The Lord has spoken.

A33Zab is more reserved that you are :
Maybe IF SS feedback/interconnection was available it would not have happened.

I certainly don’t see as necessary to go back to the "old" technology.
What is more sensible and necessary, is to openly discuss what the sidestick Airbus concept has suppressed. It is the role of Airbus, it is the responsibility of the BEA. But Old Carthusian can sleep well, never the BEA will approach the subject, far too sensitive, and if ever they do at my great surprise, it will be to better discard it as a contributory factor.

... Report in June ?

Classic straw man argument - no it doesn't, because not only are those warnings necessary, but also there are plenty of incidents where they *have* worked. I'm sure there have been plenty of incidents where the override system provided by the sidestick design has worked to resolve a situation as well.

There is an argument for limiting the number of warnings at any given time - because of the Aeroperu and Birgenair cases, where the numerous and conflicting visual, aural and yes - tactile (stick shaker) warnings only served to confuse the flight crew.

I know that there's a lot of belief in some circles that the Airbus design was a deliberate attempt to design the pilot out of the loop and eventually out of the flight deck - this simply isn't true and never was. All the information you get from a traditional flight deck is there in some form or another, and if not, alternatives are provided. You may need to access that information in a different manner, but it is there, should you choose to use it.

No-one has even attempted to answer the question as to how the captain failed to deduce a stall situation despite the information right in front of him - asserting instead that if only the A330 had yokes he would have been able to. There's no evidence to back up that assertion, only supposition that it "might" have helped. The evidence available from similar incidents suggests that it's just as likely that it "might" not.

In a situation which is outside the realms of SOP and checklists, a good, professional aviator should use the information and tools available to resolve things. All the evidence suggests that enough information was there to do so, and the tools to do so provided. The yoke argument is a red herring here.

Hi DozyWannabe,
I'm glad you raised this one because it perfectly shows what happens when the crew don't realise how much aileron is being applied to satisfy their roll request. They both applied full roll side stick, but because it was in ground Law - they only got half aileron (above 70 kts)!!! ???

From page 46 of
http://www.bfu-web.de/cln_030/nn_226...indlanding.pdf

"The aircraft touched down shortly after the 1,000 ft marker in the touchdown zone, about 2 m left of the runway centreline lights with the left wing 4° down and the fuselage pointed 2° to the right of runwayallignment, whereupon the rudder pedals were returned to the neutral position.

The aircraft yawed towards the left, thereby increasing the lift from the right wing and decreasing that from the left wing. In spite of the co-pilot's right sidestick correction, this resulted in unintended contact between the downwind main landing gear and the runway. The objective had been to land with wings level. This was confirmed by the correct application of right sidestick prior to touchdown, which was intuitively supported by the Captain's sidestick (dual input).

After touchdown the aircraft yawed a further 5° to the left. The left main landing gear lost contact with the runway. At no time did the right main landing gear make contact with the runway. Lift dumpers (partial spoiler extension) remained inactive, because the necessary prerequisites were absent.

During the next few seconds the aircraft rolled to a 23° left wing down attitude in spite of the full right deflection of both sidesticks and application of right rudder. The switch to Ground Law limited the effect of roll control corrections. The left main landing gear again made contact with the runway. At about the same instant, the left wingtip made contact with the runway."

Page 48 "The investigation showed that the pilots could not have been aware of the crosswind flight control characteristics in close proximity to the ground and which were dependent upon the aircraft design. It is impossible to clarify whether the pilots would have taken a decision for a go-around procedure earlier had there been a risk evaluation that included aircraft system behaviour, then unknown to the crew, in this wind situation with the possible effects of gusts. The BFU is of the opinion, that the respective knowledge would probably have influenced the decision."

I know. It doesn't alter the fact that there shouldn't have been a DUAL INPUT situation in the first place. Even if they didn't go around as soon as stability was lost (which was the best case scenario), the captain mishandled the procedure for taking control.

It was a high-pressure situation, so it's understandable that instinct overrode training. However, despite assertions to the contrary, there's no guarantee that the outcome would have been any better with yoked controls - in fact if it had triggered a startle response in the F/O it may even have been worse.

