Indonesian B737 runway overrun/crash
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The TE flaps shown in the photos of the wreckage are not extended; the LE devices (Slats outboard, Krueger flaps inboard) are extended.
The TE flaps are driven by screw jacks turned by a hydraulic motor. They will either remain in the position they were driven too or break off completely. An impact cannot knock them back to the stowed position.
Conclusion. Either a) The flaps were not extended before landing or b) they were retracted by the crew during the landing roll in preparation for a go-around.
A credible witness reports that he noticed the flaps remained stowed during the approach. This confirms that option a) is the case.
There are several reasons for landing without deploying the flaps, but we have some indication that the crew experienced a flap problem prior to landing but "had dealt with it" - using the QRH no doubt. Since neither the primary nor alternate flap drive systems deployed the flaps, one is led to suspect that the problem was an asymmetry lock-out. This is most commonly a sensing system defect - genuine asymmetric deployment is extremely rare. Flap position indicator faults are not - the weak point in the asymmetry sensing system has always been the flap position indicator.
For an asymmetry sensing fault, the flaps would have had to move at least a small amount. Therefore, another factor that I feel supports this hypothesis is that although the flaps shown in the photos are not extended, neither do they appear to be fully retracted.
Once committed to a flapless landing, the pilots must be very careful about controlling speed during the approach. For obvious reasons practice flapless landings are usually conducted in a simulator. Is the actual handling of a B737-400 making a flapless landing matched by the simulator motion systems?
I'm a Technical Services Engineer with FDR readout experience and trained in accident investigation, not a pilot. Perhaps a B737-400 rated pilot can comment on the simulator/aircraft handling comparison?
The TE flaps are driven by screw jacks turned by a hydraulic motor. They will either remain in the position they were driven too or break off completely. An impact cannot knock them back to the stowed position.
Conclusion. Either a) The flaps were not extended before landing or b) they were retracted by the crew during the landing roll in preparation for a go-around.
A credible witness reports that he noticed the flaps remained stowed during the approach. This confirms that option a) is the case.
There are several reasons for landing without deploying the flaps, but we have some indication that the crew experienced a flap problem prior to landing but "had dealt with it" - using the QRH no doubt. Since neither the primary nor alternate flap drive systems deployed the flaps, one is led to suspect that the problem was an asymmetry lock-out. This is most commonly a sensing system defect - genuine asymmetric deployment is extremely rare. Flap position indicator faults are not - the weak point in the asymmetry sensing system has always been the flap position indicator.
For an asymmetry sensing fault, the flaps would have had to move at least a small amount. Therefore, another factor that I feel supports this hypothesis is that although the flaps shown in the photos are not extended, neither do they appear to be fully retracted.
Once committed to a flapless landing, the pilots must be very careful about controlling speed during the approach. For obvious reasons practice flapless landings are usually conducted in a simulator. Is the actual handling of a B737-400 making a flapless landing matched by the simulator motion systems?
I'm a Technical Services Engineer with FDR readout experience and trained in accident investigation, not a pilot. Perhaps a B737-400 rated pilot can comment on the simulator/aircraft handling comparison?
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Blacksheep,
This is where the problem lies...
Yet, there are also credible witness reports at the airport who saw the plane went by them stating that the flaps were deployed for landing (they are familiar with seeing flap30/40 for 737 landings).
But the purpose of the question was not to say whether that was deployed or not, but to propose 2 alternatives based on one or the other.
From the photos, they do appear to have ended up with a flap15 position or thereabouts.
Thanks for that...
PK-KAR
This is where the problem lies...
A credible witness reports that he noticed the flaps remained stowed during the approach. This confirms that option a) is the case.
But the purpose of the question was not to say whether that was deployed or not, but to propose 2 alternatives based on one or the other.
From the photos, they do appear to have ended up with a flap15 position or thereabouts.
Thanks for that...
PK-KAR
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Flap Position
PK-KAR
Some insight
Some insight
Mechanical failure of the transmition;
Retraction of the flaps due to air loads is prevented by a no-back friction brake in the inboard transmission assembly at each flap. If transmission assembly should fail, a torque limiter in the remaining transmission assembly on that flap will stall the flap drive system to prevent structural damage. Stopping the drive system also prevents operation of the remaining flaps, thus maintaining the airplane in normal flight attitude.
