Chugalug2

AA
PPRuNe is merely a reflection of us all, good bad and indifferent. At its best though it shines. Invariably that coincides with when it is fighting a good fight, be it on behalf of SSAFFA, Gurkhas, AT fleet protection, etc. The subject of this thread is such a good fight, not an invitation to second guess what may or may not have happened to result in a terrible accident, but to right a wrong, an injustice done to two of its kind by their own service. JB sums it up more succinctly than I, so I will merely add:
Let Right Be Done!

walter kennedy

There were other casualties on board other than the RAF aircrew the relatives, friends and colleagues of whom would surely like to know the full story.
The loss of those personnel on board also had a great impact on a large section of the British people who would surely be interested in the full story.
However, that the crash happened in an RAF a/c and any hope of understanding anything much about the crash depends upon debate amongst those with knowledge and experience of the a/c, operations, avionics, etc those with an interest would naturally be drawn to a forum such as this.
I don't know of any better forum and so believe that not only should some inquiry beyond just the legal details of clearing their names be tolerated but also supported constructively.
We don't want debate to be gagged as so many inquiries are by sticking rigidly to a narrow scope (eg Hutton).
Yes we would all like to see the pilots' names cleared - the campaign's main thrust is quite right, that there was never evidence to justify that verdict - but there are indeed so many unanswered questions that still can be answered.
I personally believe that the harsh verdict was politically motivated to discourage speculation in the first place ("Look folks, it was just a case of pilot error beyond any doubt whatsover - look at the verdict!") and I do not believe that anything that could be uncovered would be prejudicial to overturning that unjust verdict - you all should have that confidence if you have faith in the pilots' abilities.

John Blakeley

Walter,

We have met and spoken on several times, and I have listened with interest and politely to your theory - but on every occasion I have told you that in the absence of the ability for anyone to know what happened the Mull Group's strategy has been to work on the legal challenge and in areas where facts are available that show there could be a different explanation to that of pilot error associated with gross negligence, and hence generate the "doubt" that would make it even more impossible for the RAF to sustain a verdict based on speculation as they have done up to now. That as far as I can see has always been the purpose of this thread. Of course the relatives and many others would like to know what happened, but they, and we, never will, and there is nothing we can do about that.

Your ideas may or may not hold water - I am not a RW pilot but I have seen others who are rebut many of your theories. Where I might agree with you is that there could have been other factors influencing the verdict, and indeed as I have shown you there is very clear evidence that not all extant and highly relevant "facts" were made available to the BOI - these do not tell us the cause of the accident as you and everyone else would like, but they do give the basis for doubt and the legal challenge. Like everyone else you are entitled to your views, but, for example, I suggest that you could start a new thread which would allow you and others to expound your theories without detracting from the purpose of this thread which I believe still has one simple factual based objective - to clear the pilots of the unjust and unjustified charge of gross negligence. Your ideas, in the absence of proof, do not help this objective in any way.

Clearly we wait for SofS's response, which is now getting later and later than "promised". But, for example, if the MOD were to take the decision to re-open the Inquiry I assume that if you have complete confidence that you can prove your point then you would step forward to give such evidence.

JB

walter kennedy

Master of None
SFFP dobbed you in as the expert in this area when he wrote:
<<Because I was never a Chinook avionics tech I cannot answer your question however Master of None in posts #3313 and #3326 DID answer your question and qualified his answer with "As someone who has operated and instructed on the RAF Chinook HC2" but you chose to ignore him as is your want.
Why you continue to ask questions then ignore the answers given, even when they come from such experts in their field is beyond me >>

