Please Answer the Question
Cazatou,
S&S has replied already and I totally agree with the sentiments expressed. You are, clearly, a politician as you have not answered the question I keep asking you on how you know how thorough the diligence process was at the Review stage, but perhaps I should assume that this is because you were stating an opinion and not a fact. I will give you my fact based response to your points 1-3, S&S has answered point 4 with a similar response to that which I would have given.
1. Assuming that MOD have given us the correct document the aircraft was operating on a RTS called "Chinook HC Mk2 - Document in the Form of an Interim CA Release" (Annex A to Letter Report TM 2210 dated 26 Oct 1993). The document was, I believe, at Issue 1 AL1 at the time of the accident. The first "official" MOD(AFD) RTS appears to have been issued on 10 January 1996 under cover of letter D/DD Mar & Hels 270/2/1 - this in turn is based the CA Release Issue to AL6 - AL7 came out on 30 April 1996, with AL8 following on 30 September 1998 - that is the last version provided to us by MOD. You are aware of the airworthiness issues with the AL1 version - including the icing limits and problems such as false engine fail warnings.
2. The problems were not with the BD flight trials alone (eg the software audit trail) but also with in-service incidents for which there was no clear explanation - 15 of them (in 1258 service flying hours) to quote the BD letter. BD did do something - they had had a meeting on 25 May to discuss FADEC issues in relation to the CA Release, which AD/HP1 chaired. This included a rather indeterminate (in terms of the minutes) discussion on the in-service problems. Present were representatives of most of the recipients of the subsequent letter of 6 June (see below) in which BD confirmed that they were stopping trials. Representation included three members of the DHSA, including two Group Captains, but not the AFD DD Mar & Hels. The letter was signed by the then DTE(P&A) and the exact wording of the concluding paragraphs was:
"I have to state that the serious, frequent and unexplained incidents to which I have alluded, have eroded what confidence we had in the Chinook HC Mk2 engine management system. This unease has grown despite our meeting on 25 May. The unquantifiable risks identified at the CA Release stage may not in themselves have changed but some have become more clearly defined by events, to an extent where we now consider the consequences of the risks and the probability of an occurrence to be unacceptable.
As a result of our concerns for the flight safety of the aircraft I have regretfully taken the decision to suspend Chinook HC Mk 2 flight trials until such time as we are satisfied with the explanations for, and solutions to, the above incidents (Note: the last one of the BD list was for ZD 576 on 19 May). Furthermore, we strongly recommend that you make our concerns known to the RAF in order that they may consider their own position.
Please be assured that this decision has been taken in complete isolation from the tragic accident that occurred on the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June, and that we remain committed to pursuing the outstanding CA Release trials as soon as our flight safety concerns are overcome. In the meantime, we will of course continue to provide you with whatever advice and assistance we can in your deliberations and to help bring the outstanding investigations and studies to a satisfactory conclusion."
This letter went to DHP A/DHP 1 for action and was copied to MODUK(AIR) DD Mar & Hels as well as the UK CLO in Boeing and D Flying. I imagine that BD, who could anyway not have unilaterally "withdrawn" the CA RTS (which they had not wanted to issue in the first place) believed that they had fulfilled their obligations. My question to you remains - if the diligence was as complete as you claimed with your statement "the diligence shown at all levels of the BOI process to ensure that all avenues of inquiry were followed and properly assessed" why was this vital letter with its clear airworthiness implications not included in the Review process or any of the subsequent inquiries? Do you know?
3. As I said before I have no idea what actions were taken by the staffs (other than the implication that the BOI team was never informed and hence never followed up this area with the BD "experts") - the comment at point 3 is yours and not mine - I was rather hoping that you would know given your firm assertion. I have tried to answer your questions -how about you answering mine!
JB