The 757 Cali crash changed our memory items to stow the speed brakes but it probably wouldn't had made any difference anyway. I was flying to Panama City that night and there was no moon so when they screwed up and headed east through the hills to Bogata because both outer markers had the same designater they could not see the terrain. My FO questioned our visual that night overflying the airport at 5,000 ft approaching over the Pacific and said all we have to clear now are sailboat masts.

I was offered the same approach straight in as them and out of courtesy declined it because of the people we lost in that crash. It isn't a hard approach but doing the ILS from the south side seemed like the thing to do after that awful crash.

aguadalte;Perhaps you would like to discuss anything the TRE brought to your attention regarding trim control when other than in Normal Law.

You must have missed a fairly intense discussion that took place in AF447 Thread No.6, where we were privileged to have some well thought-out input from an experienced aerodynamics engineer.

To directly answer your question, the DFDR traces indicate that even when stalled and with low IAS, any SS ND resulted in the appropriate response.

A good post and time to reconsider ....
 

Yes i totally agree, and a good opportunity to close down the A vs B discussions, which are fruitless in the first hand and only turn the exchange of arguments over different technical matters worth looking at into endless distractions from the detailed view itself.

Interesting aspect of the AF A340 zoom climb is that alphamax is exceeded in normal law.

Hi HazelNuts39,
Presumably alpha is measured real time and the airspeed can reduce if delta g is reduced during the apogee. It will take some time for the attitude of the aircraft to change in response to the new alpha measured at 1g, when the speed was so far back.

Some "amazing" recommendations by BEA including:
"The BEA released another safety recommendation to EASA to require the autopilot disconnect aural alarm become continuous until cancelled by human action, reasoning that the A340 cavalry charge by design sounds 1.5 seconds and may therefore be suppressed by a higher priority aural alert. This suppression had contributed to a critical incident, the BEA continued."

Wtfiidn? springs to mind.

mm43,
I thank you for driving my attention to that particular part of the forum that I have missed unfortunately.

Turbine D -

An excellent post, thanks. However I do have to take issue with one aspect:

This is incorrect. Landing mode was never triggered. (The theory that put this forward was in fact advanced by Asseline's lawyers and repeated in the international press).

What happened was that thanks to poor briefing materials provided by AF (they were B&W photocopies, so some shades of grey were either too faint to spot easily and some disappeared altogether - and the briefing notes pointed them at the asphalt runway, not the grass one being used), the crew almost missed the Habsheim airport. To stay on schedule, rather than turn around and make another approach, Capt. Asseline elected to attempt a short final that cut it too fine and maneouvre into position during the descent.

In order to do this he did not simply disarm autothrust, he actually disabled it - by holding down the disarm buttons. This makes A/THR unavailable until reset by ground crew (it was in fact intended to be used if A/THR developed a malfunction), and therefore also inhibits alpha floor protection (which is distinct from alpha protection). In order to expedite descent he chopped the thrust back past the point required for the flypast and the engines spooled down, which is a big no-no on approach as I understand it. The descent was expedited a little too much and they went below 100ft RA shortly after crossing the threshold. Landing mode was not triggered - possibly because the RA never held a stable value long enough to do so.

The photocopied aerodrome map did not show the trees at the end of the grass runway because on the original they were a light grey shade below the threshold of the photocopier - they were spotted as a danger about halfway down the runway and the thrust levers were pushed to the TOGA position shortly afterwards. Unfortunately with the engines spooled down and alpha floor disabled with the autothrust as a result of the expedited descent, they took too long to spool back up, and the only remaining protection was alpha protection, which limits pitch attitude to preserve AoA above stall. This, not landing mode, was the reason the aircraft did not climb when Asseline pulled up - he simply did not have the required thrust or airspeed to do so by the time the aircraft was over the trees.

In this case, had Asseline been able to override the computer completely, the aircraft would have stalled short of the trees, crashed out of control and many more would likely have died* as a result. As such, there's a degree of tragic irony that, had the A320 done as Asseline asked, he may not have survived to publicly rubbish the A320 for not doing as he asked.

