Can you trust your Company Training Captains ?
Can you trust your Company Training Captains ?
Can you trust your Company Training Captains ?
.......... Or ... Find out who your Friends are -
Judgment from a recent airline Employment Tribunal ...
In two long-running threads in this section, learned pruners discuss the benefits or otherwise of working for two and a half well-known UK airlines (British Airways, Virgin Atlantic and BA Euroflyer). Recent chat has described the questionable conduct of some training captains. Though not directly related to training, there is also worrying reference to more employment tribunals and some law-suits in the New Year.
If you want to read something more 'reliable' than anonymous scuttlebutt *1* about the nefarious workings of an airline's training department and its highly skilled and CAA-licensed trainers *2* - either dancing to some crooked management agenda *3* or NOT doing their very best for their trainees, may I recommend reading a few paragraphs of this Employment Tribunal Judgment from 2022 ? - https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribun...s-2302784-2017
For those who are not blessed with the time or mental fortitude to read all sixty pages, I have referred to a few paragraphs and you can take it from there, or not, as you wish.
There were several hearings and several written Judgments as the case developed. The final written Judgment is entitled "Corrected Judgment with Reasons"and is dated 23 Feb 2022.Even the corrected version failed to correct the claimant's given name from Mark to Mike in the link above.
It is worth noting that 'reasons' for a Judgment are only produced on request to eligible parties and other than the Judgments, no formal records of ET proceedings are published. The enormous bundles of paper or electronic evidence and testimony are never made available for public scrutiny - merely referred to, tantalisingly, by coded reference in the Judgment text. However, it is now usually possible (upon personal application) to watch a hearing on live video, whether the hearing itself is by video or in person. Note for the unwary watcher - keep your own cam and mic OFF.
...
The Lawson case stems from a problematic Boeing 787 flight from LHR to HKG on 25th September 2015 - (for synopsis see pages 10 -12, paras 48 -64). Presented with an unusually difficult crew situation, the Captain's choices were to return to civilisation, continue to destination or land in central Russia. After consulting with the company by sat-phone and with his crew, he decided to continue to destination. There was no dissent and no further problem.
With some evident malice, Captain Lawson was sacked on 19th May 2017. His decision to continue was, as far as I can see, never publicly criticised but unbeknown to him, a company 'Event Review Group' was critical of his actions and decisions on the event flight (para 75). More it seems, the sacking decision came from some inexplicable determinations on the part of 'Captain AA', a 'Senior Training Captain' and some management decision-makers (especially .paras 43 - 44 and 77 - 79, plus paras 266 - 271 and paras 275 - 278).
After an internal appeal and unsuccessful ACAS later in 2017 , the Employment Tribunal stewed on for over five years - from 2017 to 2022. The simple Judgment on Page 1 - " 1. The claimant was unfairly dismissed ..." and " 3. The respondent is ordered to pay to the claimant ..." (just over £90,000) barely touches the sides of this extraordinarily shameful case.
What disappoints me is the large number of individual licensed office-holders, named (or code-named) and shamed, who either took active parts in the persecution, or who failed to speak up or ask questions. Rough body count so far - eight managers, half a dozen training captains, and a training co-pilot.
Add to that the much larger number of ordinary crew (many of whom did not know Captain Lawson personally) who were willing participants in ostracising him and sharing lurid false stories (especially paras 90 and 95 - 96, and para 156) about the original event.
You have to feel sorry for the unlucky line co-pilots who were roped in for dodgy simulator chop-rides, and sorry for his supportive cabin crew from the event flight, who were subjected (individually) to threatening and hostile questioning by managers in the hope they would dish dirt on the victim (paras 83 to 87). They were also asked why they did not follow a particular checklist - (para 86) which was quietly introduced after the event. This was said to be the 'Double Pilot Incapacitation Drill' - A single page on how to fly the 787 - if there were no available pilots.
Management had plenty of opportunity to squash the false stories and support their pilot - (Does that sound familiar Pete ?) but chose to do neither (paras 88 to 91, 161 and 194.) Indeed it seems it was concerns about the untrue lurid stories surrounding the event flight and unspecified and unsubstantiated inventions of historic poor performance that drove the move to sack him. (See para 44 again).
It still took twenty months for this sorry story of prejudiced management persecution to fester into Captain Lawson's sacking,even before he had to endure the five years ET. He didn't want to leave the company and one reason he wasn't sacked earlier seemed to hinge on his refusal to sign an NDA (para 171).
Following a successful routine sim check a week after the event flight, Lawson operated his normal roster until April 2016 when he did his next LPC/OPC. This and two further sim rides were, in short, recorded as fail. (paras 98 - 107, 126 - 129 and 135 - 142). Unbelievably, one was with a Training FO who was Lawson's 'FO 1' on the event flight. You can arrange for anyone to fail a simulator ride if you are running the show and holding the bat and the balls at the same time. How many of us know about CAP 1049 ?
What was the claimant's original union doing for their member ? Very little it seems, other than trying to negotiate a severance package (paras 145 - 148) apparently without significant involvement by the claimant. The company council vice-chair at the time, who was until quite recently chair of the VACC has just taken a top management position with his grateful employer. And the Regulator ? Not a lot, as usual. Shame on you all.
Following a long period of unfitness to fly, (paras 150 - 155) the claimant was supported by the now extinct PPU (para 173) and later managed to 'mitigate his financial loss' by obtaining some temporary pilot jobs elsewhere.
In mid November 2021, just prior to the final ET five day remote videohearing, the company (having by now probably realised they were likely to lose) admitted to the 'unfair dismissal' and produced only two witnesses (para 27). They claimed (para 31) that all the real witnesses were too busy or otherwise unavailable.
First witness - a management training captain who joined the company from Monarch in May 2016 as 'Senior Manager Training of the Boeing fleet', and became involved as the airline's new 'Head of Training and Standards' in April 2017, less than a month before Lawson was sacked. He met Lawson for the very first time, four days before the sack date (para 198). The narrative of his 'evidence' took four pages (pages 38 to 41)of the Judgment.
