Owain Glyndwr
That seems to be a pretty good answer (Once I figured out that centering the ball is a form of turn coordination-even if flying straight and level.:O) And yes, you do not need much rudder in most jets in cruise (CONF 0). Therefore it would seem that the Ny input is used solely in higher numbered Configurations for turn coordination.

Since I have seen a number of "unmasking" events in other aircraft, and the switch to ALT2 from Normal law, opens possibilities for unmasking events, I will reserve final judgement. Maybe looking at the yaw trim problem from the other direction, ie Normal law masking a slight out of trim condition rather than Alt 2 law creating a condition.

Hi, I have two questions about the weather conditions experienced by AF447. A search hasn't shown up anything similar, so hopefully it's not duplicating what's been said before.

First: What was the OAT during the icing formation? I found some numbers in the BEA report that indicate a temperature of around -38C. Is that correct?

Second: Did the flight deck get any weather updates in-flight, or was their information based on pre-departure forecasts and their radar?

LIke I say, hopefully these haven't been discussed already, if they have it'd be great to get a link towards the relevant posts!

AF447 thread, page 27 will be a good place to start.

Also check the links to the three Interim Reports from the BEA which can be found on the 1st page of this current thread. You could also put "AF447 search index" (including the quotes) into the Google search engine and use the customized search engine that will be returned.

Thanks for the tips. I've already read the interim reports but the info in the thread you link to is interesting.

French national radio today !
 

It is in French, excuse me :

http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...cons/laugh.gif franceinter y a-t-il trop de pilotes dans l'avion

They did not seem to have heard anything about a stall in RIO-PAR flight ! But everything is merveillous in french airlines and French pilot schools ! :\

http://www.franceinter.fr/emission-s...s-dans-l-avion

april 30. 2012 :mad:

Yves DESHAYES (CDB AF) Président du SNPL (Syndicat National des Pilotes de Ligne)

Michel POLACKO journaliste radio spécialiste aeronautique et défense Franceinfo

Christian MOREL sociologue autor de "Les décisions absurdes : comment les éviter", tome 2 Edition Gallimard Paris

:ugh:

Sooner or later they are going to have to blame French pilots, French airline, French plane, or French pitots.

Might be why the report is taking so long... :E

I wonder how many of those 2900 hrs the PF had actually handflying and not monitoring? Not many I am sure and that is probably why he pulled up into a full stall at high altitude because he didn't understand he was in Alt law and had no stall protection. The second pilot in the left seat couldn't see what he was doing so got confused too. Then the captain comes up at the end and can't see what they are doing either with his limited time watching so can't see what he is doing with the SS. Why would any pilot at FL350 pull full back on the controls because he lost airspeed? All jets have loss of airspeed checklists showing proper pitch and power for weight and altitude. None say pull up to the stops. Boeings wouldn't let pilots do that. Unless both pilots were incredibly stupid.

A very good question Bubbers but it rather suggests that he was unaware of the aircraft and how it functioned. Never a good thing. The PNFs display should have supplied him with all the information he needed to determine the aircraft's attitude (but missing the IAS of course). But rest assured you can pulll the same trick in a Boeing - before this accident no doubt it was thought you couldn't stall an Airbus in this way. This accident is not aircraft design philosophy related.

It wasn't that long ago, 9 years, that we could all hand fly and an autopilot disconnect was a non event. Now that I have retired I hope things haven't changed much. Pilots need to be in control of their aircraft at all times. Automation is there to assist them, not fly the airplane instead of them. The great pilots I flew with 9 years ago knew how to hand fly. They didn't have a problem so only the new ones with little real hands on experience are the problem. All pilots should be competent at hand flying because your passengers deserve this.

It would be necessary that the pilots have control before to start the system, and may reverse initial conditions :

In the (relative) "old" time the pilot opened brackets for the PA/system. The pilot was "MASTER" in the effective aircraft :p, and the PA/system was "SLAVE" :oh:.

In the bad designed today's effective aricraft, the system puts pilots between brackets before he is sitting in the cockpit . The system is "MASTER" in the effective aircraft :p, and the pilot is "SLAVE" :oh:. ECAM throws him biscuits to keep him busy :(.