[* - EDIT : The three deaths that did occur (tragically including two children) were as a result of smoke inhalation, not impact forces - and the injuries were relatively minor, with a few serious cases involving broken bones. ]

RRR,

The exceedance of Alpha MAX by about 2 degrees during less than 2 seconds occurs in the initial phase of the incident. In the words of BEA (see also the graph):

My translation:

At first a headwind gust (see note 1) causes an overspeed and activates the "OVERSPEED" warning. A few seconds later an upward gust causes an increase of AoA and vertical speed. Then the PNF disconnects the AP and makes a nose-up command during 6 seconds while the PF extends the speedbrakes. At the start of the nose-up command the AoA exceeds Alpha Prot and the High AoA protection is activated. Then, during 2 s, the AoA is briefly less than Alpha Prot, with the SS at neutral, which cancels the protection. The combined effects of turbulence, of the SS command and the extension of the speedbrakes lead to an increase of pitch attitude, vertical speed and altitude. A peak of AoA greater than Alpha Prot activates the High AoA Protection again. The AoA continues to increase and exceeds Alpha MAX, which causes the automatic retraction of the speedbrakes.

Note 1: The numerical simulations show that the turbulence encountered in the occurrence is essentially characterized by a headwind gust of 25 kt, followed a few seconds later by a 35 kt upward gust. A second upward gust of 15 kt occurs about 10 seconds later. The total duration of the turbulence is approximately one minute.

P.S. Somewhat mysterious is the continued pitch up with the SS at neutral. One would like to see the elevator trace for that element of the occurrence. An explanation could be the decreasing vertical speed, possibly resulting from a downward gust, and the control system maintaining 1g.

Just to clarify, we're talking about a separate A340 incident here, not the AF447 crash - right?

Dozy-- right.
Isn't it, like, about 3 or 4 PM over there? Time to wake up! :)

Aye, but I've only been home a short while. I just didn't want another round of misunderstanding, it took a long time to establish that AF447 never went into overspeed.

Habsheim
 

Nothing on the CVR though? Autothrottle disconnect was at 50 feet RA at 12:45:26, 11 seconds later TOGA, 2 seconds later contact with trees.
They :mad: up big time, i live 10 klicks away.

from airbus last pages

None of the crew believed they had gone that low - all evidence indicates that they didn't realise they were in any danger until they realised they were level with the trees - as such the CVR was routine up until that point, and quickly became a shouting match as they tried to get out of the corner they'd painted themselves into.

[nitpick]Alpha floor protection, to be precise (the thrust component). Alpha protection, which is a flight control function and affects pitch and bank, remains active at all times in Normal Law IIRC[/nitpick]

As it should have. AF's performance as an entity was well below-par that day.

I've often wondered if Asseline would have had a better case if he had gone after AF rather than Airbus - but I suspect that he would not have had the benefit of union backing had he pursued that line.

Advantages of two SS with no feedback
 

Hi,

aguadalte

Some time ago you mentioned in an excellent post to CONF iture (*) some points that could clarify an issue:

Why AI (Airbus SAS) introduced the SS?

This issue is being covered in another Thread concerning the "interface". The paper you mention discuss the issue and is a confirmation of some concerns i had previously.

Could you help me to understand why Airbus Industries (Airbus SAS) introduced two separated SS with no feedback in their planes?

There are advantages with this design?

I mentioned my post in the specific thread avoiding to discuss the issue in AF447 thread. I don't consider the interface an issue between A or B. My agenda is on Aviation Safety, during normal conditions and during anomalies.

PS

(*)

There are advantages with this design?


In the development portion of the design, it occurs of course that separated controls were a new direction. The risks were no doubt delineated, assessed and addressed.

There were no downfalls sufficient to eliminate this portion of the design.

Hence, into manufacture, test, and service. What was the benefit portion of the change in approach? Anyone?

A possibility of course, exists that single pilot operation, contingent on the building of an extensive record of safety thus equipped, might be "just around the corner"? Awaiting BEA's opinion on the matter....

On the other hand, it may be that the determination was simply that it was unimportant for the Pilots to "see" the other's controls. Actually, that had to have been one conclusion, perhaps still held?

SS advantages (who benefits?)
 

Hi,

Bear

Commented on "Interface" thread.

Trying to get out the corner
 

Hi,

DW:

Quote:

---

...as they tried to get out of the corner they'd painted themselves into.

---

The corner they entered (ultimately in the trees) was only "painted" by the pilots? Or the designers "preprogrammed" (with the new concept, protected FBW plane) the corner?

Would not be safer to allow a pilot to just exit the corner when absolutely necessary?