Second - a non-pilot 'flight crew manager' with no previous airline experience, who by his own claim, joined the company in June 2021, four years after Lawson was sacked and less than six months before giving 'evidence' at the Employment Tribunal. The narrative of his 'evidence' took a further four pages of the Judgment (pages 42 to 46). He quickly moved on to pastures new and is now 'Head of IR and Flying Teams' at BA.
Given some of the remarks in the Judgment about the absence of any of the several 'real witnesses' for the respondent (page 6 para 31 - 32) one wonders if these two strangers to the case (who unfortunately would 'have no knowledge' of the events leading to the sacking, were naively reading from someone else's malicious script.
For both the Lawson and the Osborne cases, one might ask if the Regulator ever bothers to consider whether the 'named and shamed' characters meet the statutory requirement of 'fit and proper' to exercise the management or training posts they are privileged to hold.
Happy New Year, One and All.
And mind how you go.
LFH
...
.......... Or ... Find out who your Friends are -
Judgment from a recent airline Employment Tribunal ...
In two long-running threads in this section, learned pruners discuss the benefits or otherwise of working for two and a half well-known UK airlines (British Airways, Virgin Atlantic and BA Euroflyer). Recent chat has described the questionable conduct of some training captains. Though not directly related to training, there is also worrying reference to more employment tribunals and some law-suits in the New Year.
If you want to read something more 'reliable' than anonymous scuttlebutt *1* about the nefarious workings of an airline's training department and its highly skilled and CAA-licensed trainers *2* - either dancing to some crooked management agenda *3* or NOT doing their very best for their trainees, may I recommend reading a few paragraphs of this Employment Tribunal Judgment from 2022 ? - https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribun...s-2302784-2017
For those who are not blessed with the time or mental fortitude to read all sixty pages, I have referred to a few paragraphs and you can take it from there, or not, as you wish.
There were several hearings and several written Judgments as the case developed. The final written Judgment is entitled "Corrected Judgment with Reasons"and is dated 23 Feb 2022.Even the corrected version failed to correct the claimant's given name from Mark to Mike in the link above.
It is worth noting that 'reasons' for a Judgment are only produced on request to eligible parties and other than the Judgments, no formal records of ET proceedings are published. The enormous bundles of paper or electronic evidence and testimony are never made available for public scrutiny - merely referred to, tantalisingly, by coded reference in the Judgment text. However, it is now usually possible (upon personal application) to watch a hearing on live video, whether the hearing itself is by video or in person. Note for the unwary watcher - keep your own cam and mic OFF.
The Lawson case stems from a problematic Boeing 787 flight from LHR to HKG on 25th September 2015 - (for synopsis see pages 10 -12, paras 48 -64). Presented with an unusually difficult crew situation, the Captain's choices were to return to civilisation, continue to destination or land in central Russia. After consulting with the company by sat-phone and with his crew, he decided to continue to destination. There was no dissent and no further problem.
With some evident malice, Captain Lawson was sacked on 19th May 2017. His decision to continue was, as far as I can see, never publicly criticised but unbeknown to him, a company 'Event Review Group' was critical of his actions and decisions on the event flight (para 75). More it seems, the sacking decision came from some inexplicable determinations on the part of 'Captain AA', a 'Senior Training Captain' and some management decision-makers (especially .paras 43 - 44 and 77 - 79, plus paras 266 - 271 and paras 275 - 278).
After an internal appeal and unsuccessful ACAS later in 2017 , the Employment Tribunal stewed on for over five years - from 2017 to 2022. The simple Judgment on Page 1 - " 1. The claimant was unfairly dismissed ..." and " 3. The respondent is ordered to pay to the claimant ..." (just over £90,000) barely touches the sides of this extraordinarily shameful case.
What disappoints me is the large number of individual licensed office-holders, named (or code-named) and shamed, who either took active parts in the persecution, or who failed to speak up or ask questions. Rough body count so far - eight managers, half a dozen training captains, and a training co-pilot.
Add to that the much larger number of ordinary crew (many of whom did not know Captain Lawson personally) who were willing participants in ostracising him and sharing lurid false stories (especially paras 90 and 95 - 96, and para 156) about the original event.
You have to feel sorry for the unlucky line co-pilots who were roped in for dodgy simulator chop-rides, and sorry for his supportive cabin crew from the event flight, who were subjected (individually) to threatening and hostile questioning by managers in the hope they would dish dirt on the victim (paras 83 to 87). They were also asked why they did not follow a particular checklist - (para 86) which was quietly introduced after the event. This was said to be the 'Double Pilot Incapacitation Drill' - A single page on how to fly the 787 - if there were no available pilots.
Management had plenty of opportunity to squash the false stories and support their pilot - (Does that sound familiar Pete ?) but chose to do neither (paras 88 to 91, 161 and 194.) Indeed it seems it was concerns about the untrue lurid stories surrounding the event flight and unspecified and unsubstantiated inventions of historic poor performance that drove the move to sack him. (See para 44 again).
It still took twenty months for this sorry story of prejudiced management persecution to fester into Captain Lawson's sacking,even before he had to endure the five years ET. He didn't want to leave the company and one reason he wasn't sacked earlier seemed to hinge on his refusal to sign an NDA (para 171).
Following a successful routine sim check a week after the event flight, Lawson operated his normal roster until April 2016 when he did his next LPC/OPC. This and two further sim rides were, in short, recorded as fail. (paras 98 - 107, 126 - 129 and 135 - 142). Unbelievably, one was with a Training FO who was Lawson's 'FO 1' on the event flight. You can arrange for anyone to fail a simulator ride if you are running the show and holding the bat and the balls at the same time. How many of us know about CAP 1049 ?
What was the claimant's original union doing for their member ? Very little it seems, other than trying to negotiate a severance package (paras 145 - 148) apparently without significant involvement by the claimant. The company council vice-chair at the time, who was until quite recently chair of the VACC has just taken a top management position with his grateful employer. And the Regulator ? Not a lot, as usual. Shame on you all.