Flap Lockouts;
The flap drive system is most susceptible to lockouts in the flaps 30 to 40 range where the highest air loads exist. If the lockout occurs in the flaps 0 to 25 range structural interference, drive gearing failure, jammed transmissions, foreign object damage or hydraulic system failure are the most probable causes If the Flaps did not extend hydraulically or electrically in flaps 0 to 25 range in-flight then Structural failure and/or interference is the probable cause. When the trailing edge flaps are between 1 and 5 units, the control valve fully extend the leading edge flaps and extend all leading edge slats to the intermediate position. When the trailing edge flaps are positioned to 10 units or more, the control valve ports pressure to fully extend all leading edge slats.
If system B hydraulic pressure drops to 2000 psi, the flap and slat actuator blocking valves will hydraulically lock the actuators in the position at which the loss of pressure occurred. This locking action prevents aerodynamic blow back of the leading edge flaps and slats.
T/E Flap must have been selected other wise the slat and the Kruger's will NOT be able to extend.
Flap Load Limit System;
The system is armed When the airspeed switches or the ARINC 429 receiver senses an airspeed in excess of a range of 158 to 162 knots, the hydraulic solenoid valve positions the trailing edge flap control valve to the 30-unit position, As airspeed decreases to below a range of 153 to 157 knots, the solenoid valve is de-energised.
For the flap load system to operate, the Flap Lever must be in the 40 unit detent.
The problem of the Flap last selected position to what ever unit it was, is simply resolved by going to the remaining bits of the Cockpit and you will see the last selected position of the Flap Lever as well as the Flap gauge. I believe the cockpit was not affected, at least that was my understanding.
Having said all that I wonder if we were in the flight crew position, how we would all reacted to all these possibility in the span of few minutes.!! I am sure the flight crew regret some of their decision.
Retraction of the flaps due to air loads is prevented by a no-back friction brake in the inboard transmission assembly at each flap. If transmission assembly should fail, a torque limiter in the remaining transmission assembly on that flap will stall the flap drive system to prevent structural damage. Stopping the drive system also prevents operation of the remaining flaps, thus maintaining the airplane in normal flight attitude.
Flap Lockouts;
The flap drive system is most susceptible to lockouts in the flaps 30 to 40 range where the highest air loads exist. If the lockout occurs in the flaps 0 to 25 range structural interference, drive gearing failure, jammed transmissions, foreign object damage or hydraulic system failure are the most probable causes If the Flaps did not extend hydraulically or electrically in flaps 0 to 25 range in-flight then Structural failure and/or interference is the probable cause. When the trailing edge flaps are between 1 and 5 units, the control valve fully extend the leading edge flaps and extend all leading edge slats to the intermediate position. When the trailing edge flaps are positioned to 10 units or more, the control valve ports pressure to fully extend all leading edge slats.
If system B hydraulic pressure drops to 2000 psi, the flap and slat actuator blocking valves will hydraulically lock the actuators in the position at which the loss of pressure occurred. This locking action prevents aerodynamic blow back of the leading edge flaps and slats.
T/E Flap must have been selected other wise the slat and the Kruger's will NOT be able to extend.
Flap Load Limit System;
The system is armed When the airspeed switches or the ARINC 429 receiver senses an airspeed in excess of a range of 158 to 162 knots, the hydraulic solenoid valve positions the trailing edge flap control valve to the 30-unit position, As airspeed decreases to below a range of 153 to 157 knots, the solenoid valve is de-energised.
For the flap load system to operate, the Flap Lever must be in the 40 unit detent.
The problem of the Flap last selected position to what ever unit it was, is simply resolved by going to the remaining bits of the Cockpit and you will see the last selected position of the Flap Lever as well as the Flap gauge. I believe the cockpit was not affected, at least that was my understanding.
Having said all that I wonder if we were in the flight crew position, how we would all reacted to all these possibility in the span of few minutes.!! I am sure the flight crew regret some of their decision.
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PK-KAR's position
PK-KAR,
I don´t know who you are but if you are really involved in the investigation process, you shouldn´t be posting details and opinions here on PPRuNe, however piquant they may be.
If, on the other hand you are not involved, then we will take it with a pinch of salt.
FC.
I don´t know who you are but if you are really involved in the investigation process, you shouldn´t be posting details and opinions here on PPRuNe, however piquant they may be.
If, on the other hand you are not involved, then we will take it with a pinch of salt.
