Martin Baker to be prosecuted over death of Flt Lt. Sean Cunningham
So what are you after tuc? An MAA without serving military personnel? How will that provide informed, current, knowledge of the Military Air Environment? To answer your question, CAS is not in the management chain for those in the MAA (it goes D MAA to DG DSA to SofS). Yes, of course, people serving in the MAA will return to the mainstream RAF and no doubt you will see this as vulnerability to pressure; but how is that different from those operators working in the CAA returning to the wider commercial aviation world?
And while I do not condone the pressure that you were once subjected to, can you provide current evidence (anytime this century will do) of ANY government individual being disciplined for 'refusing to make a false declaration'? I've never witnessed such an event, nor have I ever heard a colleague express any worry regarding such pressure. I'm not denying your claim that it happended in the past, I'm querying its relevance to the current environment.
And while I do not condone the pressure that you were once subjected to, can you provide current evidence (anytime this century will do) of ANY government individual being disciplined for 'refusing to make a false declaration'? I've never witnessed such an event, nor have I ever heard a colleague express any worry regarding such pressure. I'm not denying your claim that it happended in the past, I'm querying its relevance to the current environment.
Thank you tuc, you put it far better than I, as ever. As you say, both military and civilian personnel within DSA (including the DG) are subject to the MOD CoC, just as they were previously when that CoC subverted Air Safety some three decades ago to leave it in the parlous state it is now. The signs on the door may change, the reality does not.
Fortissimo, the analogy you make with civilian aviation does not bear scrutiny. Yes, both systems come under one SoS (Defence and Transport), but the civilian Regulator and Investigator are separate and independent of each other, whereas in military aviation they come under one DG. If his investigator finds (as it should) the regulator to have failed utterly in ensuring airworthiness in investigating accident after accident is he going to severely censure himself? The throttling of UK Military Air Accident Investigation continues unhindered whereas the AAIB can find Regulator or Operator equally to have failed.
The military operator is of course the elephant in the room, and its principal guise is that of the RAF. It is that Service's Very Senior Officers that first caused the subversion by issuing illegal orders and by illegally granting RTS's to knowingly unairworthy aircraft. It is that Service's Very Senior Officers that have ensured the cover up of that subversion ever since. Thus was the Nimrod Report subverted, thus was the MAA founded on a lie.
It is being freed of such baleful influence that is the essential pre-requisite of UK Military Air Safety reform. That can only happen when the MAA and MilAAIB are outside the MOD, and thus independent of it and of each other.
Fortissimo, the analogy you make with civilian aviation does not bear scrutiny. Yes, both systems come under one SoS (Defence and Transport), but the civilian Regulator and Investigator are separate and independent of each other, whereas in military aviation they come under one DG. If his investigator finds (as it should) the regulator to have failed utterly in ensuring airworthiness in investigating accident after accident is he going to severely censure himself? The throttling of UK Military Air Accident Investigation continues unhindered whereas the AAIB can find Regulator or Operator equally to have failed.
The military operator is of course the elephant in the room, and its principal guise is that of the RAF. It is that Service's Very Senior Officers that first caused the subversion by issuing illegal orders and by illegally granting RTS's to knowingly unairworthy aircraft. It is that Service's Very Senior Officers that have ensured the cover up of that subversion ever since. Thus was the Nimrod Report subverted, thus was the MAA founded on a lie.
It is being freed of such baleful influence that is the essential pre-requisite of UK Military Air Safety reform. That can only happen when the MAA and MilAAIB are outside the MOD, and thus independent of it and of each other.
.... can you provide current evidence (anytime this century will do) of ANY government individual being disciplined for 'refusing to make a false declaration'?
I suspect that currently (and probably wisely) no-one is actually issuing such orders, therefore there is nothing to refuse, and anything to do with airworthiness is being quietly fudged.
...............
Join Date: May 2007
Location: upstairs
Posts: 208
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ogre,
You are correct, I only had the UK in mind (although I once had cause to read DEF(AUST) 5679!). You say "...to prove we have done everything reasonably practicable, with requests for details of what mitigations we didn't implement and why not." Who is asking this? The legal authorities or the procuring agencies? There was/is a similar issue in the UK. The legal authorities only come into play when, as in this sad case, something goes wrong. The procuring agencies seemed to be the ones asking such questions despite the legal duties only applying to the manufacturer. It can be argued that accepting the Def Stan (00-56) in the contract allows this investigation but it doesn't alter the law of the land nor those charged with responsibility for its observation.