Rigid programming (hard limits) is really necessary? The pilots really need this kind of "protection"?

When you know the history of AF447 and (as far many saying) formation - training of new pilots it seems that strict limits are needed :}
If they had been strict in AF447 .. Hall could have said in reaction to SS command to climb :
I dunno our speed ... but ..
Your throttles are set at VVV
The weight of the aircraft is XXX
The current altitude is YYY
The temperature is WWW
The CG is located at ZZZ
If you want climb now you're going to put us in a very dangerous situation that's why I will limit your ability to climb
Will give you update ASAP

Habsheim
 

Thanks for that link RF4 :
Habsheim : Airbus Response to the Criticisms to the BEA Final Report

By any chance, would you have also the document :
L’Affaire/The Case by Mr R.A. Davis which was the main reason of the Airbus response.

To note that Mr R.A. Davis has been at the head of the prestigious AAIB during 15 years, and not only "an aircraft accident consultant" as the Airbus Response likes to describe him. Also, he was specialized in the Flight Recorders decrypting …

Obviously, there is still a tremendous interest for Habsheim.
I just don’t understand why PPRuNe refused me the possibility to start a thread exclusively dedicated to Habsheim … ?

Protections
 

Quote:

---

If you want climb now you're going to put us in a very dangerous situation that's why I will limit your ability to climb

---

Why not limit the climb (zoom climb, ballistic climb, any climb) above REC MAX?

Simple programming, easy to inform the crew, hard limit IMHO important to avoid entering a very dangerous space where you could stall and LOC your plane.

Why not? This would be over automation? :=

Simply put:

You must have authority to control your plane. Always. Specially during anomalies of any type.

Hi,

Confi_ture
Sensitive subject !! ... minefield .. contaminated with viruses of conspiracy ... ghosts that lurk .. case closed for justice .... post mortem analysis highly discouraged ... http://smilies.sofrayt.com/%5E/9971/deepsleep.gif

Conveniently buried issue
 

Hi

:}

I've got a lot of time for Ray Davis, and read that he did exemplary work trying to get to the bottom of BEA548 back in 1972 - which was no mean feat given the lack of survivors and lack of a CVR (In fact the recommendations made by his team were what eventually made CVRs mandatory in G-registered transport category aircraft).

Airbus wasn't knocking him, despite how you're trying to frame that statement. They were pointing out that he had been retired for several years before he took the case on. You can't bring a doctor back after an extended period of retirement without first familiarising them with the advances that have happened in their absence - so it goes with accident investigators.

No, he wasn't. For a start, Flight Recorder data is not "encrypted", it is encoded. On the old analogue gear this was as a series of voltages and on the newer digital boxes as a serialised sequence of binary data.

Ray Davis was a brilliant investigator, but he didn't really understand how DFDRs differed from their older analogue counterparts, which led him to make several erroneous conclusions about the tapes, which are explained at length in the article Franzl posted.

Yes - only painted by the pilots. They diverged from an already shoddily-put together flight plan because they missed the turning point for the airfield, then elected to expedite the descent rather than turn around and start the approach again - letting the engines spool down completely in the process (fatal mistake no.1).

They made the decision to disable A/THR completely to proceed with the display. As PJ2 said, the narrow, short runway may have fooled them into believing they were higher than they were. This prevented any chance that the system could help them out of their predicament (fatal mistake no.2)

In this case, no. I've already said that if Alpha protection had not checked Asseline's attempts to pitch up that the aircraft would have stalled and more would have died.

Clearly - sometimes - yes. This isn't a criticism of pilots as a breed, just an honest acknowledgment that we all have bad days at the office.

Funny that an allegedly "conveniently buried" issue has already been brought up at least three times in the course of discussing AF447, an incident which bears no relation to AF296 in any way, shape or form on a technical or procedural level.

You are lokking for that one?

Davis

Most of the conspiracy stuff is here:

crashdehabsheim

Thanks a lot RF4 !
The last time I visited that site, a while ago I admit, the original English version of Davis document was not there, only the translated French version was.

You know, nowadays the conspiracy idea is always raised when people are looking to NOT debate a subject - It is getting all too convenient.

I just can't stand anymore reading DozyWannabe uninformed erroneous and false comments on Habsheim.

There is matter to discuss on Habsheim, I'm looking for that.
Of course the level of credibility and independance of the BEA will be chalenged ...