In the 8 billions Ariane 501 crash (Arianespace 4.june1996) the initial condition had been added, to compute the ground position of the rocket. At take-off the bug needed only 37 seconds to show it was the master of the rocket.
The perfect inquiry conducted by Jacques-Louis LIONS finished in less than 24 hours, written in 15 days, published in 6 weeks, showed that in computer systems we must not trust the system if we see no failures, but we must take it for faulty so long we have not been able to Proof it is safe, with all the best knowlege at this time.

All pilots should be competent at hand flying because your passengers deserve this.

Obviously the airlines and their shareholders, in the case of AF447 the French Govt, do not agree with you. It is all about making a profit. As someone said in one of these threads, I think, that if airlines had their way there would be no flight crew, just like no staff on some subways.

promani. see roulishollandais. I agree with both of you. It is ironic that the tables are turned on those whose allegiance is to machinery, that when faulted, the mechanism cannot solve its problem. It is done, finished. No escape....but for the humans who control the mechanism, who can reason, and problem solve.

Stubborn fealty to a false god. Make no mistake, the 447 flight was doomed at UAS onset, doomed, without the flight crew. That she crashed is perhaps due poor communication among the three pilot, but the a/c was lost prior anyway.

The problem was soluble up to well into STALL (likely), but only by the hands of man. Yet it is pilots who take the blame for the shortcomings of the automations. Once the a/c gives up, there is no pathway back to stable, save for the intervention of the safety pilots. The interventions were inadequate, but those who believe in pilotless travel would be wise to consider that because the rescuers failed, the new way may not be safe without at least the chance of salvation. Keep the Mark I, yes?

Salute!

Good grief, are we now supposed to train our pilots to do fault analysis for 99% of the flight and then decide if Hal is doing O.K., and then "save the day" when Hal says "I can't do any more and don't know what's wrong"? BEAM ME UP!

Even if that approach is taken, then the humans still have to have the abilities and skills and judgement to fly the jet and get all the folks to the ramp. And they better have lottsa training for unusual flight conditions and loss of indicators.

Only reason I cut the crew some slack is the complicated reversion laws, unusual warning sounds and displays and such. I still think the PF thot he couldn't stall the jet due to the AoA protections ( poor term, but for another thread). Otherwise, I blame the crew.

I do not agree that the jet is so well designed that it is fool proof. Nor do I buy the argument that it did what it was supposed to, so no problem with the jet. I throw the foul flag, and point to the displays, confusing warnings, and on and on....

I see no point in discussing the yaw dampers and sideslip angles and all that stuff. Best I can tell is that the jet was fairly controllable, even at an extreme AoA and slow speed. So an attaboy to Airbus aero folks. And many "aw $hits" to the display and sfwe folks and training program. Takes 20 of gums' "attaboys" to equal one "aw $hit".

My feeling is that most of the pilots here think that better training and more hand-flying is vital. And then there's the human factors such as displays, warnings and complicated control law reversions. Am I way off base?

I thank the Lord that the primitive FBW system I flew had AoA as the prime limit, and the gee and rate limits secondary. Our yaw damper for the rudder commands was decent, but prolly no better than any jet that flew from the mid-fifties.

I say again that you could not get into the stall or "deep stall" without zooming up at 70 or 80 degrees of pitch and let the jet zip past the control law limits, then settle into the infamous "deep stall". If you were rolling and such, it was really hard to do.

I look forward to the final report and recommendations. Will be extremely interesting.

gums, I agree, yaw had nothing to do with this crash. Pulling back on the SS for no reason did and they would have been better rolling off into a steep bank than pitching up into a deep stall. He must have thought he was stall protected and forgot he was in alternate law. I still would like to know of those 2900 hrs how many were flying and how many merely monitoring an autopilot.

When I upgraded to captain from the MD80 to the B737 200 I did a lot of hand flying in the 80 to get my basic skills back to what they were. Flying skills can not be maintained by monitoring, only by doing.