While the UK Health And Safety At Work Act uses "reasonably practicable" it doesn't attempt to define it as it represents a relatively well understood UK legal concept. When the Act was published in 1974, it's contents weren't new, the Act just codified what the Common Law already said about health and safety. I still believe that the translation of SFAIRP into something meaningful for engineers isn't very straightforward. The HSE is quite good at this - their web pages are quite informative - but the guidance has limited utility for manufacturing complex products like military aircraft.
I agree that there can be hard side effects on manufacturing companies, but mostly those whose products have the highest severity hazards in use. I believe such companies need to recognise this and use a safety engineering process from product concept to delivery and in-service. Companies need to recognise that safety engineering is a fundamental part of the Systems Engineer's toolbox. For me Def Stan 00-56 (in any of its early versions) hasn't really been very good at making this clear and in my experience this helps lead PTs to address safety just before entry into service. This approach puts the emphasis on process outputs rather than continuous monitoring and involvement which is the way if they're truly interested in "details of mitigations". I often thought that the requirements of earlier versions of Mil Std 882 tended to be better about the use of safety through product life. Funnily enough, the Eurofighter contractual process is based on the Mil Std as the Def Stan hadn't been published when the contract was signed.
EAP
You are correct, I only had the UK in mind (although I once had cause to read DEF(AUST) 5679!). You say "...to prove we have done everything reasonably practicable, with requests for details of what mitigations we didn't implement and why not." Who is asking this? The legal authorities or the procuring agencies? There was/is a similar issue in the UK. The legal authorities only come into play when, as in this sad case, something goes wrong. The procuring agencies seemed to be the ones asking such questions despite the legal duties only applying to the manufacturer. It can be argued that accepting the Def Stan (00-56) in the contract allows this investigation but it doesn't alter the law of the land nor those charged with responsibility for its observation.
While the UK Health And Safety At Work Act uses "reasonably practicable" it doesn't attempt to define it as it represents a relatively well understood UK legal concept. When the Act was published in 1974, it's contents weren't new, the Act just codified what the Common Law already said about health and safety. I still believe that the translation of SFAIRP into something meaningful for engineers isn't very straightforward. The HSE is quite good at this - their web pages are quite informative - but the guidance has limited utility for manufacturing complex products like military aircraft.
I agree that there can be hard side effects on manufacturing companies, but mostly those whose products have the highest severity hazards in use. I believe such companies need to recognise this and use a safety engineering process from product concept to delivery and in-service. Companies need to recognise that safety engineering is a fundamental part of the Systems Engineer's toolbox. For me Def Stan 00-56 (in any of its early versions) hasn't really been very good at making this clear and in my experience this helps lead PTs to address safety just before entry into service. This approach puts the emphasis on process outputs rather than continuous monitoring and involvement which is the way if they're truly interested in "details of mitigations". I often thought that the requirements of earlier versions of Mil Std 882 tended to be better about the use of safety through product life. Funnily enough, the Eurofighter contractual process is based on the Mil Std as the Def Stan hadn't been published when the contract was signed.
EAP
...refusing an order to lie is treated as an offence. I am given to understand that this extraordinary policy has been formally confirmed by several successive governments and is still in force.
I am not disputing what someone may or may not have said to a fellow PPruner over 2 decades ago, I am simply saying that I do not believe that anyone working in govt today believes, for a second, that refusing an order to lie would lead to disciplinary action.
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: Australia OZ
Age: 75
Posts: 2,577
Likes: 0
Received 52 Likes
on
45 Posts
Martin-Baker - Ejection History 12mins & ONLY 1946-47
Published on Oct 12, 2016 Martin-Baker
"A brief video showing some of the history behind Martin-Baker and the Ejection Seat."
"A brief video showing some of the history behind Martin-Baker and the Ejection Seat."
Last edited by SpazSinbad; 12th Oct 2016 at 14:06.
Personal testimony of being ordered to suborn the regulations and being disciplined for not doing so has been posted on this forum on a number of occasions. No doubt it will be so again, but in the meantime I commend the site "Military Airworthiness - A Tale of Mendacity" in which the subject of this thread is covered, together with other military airworthiness related fatal air accidents. The part that covers the issues raised by Red Line Entry is in Part 8.1 "The Elephant in the Room and the Case for Independence" :-
https://sites.google.com/site/milita...A/independence
To answer your question Wander00, nothing has been tested in court. Neither the Thames Valley Police nor the RAF Provost Marshal have shown any interest in investigating, let alone laying charges against anyone. I wonder why?
https://sites.google.com/site/milita...A/independence
To answer your question Wander00, nothing has been tested in court. Neither the Thames Valley Police nor the RAF Provost Marshal have shown any interest in investigating, let alone laying charges against anyone. I wonder why?