Following a long period of unfitness to fly, (paras 150 - 155) the claimant was supported by the now extinct PPU (para 173) and later managed to 'mitigate his financial loss' by obtaining some temporary pilot jobs elsewhere.
In mid November 2021, just prior to the final ET five day remote videohearing, the company (having by now probably realised they were likely to lose) admitted to the 'unfair dismissal' and produced only two witnesses (para 27). They claimed (para 31) that all the real witnesses were too busy or otherwise unavailable.
First witness - a management training captain who joined the company from Monarch in May 2016 as 'Senior Manager Training of the Boeing fleet', and became involved as the airline's new 'Head of Training and Standards' in April 2017, less than a month before Lawson was sacked. He met Lawson for the very first time, four days before the sack date (para 198). The narrative of his 'evidence' took four pages (pages 38 to 41)of the Judgment.
Second - a non-pilot 'flight crew manager' with no previous airline experience, who by his own claim, joined the company in June 2021, four years after Lawson was sacked and less than six months before giving 'evidence' at the Employment Tribunal. The narrative of his 'evidence' took a further four pages of the Judgment (pages 42 to 46). He quickly moved on to pastures new and is now 'Head of IR and Flying Teams' at BA.
Given some of the remarks in the Judgment about the absence of any of the several 'real witnesses' for the respondent (page 6 para 31 - 32) one wonders if these two strangers to the case (who unfortunately would 'have no knowledge' of the events leading to the sacking, were naively reading from someone else's malicious script.
...
*1* I am NOT trying to diss the concept of anecdotal scuttlebutt on PPRuNe - OPSEC must be preserved as we used to say in the Air Force. Scuttlebutt is best kept anonymous as we don't want the inevitable reprisals to be made too easy. As we know from elsewhere on PPRuNe etc., given the right resources, even the truth can often be legally suppressed.
*1* I am NOT trying to diss the concept of anecdotal scuttlebutt on PPRuNe - OPSEC must be preserved as we used to say in the Air Force. Scuttlebutt is best kept anonymous as we don't want the inevitable reprisals to be made too easy. As we know from elsewhere on PPRuNe etc., given the right resources, even the truth can often be legally suppressed.
...
*2* The highly respected professional qualifications of TRI and TRE are the gift of the UK CAA - NOT of the airline or its management. Thus we should expect high ethical integrity from our TRI/TREs, who should avoid any temptation to prostitute themselves upon the altar of an oppressive or vindictive employer. ... Cue - CAP 1049 reminder.
*2* The highly respected professional qualifications of TRI and TRE are the gift of the UK CAA - NOT of the airline or its management. Thus we should expect high ethical integrity from our TRI/TREs, who should avoid any temptation to prostitute themselves upon the altar of an oppressive or vindictive employer. ... Cue - CAP 1049 reminder.
...
*3* For 'balance' I offer this ET originating from the BA pilots strike in 2019. Note once again, the inability of the ET to spell the claimant's name correctly
...*3* For 'balance' I offer this ET originating from the BA pilots strike in 2019. Note once again, the inability of the ET to spell the claimant's name correctly
For both the Lawson and the Osborne cases, one might ask if the Regulator ever bothers to consider whether the 'named and shamed' characters meet the statutory requirement of 'fit and proper' to exercise the management or training posts they are privileged to hold.
Happy New Year, One and All.
And mind how you go.
LFH
...
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My word this makes for extremely sobering reading for so many different reasons.
I am utterly flabbergasted at the sim conduct, beyond the other skulduggery. How can anyone that such an organisation operates a “just culture”. Perhaps I have lived far too sheltered a life (I’d like to think not having flown for varying quality operators in the UK, Middle East and the EU) but I am deeply depressed that such a sequence of events could have happened at a “premier” operator under UK CAA jurisdiction.
I am utterly flabbergasted at the sim conduct, beyond the other skulduggery. How can anyone that such an organisation operates a “just culture”. Perhaps I have lived far too sheltered a life (I’d like to think not having flown for varying quality operators in the UK, Middle East and the EU) but I am deeply depressed that such a sequence of events could have happened at a “premier” operator under UK CAA jurisdiction.
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I was saddened listening to a vS manager saying a certain fo wasnt being considered for command because they never socialise with the crew down route and a couple of other reasons. All sounded underhand and boys club.
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The claimant, Captain Lawson, won the maximum allowable amount to be awarded for unfair dismissal, but those acolytes still within the airline in question, particularly some within the training department, still readily recount his case as a "loss", because of the many wild rumours that Captain Lawson was seeking millions.
In fact, Captain Lawson primarily sought to clear his name of the assertion that he was an "unsafe" pilot. An assertion narrated until the bitter end by witnesses that were wholly unqualified to make it. Mr Lawson did clear his name. And so he won. Consequently, he now commands long haul aircraft successfully elsewhere in the UK. He was poorly represented by the national pilot union in his time of neeed. Luckily others picked up the batton in the intervening years that came to pass, and Captain Lawson won his day in court.
But sadly nothing changes. There are multiple claims ongoing in the Employment Tribunal against the airline today. BALPA have recently dropped their support for the only claimant they were funding as the final hearing date approaches. The prominent BALPA officer during the period of time in contention having just defected to a management position at the airline. Assertions of "safety concerns with individual pilots" have again being narrated, by the same manager who was the witness in the Lawson case. Careers have again been ended because of wholly incorrect assertions from an individual that had no qualified experience to make them.
Astute pilots would do well to stop reading Instagram and start reading the real stories like this one.
The truth is out there, as Mulder and Scully said. And the courts are left to uncover more of it.
In fact, Captain Lawson primarily sought to clear his name of the assertion that he was an "unsafe" pilot. An assertion narrated until the bitter end by witnesses that were wholly unqualified to make it. Mr Lawson did clear his name. And so he won. Consequently, he now commands long haul aircraft successfully elsewhere in the UK. He was poorly represented by the national pilot union in his time of neeed. Luckily others picked up the batton in the intervening years that came to pass, and Captain Lawson won his day in court.