Assuming that this pilot fly only long haul .. and taking an average of 8 hours flight for each trip
Assuming that the pilot fly manually (generous here) ten minutes after take off and ten minutes before landing ( I'm being generous as it's already almost impossible he perform all take off and landings) .. this gives a manual flying experience (at low altitude) of 120 hours!

To my defense of confusing reversion
 

So I look up the reversion laws and sub-laws and sub-sub-laws. Then read the footnotes and such, and then I get upset. Sorry, but I want/need something to hang my hat on.

And only thing I have if my touch and feel and experience. You know, "talk to me baby. What's this thing doing? I can help."

So Here's the notes from the A330 flight control reversion when outta basic control laws.

I was pretty good in school, but would have trouble on a test with these footnotes. Sheesh.

If WOW, then I don't care about other things not agreeing as long as the AOA probes are not all reading the same value and don't move when I pull or push a bit ( and would expect a warning of some kind). Of course, I could prolly "feel" some burble" "buffet" or wing rock or other things that let me know I am getting where I don't want to be.

So I do not let the 'bus design off the hook. I go with lottsa crew error in technique and coordination, but also question the basic design philosophy and training.

Hi,

Sure, if such UAS event hapened while taking off or approach, the pilots were able to think about MAN PITCH TRIM, because they are trained for (ONLY at low altitude). [remember TAMRON 1994 LFPO]

Is there anybody believing at FL370 that THS had gone away -13 degrees ?

All pilots should be competent at hand flying because your passengers deserve this.

Bubbers, 289 absolutely agree.

But ..... they don't deserve this they need this. The distinction between the two verbs is vital.

This keeps coming up, in various forms, and I'm not sure I understand why.

If never trained in alt law I can see why he maybe missed the display and pnf call of it, and even the stall warning didn't give him a clue... but why was he anywhere near protection envelope in the first place ? The protections are there, I thought, to stop inadvertently straying outside the envelope, and (some modes) to give maximum performance within the protection envelope for specific circumstances - e.g. emergency terrain avoidance. What lead PF to desire maximum climb performance and then assume he was protected ?

Or put another way, you say PF was thinking:

"I can pull back as hard as I like to get maximum climb, because the plane will protect me"

But before that must be the thought:

"I need to pull back hard to climb fast (for several 000 ft) because... <???>"

This is right at the start, before the stall, to be clear.

What's the blank ? Surely unless we can fill that in the thought-he-was-protected is not relevant, and we are back to LOC in pitch being inadvertent. What little CVR there is seems also to support that - PNF says "why are you climbing" not "pull up mountain ahead". PF response seems to indicate he doesn't believe or understand he is climbing, PNF then insists he is.

2.5.12


IF, re: “ . . . pull back as hard as I like to get maximum climb . . .”

You seem to think he did this from the outset. He didn’t. If you look at the “stirring mayonnaise” chart,

[see:
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/46839...ml#post6819601 ]

his pitch up inputs were neither full nor consistent at that time. Some have postulated that the stick back was inadvertent while he was using (too) large movements in roll. (PNF was telling him to make more gentle movements.)

It was after getting roll under control that he went to full stick back, AIUI.

Nobody knows what he thought or why, but one possibility is that after getting roll sorted, and the nose had started rising, with whatever alert noises were going off, he became confused; could not believe speeds, started to disbelieve some or all other indications, talked about crazy speeds, ended up stalled but ignoring the stall warning, had huge cockpit noise, (noted by somebody who has heard the CVR, it was reported) and thought, at least at times, that he had overspeed. So maybe he was pulling the nose up to try to slow down. Remember, at one stage he tried to use the airbrakes too, until PNF stopped him.

@ChrisN Nobody knows what he thought or why, but one possibility is that after getting roll sorted, and the nose had started rising, with whatever alert noises were going off, he became confused; could not believe speeds, started to disbelieve some or all other indications, talked about crazy speeds, ended up stalled but ignoring the stall warning, had huge cockpit noise, (noted by somebody who has heard the CVR, it was reported) and thought, at least at times, that he had overspeed. So maybe he was pulling the nose up to try to slow down. Remember, at one stage he tried to use the airbrakes too, until PNF stopped him.