Red Line Entry
I've been prepared to publish, twice, what you ask about, under my own name. Cited therein is correspondence from MoD following submission of proofs, when I offered to change anything that was inaccurate. In one reply (28.10.14), the Cabinet Secretary (Sir Jeremy Heywood) referred directly to such disciplinary action and stated it would be "inappropriate" to make any changes to the rulings.
I do not speak of a single event "over two decades ago". I speak of consistent rulings and action since I first experienced this in December 1992. I cannot say if it happened before that, but have opined that it began as a reaction to the Director of Flight Safety notifying the Chief Engineer and ACAS in August 1992 of systemic failings. Until then, relatively infrequent notifications of the same (from January 1988), by MoD auditors, were simply ignored. As a direct result of this 1992 action, the Director Of Internal Audit undertook a 3 year audit and confirmed the failings to PUS in June 1996. The primary aim of that audit was to provide top cover for those who had been threatened with dismissal. Thereafter (to my knowledge) the action taken was "only" formal warnings, which of course have long term effects as they are always brought up at subsequent interviews.
Forgive me if I skip forward into this century, but in April 2003 PUS was advised by MoD's Director of Personnel, Resources and Development that MoD did not regard issuing an order to commit fraud by misrepresentation (making a false declaration) as "wrongdoing" and that adverse staff reports would not be amended to remove references to the offence (the refusal to commit fraud). At 2 Star level, a direct question was asked, in writing - which is the greater offence, the refusal or the order? His written ruling was that only one offence was committed - the refusal. This was subsequently upheld by the Chief of Defence Procurement and (from memory) five Ministers for the Armed Forces. In the same letter (April 2003), PUS was advised that there was only one person in MoD who had voiced concern at systemic airworthiness failings and waste; and that this person was wrong. This claim ignored the raft of internal audits reporting the same. This correspondence followed a formal hearing on the subject in September 2002, which led to CDP issuing his rulings, twice. Civilian staff were advised in writing by their Trades Union (prospect) who, after investigating, decided it could not make a formal complaint about the policy. MoD now claims this formal hearing did not take place, but the transcript of the recording is very clear (as is the recording). My opinion is that, again, this 2003 ruling was (in part) designed to divert attention from a significant event - the loss of Tornado ZG710 the previous month. Part of the original complaint had been that aircraft were being delivered functionally unsafe, but false declarations made that they were safe. It was well known that an inspection of Tornado IFF system integration, specifically failure warnings, had been rejected at 2 Star level in 1999 and 2002, and ACM Burridge in his remarks confirmed the accident would probably have been avoided had such integration been effected properly.
You could write a book.......
I've been prepared to publish, twice, what you ask about, under my own name. Cited therein is correspondence from MoD following submission of proofs, when I offered to change anything that was inaccurate. In one reply (28.10.14), the Cabinet Secretary (Sir Jeremy Heywood) referred directly to such disciplinary action and stated it would be "inappropriate" to make any changes to the rulings.
I do not speak of a single event "over two decades ago". I speak of consistent rulings and action since I first experienced this in December 1992. I cannot say if it happened before that, but have opined that it began as a reaction to the Director of Flight Safety notifying the Chief Engineer and ACAS in August 1992 of systemic failings. Until then, relatively infrequent notifications of the same (from January 1988), by MoD auditors, were simply ignored. As a direct result of this 1992 action, the Director Of Internal Audit undertook a 3 year audit and confirmed the failings to PUS in June 1996. The primary aim of that audit was to provide top cover for those who had been threatened with dismissal. Thereafter (to my knowledge) the action taken was "only" formal warnings, which of course have long term effects as they are always brought up at subsequent interviews.