But sadly nothing changes. There are multiple claims ongoing in the Employment Tribunal against the airline today. BALPA have recently dropped their support for the only claimant they were funding as the final hearing date approaches. The prominent BALPA officer during the period of time in contention having just defected to a management position at the airline. Assertions of "safety concerns with individual pilots" have again being narrated, by the same manager who was the witness in the Lawson case. Careers have again been ended because of wholly incorrect assertions from an individual that had no qualified experience to make them.
Astute pilots would do well to stop reading Instagram and start reading the real stories like this one.
The truth is out there, as Mulder and Scully said. And the courts are left to uncover more of it.
In my 40 plus years in flying predominantly in the airlines and in a training capacity…yes there are some really bad TREs and TRIs and confusingly a lot of very good ones. If VS, one of my former employers was one of those that concocted a sim failure presumably with the cooperation of the TRE then they should be ashamed of themselves. Very disappointing. There are always those with the larger egos who use training appointments as a stepping stone to management. Most don’t know why but it is just ego and ambition. Unfortunately the amoral among that group do not care about collateral damage.
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Given that these are the CAA's nominated examiners in question, the silence from the regulator is concerning if not altogether surprising. I read the entire report with increasing anger on behalf of Captain Lawson.
This also provides an interesting insight into the BALPA problems at VS, although their cosy relationship with management elsewhere is still an issue. It seems like the CC at Virgin were (are?) operating as an extension of management.
Fundamentally this highlights a major issue with training at VS. If they're deliberately failing and managing out perfectly good pilots that they don't like, it makes one wonder how many trainer's mates are being let through the process when they shouldn't be. Perhaps, like all the major changes needed in aviation, the answer will, one day, be written in blood.
This also provides an interesting insight into the BALPA problems at VS, although their cosy relationship with management elsewhere is still an issue. It seems like the CC at Virgin were (are?) operating as an extension of management.
Fundamentally this highlights a major issue with training at VS. If they're deliberately failing and managing out perfectly good pilots that they don't like, it makes one wonder how many trainer's mates are being let through the process when they shouldn't be. Perhaps, like all the major changes needed in aviation, the answer will, one day, be written in blood.
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The claimant, Captain Lawson, won the maximum allowable amount to be awarded for unfair dismissal, but those acolytes still within the airline in question, particularly some within the training department, still readily recount his case as a "loss", because of the many wild rumours that Captain Lawson was seeking millions.
9. The claimant presented a Schedule of Loss originally totalling £1,704,824.58 [67]; and an updated Schedule of Loss on 18 November 2021 totalling £2,471,548.06 [1131].
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I am honestly in shock having read the judgement from the ET. The company and its spineless minions masquerading as various forms of managers and examiners ought to be ashamed of themselves.
Not only for how they themselves treated this poor professional, but for how they allowed him to be treated by bullies and gossips in the work place.
Examiners and instructors doing the bidding of some faceless manager to further their own career? If this in the level of integrity exhibited by instructors and examinera in the VAA pilot corps I’m seriously concerned.
It all struck me as strange and confusing until I came across this paragraph.
Monarch grifters came en masse to my airline to well and truly ruin what was previously a well functioning flight ops and training department after their own airlines demise.
Not only for how they themselves treated this poor professional, but for how they allowed him to be treated by bullies and gossips in the work place.
Examiners and instructors doing the bidding of some faceless manager to further their own career? If this in the level of integrity exhibited by instructors and examinera in the VAA pilot corps I’m seriously concerned.
It all struck me as strange and confusing until I came across this paragraph.
Monarch grifters came en masse to my airline to well and truly ruin what was previously a well functioning flight ops and training department after their own airlines demise.
This has fully been in the public domain since March 2022 according to the link provided. Why only bring it up now?
and in a training capacity…yes there are some really bad TREs and TRIs and confusingly a lot of very good ones. If VS, one of my former employers was one of those that concocted a sim failure presumably with the cooperation of the TRE then they should be ashamed of themselves. Very disappointing. There are always those with the larger egos who use training appointments as a stepping stone to management. Most don’t know why but it is just ego and ambition. Unfortunately the amoral among that group do not care about collateral damage.
I see it happening in my company right now.
Especially:
There are always those with the larger egos who use training appointments as a stepping stone to management.
Candidates should know (and briefed) that in case any issue comes up during a LPC, the candidate has the right to go straight to the authorities and file a complain.
If a tre cannot put the terminal on the correct side of the Rwy, in a generic airport sim scenario she/he should not be there or at least brief accordingly!
Stay safe!
This!^
I see it happening in my company right now.
Especially:
I am only 38 years in this business and I was a tre and tri but what is happening nowadays is disgusting.
Candidates should know (and briefed) that in case any issue comes up during a LPC, the candidate has the right to go straight to the authorities and file a complain.
If a tre cannot put the terminal on the correct side of the Rwy, in a generic airport sim scenario she/he should not be there or at least brief accordingly!
Stay safe!
I see it happening in my company right now.
Especially:
I am only 38 years in this business and I was a tre and tri but what is happening nowadays is disgusting.
Candidates should know (and briefed) that in case any issue comes up during a LPC, the candidate has the right to go straight to the authorities and file a complain.
If a tre cannot put the terminal on the correct side of the Rwy, in a generic airport sim scenario she/he should not be there or at least brief accordingly!
Stay safe!
I have fallen foul of this - to a lesser extent.
I have been employed by four UK airlines, and my development was encouraged and nurtured in 3 of them. The other one, however, seemed to be against me almost from the start. The first TRE in that airline, and my trainer for a significant type rating, was not very good at actually training, and seemed to take a dislike to me.
Fair enough - we can't all like or be liked by everybody we work with, but I was always professional, modest; never boastful, turned up to the crew room in good time, well presented and well prepared. I was always pleasant and respectful to cabin crew and operations staff etc.