He actually deployed the airbrakes, at 2:12:04. Three seconds later, PNF said,
at 2:12:07 "No, above all do not extend...." the rest of the sentence is not quoted, if it exists. Spoilers are deployed, not extended. Was PF reaching for FLAP? The "crazy speed" comment comes in conjunction with the spoilers deployed.....PNF has the most time in the 330, and my guess is he would not 'extend' the spoilers, he would "deploy" them.

At 2:10:10.4,
"STALL/STALL". just six tenths of a second later (2:10:11) the PNF: "What is that?" I propose PNF is not rhetorically commenting re: "STALL", he certainly knows what it is, but may be remarking on what caused the AoA to provoke the Warning, the extreme airstream noise that filled the cockpit. A robust turbulence that jiggered the vanes, and caused the Vanes to read correctly, but transiently....STALL/STALL.

stall, stall to 99.9 percent of the pilots on the earth would mean stick forward.

Not at 2:10:10.4, bubbers. Not at M.80, and five seconds after autopilot quits.

And not with the nose down already, and he still had the AoA bug on the speed tape, it was nowhere near the bug. What do you make of the PNF saying, "What was that?" ? Recheck the stick trace. The Stall Warn triggers at the beginning of the climb? Then doesn't return til top of climb? For the Stall Warn to be authentic at the handoff, would have meant sufficient g to break something?

Wait a minute.......

infrequentflyer789;
Re Post #299...I don't know why this aspect of the initial phase keeps returning to the thread either but there it is. Some accidents develop a mystique about them.

It's a big task to read through all nine or so threads I suppose but this has been discussed thoroughly and the results are consistent: - there are only a few reasonable theories which can explain why a rational, trained airline pilot would pull back half the available stick deflection and, with back-and-forth variations, keep it mostly in the NU position, even in spite of the fact that a minute later, pulling back does not arrest the rate of descent and the stall warning sounding almost constantly.

So far as training goes regarding Alternate Law, it is done in practically every simulator session as a result of some other scripted abnormality and the fact that the airplane is in Alternate Law, (1 or 2, doesn't matter...), should be instantly recognized and it should be thoroughly understood that one has an "ordinary airplane" on one's hands and must fly as a non-protected airplane. Memorized drills, QRH Procedures, SOPs and CRM are equally intended to provide quick and accurate ways to secure a compromised airplane AND to provide familiar "territory", guidance and therefore control in the face of "something wrong", to establish and maintain cockpit discipline, including the psychological and emotional responses such as perceptions, sense-making and fear which naturally accompany such events.

I posted the following graphic between a year and two years ago to show that far from unfamiliar, strange territory, flying in Alternate Law is fundamental knowledge of the airplane. This graphic is from an old CBT (Computer Based Training) module, ca. 1998.

If someone believes he is flying a computer platform which one "manages" (as we are told we are doing when using the autoflight system), and not an airplane which one flies, and expects the software design engineer and not an airline pilot of reasonable ability to retain the aircraft's innate stability and maintain control in all reasonable circumstances, then, to start, there is a major disconnect somewhere in the process of standards, training and checking and a major philosophical flaw in the approach to automation and its uses, benefits and HF problems.

I hope that the BEA Report addresses this question, among many reasonably and logically asked here.


http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-KRNS...KRNSqw4-XL.jpg

Hi,

Lyman
Again .. a translation difficulty :)
In french he tell:
"non surtout ne ne les sors pas"
In french you can use "sors" for the action of extend flaps or deploy spoilers or extend gear or pulling a rabbit out a hat or take a walk
Je sors les flaps
Je sors les aérofreins (spoilers)
Je sors le train d'atterrissage (I extend the landing gear)
The word (verb) "sortir" can be used for various actions and its meaning depends on the context in which it is used
Finesse de la langue française
Finesse of the French language :)

Hi jcjeant.:ok:

I learned at school that 'sortir' meant to 'leave, or depart'. Hence, "Sortie". "He flew three sorties today"......

"Je sors l'ecole". English is the language of aviation, by treaty, but I can understand the stress, so French is not unusual in this instance, so I don't get how 'depart' attaches to the cockpit conversation? (or that my take is 'wack'?)