FC.
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Few Cloudy,
Feel free to take it with a pinch of salt. All that's said is subject to change when the CVR and FDR gets translated, and then the final report.
I'm just fed up with some of the silly speculations and some of the outrageous comments lately (not necessarily in this topic).
PK-KAR
Feel free to take it with a pinch of salt. All that's said is subject to change when the CVR and FDR gets translated, and then the final report.
I'm just fed up with some of the silly speculations and some of the outrageous comments lately (not necessarily in this topic).
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Remember what that guy told you in flying training.... Good landings come from good approaches.
The evidence is mounting here to suggest a grossly mishandled/rushed approach followed by a heavy landing + bounce. There may have been an attempt to GA (flaps around F15), or the flaps may have been at the maximum the extent they could manage due to excess speed on approach. In any case one good bounce on the nose gear precipitated separation and the energy/flap profile on reaching the upwind end of the runway precluded further flight.
All seemed to be well in R/t exchanges prior to landing with no suggestion of an abnormal config. Perhaps they were so laid back that they got F15 out + gear down and then realised the mistake when they tried to flare. It seems the CVR may be corrupt as the Aussies have sent it back to Honeywell for deeper attempts to salvage any recording so we may never know the mood on the FD prior to landing. The FDR data thankfully seems to be intact and has been communicated back to the Indonesians.
Not much longer to wait I think.
Edited to add:... If this turns out to be a flap assymetric lock-out that went unnoticed by the crew at some stage during decel/flap deployment then I think Boeing will have another lawsuit on their hands in the manner of Helios.
In the 737 there is NO centralised warning or attention-getter to the crew if the TE flaps fail to extend during deployment. The procedure relies totally on the pilots noticing the demanded flap position being at odds with that selected. In other words it is trapped entirely by pilot verbal SOP discipline.
The consequence would be the operation of the aircraft, close to the ground, at a speed well below that required for the demanded flap config..... that would do it. Another fine example of how not to design an airliner!
The evidence is mounting here to suggest a grossly mishandled/rushed approach followed by a heavy landing + bounce. There may have been an attempt to GA (flaps around F15), or the flaps may have been at the maximum the extent they could manage due to excess speed on approach. In any case one good bounce on the nose gear precipitated separation and the energy/flap profile on reaching the upwind end of the runway precluded further flight.
All seemed to be well in R/t exchanges prior to landing with no suggestion of an abnormal config. Perhaps they were so laid back that they got F15 out + gear down and then realised the mistake when they tried to flare. It seems the CVR may be corrupt as the Aussies have sent it back to Honeywell for deeper attempts to salvage any recording so we may never know the mood on the FD prior to landing. The FDR data thankfully seems to be intact and has been communicated back to the Indonesians.
Not much longer to wait I think.
Edited to add:... If this turns out to be a flap assymetric lock-out that went unnoticed by the crew at some stage during decel/flap deployment then I think Boeing will have another lawsuit on their hands in the manner of Helios.
In the 737 there is NO centralised warning or attention-getter to the crew if the TE flaps fail to extend during deployment. The procedure relies totally on the pilots noticing the demanded flap position being at odds with that selected. In other words it is trapped entirely by pilot verbal SOP discipline.
The consequence would be the operation of the aircraft, close to the ground, at a speed well below that required for the demanded flap config..... that would do it. Another fine example of how not to design an airliner!
Last edited by Magplug; 15th Mar 2007 at 13:23.
If, on the other hand you are not involved, then we will take it with a pinch of salt.
There are various souces of info, some of it more credible than others. Thus a little salt often helps the digestion.
I come to PPrune just for a taste on a daily basis
With the current focus on the flap configuration, some consideration might be given to problems associated with an abnormal flap approach and landing scenairio. These are general comments, not necessarily about the subject accident, and should be taken with a pinch of salt.
In a swept-wing jet, it is difficult to control speed on a 3 degree approach accurately at VRef with flaps at reduced angle and especially with flaps retracted. This is due to the low drag configuration and unexpectedly and low engine RPM required.
The common error seen in training is for the pilot to stabilize the speed at 15-20 knots above Vref and then for the pilot to experience some difficulty in reducing the speed in a timely manner to Vref. The higher approach speeds associated with reduced or zero flap angles further reduces the time available to accomplish the tasks necessary to line the aircraft up for landing and carry out the standard and abnormal checklists.