But I was doomed in that airline. I always passed my SIM exams but that first TRE poisoned most of the others against me and my career basically stopped in the RHS. I never did find out why he hated me so much, but it was very confusing that some of the line Captains were sloppy; turned up late, were badly presented, could barely fly, or barked at crew and Ops, and generally threw their weight around etc. - unlike me.
Another senior TRE, new to the company, failed to perform the proper SOP actions during an EFATO in the SIM. He was really sketchy and had clearly not prepared. I was his F/O in the SIM and I thought Uh Oh, this is going to be embarrassing, there are going to be stern words. Nope. The SIM TRE just said "ahem, yes, right, onto the next exercise".
I realised then that there was a hidden company agenda - and that I wasn't a part of it !
Having company TREs assessing their own company pilots is open to abuse of privilege. CAA should do all SIM exams and assessments.
I have been employed by four UK airlines, and my development was encouraged and nurtured in 3 of them. The other one, however, seemed to be against me almost from the start. The first TRE in that airline, and my trainer for a significant type rating, was not very good at actually training, and seemed to take a dislike to me.
Fair enough - we can't all like or be liked by everybody we work with, but I was always professional, modest; never boastful, turned up to the crew room in good time, well presented and well prepared. I was always pleasant and respectful to cabin crew and operations staff etc.
But I was doomed in that airline. I always passed my SIM exams but that first TRE poisoned most of the others against me and my career basically stopped in the RHS. I never did find out why he hated me so much, but it was very confusing that some of the line Captains were sloppy; turned up late, were badly presented, could barely fly, or barked at crew and Ops, and generally threw their weight around etc. - unlike me.
Another senior TRE, new to the company, failed to perform the proper SOP actions during an EFATO in the SIM. He was really sketchy and had clearly not prepared. I was his F/O in the SIM and I thought Uh Oh, this is going to be embarrassing, there are going to be stern words. Nope. The SIM TRE just said "ahem, yes, right, onto the next exercise".
I realised then that there was a hidden company agenda - and that I wasn't a part of it !
Having company TREs assessing their own company pilots is open to abuse of privilege. CAA should do all SIM exams and assessments.
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Hmm..
Having read the above I simply want to weigh in a bit of a counterweight.
I am a TRI/TRE for a legacy European carrier, and I can not recognise this type of environment at all. At my outfit, I know of no trainer at present, who bullies colleagues during LIFUS/sim and should such an individual repeatedly "show up" in the rumour mill, action would be taken promptly by our Training Management.
As been mentioned, having a TRI/TRE you represent your national aviation authority first, and your company second. Personal integrity / suitable personality / a true desire to teach and improve safety standards are the cornerstones of a Training Captain, period.
As for the CAA to conduct all checks etc, that is simply hiding the real problem, which is a toxic company culture and a bunch of no-principle individuals running the training dept. Sad story..
my 2 cents,
I am a TRI/TRE for a legacy European carrier, and I can not recognise this type of environment at all. At my outfit, I know of no trainer at present, who bullies colleagues during LIFUS/sim and should such an individual repeatedly "show up" in the rumour mill, action would be taken promptly by our Training Management.
As been mentioned, having a TRI/TRE you represent your national aviation authority first, and your company second. Personal integrity / suitable personality / a true desire to teach and improve safety standards are the cornerstones of a Training Captain, period.
As for the CAA to conduct all checks etc, that is simply hiding the real problem, which is a toxic company culture and a bunch of no-principle individuals running the training dept. Sad story..
my 2 cents,
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Can you trust your Company Training Captains ?
.......... Or ... Find out who your Friends are -
Judgment from a recent airline Employment Tribunal ...
In two long-running threads in this section, learned pruners discuss the benefits or otherwise of working for two and a half well-known UK airlines (British Airways, Virgin Atlantic and BA Euroflyer). Recent chat has described the questionable conduct of some training captains. Though not directly related to training, there is also worrying reference to more employment tribunals and some law-suits in the New Year.
If you want to read something more 'reliable' than anonymous scuttlebutt *1* about the nefarious workings of an airline's training department and its highly skilled and CAA-licensed trainers *2* - either dancing to some crooked management agenda *3* or NOT doing their very best for their trainees, may I recommend reading a few paragraphs of this Employment Tribunal Judgment from 2022 ? - https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribun...s-2302784-2017
For those who are not blessed with the time or mental fortitude to read all sixty pages, I have referred to a few paragraphs and you can take it from there, or not, as you wish.
There were several hearings and several written Judgments as the case developed. The final written Judgment is entitled "Corrected Judgment with Reasons"and is dated 23 Feb 2022.Even the corrected version failed to correct the claimant's given name from Mark to Mike in the link above.
It is worth noting that 'reasons' for a Judgment are only produced on request to eligible parties and other than the Judgments, no formal records of ET proceedings are published. The enormous bundles of paper or electronic evidence and testimony are never made available for public scrutiny - merely referred to, tantalisingly, by coded reference in the Judgment text. However, it is now usually possible (upon personal application) to watch a hearing on live video, whether the hearing itself is by video or in person. Note for the unwary watcher - keep your own cam and mic OFF.
...
The Lawson case stems from a problematic Boeing 787 flight from LHR to HKG on 25th September 2015 - (for synopsis see pages 10 -12, paras 48 -64). Presented with an unusually difficult crew situation, the Captain's choices were to return to civilisation, continue to destination or land in central Russia. After consulting with the company by sat-phone and with his crew, he decided to continue to destination. There was no dissent and no further problem.
With some evident malice, Captain Lawson was sacked on 19th May 2017. His decision to continue was, as far as I can see, never publicly criticised but unbeknown to him, a company 'Event Review Group' was critical of his actions and decisions on the event flight (para 75). More it seems, the sacking decision came from some inexplicable determinations on the part of 'Captain AA', a 'Senior Training Captain' and some management decision-makers (especially .paras 43 - 44 and 77 - 79, plus paras 266 - 271 and paras 275 - 278).
