Red Line Entry
I've been prepared to publish, twice, what you ask about, under my own name. Cited therein is correspondence from MoD following submission of proofs, when I offered to change anything that was inaccurate. In one reply (28.10.14), the Cabinet Secretary (Sir Jeremy Heywood) referred directly to such disciplinary action and stated it would be "inappropriate" to make any changes to the rulings.
I do not speak of a single event "over two decades ago". I speak of consistent rulings and action since I first experienced this in December 1992. I cannot say if it happened before that, but have opined that it began as a reaction to the Director of Flight Safety notifying the Chief Engineer and ACAS in August 1992 of systemic failings. Until then, relatively infrequent notifications of the same (from January 1988), by MoD auditors, were simply ignored. As a direct result of this 1992 action, the Director Of Internal Audit undertook a 3 year audit and confirmed the failings to PUS in June 1996. The primary aim of that audit was to provide top cover for those who had been threatened with dismissal. Thereafter (to my knowledge) the action taken was "only" formal warnings, which of course have long term effects as they are always brought up at subsequent interviews.
Forgive me if I skip forward into this century, but in April 2003 PUS was advised by MoD's Director of Personnel, Resources and Development that MoD did not regard issuing an order to commit fraud by misrepresentation (making a false declaration) as "wrongdoing" and that adverse staff reports would not be amended to remove references to the offence (the refusal to commit fraud). At 2 Star level, a direct question was asked, in writing - which is the greater offence, the refusal or the order? His written ruling was that only one offence was committed - the refusal. This was subsequently upheld by the Chief of Defence Procurement and (from memory) five Ministers for the Armed Forces. In the same letter (April 2003), PUS was advised that there was only one person in MoD who had voiced concern at systemic airworthiness failings and waste; and that this person was wrong. This claim ignored the raft of internal audits reporting the same. This correspondence followed a formal hearing on the subject in September 2002, which led to CDP issuing his rulings, twice. Civilian staff were advised in writing by their Trades Union (prospect) who, after investigating, decided it could not make a formal complaint about the policy. MoD now claims this formal hearing did not take place, but the transcript of the recording is very clear (as is the recording). My opinion is that, again, this 2003 ruling was (in part) designed to divert attention from a significant event - the loss of Tornado ZG710 the previous month. Part of the original complaint had been that aircraft were being delivered functionally unsafe, but false declarations made that they were safe. It was well known that an inspection of Tornado IFF system integration, specifically failure warnings, had been rejected at 2 Star level in 1999 and 2002, and ACM Burridge in his remarks confirmed the accident would probably have been avoided had such integration been effected properly.
You could write a book.......