When time permits I will start a thread called Habsheim.

DDMM
 

Distract, Damage, Muffle, Marginalize. The answer is always patience, and some element of good fortune, or a change in fortune of those who hurl "Conspiracy".

The thing I do not get is the animosity toward scepticism.

Patience, Persistence.

The hook in this report will be the conversations, cockpit. Habsheim made a fertile field for loss of reputation, no doubt. Who will guard the guardians? The mere appearance of a conflict should provide a judicial special master, or ombudsman, one would hope. The Public interest is superior to bottom line.

imho

I think you'll find everything I said backed up by the investigators, the courts and and every aviation agency in the world. Your argument is predicated on the paranoia of a mentally ill ex-AF Captain who went to bat with Asseline and ended up ruined.

In the immortal words of Jack Nicholson, "You can't handle the truth".

Damage, Distraction, Marginalize. Next comes Muffle.

Lyman,

Have you considered that people are just fed up with your continued attempts at disinformation and manipulation of the known facts? The picking and choosing, taking things out of context and ignoring others.

The only saving grace would be that you are simply not able understand the subject and/or are a confused soul. I suspect that is only partly the answer.

CONF iture seems to heading down the same path, sadly.

Hi,

DW
Urban legend ...
Sorry DW .. but this Captain was not mentally ill .. and that's not my opinion .. but it is the medical reports that attest after examination by experts that this pilot was not mentally ill
Those reports are available on internet
It surprises me that you did not know that .. saw the interest and knowledge you have of the accident

I think you are intertwining factual information with personal opinions. Here is why:

Quote:
Your quote
Nowhere does Airbus point out what is in bold in your statement, that is your interpretation/personal opinion. Mr. Davis challenged the BEA report, particularly that of the recorded data.

IMO, that left both the BEA and Airbus no choice but to discredit Mr. Davis and his technical challenges, and they did. Much was at stake for Airbus, a new airplane, new concept for flight controls, first airplane delivered, a public demonstration and public conjecture that the airplane was at fault. It was important for Airbus to rebut, emphasizing the aircraft performed as designed. In the same way it was important for the BEA to rebut as they were under much heat for a perceived "botched & biased" investigation by the media and others, erroneous or not. This happens all the time in the courts with either the prosecution or the defense attempting to discredit a knowledgable expert witness and it happened in this instance.

Your quote

IMO, I don't see a shouting match at all, there were only six short vocal exchanges three by the F/O, three by the Captain once they reached 100 ft., the last comment by the Captain coming while descending into the trees.


Originally posted by RR_NDB
Your quote
IMO, the bold in your statement is supposition for something that didn't take place and therefore can't be confirmed one way or another.


Originally posted by RR_NDB:
Your quote
IMO, this gets back to the philosophical FBW debate, your opinion, not a fact.

Your quote
IMO, there are always overarching fundamentals, whether they be familiarity with and understanding of the aircraft operating systems, training, improvements and or changes in basic written operational instructions that may differ from one incident to another. Nevertheless, there are relations from this aspect or point of view.

Turbine D useful observation
 

This may be the reason we find sometimes difficult present arguments to DW.

TD probably characterized something useful to be considered by DW and some other participants.

I think it's important to distinguish facts from personal opinions and put both clearly separated.

E.G.

I personally have as a Electronics Designer serious objections against several "resources" (including protections, etc.) used in aviation today. When questions, issues and facts are presented to us it's important to hear, to analyze, to study, etc. before.

Sometimes we must criticize. I made this against the FALSE REDUNDANCY of using 3 Pitot's that stistically fail near simultaneously. I called it ridiculous. The responsibility is not small when we make this. We must check redundantly and then, need to be assertive.

Assertivity without careful analysis is dangerous and can cause problems and confusion.

DW, re your post #694- "[nitpick]Alpha floor protection, to be precise (the thrust component). Alpha protection, which is a flight control function and affects pitch and bank, remains active at all times in Normal Law IIRC[/nitpick]"

Thank goodness I don't have to remember the nitpicky stuff any more. Thirty-five years was enough.

For Lyman:
Yes, odd, even though I have seen something very much like that in real life previously*.

I repeat my guess regarding what is behind that non-reaction: SW presumed spurious due to known airspeed spurious input. That said, simply paying more attention to "tasks x, y, and z" may render the audio input less compelling.