After an internal appeal and unsuccessful ACAS later in 2017 , the Employment Tribunal stewed on for over five years - from 2017 to 2022. The simple Judgment on Page 1 - " 1. The claimant was unfairly dismissed ..." and " 3. The respondent is ordered to pay to the claimant ..." (just over £90,000) barely touches the sides of this extraordinarily shameful case.
What disappoints me is the large number of individual licensed office-holders, named (or code-named) and shamed, who either took active parts in the persecution, or who failed to speak up or ask questions. Rough body count so far - eight managers, half a dozen training captains, and a training co-pilot.
Add to that the much larger number of ordinary crew (many of whom did not know Captain Lawson personally) who were willing participants in ostracising him and sharing lurid false stories (especially paras 90 and 95 - 96, and para 156) about the original event.
You have to feel sorry for the unlucky line co-pilots who were roped in for dodgy simulator chop-rides, and sorry for his supportive cabin crew from the event flight, who were subjected (individually) to threatening and hostile questioning by managers in the hope they would dish dirt on the victim (paras 83 to 87). They were also asked why they did not follow a particular checklist - (para 86) which was quietly introduced after the event. This was said to be the 'Double Pilot Incapacitation Drill' - A single page on how to fly the 787 - if there were no available pilots.
Management had plenty of opportunity to squash the false stories and support their pilot - (Does that sound familiar Pete ?) but chose to do neither (paras 88 to 91, 161 and 194.) Indeed it seems it was concerns about the untrue lurid stories surrounding the event flight and unspecified and unsubstantiated inventions of historic poor performance that drove the move to sack him. (See para 44 again).
It still took twenty months for this sorry story of prejudiced management persecution to fester into Captain Lawson's sacking,even before he had to endure the five years ET. He didn't want to leave the company and one reason he wasn't sacked earlier seemed to hinge on his refusal to sign an NDA (para 171).
Following a successful routine sim check a week after the event flight, Lawson operated his normal roster until April 2016 when he did his next LPC/OPC. This and two further sim rides were, in short, recorded as fail. (paras 98 - 107, 126 - 129 and 135 - 142). Unbelievably, one was with a Training FO who was Lawson's 'FO 1' on the event flight. You can arrange for anyone to fail a simulator ride if you are running the show and holding the bat and the balls at the same time. How many of us know about CAP 1049 ?
What was the claimant's original union doing for their member ? Very little it seems, other than trying to negotiate a severance package (paras 145 - 148) apparently without significant involvement by the claimant. The company council vice-chair at the time, who was until quite recently chair of the VACC has just taken a top management position with his grateful employer. And the Regulator ? Not a lot, as usual. Shame on you all.
Following a long period of unfitness to fly, (paras 150 - 155) the claimant was supported by the now extinct PPU (para 173) and later managed to 'mitigate his financial loss' by obtaining some temporary pilot jobs elsewhere.
In mid November 2021, just prior to the final ET five day remote videohearing, the company (having by now probably realised they were likely to lose) admitted to the 'unfair dismissal' and produced only two witnesses (para 27). They claimed (para 31) that all the real witnesses were too busy or otherwise unavailable.
First witness - a management training captain who joined the company from Monarch in May 2016 as 'Senior Manager Training of the Boeing fleet', and became involved as the airline's new 'Head of Training and Standards' in April 2017, less than a month before Lawson was sacked. He met Lawson for the very first time, four days before the sack date (para 198). The narrative of his 'evidence' took four pages (pages 38 to 41)of the Judgment.
Second - a non-pilot 'flight crew manager' with no previous airline experience, who by his own claim, joined the company in June 2021, four years after Lawson was sacked and less than six months before giving 'evidence' at the Employment Tribunal. The narrative of his 'evidence' took a further four pages of the Judgment (pages 42 to 46). He quickly moved on to pastures new and is now 'Head of IR and Flying Teams' at BA.
Given some of the remarks in the Judgment about the absence of any of the several 'real witnesses' for the respondent (page 6 para 31 - 32) one wonders if these two strangers to the case (who unfortunately would 'have no knowledge' of the events leading to the sacking, were naively reading from someone else's malicious script.
For both the Lawson and the Osborne cases, one might ask if the Regulator ever bothers to consider whether the 'named and shamed' characters meet the statutory requirement of 'fit and proper' to exercise the management or training posts they are privileged to hold.
Happy New Year, One and All.
And mind how you go.
LFH
...
.......... Or ... Find out who your Friends are -
Judgment from a recent airline Employment Tribunal ...
In two long-running threads in this section, learned pruners discuss the benefits or otherwise of working for two and a half well-known UK airlines (British Airways, Virgin Atlantic and BA Euroflyer). Recent chat has described the questionable conduct of some training captains. Though not directly related to training, there is also worrying reference to more employment tribunals and some law-suits in the New Year.
If you want to read something more 'reliable' than anonymous scuttlebutt *1* about the nefarious workings of an airline's training department and its highly skilled and CAA-licensed trainers *2* - either dancing to some crooked management agenda *3* or NOT doing their very best for their trainees, may I recommend reading a few paragraphs of this Employment Tribunal Judgment from 2022 ? - https://www.gov.uk/employment-tribun...s-2302784-2017
For those who are not blessed with the time or mental fortitude to read all sixty pages, I have referred to a few paragraphs and you can take it from there, or not, as you wish.
There were several hearings and several written Judgments as the case developed. The final written Judgment is entitled "Corrected Judgment with Reasons"and is dated 23 Feb 2022.Even the corrected version failed to correct the claimant's given name from Mark to Mike in the link above.
It is worth noting that 'reasons' for a Judgment are only produced on request to eligible parties and other than the Judgments, no formal records of ET proceedings are published. The enormous bundles of paper or electronic evidence and testimony are never made available for public scrutiny - merely referred to, tantalisingly, by coded reference in the Judgment text. However, it is now usually possible (upon personal application) to watch a hearing on live video, whether the hearing itself is by video or in person. Note for the unwary watcher - keep your own cam and mic OFF.