@CONF - you do realise that the accusation of arrogance you're levelling at A33Zab for saying what he's saying can also be levelled at you for insisting that yokes solve everything and are an objectively superior control method, don't you?

Hi DozyWannabe,
Well I'm afraid we'll have to disagree on that one.

On the TriStar, operating to Bermuda with strong crosswinds and only Island Holding fuel, we would sometimes have to land in limiting crosswinds. If we attempted to align fully with the runway using rudder, we could feel when we were about to run out of aileron control (by the position of the yoke), so we would have to relax the rudder slightly and accept touching down with more drift.
(& full aileron control was available on the ground, even above 70 kts)

None of that feed back is available with Airbus FBW.

The fact that they got reduced aileron control on landing was not due to DUAL INPUT - it's simply a function of "on ground" mode.

Logic Problem
 

DW:
Some of us are heartily sick of this failure of logic of yours. OK, I am! :O

Few, if any, have said anything about it being "superior" or would "solve everything." And you talk about straw men! I, and others, have said until we are blue in the face, (like this): :confused: that it MIGHT have helped. WE can't prove that it would have, and YOU can't prove that it wouldn't. This is simple logic. Very experienced pilots here have opined that it might have helped. You are fighting a battle that you just can't win; give it up, man! This issue is the MAIN thing causing the hamster wheel to go around endlessly. No one will ever know if it would have helped.

As an educated SLF, When I am riding in the back minding my own business, I expect that EVERY POSSIBLE SAFETY MEASURE is in place (if it were not prohibitively expen$ive). Not rocket science. You sound like one of those accursed bean counters, or else there's some sort of bias that we don't know about. /rant

Where are you going with that one Dozy ... ?

Accusation of arrogance towards A33Zab ??? Please explain.
Where do I insist that yokes solve everything ? Please quote.

Sidestick Airbus concept suppress information of great value for a crew : It is a fact. You can quote me on that one.

You say "suppress", I say "supplies differently where that information is indeed necessary". The flipside is that the sidestick system comes with safety features and benefits that are not available with interconnected yokes - this is also a fact.

@Organfreak - as many very experienced pilots have opined that it might not make a difference as have that it might. This isn't a "failure of logic" on my part either, I know full well the posting histories of some of those I'm talking to - some of them have outright accused Airbus of being in cahoots with airline beancounters to sideline pilots. People asking "why won't they interconnect the sidesticks?" not only seem wedded to the idea that interconnection is a positive in *every* case (it isn't) - but, as importantly, don't seem to have grasped that interconnecting the sidesticks would defeat several safety features inherent in the design.

Regarding "every possible safety measure" being in place - interconnected yokes are *not* a safety measure by any objective standard. I know you're a Boeing man, but give a little ground here, eh?

Requested response
 

B44:

It wouldn't let me link to page 72 (Spoilers), but once you get it open go right to page 72. :)

B 757 General Familiarisation in Maintenance

(Sorry to interrupt CONF :))

DW:
No, you don't.

I'd swear you'd said something along those lines previously - I may be wrong, and happy to be corrected. I'm sorry if you're offended by anything I've said - but I don't like situations where all the cards aren't on the table.

You asked if I have a bias? Yes I do - I am biased towards lack of bias, objective criticism and dispassionate observation, nothing more. If a very experienced pilot, or anyone else for that matter, says they feel uncomfortable about the lack of tactile feedback inherent in the system - that's their call and I won't say a peep. If they say on the other hand that tactile feedback is inherently safer with no concrete evidence, then I'm likely to refute the statement. If they are unaware that the design of the system has safety benefits that the traditional yoke does not, I'm well within my rights to point that out.

The fact that Airbus and Boeing share around 50% of the market each and have done for over a decade with no statistically significant safety discrepancies between them proves conclusively that whatever the benefits and drawbacks are to their control designs, both are valid and safe ways of doing it.