If the approach speed error is significantly above Vref, idle thrust must be selected to allow the speed to creep back to the correct speed. If the pilot's attention is diverted and the speed is allowed to go more than about 10 knots below Vref, the inherent low response for jet engines to spool up from idle and the very high induced drag (on the backside of the drag curve) can very quickly result in even further speed reduction with a very high vertical sink rate situation.
At the best of times, landing distance required is very limiting with reduced or with zero flap angles and therefore it is critical to achieve the correct touchdown point on the runway at the correct Vref speed for the configuration, so that the aircraft may be stopped in the remaining runway length.
In a swept-wing jet, it is difficult to control speed on a 3 degree approach accurately at VRef with flaps at reduced angle and especially with flaps retracted. This is due to the low drag configuration and unexpectedly and low engine RPM required.
The common error seen in training is for the pilot to stabilize the speed at 15-20 knots above Vref and then for the pilot to experience some difficulty in reducing the speed in a timely manner to Vref. The higher approach speeds associated with reduced or zero flap angles further reduces the time available to accomplish the tasks necessary to line the aircraft up for landing and carry out the standard and abnormal checklists.
If the approach speed error is significantly above Vref, idle thrust must be selected to allow the speed to creep back to the correct speed. If the pilot's attention is diverted and the speed is allowed to go more than about 10 knots below Vref, the inherent low response for jet engines to spool up from idle and the very high induced drag (on the backside of the drag curve) can very quickly result in even further speed reduction with a very high vertical sink rate situation.
At the best of times, landing distance required is very limiting with reduced or with zero flap angles and therefore it is critical to achieve the correct touchdown point on the runway at the correct Vref speed for the configuration, so that the aircraft may be stopped in the remaining runway length.
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Sinbad1 – thanks for the technical clarification – I was a bit rusty on some of those details.
Few Cloudy – the guy has never claimed to be involved in the investigation – and in fairness, has never said anything to suggest he is.
As far as a ‘pinch of salt’ is concerned – probably good advice in general on PPrune....certain times requiring more salt than others. (ref. to my previous outburst).
Magplug – if by “the manner of Helios” you mean a scurrilous claim – then I would agree.
(Without prejudice to the cause of this accident!) - However, if that’s not what you mean, in any aircraft not fitted with the relevant warning devices by design (and subsequent relevant certification), how would the manufacturer be responsible in the case where the crew fail to monitor the approach (spec, the deployment of flaps on the flap position indicator) properly. In the case of flap lever movement – the complete responsibility lies with the crew to monitor that they get what they expect.
GPWS “TOO LOW, FLAPS” – which monitors actual flap position – not the selected position. But then – this should be considered in the manner of a “secondary” warning – the primary being proper procedure on the part of the crew.
Most likely – very difficult for the crew not to notice (pitch ‘n power). If, for example, flaps at 5,10 or 15 – and IAS well below Vref for that position (heading for Vref 30) – and in relatively calm winds and visual – pitch and power relationship will be out of odds with the ‘norm’ and the different ‘landing picture’ will also be a cue to the crew that something’s wrong. Very hard if ‘by accident’ and not done purposefully.
Flexibleresponse - sorry if seems some of the above might cut accross your post - which of course is a quite accurate commentary. I hadn't seen your post when i logged on.
Few Cloudy – the guy has never claimed to be involved in the investigation – and in fairness, has never said anything to suggest he is.
As far as a ‘pinch of salt’ is concerned – probably good advice in general on PPrune....certain times requiring more salt than others. (ref. to my previous outburst).
Magplug – if by “the manner of Helios” you mean a scurrilous claim – then I would agree.
(Without prejudice to the cause of this accident!) - However, if that’s not what you mean, in any aircraft not fitted with the relevant warning devices by design (and subsequent relevant certification), how would the manufacturer be responsible in the case where the crew fail to monitor the approach (spec, the deployment of flaps on the flap position indicator) properly. In the case of flap lever movement – the complete responsibility lies with the crew to monitor that they get what they expect.
In the 737 there is NO centralised warning or attention-getter to the crew if the TE flaps fail to extend during deployment
GPWS “TOO LOW, FLAPS” – which monitors actual flap position – not the selected position. But then – this should be considered in the manner of a “secondary” warning – the primary being proper procedure on the part of the crew.