The Lawson case stems from a problematic Boeing 787 flight from LHR to HKG on 25th September 2015 - (for synopsis see pages 10 -12, paras 48 -64). Presented with an unusually difficult crew situation, the Captain's choices were to return to civilisation, continue to destination or land in central Russia. After consulting with the company by sat-phone and with his crew, he decided to continue to destination. There was no dissent and no further problem.
With some evident malice, Captain Lawson was sacked on 19th May 2017. His decision to continue was, as far as I can see, never publicly criticised but unbeknown to him, a company 'Event Review Group' was critical of his actions and decisions on the event flight (para 75). More it seems, the sacking decision came from some inexplicable determinations on the part of 'Captain AA', a 'Senior Training Captain' and some management decision-makers (especially .paras 43 - 44 and 77 - 79, plus paras 266 - 271 and paras 275 - 278).
After an internal appeal and unsuccessful ACAS later in 2017 , the Employment Tribunal stewed on for over five years - from 2017 to 2022. The simple Judgment on Page 1 - " 1. The claimant was unfairly dismissed ..." and " 3. The respondent is ordered to pay to the claimant ..." (just over £90,000) barely touches the sides of this extraordinarily shameful case.
What disappoints me is the large number of individual licensed office-holders, named (or code-named) and shamed, who either took active parts in the persecution, or who failed to speak up or ask questions. Rough body count so far - eight managers, half a dozen training captains, and a training co-pilot.
Add to that the much larger number of ordinary crew (many of whom did not know Captain Lawson personally) who were willing participants in ostracising him and sharing lurid false stories (especially paras 90 and 95 - 96, and para 156) about the original event.
You have to feel sorry for the unlucky line co-pilots who were roped in for dodgy simulator chop-rides, and sorry for his supportive cabin crew from the event flight, who were subjected (individually) to threatening and hostile questioning by managers in the hope they would dish dirt on the victim (paras 83 to 87). They were also asked why they did not follow a particular checklist - (para 86) which was quietly introduced after the event. This was said to be the 'Double Pilot Incapacitation Drill' - A single page on how to fly the 787 - if there were no available pilots.
Management had plenty of opportunity to squash the false stories and support their pilot - (Does that sound familiar Pete ?) but chose to do neither (paras 88 to 91, 161 and 194.) Indeed it seems it was concerns about the untrue lurid stories surrounding the event flight and unspecified and unsubstantiated inventions of historic poor performance that drove the move to sack him. (See para 44 again).
It still took twenty months for this sorry story of prejudiced management persecution to fester into Captain Lawson's sacking,even before he had to endure the five years ET. He didn't want to leave the company and one reason he wasn't sacked earlier seemed to hinge on his refusal to sign an NDA (para 171).
Following a successful routine sim check a week after the event flight, Lawson operated his normal roster until April 2016 when he did his next LPC/OPC. This and two further sim rides were, in short, recorded as fail. (paras 98 - 107, 126 - 129 and 135 - 142). Unbelievably, one was with a Training FO who was Lawson's 'FO 1' on the event flight. You can arrange for anyone to fail a simulator ride if you are running the show and holding the bat and the balls at the same time. How many of us know about CAP 1049 ?
What was the claimant's original union doing for their member ? Very little it seems, other than trying to negotiate a severance package (paras 145 - 148) apparently without significant involvement by the claimant. The company council vice-chair at the time, who was until quite recently chair of the VACC has just taken a top management position with his grateful employer. And the Regulator ? Not a lot, as usual. Shame on you all.
Following a long period of unfitness to fly, (paras 150 - 155) the claimant was supported by the now extinct PPU (para 173) and later managed to 'mitigate his financial loss' by obtaining some temporary pilot jobs elsewhere.
In mid November 2021, just prior to the final ET five day remote videohearing, the company (having by now probably realised they were likely to lose) admitted to the 'unfair dismissal' and produced only two witnesses (para 27). They claimed (para 31) that all the real witnesses were too busy or otherwise unavailable.
First witness - a management training captain who joined the company from Monarch in May 2016 as 'Senior Manager Training of the Boeing fleet', and became involved as the airline's new 'Head of Training and Standards' in April 2017, less than a month before Lawson was sacked. He met Lawson for the very first time, four days before the sack date (para 198). The narrative of his 'evidence' took four pages (pages 38 to 41)of the Judgment.
Second - a non-pilot 'flight crew manager' with no previous airline experience, who by his own claim, joined the company in June 2021, four years after Lawson was sacked and less than six months before giving 'evidence' at the Employment Tribunal. The narrative of his 'evidence' took a further four pages of the Judgment (pages 42 to 46). He quickly moved on to pastures new and is now 'Head of IR and Flying Teams' at BA.
Given some of the remarks in the Judgment about the absence of any of the several 'real witnesses' for the respondent (page 6 para 31 - 32) one wonders if these two strangers to the case (who unfortunately would 'have no knowledge' of the events leading to the sacking, were naively reading from someone else's malicious script.
...
*1* I am NOT trying to diss the concept of anecdotal scuttlebutt on PPRuNe - OPSEC must be preserved as we used to say in the Air Force. Scuttlebutt is best kept anonymous as we don't want the inevitable reprisals to be made too easy. As we know from elsewhere on PPRuNe etc., given the right resources, even the truth can often be legally suppressed.
*1* I am NOT trying to diss the concept of anecdotal scuttlebutt on PPRuNe - OPSEC must be preserved as we used to say in the Air Force. Scuttlebutt is best kept anonymous as we don't want the inevitable reprisals to be made too easy. As we know from elsewhere on PPRuNe etc., given the right resources, even the truth can often be legally suppressed.
...