Kneejerk calls to change the sidestick system's design based on one possible factor in a single incident are wrong-headed and ludicrous, and they only ever seem to go one way. No-one went round suggesting that Boeing retrofit the 757 with sidesticks because the Birgenair PNF didn't do anything when the aircraft was stalled - why should it be any different with the A330 and yokes because of AF447?

My sincere apologies to rudderrudderat for not attributing my quote in #407 to him, in 406.
PEI_3721 :

"With the lack of an airspeed display, a FBW aircraft has no backup of sensed trimmed position as with a conventional aircraft (no stick-force for trim speed error), thus it is important to look at the physical trim indication and be aware of the need to null any stick input when the desired flight path is achieved."

I was not focused on Stick force, per se, but on the lack of awareness PF had of his Pitch... To lower the NOSE, he has to overcome the springs, even though the a/c cooperates fully, (or would) in his command for descent(s)? IOW, and this sounds disrespectful of him, but is he "mistaking neutral for level?"

One assumes he was better treated in ROLL, as he seems to have sussed DIRECT LAW re: ROLL rather quickly. How is it his inputs were fundamentally on in correction angle, (only in rate did they alarm, and that soon settled out).

So, unfamiliar with "miss twitchy", he does a splendid job (DW, PJ2). (I disagree, ROLL remained a serious issue). Yet in PITCH, g controlled, he screws up quickly and chronically..... Do his actions, that result in "Level" (though climbing) emanate from sussing a "new normal" each time he lets up on Back Stick?

What are the two looking at, if they had attitude, how in GOD's name do either one not see the Nose well into blue? And what do you make of the conversation re: trend? I cannot figure what they refer to as trend, does "going up?" mean positive ROC? Or does it mean "inputting a command for climb?"

I think the allusion to ab initio (or medial) reversion is sound. He is a glider pilot, and cannot fly 330 as a Schweizer....

Maybe stop creating stories of your own, then you won’t need to fight them.

DW, any chance you assume those statements at least, or is it free speech again with no backbone ?

After analyzing hundreds of messages including the elements trying to show that the pilots are not fully responsible for the accident .. I conclude ( the sad reality) that none of the explanations fail to hold harmless the lack of professionalism of the pilots
Since setting up deep stall to the imposibility to recover from it .. is comparable to performances of poor beginners despite their experience (their licenses of liner pilot and flight hours on paper)
I can compare them (their piloting skill) to the September 11 terrorists .. but them .. despite their poor piloting skill and inexperience on type .. they have completed their mission that was to kill people
The mission of the Air France pilots was to save people .. and they have not fulfilled their mission
Maybe crude and rude .. maybe some think like this but don't speak of it .. but after all ... why not ?

My friend, I hope you reconsider. The two things are not even alike, at all. We already have many helps to explain what happened, and although it seems the pilots were somewhat at fault, you must consider what you say. There was no evil on board or on the ground in connection with the tragic loss of 447. I am angry with some involved with crash of AF, but they are humans, too, and likely suffer with the rest of us....

Take a breath mon ami.

jcjeant: Wow.

Lyman;
How and in what way does a roll to a bank angle of about 8deg either way "remain a serious issue"? I'm referring of course to "Phase 1", which is from the initial UAS event until the onset of stall-warning or the apogee.

The evidence that the PF got the roll under control quite quickly is in the data - it is a series of diminishing oscillations - a stabilizing (reducing) pattern of divergences, between left and right.

Now, as the AoA increases and lateral stability decreases, roll commands increase again and along with everything else roll becomes increasingly unstable, but all this occurs after the stall warning and just a bit later, the stall at apogee.

Even if there is some incidental pitch up command, both pitch and roll are eminently controllable with small movements and a normal response to an incidental pitch-up which is not desired, (for sure, not at FL350).

Ideally, one flies the airplane, which here means that the pitch is lowered and stick movements subside, (stick held fast), while the mass of the airplane settles down in the thinner air, then one returns to cruise altitude, etc.

th to go, then with renewed vigor....
 

My take is that as well as PF did in his containment of his initial overcontrol in ROLL, he was unable to sense a neutral, in PITCH attitude. I would have expected that due to DIRECT LAW in ROLL, it should have been the reverse.