*Two (of a number) things I experienced IRL to do with warnings ignored.

A. Late 80's. Night training flght. Safe for solo check, me Instructor, one Student. Standard arrival VMC, night, final landing. Task: simulate "you have an engine oil high temp, low pressure" (engine oil leak drill). Student chooses correct response: climb to high key then set up for a (power on, training) dead stick landing profile. Which he did, except ... (this is at night, warning lights tend to be brighter in the cockpit at night) when he got to high key (~ 2500 feet AGL) he dropped the flaps rather than the gear and began his turn.
This gave him multiple warnings:
Caution light flashing (he'd turned on the landing lights),
flashing red light
loud and annoying warning horn,
He reported to me "three down and locked, landing checklist complete" and proceeded into the turn for low key (which is the abeam / 180 position) for a dead stick landing profile. He reset the Master Caution ... but didn't fix anything else.
I allowed him to continue, figuring he'd catch his configuration error and fix it at the 180. He approaches the 180, calls tower, reports three down and locked (all three indications were up, all warnings still going off) and continues.
Tower clears him to land.
He hits the 90, roughly on profile, (a bit high now, as he should have gear and flaps down already) and reports to me "gear down, flaps down, checklist complete" and begins a gentle slip (a technique taught for altitude control in the dead stick provile) to get his final better matched to profile.
All lights and aural warnings still going off.
I direct him, as he turns to final, to wave off / go around. (IP wants to preclude wheels watch shooting flares at us at night).
I call tower "Wave off, request left Low key" as the student obediently waves off this approach, and tried to raise the gear.
And now, the icing on the clueless cake.
"Sir, the gear handle won't go up, are you holding it down?"
(Instructors would occasionally guard gear handle to avoid certain errors, overspeed gear, etc).

My reply: "You never lowered it, which is why you can't raise it any higher than UP, A---. I have the controls."

I cleaned up the aircraft, took it to low key, performed the rest of the dead stick profile, and landed the aircraft, emphasizing to him the absence of the warning horn, absence of warning lights, and absence of anything odd.

I had flown with him before, and he'd usually gotten things in the right order. I had been his instructor on his first night flight, and he'd flown that same profile correctly then. What struck me was how the warning at night are so much more noticeable, and he never seemed to "see" them.

For whatever reason, he went brain dead and exposed a tendency to report things by rote that he wasn't doing. (Bad idea) No solo for him.

B. Year 2001, me pilot under instruction (referesher training) and my experienced IP has the controls. Day, VFR, return to base for final landing. Pilot enters the break nicely, gets to the 180, calls 3 down and locked (and I check, seeing the handle up and indicators up, and flaps going down) and he calls tower, three down and locked, for landing permission.
I say
"T---, the gear handle is still up, as are the wheels, and that warning horn is kinda loud."
Pause.
Wheels go down, flaps stay down, we review the checklist complete together, agree we have three down, and we land safely. (He buys at the club that afternoon, needless to say. :ok: )

From novice to experienced pilot ... it can happen.

What makes me so confused and so sad is that it seems to have happened to both pilots on the flight deck in AF 447.

That is why I lean toward an internal dialogue inside each head "with airspeed unreliable, stall warning must be spurious."

I could be very wrong, and it may be some other thing, or a bunch of other things.
Altitude display was not known to be manfunctioning, nor the attitude indicator malfunctioning. (Slight unknown, but no strong direct evidence for)
From info reported, PNF's attitude indicator was for sure working.

If PF didn't notice stall warning, what caused him to select CLB, then TOGA, go to 15 degrees pitch and actively maintain that until the airplane dropped out of his hand after 40 seconds?
http://i.imgur.com/ETUWN.gif?1

Norbert Jacquet ended up several lettuces short of an allotment. He paid the "medical experts" (actually university professors) to refute that assertion and then spent the next few years putting together a website filled with ever more paranoid claims that the French aviation industry was out to get him.

As a rule, that suggests a level of paranoia and mental instability considerably above the norm to me. "Here's the reason I was blackballed by my country's aviation industry to protect a dangerous aircraft design, and by the way here are three experts who have all concluded I'm not mad" is not exactly an introduction to inspire one with confidence.

