on ground control. Tower/ground positions were not combined.
ATIS India (WN708 reported receiving, assume FDX1432 received same) stated ‘arrivals expect ILS approach 18 right, 18 left, simultaneous approaches in use.’ No mention of ‘low visibility ops’ other than reported weather.
WN708 taxi instructions were G2, G, B, report turning onto G.
About 1 minute later WN708 reports reaching G. Ground then directs WN708 to contact tower on 121.0 upon reaching 18L. Assumption is that WN708 continues to monitor ground until reaching 18L at B. About 2.5 minutes later (assuming that LiveATC files are time synchronized), WN708 contacts tower and reports ready at 18L.
After go around, FDX contacts approach and requests ‘long vectors for Cat III ILS 18L.’ Sometimes approach will ask reason for go around. Not this time.
After landing and contacting ground, Fedex receives taxi instructions but no further discussion with ground regarding incident (post-local controller apology on tower freq).
About 2 minutes after FDX1432 reports clear of 18L, same local controller withholds a takeoff clearance for an AA reporting ready for departure at 18L with another AA reported on a 2-mile final Cat III ILS for 18L.
No further discussion of incident after WN708 checks in with departure.
Same local controller issues ‘turn right when able’ instruction (twice) to AA after landing on 18L. IMO, this supports theory that, when local controller used identical instruction for WN708, he thought that WN708 had aborted his takeoff.
Regarding comment that “ready” call upon reaching runway is inappropriate, all of the departing aircraft reported “ready,” “ready for departure,” or “in sequence” upon reaching the assigned departure runway.
About 17 minutes after the FDX/WN incident, a new voice appeared on the tower frequency; i.e., local position was changed.
The problem is that this video is getting spread around as if it is somehow factual when it is anything but (I've seen it in other non-aviation forums and it is not always understood to be fake). It has no place here
Only half a speed-brake
BFSGrad Thanks. Apparently what we don't hear is the controller restricting the departing SWA (SID to 4000') to stay below the GA ALT for FDX (3000'). I wish not to hint anymore which site I copied that information from as it may or may not be true nor relevant. BTW their own thread got closed for good reasons.
megan As an irony or absurdity display of what's going on inside the media sphere. Accepted and appreciated as such.
It was another member defending it as being helpful who caused the uproar. While he might have a case that in the political world - as an empirical observation - facts as such don't help in getting funding or public support the slightest, herein eath the wolves.
megan As an irony or absurdity display of what's going on inside the media sphere. Accepted and appreciated as such.
It was another member defending it as being helpful who caused the uproar. While he might have a case that in the political world - as an empirical observation - facts as such don't help in getting funding or public support the slightest, herein eath the wolves.
Pegase Driver
When first ATC Watcher used the 'I'-word, I had the brief idea of running a survey.
"There is a specific and exact meaning of physical nature to the word IMMEDIATE when used in connection with a take-off clearance by ATC or pilots.
Do you know what it is? Are you confident the prevalent majority of flightdeck colleagues at your operator do? "
.
"There is a specific and exact meaning of physical nature to the word IMMEDIATE when used in connection with a take-off clearance by ATC or pilots.
Do you know what it is? Are you confident the prevalent majority of flightdeck colleagues at your operator do? "
.
Again , a bit of educational reading for those interesting , here is the definition of an immediate take off taken from Skybrary .
When given the instruction ‘cleared for immediate takeoff’, the pilot is expected to act as follows:
According ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), in the interest of expediting traffic, a clearance for immediate take-off may be issued to an aircraft before it enters the runway. On acceptance of such clearance the aircraft shall taxi out to the runway and take off in one continuous movement. (ICAO Doc 4444, 7.9.3 Take-off clearance)
Controllers who issue instructions to a departing aircraft to line up and wait in the expectation that the subsequent take off will be an 'immediate' one are advised to add "be ready for an immediate departure" to the line up instruction. This gives the pilot an opportunity to decline the instruction if they anticipate that they may not be able to accept an immediate take off clearance.
Before issuing immediate takeoff clearance to an aircraft the controller should consider the likely time the aircraft will need to commence its takeoff roll - whilst a short haul twin jet would need 30 seconds on average, a fully loaded wide body airliner on a 12-14 hour trip would need more time, and larger engines also take longer to spool up. Also, the controller should consider how quickly and by what route the aircraft could clear the runway if instructed to do so due to non-compliance with the immediate takeoff clearance.
Controllers should be prepared to change their traffic sequence plan in a shortage of time in case of unexpected aircraft non-compliance with the immediate takeoff clearance (e.g. stopping on the runway) . Such change to the controller's initial plan may include, as appropriate:
- At the holding point: taxi immediately on to the runway and begin a rolling take off without stopping the aircraft. If it is not possible to begin taxiing onto the runway at once or if take off performance calculations mean that a standing start is necessary, then the clearance must be declined
- If already lined-up on the runway: commence take-off without any delay. If this is not possible for any reason, the pilot must advise the controller immediately.
According ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), in the interest of expediting traffic, a clearance for immediate take-off may be issued to an aircraft before it enters the runway. On acceptance of such clearance the aircraft shall taxi out to the runway and take off in one continuous movement. (ICAO Doc 4444, 7.9.3 Take-off clearance)
Controllers who issue instructions to a departing aircraft to line up and wait in the expectation that the subsequent take off will be an 'immediate' one are advised to add "be ready for an immediate departure" to the line up instruction. This gives the pilot an opportunity to decline the instruction if they anticipate that they may not be able to accept an immediate take off clearance.
Before issuing immediate takeoff clearance to an aircraft the controller should consider the likely time the aircraft will need to commence its takeoff roll - whilst a short haul twin jet would need 30 seconds on average, a fully loaded wide body airliner on a 12-14 hour trip would need more time, and larger engines also take longer to spool up. Also, the controller should consider how quickly and by what route the aircraft could clear the runway if instructed to do so due to non-compliance with the immediate takeoff clearance.
Controllers should be prepared to change their traffic sequence plan in a shortage of time in case of unexpected aircraft non-compliance with the immediate takeoff clearance (e.g. stopping on the runway) . Such change to the controller's initial plan may include, as appropriate:
- cancelling the clearance before the aircraft moves onto the RWY;
- instructing the aircraft to clear the runway;
- de-conflicting the takeoff from a go around in the air;
- issuing of 'stop takeoff' instruction to the departing aircraft that has commenced the take-off roll.
Miscellaneous
- The procedure should take into account relevant local aerodrome factors and its use should be described in the Manual of Operations of the respective unit.
- In line with normal practice, the word “takeoff” must only be used when issuing the takeoff clearance. In all other reference to a pending takeoff, the word “departure” or “airborne” should be used instead.
- Although an immediate take off clearance given before the aircraft reaches the runway centreline is sometimes referred to as “rolling takeoff”, in official documents such as ICAO Doc 9432, ICAO Doc 4444 (Chapter 12) and UK CAA CAP 413 only the terms “immediate takeoff” and ”immediate departure” are used.
End of the educational minute..
The SWA clearance, with Fedex on 3 Miles out on a Cat III landing, was just off.
There are (very occasionally) times when the viz is below limits but LVPs aren’t yet in place.
I’d expect to tell pilots explicitly whether there is protection. Or is there an assumption in the US that if viz is below limits or you request cat 3 you will automatically get protection?
Only half a speed-brake
condensed for the upcoming generation: "Immediate" = rolling take-off (myself I lost the other small details long ago).Note to safetypee: as the people, operational environment and language evolve, would it make sense to start using this, "Rolling take-off"? Ticks all the boxes in my book, apart from needing a separate "move now!" call.
(I am not sure if immediately sounded over there, and have no desire listening to the tapes. In that environment it does not really matter - which is not a fault of anyone involved)
Del Prado Discussed some pages ago. You need to have a read, impossible to shorten.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 13th Feb 2023 at 09:05.
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Any controller that thinks or feels that a pilot reporting ready puts them under pressure to release an unsafe departure should hand their licences back.
Del Prado Discussed some pages ago. You need to have a read, impossible to shorten.
Only half a speed-brake
Pleasure. 8 minutes of reading tops.
Typing the answer to be proper, accurate and not prone to misinterpretation would take me about 3x as much. Happy to be impressed by your result after you walk the walk.
Typing the answer to be proper, accurate and not prone to misinterpretation would take me about 3x as much. Happy to be impressed by your result after you walk the walk.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 13th Feb 2023 at 11:44.
BFSGrad Thanks. Apparently what we don't hear is the controller restricting the departing SWA (SID to 4000') to stay below the GA ALT for FDX (3000'). I wish not to hint anymore which site I copied that information from as it may or may not be true nor relevant. BTW their own thread got closed for good reasons.
These are the limitations of LiveATC.
Only half a speed-brake
Nice.
The question about LVO active turned as inconclusive because (it seems) it is implied over there and not declaratory.
Moreover, people here so far lack the knowledge what their LVPs are, to be followed by ATC for the runway environment.
The question about LVO active turned as inconclusive because (it seems) it is implied over there and not declaratory.
Moreover, people here so far lack the knowledge what their LVPs are, to be followed by ATC for the runway environment.
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Here is my animated video reconstruction of the event driven by ADS-B granular data provided by flightradar24 and audio from LiveATC. Please see the video details for specific information about the reconstruction, including the limitations (especially the inability to verify accurate synchronization of the audio track).
ATTN: I got a tip on the timing of the audio for the event, and I believe it is wrong in the following reconstruction. I have added a new post with the new timing, but I am leaving the following link here for future reference. I have requested time tagged audio from the FAA to know the timing with confidence, but that will take a while to get.
ATTN: I got a tip on the timing of the audio for the event, and I believe it is wrong in the following reconstruction. I have added a new post with the new timing, but I am leaving the following link here for future reference. I have requested time tagged audio from the FAA to know the timing with confidence, but that will take a while to get.
Last edited by airplanecrazy; 13th Feb 2023 at 22:04. Reason: To document that the audio timing for this video is most likely wrong.