*2* The highly respected professional qualifications of TRI and TRE are the gift of the UK CAA - NOT of the airline or its management. Thus we should expect high ethical integrity from our TRI/TREs, who should avoid any temptation to prostitute themselves upon the altar of an oppressive or vindictive employer. ... Cue - CAP 1049 reminder.
*2* The highly respected professional qualifications of TRI and TRE are the gift of the UK CAA - NOT of the airline or its management. Thus we should expect high ethical integrity from our TRI/TREs, who should avoid any temptation to prostitute themselves upon the altar of an oppressive or vindictive employer. ... Cue - CAP 1049 reminder.
...
*3* For 'balance' I offer this ET originating from the BA pilots strike in 2019. Note once again, the inability of the ET to spell the claimant's name correctly
...*3* For 'balance' I offer this ET originating from the BA pilots strike in 2019. Note once again, the inability of the ET to spell the claimant's name correctly
For both the Lawson and the Osborne cases, one might ask if the Regulator ever bothers to consider whether the 'named and shamed' characters meet the statutory requirement of 'fit and proper' to exercise the management or training posts they are privileged to hold.
Happy New Year, One and All.
And mind how you go.
LFH
...
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Quote from the tribunal:
Not a wild rumour - the report says he was claiming this under disability discrimination legislation; when this was disallowed, he tried to seek reemployment - that would permit claiming backpay. Tribunal did not agree to enforce a re-employment order.
Not a wild rumour - the report says he was claiming this under disability discrimination legislation; when this was disallowed, he tried to seek reemployment - that would permit claiming backpay. Tribunal did not agree to enforce a re-employment order.
...with all due respect (I know - I hate that phrase too!), but you are slightly wayward in your interpretation of events and the ET procedures in such claims.
Captain Lawson primarily sought to clear his name of a wrongful assertion of him being an unsafe pilot. He succeeded.
He also sought reinstatement from the very first moment of filing his claim at the ET, not, as you suggest, after any failed disability claim. He was prevented from being reinstated (after the airline admitted liability for unfair dismissal) at the remedy hearing. This because the company argued it was impractical for them to re-employ him due to the litigation having gone so far and all trust between parties had broken down, and therefore it should not be viable for the Judge to order it. Therefore the Judge ruled accordingly.
A schedule of loss is just that - an account of your actual losses you have suffered as a result of the detriment occuring as demonstrated to the Tribunal. In fact, it is the Tribunal that orders that a claimant must supply the schedule of loss. Those losses increase as the time passes during the litigation, as you identified. But any final compensation awarded is done so according to any statutory caps governing allowable award, and also with an eye on the amount of losses that are demonstrated in the schedule of loss. Hence Captain Lawson got awarded the maximum amount that the Judge was permitted to award due to a statutory cap. His demonstrated losses were far in excess of what the aplicable statutory cap permitted that he could be awarded. The airline tried to argue the award down, even at this stage, but the Judge declined their arguments. He won the maximum compensation he could have been awarded for unfair dismissal.
The wild rumours I refered to were with respect to the continuing inferences within the airline workforce at the time that Captain Lawson was demanding/had even been given a VAA settlement figure of many millions. Those acolytes still prefer to claim that Captain Lawson "lost" and the airline "won" on this basis.
I hope that helps interested readers. It is a sobering vindication story indeed, and one very worthy of your time to read the 60 pages.
As to naming names of those involved in the more recent ongoing events, that is best left for personal pondering personal conclusions. Nobody wants to be joining them in the High Court defamation away day!
Last edited by NAT Zulu; 1st Jan 2024 at 16:11.
Complaining to the CAA about the conduct of an LPC is under Regulation 6. This is fully outlined in Doc 24 the CAA document on how to be a TRE. It is unfortunate that line pilots are not familiar with this document as it forensically details TRE conduct and procedures. This includes the statement to be relaxed and professional. Ironically first written by a fierce female flight ops inspector of legendary repute who conspicuously did not follow her own advice. I digress. This is clearly guidance not followed when barking about how the ex military pilots are there to help the hapless civilians ( as quoted in the case notes). I knew many fine trainers in VS, ex military or otherwise and they would not have behaved in this manner. In a similar vein to be failed on a wind shear event is unheard of in my experience (TRE appointment 1993). If the item is failed then it needs to be retested. The retest should come at the end of the test, it should clearly be stated as a failure and retraining should be offered prior to a retest. 2 fails in one item is a test failure. It does not appear to me that procedure was followed correctly nor communicated unambiguously to Captain Lawson. It would appear that there were clear grounds for a Reg 6 appeal. It would also seem that Virgin Atlantic’s training department has appointed some seriously rotten apples with skewed moral compass.
I have read all 60 pages of that report, and my reaction is wow! Just wow!
I am utterly shocked that trainers at Virgin Atlantic can operate in this way.
I have had a Virgin trainer conduct an LPC/OPC on myself via a third party and found him very fair, and informative, with some really useful training points. Which makes reading this judgement even more shocking.
A reality check for aspiring Virgin pilots I think.
I am utterly shocked that trainers at Virgin Atlantic can operate in this way.
I have had a Virgin trainer conduct an LPC/OPC on myself via a third party and found him very fair, and informative, with some really useful training points. Which makes reading this judgement even more shocking.
A reality check for aspiring Virgin pilots I think.
Have also plowed through all 60 pages and it was riveting reading, albeit for all the wrong reasons. Having extensive insight into union work in a different field, I'm completely and utterly disgusted at the lack of help and support from BALPA. Moreover, has this led to any changes in the VS training department? The lack of moral fibre among the involved trainers is beyond belief... I'm surprised this has received so little attention, when searching for the case online, there are some lurid headlines mainly from the tabloids, there's virtually no coverage from industry sources. VS have gotten away far too lightly IMO.
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Taking those sixty pages at face value, the immoral and patently dishonest behaviour of these egotistical and authoritarian individuals seems increasingly to be a reflection of a society where such conduct is dispensed seemingly without consequence. Reminds me of the behaviour of the 2001 Cathay Pacific Star Chamber members who also ruined lives with impunity.