The consequence would be the operation of the aircraft, close to the ground, at a speed well below that required for the demanded flap config
Flexibleresponse - sorry if seems some of the above might cut accross your post - which of course is a quite accurate commentary. I hadn't seen your post when i logged on.
Last edited by theamrad; 15th Mar 2007 at 16:26.
Flaps at 30?
Hey everyone,
We have been speculating on whether the flaps were at 30 or 15 when the plane crashed. Just take a look at these pics:
First, the crashed Garuda jet. Take a close look at the pylon between the inboard and outboard flap sections, and the amount of droop that is visible.
http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage2.jpg
Then, look at this photo, of a 737 in flight with flaps 30:
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0194314/M/
The pylon between the inboard and outboard flap section looks the same to me....
Then, take a look at this photo! It is of a 737 just after it landed WITH FLAPS 15, probably because of the Airworthiness Directive that was active at the time, forcing operators to land with flaps 15 (2005).
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0937376/M/
Now THAT is flaps 15. Look at the amount of pylon visible....
So in my opinion, the Garuda guys landed with flaps 30. But still, it appears to me to have been a rushed approach...
We have been speculating on whether the flaps were at 30 or 15 when the plane crashed. Just take a look at these pics:
First, the crashed Garuda jet. Take a close look at the pylon between the inboard and outboard flap sections, and the amount of droop that is visible.
http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage2.jpg
Then, look at this photo, of a 737 in flight with flaps 30:
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0194314/M/
The pylon between the inboard and outboard flap section looks the same to me....
Then, take a look at this photo! It is of a 737 just after it landed WITH FLAPS 15, probably because of the Airworthiness Directive that was active at the time, forcing operators to land with flaps 15 (2005).
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0937376/M/
Now THAT is flaps 15. Look at the amount of pylon visible....
So in my opinion, the Garuda guys landed with flaps 30. But still, it appears to me to have been a rushed approach...
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F9,
I think the pylon has been pushed up. By your pictures, if you look at the second photo, the pylon is flush with the wing, in the first, it is bent well upward, thus giving the effect the flaps are further down than actual.
Dog
I think the pylon has been pushed up. By your pictures, if you look at the second photo, the pylon is flush with the wing, in the first, it is bent well upward, thus giving the effect the flaps are further down than actual.
Dog
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FoxNiner...
U forgot one thing...
The trailing edge of the engine pylon in the crash photo was dislodged, and had bent a few degrees UP! If you see from the flap15 and flap30 landing photo, you would see that it is flush with the upper surface of the wing.
A better way would be to estimate the length of flap deployment in comparison with the length of the engine pylon trailing edge.
Now use that method when comparing all three photos, and you'd quickly see that when the aircraft crashed, the flaps were not at 30.
PK-KAR
U forgot one thing...
The trailing edge of the engine pylon in the crash photo was dislodged, and had bent a few degrees UP! If you see from the flap15 and flap30 landing photo, you would see that it is flush with the upper surface of the wing.
A better way would be to estimate the length of flap deployment in comparison with the length of the engine pylon trailing edge.
Now use that method when comparing all three photos, and you'd quickly see that when the aircraft crashed, the flaps were not at 30.
PK-KAR
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I agree with Dogimed - I think that the photos referenced by Fox Niner actually show that the flaps WERE at 15, judging by the amount of flap section upper surface that is visible. The pylon has obviously been pushed up through the top of the wing so is no longer a fixed reference.
It's an interesting time to be in Jakarta at the moment; the rumour mill around this accident is in overdrive, as one might expect!
It's an interesting time to be in Jakarta at the moment; the rumour mill around this accident is in overdrive, as one might expect!
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Some more info.
http://www.news.com.au
Indonesia may close airlines after crashesFrom correspondents in Jakarta
March 16, 2007 08:05pm
Article from: ReutersFont size: + -
Send this article: Print Email
INDONESIA may close some airlines after a government-sanctioned team of transport experts called for a revamp of the aviation industry following a series of air accidents, Vice President Jusuf Kalla said today.
Last week, a Garuda Indonesia plane with 140 people on board overshot the runway in cultural capital Yogyakarta and burst into flames, killing 21 people including five Australians.
"Whoever fails to meet regulations will face sanctions, including airlines which fail to meet aviation regulations," Mr Kalla said.