So I suppose I had better address what you have written:
I ignored your post #3313 as, at first reading, I thought it was inadequate and confusing; however, going through it again, I recognise that it was just very concise and someone experienced with the system should have understood your point clearly – I recognise that point now and I apologise for not responding earlier – the problem is one of confusing the course selector as a whole and the Course Deviation Indicator/Bar (CDI/CDB).
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Your post #3326, again giving a confusing (to the layperson) description, showed that you have misread or misunderstood what I have written, the bit about there being no VOR or TACAN of use particularly illustrates this as it was a fundamental point that I was making (agreement!).
I reproduce those posts of yours below and follow them with a brief summary of how I believe the instruments work so that readers can compare and perhaps get a clearer understanding from the two versions – and perhaps you could contribute further understanding:
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Post # 3313
<<Walter on the Chinook HC2 the CDB can be set by either pilot to any hdg regardless of any other outside stimuli (infact external sources cannot move the CDB), he can also manipulate the other pilots CDB. That the CDBs were on different hdgs would suggest to me that something may have nudged it, say some turbulence?.. or crashing at speed into a large cumulo-granite!>>
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Post # 3326
<<As someone who has operated and instructed on the RAF Chinook HC2 and not just gleaned information from other uninformed opinions I'm confident that there is no embaressment on my side. The CDBs can only be moved by the pilots. They can be used to display cross track information from a variety of sources including a navigation computer, but are often used just to display to the Handling Pilot a desired heading set by the Non Handling Pilot. The reasons the CDB in this case was indicating what it was will never be known but it cannot have been 'dragged' around there by an external influence. If the HP/NHP had reason to doubt the nav computer they may have been looking for a known point to 'zero' it on, please note the use of the phrase 'may have'. The only other info the CDB can work on are TACAN or VOR indications, neither of which were situated on the Mull that day, at least they weren't when I was.>>
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My version:
I recommend readers without an aviation background to get familiar with the functions and uses of Horizontal Situation Indicators (HSIs) by reading around – there are plenty of well illustrated descriptions available on the web – and perhaps play around with a PC flight simulator doing a bit of VOR nav – this would make it easier to follow the arguments.
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COURSE SELECTOR DESCRIPTION
The course pointer has a head and tail, physically attached to each other within the instrument housing, and when they rotate about the instrument face, one moves with the other. It is moved around the face of the instrument, and therefore relative to the compass rose, by turning the knob on the lower right face of the HSI. The position of the pointer relative to the rose is repeated digitally in the top right corner of the HSI – this is the Course Indicator.
(Briefly) the rose is driven by the gyro compass and moves around as the a/c heading changes – the course pointer position on the rose is the desired course that is fed back to the nav computer/aid/whatever which returns the drive for the Course Deviation Indicator (CDI) / Bar (CDB), a bar which lies between the head and tail of the pointer and which indicates in what sense the a/c is on or off track and the alignment with the desired course.
The pointer head, CDI and the tail are collectively called the COURSE SELECTOR.
The course selector is used for navigation tracking in several modes including for example following a VOR radial or the track to a waypoint generated by a GPS/Doppler nav computer.
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SLAVING
While in the a/c type of interest here each pilot may independently select different navigational modes for display on his HSI, it is usual in route navigation for the CDI, just the bar in the middle that is, to be slaved to the co-pilot/navigator’s HSI, such that the handling pilot just has to follow the CDI to keep on the planned track.
How this is done on the 47D is that the navigator presses a button on his HSI mode select panel (CMD SEL) which does two things:
If the AFCS is set accordingly, his HSI heading bug will demand the heading (no interest here);
His CDI position and orientation with respect to the compass rose will be duplicated by the other HSIs CDI – regardless of what position the handling pilot has his course selector pointer (and course indicator), moving his knob around will move his course selector pointer (and indicator) but will not affect the orientation of the CDI wrt the compass rose on his HSI.
However, there seems to be an area of confusion here – perhaps the HC2 is different in this respect and I would appreciate being put right if the following assumption is wrong:
The type of HSI fitted to a 47D of the time was an electro mechanical device which would not apparently support a servo type movement of the course selector pointer by an external source – just the knob seems to be the only way of moving it (I believe MasterofNone was making this point) – this is quite different to the CDI bar which is driven externally and therefore it is easy to understand how this is slaved.
Inspection of cockpit photographs of a 47D and an HC2 show what appears to be the same type of instrument (HSI).
Thus I am assuming that, even in the case where CDIs are slaved, the individual course pointers (along with their digital indicators) can have different bearings to each other – and these two values were preserved in ZD576 (028 and 035, evidence rated “positive”).
Had they been just doing normal route flying, the position of the CDI bars should have been in the same position – their positions were preserved by way of marks caused by first impact and were not the same (left/nhp 0,9 div left, right hp 1,5div left, evidence “positive” and “not highly positive” respectively). So the track bars were (assuming 1 div is equivalent to 5 deg) 3 deg different.
I believe it is the latter, the difference in the CDI bar positions, that MasterofNone was describing – not the whole course selector – when he was suggesting perhaps the impact had caused those positions.
(It is interesting that, from memory, Group Captain Pulford [was it?] did not make this distinction either when answering questions put by Lord Toombs at an inquiry.)
One should consider that the difference in bar positions, while not huge, was not to be expected (if slaved) from impact because of the positions of those instruments in the same plane on the front panel – they should have experienced the same dynamic force at initial impact.
As I have pointed out in previous posts, it is hard to see that the hp’s HSI selector could have been moved from 027 to 035 by impact.
If you consider that the last leg (pos of waypoint change to crash site) was on a track of 035 mag this suggests that the hp’s course selection of 035 was deliberate – it is just too much of a coincidence to have been otherwise.
The combination of the CDI bars being different and the Course Selector values being different could reasonably suggest that the HSIs were not slaved. I do not know how this is achieved in an HC2 but the HC2 Chinook has a few more options on its Mode Select Panels (lots more buttons than the 47D), the choice of feeds coming via the FDIC (Flight Display Interface Controller), and so I would welcome some comment on this from those who should know.
Just for interest, in later HC2s that were equipped with ARS6 was the usual practice to have the hp’s HSI working from ARS6 input whilst the nhp kept an eye on area nav on his HSI?
I agree with MasterofNone that there were no VORs/TACANS within range on a bearing of 035 and I add that none of the stored waypoints in the SuperTANS could have generated such a bearing – points I have made before when suggesting that they could possibly have been referring to a PRC112 that was supposed to be on that LZ I have described.
While my suggestion of this particular equipment is speculative – the only thing I can think of that could have misled them – there is plenty of evidence that, when summed together, points to their intention to land or closely approach that landing area; this should be addressed by the Mull group as it strongly indicates an extra task, thus far undeclared, that surely clears the pilots of blame.