Are you saying that their conversation was sloppy, or that the translation by BEA is sloppy?

merci

@Lyman:
 

Since english is not my native tongue, I have to use:

SIMPLIFIED TECHNICAL ENGLISH
Specification ASD-STE100
European Community Trade Mark No. 004901195
International specification
for the preparation of maintenance documentation in a controlled language.



EXTENSION (n): 1. The “action” when something extends

Approved Example: MAKE SURE THAT THE EXTENSION OF THE AIRBRAKES IS SMOOTH.


DEPLOY (v),
DEPLOYS,
DEPLOYED,
DEPLOYED: To move into a position of operation from a position of storage
NOTE: Use for thrust reverser or drogue chute operations only.
For other meanings, USE: EXTEND, RELEASE

Approved example: KEEP PERSONNEL AWAY FROM THE AIRCRAFT WHEN THE THRUST REVERSER DEPLOYS.


Evidence is in the FDR spoiler traces!

Thank you sir. In BEA #3 the chronology shows that the spoilers were deployed; three seconds later, the PNF states: "Do not extend" etc. In this case extend is not a noun, it is a verb?

Can you find where the spoilers were later "stowed"? I haven't found it yet.

(will post pp and exact quote, looking)

Do you have opinion on 'sortir'?

thank you

addend: For purposes of discussion, I am relating the events only to the verbal record, not the FDR. The DFDR was not a part of the problem, essentially, only a witness to it. Blending the FDR traces with a discussion amongst (the three) pilots (actual) is in a way a bias.

@ PJ2 ....."There are only a few reasonable theories which can explain why a rational, trained airline pilot would pull back half the available stick deflection and, with back-and-forth variations, keep it mostly in the NU position, even in spite of the fact that a minute later, pulling back does not arrest the rate of descent and the stall warning sounding almost constantly."

I think I agree, but would suggest the insertion of an alternate to 'reasonable'. Can we try 'obvious'? Many possibilities have been mentioned, and rejected, in some cases, without objectivity. Bias is a subjective species of opinion, and should play no part in a detached investigation. "Reasonable" is a matter of opinion, and led in some cases to the repetitive presentation of fatal accidents, simply because the cause was not 'reasonable'.

Mention airframe damage, and the gallery frowns and stomps its feet, likewise computer failure of massive nature. In this regard, I have great respect for BEA, they do not make conclusions, only supposition. The final report will be similar. I expect an objective and thorough document. Throughout each report, the authority is careful to not make dramatic conclusion. The downside is that by exclusion, readers of the reports "conclude" fact. Damage, for instance, is possible, but not seriously addressed; therefore the popular conclusion is "Intact at Impact". A serious sceptic would respond: "Define Intact"........

Hi,

Indeed....
FDR traces did not reflect what the pilots see on the panel (instruments)
The FDR is the only witnesses of their actions
In flight .. the pilots did not real-time access to the FDR
They do not have a printer showing a graph (similar to those of BEA) of the FDR data recorded (and same for the ACARS)

jcjeant. tres bien.

I can't remember how long ago it was, but I asked a question re: FDR and real time flight management.

The FDR is a resource. It is in fact a pilot with a phenomenal memory. The downside is that this resource is wasted on Court filings, arguing lawyers, and biased professionals, with an agenda.

What in God's name prevents the acquisition, analysis, and exploitation of the FDR in real time? Inertial records become flight path cues, etc.? It is a crime, to waste resources. Lives are at stake.

merci, rant fin

Real time FDR data and such
 

@ Lyman.....

The relatively intact impact and wreckage pics was what prompted me to postulate the "deep stall" theory. Then I had good inputs from others here and got to see some FCOM documents and so forth. It became obvious that you could fly the 'bus into a very deep stall and have reasonable lateral control and even pitch control. But sooner or later ya gotta relax the back pressure or even push the stick forward and see what happens.

Gotta tellya that the HUD I had in the Viper and Sluf used real time inertial data for the flight path marker and AoA and vertical velocity and alt and speed and heading........ When you see the AoA bracket at the top of the HUD and speed is slow......duhhhhhh.