He said errant airlines would be given warnings, suspended or shut down following an audit depending on their state of affairs.
"Just wait for news from the director general of civil aviation," he said.
A team commissioned by the Government after a passenger jet with 102 people on board disappeared in January has said safety standards had deteriorated since the deregulation of the aviation sector in the late 1990s.
Yesterday, it urged the Government to shut down air operators that ignore safety rules in a series of recommendations to the government.
Investigators in last week's Garuda crash are questioning the pilots and the cabin crew to see if human error was involved in the accident.
Air travel in Indonesia, a country of more than 17,000 islands, has grown substantially since the liberalisation of the airline industry that has triggered price wars among airlines.
The rapid growth has raised questions over whether safety has been compromised and if the infrastructure and personnel can cope with the huge increase.
The team is also due to come up with recommendations on improving safety on other transport networks including the nation's overstretched ferry system.
Indonesia may close airlines after crashesFrom correspondents in Jakarta
March 16, 2007 08:05pm
Article from: ReutersFont size: + -
Send this article: Print Email
INDONESIA may close some airlines after a government-sanctioned team of transport experts called for a revamp of the aviation industry following a series of air accidents, Vice President Jusuf Kalla said today.
Last week, a Garuda Indonesia plane with 140 people on board overshot the runway in cultural capital Yogyakarta and burst into flames, killing 21 people including five Australians.
"Whoever fails to meet regulations will face sanctions, including airlines which fail to meet aviation regulations," Mr Kalla said.
He said errant airlines would be given warnings, suspended or shut down following an audit depending on their state of affairs.
"Just wait for news from the director general of civil aviation," he said.
A team commissioned by the Government after a passenger jet with 102 people on board disappeared in January has said safety standards had deteriorated since the deregulation of the aviation sector in the late 1990s.
Yesterday, it urged the Government to shut down air operators that ignore safety rules in a series of recommendations to the government.
Investigators in last week's Garuda crash are questioning the pilots and the cabin crew to see if human error was involved in the accident.
Air travel in Indonesia, a country of more than 17,000 islands, has grown substantially since the liberalisation of the airline industry that has triggered price wars among airlines.
The rapid growth has raised questions over whether safety has been compromised and if the infrastructure and personnel can cope with the huge increase.
The team is also due to come up with recommendations on improving safety on other transport networks including the nation's overstretched ferry system.
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I suppose I'm a little late with this, but enlarging the crash photo linked by fox niner, the pylon does appear to be bent up and also twisted with the top closer to the fuselage.
If the twist is taken out and the pylon brought down to conform to the wing surface you get a different look.
For whatever it's worth or whatever it means, an edited photo ...
http://i9.photobucket.com/albums/a93...x/montage3.jpg
If the twist is taken out and the pylon brought down to conform to the wing surface you get a different look.
For whatever it's worth or whatever it means, an edited photo ...
http://i9.photobucket.com/albums/a93...x/montage3.jpg
ex-Tanker
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OK PK, just reading some of your posts it sounded as though you had been called as a witness - glad you weren't.
I still don't think the photo tells us anything definite about the flap setting before the crash, by the way. If you really belted a flap from 30 or 40 all the way up to 15 by brute force, then something has to give. Something has given - as witness the fairing being out of position.
Only when the fat lady in the Flt Rec has sung, will we know.
FC.
I still don't think the photo tells us anything definite about the flap setting before the crash, by the way. If you really belted a flap from 30 or 40 all the way up to 15 by brute force, then something has to give. Something has given - as witness the fairing being out of position.
Only when the fat lady in the Flt Rec has sung, will we know.
FC.
Investigation team confirms flaps not in landing configuration and no wind shear.
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/win...722744310.html
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/win...722744310.html
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FewCloudy,
At least the photos were useful to push the investigators a bit to admit that flap failure is being looked at... At least we know we're on the right track...
PK-KAR
At least the photos were useful to push the investigators a bit to admit that flap failure is being looked at... At least we know we're on the right track...
PK-KAR
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FewCloudy,
Surely, if the flaps were forced from 30/40 back to '15' by the crash forces, they wouldn't just neatly rewind up their screwjacks/fairings, would they? More likely they would be bent and broken off.
Surely, if the flaps were forced from 30/40 back to '15' by the crash forces, they wouldn't just neatly rewind up their screwjacks/fairings, would they? More likely they would be bent and broken off.