Simply put, PF was chronically either a) seeking to slow, or b ) seeking to avoid a descent. What other than those two would explain a chronic UP input? You point to his remedy of ROLL in "Phase 1". Later, with excursions in ROLL of over 40 degrees either side, he kept the bird from turning over. Again, a "mastery" of lateral. But an acute misunderstanding of PITCH.

Do you expect any surprises in BEA "Final"? I think most everything was anticipated at great length here. Do you think they will address UAS in full, for instance, discussing loss of Radome? How in depth will they go in analyzing the vagaries of the newest nemesis " Microcrystalline Water Ice"?

Will they rehash the badness of reselecting AutoPilot whilst in NCD?

A month to go, then with renewed vigor.....

all the best,

Lyman;

Some edu-guesses - they could be way off base, but an attempt...

The airplane is more sensitive in Alt Law in roll but once one gets used to it, it is controllable using tiny inputs. Being unable to sense a neutral point would be difficult because it is strong enough in the SS to feel it, but if distracted or under pressure, perhaps not as easily. The way to find the null in either yoke or SS is to let go of the controls for a moment - in most cases nothing immediate would occur and one starts from the null point. The airplane is less sensitive in pitch, but in pitch one is changing the trajectory of the entire mass, and in thin air, whereas in roll, one is (in the immediate sense), not asking anything more of the airframe than a change in bank - other than the engines, fuel and wing-structure and some resistance from the vertical and horizontal stabilizers, one isn't immediately changing flight-path which requires much more work. Just edu-guessing here...remember, I'm not an engineer!

Possibly - this has been discussed at length in thread 2 or 3. The baro alt decreases about 300ft initially then recovers quickly - it did this in the Air Caraibes event as well. Seems a characteristic of this event. Even if this was an over-reaction by an inexperienced-at-manual-flight-in-cruise pilot, (and there, most of us are the same!), it is easily controlled by gently pitching back down and settling the mass of the airplane. But no. The pitch continued to increase. There is lots of blue on the PFD, and one should be getting very (very!) twitchy where one's behind meets the seat if you get my drift - high pitch angles at cruise are an instant "full-alert" & "get it down", now, kinds of occurences.

On pitch, I suspect right after the apogee and by the time the bank angles were reaching 40deg, (only at one point in the descent), a differently-developing psychological state began overtaking the crew, esp the PF. It is well known that high stress exhausts intellectual resourcefullness and perceptions - this was mentioned in the Alaska Air 261 MD80 jackscrew accident off LAX. I think this would be addressed in the HF section of the Report. A rational assessment of pitch was perhaps less possible as a visceral, self-preservation response developed from a state of increasing loss of SA - the solidly-held up elevator occurs twice in the descent and for a protracted period of time. The same phenomenon was recorded in the Airborne Express DC8-63 stall accident in 1996.

I think the surprises will probably be in the emphasis the BEA places on various aspects of the accident and not in what may or may not have been missed. There will be absences in the report that will be puzzling to some I suspect but that comes from one's particular POV and not necessarily from the importance of one or another aspect of the accident. The three IR's are thorough, particularly the third and address HF/Ops matters such as SOPs, CRM and so on and I think that will be the most examined. It is reasonable to consider that the stall warning, AoA indicator (raised in the Airborne Express accident), and THS items will be discussed but it is hard to say how, primarily because the airplane performed as designed and certified. It will be interesting to see if the sidestick issue is discussed. I think it will be minor if at all, primarily because it remains a demonstrably successful design and there are some counter-examples where the yoke design hasn't prevented the stall or crash, and because the expectation that design engineers cannot be expected to design against all possible circumstances. Something like that anyway...it's all a guess.