Forgive me if I skip forward into this century, but in April 2003 PUS was advised by MoD's Director of Personnel, Resources and Development that MoD did not regard issuing an order to commit fraud by misrepresentation (making a false declaration) as "wrongdoing" and that adverse staff reports would not be amended to remove references to the offence (the refusal to commit fraud). At 2 Star level, a direct question was asked, in writing - which is the greater offence, the refusal or the order? His written ruling was that only one offence was committed - the refusal. This was subsequently upheld by the Chief of Defence Procurement and (from memory) five Ministers for the Armed Forces. In the same letter (April 2003), PUS was advised that there was only one person in MoD who had voiced concern at systemic airworthiness failings and waste; and that this person was wrong. This claim ignored the raft of internal audits reporting the same. This correspondence followed a formal hearing on the subject in September 2002, which led to CDP issuing his rulings, twice. Civilian staff were advised in writing by their Trades Union (prospect) who, after investigating, decided it could not make a formal complaint about the policy. MoD now claims this formal hearing did not take place, but the transcript of the recording is very clear (as is the recording). My opinion is that, again, this 2003 ruling was (in part) designed to divert attention from a significant event - the loss of Tornado ZG710 the previous month. Part of the original complaint had been that aircraft were being delivered functionally unsafe, but false declarations made that they were safe. It was well known that an inspection of Tornado IFF system integration, specifically failure warnings, had been rejected at 2 Star level in 1999 and 2002, and ACM Burridge in his remarks confirmed the accident would probably have been avoided had such integration been effected properly.
You could write a book.......
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Hanging off the end of a thread
Posts: 32,894
Received 2,833 Likes
on
1,210 Posts
Regarding the shackle, wouldn't you think they'd have fitted a spacer or a sleeve to prevent overtightening.
A longer bolt shank so it does not pinch when torqued down due to becoming thread bound may have been the answer, however the length may also be an issue.
It has always struck me that the MAA's position, outlined by Red Line Entry, is not dissimilar to anyone with financial and technical delegation. When conducting scrutiny, technical (and it must be technical) staff are seen to be working direct to PUS, as the Chief Accounting Officer. When making their written declaration and signing, they act separately of their line management chain. In the same way the MAA have a more direct link to SofS. But that does not make them "independent", as they have another line management chain which determines their career path far more directly than PUS/SofS ever does. In both cases, the system falls apart because the systemic failures have taken place in that second, more traditional, chain. And, notably, in both cases the PUS/SofS chain has shown no inclination to act upon notification of total breakdown. Set aside, if you like, my evidence, and just ask this. When were systemic failings formally notified by auditors? (13.1.88-on). Who caused them and who judged the complaint? (Same people). Were the notifications repeated regularly? (Yes, every year since). Who rejected them? (Same people). What event brought matters to a head? (Nimrod XV230, and notification of previous reports to the Coroner). Did MoD continue to deny this thereafter? (Yes). Did similar failings continue to occur? (Yes). What's gone wrong? MoD is judge and jury.
I've answered that before. But I offer this, again. MoD has stated, in writing, that only one person believes there were systemic failings. Written in 2003, this claim has been cited repeatedly by Ministers, in correspondence with other Ministers. I'd like to know what MAA staff think of this claim, given the obligation, set out in every letter of delegation, to report such failings and ensure they are escalated. Of course, the claim is nonsense, so one must ask who is writing these Ministerial briefings? And why the MAA senior management is content with them (because they have been notified of them, and in one particular case wrote the briefing). That doesn't sound like an independent organisation. It sounds like one that is scared to stick its head above the parapet. Content to wait for an accident and react, rather than be proactive.
So what are you after tuc? An MAA without serving military personnel?
If I could just row back to the safety case issue, in particular #68 and the comment by EAP86. My memory of detail from 15 years ago is a bit sketchy, but I am sure the Mk 10 seat and the Mk9 in Jaguar were considered legacy systems. Now, notwithstanding all the valid comment, regulations and rights and wrongs I think that was how it was.
I expect many have read David Hill's paper on the accident which I admire for the research; however, I find a couple of the arguments a bit weak to present to such a high powered distribution.
I expect many have read David Hill's paper on the accident which I admire for the research; however, I find a couple of the arguments a bit weak to present to such a high powered distribution.
SB:-
Fair enough. Would you please explain? Also I find your comment "a bit weak":-
The Hawk Mk 10 seat had no safety case, rendering it unairworthy. No "legacy" consideration can accomodate that!
I find a couple of the arguments a bit weak to present to such a high powered distribution.
I am sure the Mk 10 seat and the Mk9 in Jaguar were considered legacy systems
I'm sure any weakness could be corrected, or better explained. But few readers will miss the central point, that it does not contain allegations or supposition, being based on MoD's own statements, and practices Vs policies. Not least, as Chug points out, the Service Inquiry's statement that there was no safety case report. This in itself is a bit of a weak statement, because it doesn't actually say Martin Baker had not compiled a safety case. My guess is they did, but just weren't under contract to maintain it, or under directed sub-contract to BAeS to contribute to the whole aircraft safety cases for all Mk10 users. In other words, exactly the same situation faced by the Nimrod IPT Leader in 1999. But in this case, the IPTs (S&AD and Hawk) had, apparently, passed rigourous MAA audit in the past year; whereas in 1999 it was known and accepted by senior staff that safety cases were not funded properly, the entire process being a bit hit and miss. The SI report does comment on this, but stops short of open criticism. As ever with SI reports, it is very light on events that led to factors and cause.