I am having my LEF failure video digitized so all can see how neat the HUD was when you are making the first landing attempt with serious stuff not working like it's programmed to do.

gums

howdy. Since you're USAF, you may be familiar with John Boyd and his thirty second challenge at Nellis. Col. Boyd was not well liked by Brass, he had no time for pyramid types.

If you know about Boyd's flat plating trick, you may know how stable the HUN was in totally departed flat aspect, all drag, no lift, an object of diminishing energy, giving it up for the 'cause'. It won for Boyd his deserved rep, and cred.

How different is 447's 330? Not much, I think. The a/c derived its 'stability' in deep Stall from spill, not flow.

The HUD, inertial cueing and other military benchmarks are expensive. Very expensive. If Joe Q. Public knew how safe he would be if the beanies spent some dough, he would revolt, as did the Air France pilots, when they finally realized how they had been waltzed by the company v/v PITOT THALES.

It is way important to keep the real deal on the down low, lest profits fall with fewer and fewer fatalities, as equipment is brought (at great expense) into the NOW, out of the THEN.

447 remained stable because she had her airmass controlled. She wasn't "directing" the flow, she was not in flow. She was in "spill". One can fly drag, as well as lift; ask a sailor, or read Boyd's "ACM" white papers.

You speak 'boydese'?

cheers, see you at the bar.

wings of tin

OODA loop
 

Salute!

@Lyman

Don't get into Boyd other than the OODA. The guy may have helped get the Viper and Eagle and Hornet into the inventory, but his A2A claims are grossly embellished, and I know folks of his vintage.

As RR and others have posted, the OODA loop was in play for AF447. The thing I see is the "d" and the "a". Ya gotta give the jet a few seconds to respond to whatever you or Hal is commanding. Then you decide and act.

I shall still ascribe most of the tragedy to pilot actions, but I'll also add some human factors, crew coordination and design philosophy/implementation factors.

This will be a landmark accident report.

G

Sorry to correct you again:



STOWED:

What's left after correction is what is correct, the Truth. It's all good.....

thank you Captain.

Lyman;
No, that loses/reinterprets my intended meaning. The notion of "plausible", associated with "reasonable", isn't the same as "obvious".

PJ2

Off Topic Response
 

Momentary off topic:

Boyd's 'trick' worked for one and only one reason...

He positioned his 'victim' close enough behind him that, keeping in mind the slight delay in reacting, there were actually only two outcomes possible if the 'victim' attempted to 'follow' him,

the 'victim' either accepted the overshoot or...the 'victim' was willing to HIT him.

Boyd did not depart the F-100, he simply used max instantaneous turn capability with some thrust modulation and a loaded rudder reversal, all at speeds & AOA above the stall.

If the A330 simulation is near accurate, the A330 is quite a bit more stable approaching and entering a stall than an F-100 for which...the word 'squirrel' comes to mind. :}

Back to the game...

Yes, exactly, I was trying to point out the difference in our respective povs.

I did not mean to "correct" your post, only a temporry mod, to frame the difference between "Plausible", and "apparent".

Implausible, unreasonable: "It doesn't make sense".

Obvious, apparent: "Sense or not, there it is." Some things that don't make sense can kill people, and judging something by how much logic it contains can mislead. Just my opinion. As a matter of fact, the less sense evidence makes, the more one should be open to "Implausible". A parenthetic to Occam?

cheers

Only once the evidence came back that suggested pretty conclusively that neither had occurred. Prior to that the most accurate thing anyone could say was that it was unlikely, and attempt to explain why it was unlikely with the facts at their disposal (as I did).

It's one thing to think outside the box in an open-minded fashion - but what tends to be the case in any incident or accident involving Airbus is that some people - usually the same people each time - will approach the problem with a pre-conceived conclusion in mind to support a personal agenda which pre-dates that particular incident.

@chrisN - I don't think they ever got roll under control in any meaningful sense, because the PF was trying to use fistfuls of aileron throughout the sequence. Prior to the stall gentle aileron may have been effective, but post-stall the only thing that can effectively control roll is rudder.