I hope the UAS issue will be addressed from a number of viewpoints. As you know I think the drill and checklist are poorly-crafted, poorly-trained and to put it simply, confusing. There are a few documents which have surfaced over the past year or so that put meat on this memorized drill and read-do QRH checklist so perhaps with such supporting training it's okay as written. The FCTM emphasizes items that are not at all clear in the drill. I think the PF was executing what he knew from a previous sim which was the memorized drill just after takeoff which is entirely the wrong thing to do at cruise altitude but this isn't clear as evidenced in the discussion in thread 5 or 6. I've had a go at re-designing it and it seems to work but there are always considerations that at first aren't obvious and maybe the drill as-written is still the best. I think the pitch-up was intentional and it rapidly confused the PF and the PNF did not take action, did not challenge what was happening and did not stop it, which, to me and many others, would have been obvious once seeing a pitch attitude of 10 - 12 degrees at FL350 so I think there is a cultural thing (broadly HF) here that will show up in the report. This has already been mentioned with regard to two F/O's, cockpit gradient, Captain's briefing etc.

There was no loss of radome until impact so it won't be discussed.

I think the discussion of ice formation and loss of pitot function will be extensive, as will the pace and decision-making process regarding actions and replacement prior to the accident. I think it may be a summary of thinking and design changes already done. But also it deserves the same kind of treatment say, that the ice-formation in the Trent 900 received in the BA777 Report.

I think also there will be questions/comments for all parties regarding awareness, training and checking given that the industry had had thirty-odd UAS events in cruise yet it didn't appear to be making them a part of recurrent training. I never once saw any such abnormal in the sim yet they were out there, post-1996. Other already-required scenarios may have crowded out the time needed for this but it was a demonstrable threat which, to me, was not handled in the way we ourselves are trained when we are doing threat-and-error management in the cockpit. I can't ever recall it even being discussed.

I can't recall - did the crew do that and was it potentially a factor? Regardless, I suspect it won't be discussed except in passing. The Bulletin was issued and is part of SOPs.

Quote:

---

"A month to go, then with renewed vigor....."

---

It's an extremely challenging report to write - I think it will be longer than June but again, a guess. I suspect the translation will be even longer still.

Reason for the right turn after the stall
 

I've been dinking around with this and here is what I've come up with on the right turn after the stall (after all, why not a left turn?)

First, there was no "uncovered setting of the rudder trim that became exposed by Alt2 as I had earlier suggested there might be.
The autopilot has authority to trim the rudder in the same way that the pilots can and did so a number of times up to the AP disconnect. It was with the last A/P rudder trim setting that AF447 did its descent.http://home.comcast.net/%7Eshademaker/AF447Yawtrim1.jpg
Before the AP disconnect, there are some small trim adjustments on the order of 0.2 degrees. ranging from -0.25 to -0.5 degrees. After the AP disconnect, there are some small blips in the trace, but the indications remains as before. The position moved to -0.4 degrees seconds before the AP disconnect and that is where it stayed. -0.4 degrees has the effect of being a slight right rudder input. The reasons for the blips in the trace are unknown, and are most likely caused by noise on the circuit, or mechanical slop in the indicating system.

The effect of slight rudder trim would be minimal until the AOA began to run up, at which point, it would cause a preference to drop the right wing in a stall. The turns that are observed after the stall would then result from this preference plus pilot inputs on the rudder.

This probably repeats the evaluations of others, but now is my own.:O

When I pulled the clean F-4 into a stall and held it there, the aircraft would drop off on a wing. If I then applied opposite rudder gradually increasing, it would then flop over on the other side without being able to stabilize it even momentarily in a wings level mode. If I continued doing this ruder exercise, the aircraft would reverse itself yet again ever more violently. This is the experience I use to explain the AF447 post stall behavior although the A330 has a very docile stall by comparison.

Before there was loss of situational awareness of nose attitude, there was loss of situational awareness of altitude.

It is unimaginable to me that anyone who thinks they are a competent IFR capable pilot could completely lose the bubble on this, yet both PF and PNF allowed the altitude to get completely away from them and made almost no effort to put the aircraft on altitude. With the gain in potential energy came a loss of kinetic energy and this finally led to a stall.