There was no safety case, but, as I said, notwithstanding all the valid comment, regulations and rights and wrongs, that was how it was. Sadly, the person who could shed a lot of light onto events of those days is no longer with us.
As for 'The Paper', I think very subjective comment, such as MBA saying 'still use this seat' to suggest it should have been upgraded detracts from the more serious issues discussed.
Anyway, said my bit so that's me done.
As for 'The Paper', I think very subjective comment, such as MBA saying 'still use this seat' to suggest it should have been upgraded detracts from the more serious issues discussed.
Anyway, said my bit so that's me done.
SB:-
Not only was but is in my view. The point that tuc and I are making is that how it was has led to 63 deaths in airworthiness related accidents and how it is will go on doing so unless some really radical steps are taken PDQ. The RAF has to confront the elephant in its own room, which is the continuing cover up of illegal orders and illegal actions made by its own Very Senior Officers. Only then can the Nimrod Report be seen as part of that cover up. There was no "Golden Period", quite the contrary there was deliberate sabotage of the UK Military Air Safety system. Once the Nimrod Report is seen as the sham that it is then the MAA, which proclaims Haddon-Cave as its corner stone, can likewise be seen in its true light. Regulation and Investigation is not safe in the MOD's hands and must be wrested free of them and of each other. Then and only then can the long and difficult road to regaining UK Military Airworthiness be started out on.
There was an MOD apologist that was forever saying much the same on the Mull thread, yet he returned time and time again. So stay with the conversation SB. Jaw jaw, and all that...
that was how it was
Anyway, said my bit so that's me done
Okay, okay, I'll stay with it, but really, I don't think I can add much to the conversation. I'm on the same side as you and tuc and I understand how safety has been eroded by VSOs and their drive for budget cuts and then turning a blind eye to the inevitable results. Reading some of the learned posts on this site has made me think how poorly I was trained (!) and prepared for the role I undertook; I had to work it out as I went along, just making sure I didn't do anything stupid. I suppose that fits in with many of the arguments you both make.
Gotta go now for the unbiased Brexit argument on Question Time!
Gotta go now for the unbiased Brexit argument on Question Time!
Slow Biker, with the greatest respect you have already added much value, simply by accepting the truth of what is being said. A few here endured much criticism when these failures were first raised, many repeating the MoD line that such things could never happen. Now, dare I say it, it is only a few hard liners who refuse to accept the facts laid bare before Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip. It is often better to read the evidence before trying to refute it. Especially when it is in MoD's own hand! I don't make accusations here, simply note MoD's own statements in an attempt to explain accidents like this. Very unoriginal I'm afraid.
Slow Biker:-
On the contrary you have already added much. Your own experience emphasises the dysfunctional system that meant that you were left simply hoping not to be the one that acted wrongly out of ignorance. It was not your fault not being fully informed but of those that rendered the system dysfunctional to such a gross extent. As you say we are all on the same side. We all want UK military aircraft to be airworthy. It will take all of us to demand that real reforms rather than pretend ones make that happen. As to learned posts, they certainly don't come from me! I was a lowly GD/P. They don't come more unlearned than that!
Come on in and join the fray! I must though regrettably end on a note of mild censure. Question Time biased? Really Sir, how can you suggest such a thing?
Okay, okay, I'll stay with it, but really, I don't think I can add much to the conversation
Come on in and join the fray! I must though regrettably end on a note of mild censure. Question Time biased? Really Sir, how can you suggest such a thing?
Join Date: Nov 2015
Location: BRS/GVA
Posts: 342
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Its in the news again today.. Ejection seat firm in court over Red Arrows pilot death - BBC News
MB make something that has saved many lives, but which does that by employing some dangerous and violent methods in a last resort solution. And all that with an excellent record.
I really don't see how this is justified in general with the above said, and specifically when having read the report which doesnt seem to point much to MB being at fault compared to other factors.
MB make something that has saved many lives, but which does that by employing some dangerous and violent methods in a last resort solution. And all that with an excellent record.
I really don't see how this is justified in general with the above said, and specifically when having read the report which doesnt seem to point much to MB being at fault compared to other factors.