@TurbineD

I wouldn't say I'm threading opinion between documented info - it's pretty obvious that Ray Davis's conclusions come from a lack of understanding regarding digital flight recorder information storage. This isn't me knocking him, this is just a fairly straightforward conclusion. Think what you may of the source, but pages 21-38 (original) of the Airbus rebuttal posted by Franzl go into considerable detail to explain it.

Also worth pointing out is that the BEA and Airbus rebuttals were separate entities and there was no collusion in producing the documents - the BEA invited Airbus to provide their own given the technical expertise on the DFDR technology they were using.

Maybe "shouting match" was an extreme description, but there is a definite increase in volume, intensity and interpersonal conflict from the moment the crew spotted the trees on the CVR.

The "philosophical" debate on FBW and protections aside, I was simply providing an example where the protections *did* in fact save lives from the actions of a captain who on that particular day turned out to not be as infallible as he thought he was.

I think it is all about the FDs coming back at that time in V/S mode. The PF happily finds something to follow ...
Before AF447, TOGA was the correct answer to a stall warning, but 15 degrees of pitch was not part of that procedure.

During that period, the autotrim silently helps him to follow that foolish FD command and gives him the illusion to be in control ...

A few elements could now make us think the pilots intentionally discredited the stall warning.


Would you add to your graph the FD, V/S, SEL V/S traces if possible ?

There are some practical difficulties with that, and I don't see the point. On page 111 the V/S Sel equals the V/S and page 91 IR#3 states:

HazelNuts39, your question I don't have a simple answer to.

Caveat: the following is an attempt at analysis, not any sort of "truth" about what happened.

Let's suppose that the stall warning (created by the sustained "zoom climb," which is a matter of either scan breakdown or perhaps an internal decision to use nose to control speed to avoid overspeed ... ) triggered the "low altitude stall warning" response, which might be described and depicted in your graph, albeit with a nose attitude not set and held very well.

1. What stall warning ought to trigger is a decision to reduce angle of attack, particularly when stall warning happens at cruise altitude. It didn't. Why is that? Unknown. (Estimate: In part, I don't think either pilot had a sense of the AoA of the wing. I also wonder at their training regarding "high altitude stall, high altitude approach to stall.")

2. As the warning sustains over time (50-60 seconds) the control inputs do not show a trend of AoA reduction based upon your graph. The overall trend is to climb toward limits of performance envelope (if not into it). What seems to be going on in the cockpit is that the pilot who took the actions you describe is not getting the result he expects.

(Expectation: "If I go to CLB and TOGA, I should fly out of this stall warning.")

Note: his / their response at cruise altitude (with a lower altitude set of procedures) isn't the response one would expect. (Do I hear the Pitch and Power Chorus warming up in the background?)

At some point in that 50 - 60 seconds of response, I conclude a cognitive mismatch:
"What I am doing to treat stall warning is not curing my stall warning sympton."
This could lead to internal conclusion that "A/S is unreliable, this stall warning is unreliable or spurious since what is supposed to fix it didn't."
Further stall warnings, when they come back on well into the stall, are ignored during the period when a potential remedy (nose down, fly out of the stall, begun somewhere above ~ 12-15000 feet?) to stall could be attempted.
The signal "stall warning" is never converted into either pilot's awareness "you are stalled" realization. I believe that if PNF had diagnosed "we are stalled" he would have said so to the PF.
(From my example, my flight student never converted "lights and warning noise" to "your gear are still up" realization.)

Back to AoA, which is measured but not displayed. There is no AoA gage to consult as a cross check. Neither pilot seems to have considered digging down through the pages to get a look at AoA. (Memory hazy: is it seven button / page actions to get there? PNF would need to do this, PF was behind the aircraft and trying to fly it). Given their task loading gradient and apparent misunderstanding of what is going on, I am not surprised that PNF didn't go head down in search of AoA on the pages. Were AoA a primary concern, the actions we see evidence of on the traces would probably have been different. Also, when captain at last arrives, would his glance at an AoA gage help him say "{Merde!} You are stalled, do x, y, z, etc." Don't know, maybe yes.

So there you go: if not initially (your point is taken on that score), then at some point subsequent, the stall warning was either
dismissed as suprious
or
ignored due to "what is it doing now?" problem solving/confusion overriding aural cues.

@ 0210, 47 sec.
That appears, from your graph, to be about six seconds before CLB TOGA are chosen. Did I read your graph correctly?