OmegaV6

Walter .. the whole of your diatribe above is pointless in the context of this thread.

It is not necessary to show any reasoning as to why/what/where or any other of your fantasies.

The Pilots can and must be cleared of blame (as you put it) for one simple reason - and simplicity seems to be lost by many folks - and I capitalise this on purpose.

THERE IS NO PROOF OF WRONG DOING, NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE AN ERROR, THE CAUSE IS, AND REMAINS, UNKNOWN.

Therefore the Pilots cannot be blamed because NO ONE KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED

Simple. End of.

Seldomfitforpurpose

WK,

You have yet again failed to spot some of the best advice that the various experts in here have to offer, namely, in this instance the venerable John Blakeley who offers this absolute pearl........and I suspect this sadly will also be ignored

" Like everyone else you are entitled to your views, but, for example, I suggest that you could start a new thread which would allow you and others to expound your theories without detracting from the purpose of this thread which I believe still has one simple factual based objective - to clear the pilots of the unjust and unjustified charge of gross negligence. Your ideas, in the absence of proof, do not help this objective in any way."

I for one, as would many others I believe love the opportunity to debate your theory in another thread whilst leaving this thread for it's one and only fairly explicit intention, so why not man up and accept JB's challenge.

Come on man start a new thread and lets thrash this out elsewhere

John Purdey

OmegaV6. My goodness, how this thread has strayed! Meanwhile, you say that 'there is no proof of wrong doing' ie by the crew. I thought it had been established that they were below their Safety Altitude in IMC conditions. Is that not crew error? JP

Brian Dixon

It could be crew error, Mr Purdey, but we can't say that it was with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, as per the requirements of the Regulations and laws in place at the time.

Hopefully we are now sufficiently back on topic for you.

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

walter kennedy

OmegaV6
Pls refer post #3463 – still don’t give a damn?
Not worth contemplating that deliberate turn that got them into trouble?
Can you not see the implications of the course setting matching the a/c track on that last leg?
Let me describe a very simple process:
Let us say you have a nav mode selected that is giving you a bearing on your #1 pointer on your HSI;
If at some point you want to go straight to it you turn your course selector knob until your course pointer is pointing at the #1 bearing pointer – while you turn in that direction;
If you have done this quickly enough, the CDI will not be much displaced from the centre of line of the course pointer;
A little bit of manoeuvring so your CDI is in line with your course pointer and you are going straight for that waypoint or ground navaid.
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How does this fit with what is known about this crash?
They had been going along 027 mag for 40 miles with a valid waypoint (A) still directly ahead;
It would have been normal for the nhp to have had his HSI set up for this and the hp’s CDI slaved to this (and on such a long leg, the hp may also have had 027 set on his course selector);
At less than a mile from the crash site – with waypoint A still directly ahead – waypoint A is dumped on the SuperTANS;
The a/c turns 8 deg right onto 035 mag which it maintains right up to the last seconds before impact when a sudden evasive manoeuvre was initiated – and 035 was found set on the hp’s HSI course selector;
Does this not suggest that the hp was referring to another navaid?
Something that disagreed with the SuperTANS?
Some point reference that was intrinsically accurate that helo pilots would trust?
Flt Lt Tapper had reservations about the accuracy of the SuperTANS, especially after a water crossing, and perhaps would not have been surprised at a discrepancy of ½ a mile or so – hence if opting for a local point reference would it not make sense to move on from waypoint A in the nav computer to avoid confusion?;
The only candidate I can think of is a PRC112 that should have been at the LZ (for which waypoint A was an obvious inner marker) but may have been ½ mile or so up the hill – it would have given accurate range to the LZ had it been in the right position;
Given that they had started to slow down, a baro alt was set to give zero on the ground at the elevation of that LZ (QF whatever), and a RADALT warning was set at min consistent with an imminent landing in poor conditions – and that Chinooks had landed there before, and that that was what some local authority figures thought they were going to do this time – it rather looks like they were heading in there but the local aid was out of position by accident or design;
Even their tactical call sign was consistent with an exercise of this kind – in fact, everything that is known about this crash fits this scenario.
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Don’t tell me this is fantasy – and it has not been working through this analysis on this forum has delayed the objective for 13 ½ years.
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SFFP/MasterofNone
Still no constructive technical feedback from you good people? Come on! - how did data get from ARS6 to HSI in the later HC2 Chinooks? Too much to ask?
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JP
One thing I think I have contributed here is local knowledge of the weather conditions (numerous earlier posts) - they were not in IMC, they were below local orographic cloud and approaching fog that was right on the slopes. I have always maintained that they had, in the absence of visual clues, been misled as to their range to go.
A/c do crash by flying into terrain while in (perhaps marginal) VFR conditions when that terrain is featureless - eg was it a Chinook in the Falklands hit a ridge simply because of visual judgement of how far away it was? - more recently, a US Chinook in Afghanistan, the tail end of a few of them, hit a sand dune because the terrain was "featureless" (clear night but dark so using NVG). These examples in situations where they were just making their way along VFR style - imagine going to a specific spot in such conditions but with an instrument that you had faith in telling you that you had 1/2 a mile further to go to the obstacle - very easy to come unstuck?

Winch-control

THERE IS NO PROOF OF WRONG DOING, NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE AN ERROR, THE CAUSE IS, AND REMAINS, UNKNOWN.
Now WK, I handed over as rear crew to GF and KH and I look at these postings, but have refrained from commenting (for 13 plus years). I am totally disgusted with the way you have tried to move this thread away from its purpose.
This thread is here to clear the names of a very competent, skilled SF crew that met with; what anyone that still has an arsehole knows; an untimely death.
As this will be my only post on this thread, I might add, Firstly, a crew of the highest capability, secondly, an HC mk2 that probably was not, and thirdly a sad loss to all. Let the truth be known!
Finally...whilst this is PPRuNe, lets just speculate that both pilots ate the same prawn volovants (sp)!
Brian Dixon...Keep up the excellent work...
THERE IS NO PROOF OF WRONG DOING, NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE AN ERROR, THE CAUSE IS, AND REMAINS, UNKNOWN.

flt_lt_w_mitty

SffP and others - the question is:

If WK is on so many people's ignore list, would we see if he does start a new thread? Interesting question..........................

It would be a shame really, as his topic certainly has merit as a subject to be looked at - at the appropriate time and place, of course.

pulse1

WK,

As many others have said, your ideas are pure speculation. But we do KNOW something - they changed the TANS waypoint to Coran BEFORE they reached the Mull. Why on earth would they do that if they were planning to land near the Mull?

I'm not a military pilot but I would have put in a waypoint or IP for the landing site and used it as additional back up if I was testing a new system.

John Purdey

Brian. Agreed! At least we do seem to be back on topic. Regards as always, and we await the long delayed response from SofS. Jp

John Purdey

Walter. We really should not reopen the discussion as to IMC or VMC conditions over the Mull at that time, but do take note of the numerous witnesses who were on the ground at the time, several of whom were professionally qualified to give an assessment. Enough now!!. Regards JP

OmegaV6

If it was a deliberate act.. yes
If it was because if a mistake .. yes
If it was through a mechanical fault .. NO

No-one knows the cause .. which of those 3 reasons apply ?? as there is doubt .. they must be cleared ..

As said before ... let us try and keep it simple

THERE IS NO PROOF OF WRONG DOING, NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE AN ERROR, THE CAUSE IS, AND REMAINS, UNKNOWN.

Seldomfitforpurpose

JP,

Take out the safety alt part but on the more than one occasion when you did it it was it because of a,b,or c as suggested by Omega ?.......... and just tell us again where it was established as to what the crew could see from the flight deck windows

John Purdey

Seldom (if ever!) Our exchanges take us nowhere; let us await SofS's verdict, and then we shall see! With all good wishes, as always. JP

Seldomfitforpurpose

JP,

"Seldom (if ever!)"

Dear oh dear, I know it really irritates but when you make sweeping generalisations I am am bound to ask the obvious questions so, just to repeat myself

"and just tell us again where it was established as to what the crew could see from the flight deck windows"....................which of course you cant answer

And with regards to the IMC thing, was it crew error when you did it?

FJJP

Seldomfitforpurpose in post #3467 has the best suggestion for a long, long time - WK start a new thread to allow people to expound their theories on the causes [like the 2 Nimrod threads]. That will leave this thread to concentrate on the original aim - to help to get the original verdict overturned.

Which is why, although I have been following the thread, I have refrained from posting for a long time - IMHO there is too much irrelevance which is distracting from the main aim....

cazatou

SFFP

I realise how much you enjoy your little digs at JP, but you really should get your head around the fact that recognised procedures were much different in the early 50's. They had been evolved from hard earned experience since 1939 to facilitate the completion of the mission in the face of enemy operations involving aircraft with a much superior performance. Bear in mind that in July 1953 no fewer than 216 Meteor F.8s flew in the Coronation Review at RAF Odiham - an aircraft that 77Sqn RAAF had found wanting against Mig 15 opposition in Korea 2 years earlier. De Havilland Hornets were not replaced in the Far East (45 Sqn) until June 1955.

When I was operating in the big sand pit (that todays generation of aircrew is learning to love so well) back in the 60's there was a hached line on the map corresponding to somewhere around 30 - 40 NM from the coast which bore the legend "end of reliable relief information". Would you care to inform me what our Safety Altitude was if we were forced to climb?