The only thing that makes sense is that the roll problems were so concerning, that both pilots concentrated on that to the exclusion of their altitude scans. :hmm:

CONF iture
Human factors are the vital things to consider here - how the crew reacted to the situation. The sidestick/yoke thing is just window dressing with no real relevance to the accident. There were so many other inputs the crew could have obtained without reference to a hypothetical yoke. What makes you think that given their inability to access the information they had available that a yoke would have made any difference? What you posit is a wish state - you wish that a yoke would have provided the solution because your prejudices are inclined that way. I have no problem with you preferring the yoke but once you depart from the objective standpoint you end up in the area of speculation. We do know the following - the sidestick works and works safely. There are thousands of examples flying around at the moment. The yoke also works and works safely. Like the sidestick it does not guarantee that if a PF does something strange the PNF will react. It is not about being able to see and we have examples of where the PNF could see the yoke and did not act. I would also suggest you consider this point. In a high stress situation your interpretation of the actuallity may be considerably different to what things are. That is why the scan is so important - your instruments will tell you what is actually going on not what you believe the position of the stick is. We have a flight crew non performance here and given the evidence we have this crew would have not been able to deal with the situation no matter what their input device was. That is the sad reality.

RAeS conference
 

This will be too long for a single post, but I think some of the comments will resonate with some contributors ...

Part A

RAeS conference
 

Here is Part B

what´s going on...
 

absolutely correct, but.....


..........the instruments dont tell, why something is happening.

A climbing indication can be caused by an intentional stick input, by turbulence, by an updraft, or by a stick input seconds before. The aircraft can still be in a climb, the pitch can still be positive, the VS can still be positive, and the Stick is in neutral or even forward.

In the F4 we had no autothrottle, but a possibility of autoacceleration of the engine with certain malfunctions (aux air doors failed). The RPM increased to 100%, but we could see the unchanged throttle position and that therefore it was a malfunction and not an inadvertent advance of power, which caused the RPM to rise. Had our throttles in the front and backseat not been interconnected, a rise in RPM observed on the rpm gauge in both cockpits could have been a malfunction or a willing act of the other guy.

In case of AF447 it might have been helpful for the PNF and the captain to know, what kind of SS input the PF was doing in assisting the process of correlating the behaviour of the aircraft with the !!!wrong!!! inputs of the PF, thus aiding in failure assesment and leading to problem solving. Same might be true for the THS trim position as well as the Throttle position.

As long as the PF is doing what PNF would do himself, as long as he is acting in the expectation pattern, the instruments give all necessary information. But it gets tricky, when the instruments do not correlate with the expectation pattern and there is no other means to crosscheck why that would be the case, because the instruments only tell you what is happening.

Now you have to evaluate what caused the discrepancy from the expected, turbulence? flight control malfunction? updraft? indicator malfunction? unintended flightcontrol input? Deliberate flight control input?

That might be true, unfortunately.

Imho the standpoints don´t differ that much from each other concerning objectivity and speculation. Nobody knows what would have happened, when............
We know however what had happened with AF447, and that one was not desireable as many other accidents with or without SS / Yoke.

So it is worth to think over all issues, might they be liked or not.

Indeed some interesting points - however, I would go as far as to suggest that one shouldn't be operating on an expectation pattern. My instructors always taught me that you don't expect anything but you accept what the instruments tell you. Once you start to expect you run the risk of deviating from how things are and getting into a mess. Of course this may be different in military aviation but this is what I learned. Knowing what is often a vital factor and could be said to have more importance than why. The aircraft is climbing too quickly therefore put the nose down. Understanding why it is climbing can come late I would think.
I would agree with you about speculation but here the evidence points to human factors and crew non performance in such a way that the input device was peripheral and would have remained so no matter what. It does make one wonder how these poor people ever got onto an aircraft flight deck. Given, for example, that there seems to be no attempt to diagnose the initial issue in accordance with SOPs how would the input device have made any difference? In my opinion the breakdown in everything related to flight management and procedure was so complete it would overwhelm any system. That is why a discussion of whether a yoke would have helped is futile.

It's wrong! Who wrote that? I did?!? Oh well... What I wrote was very simplified, and most probably oversimplified, illustration of the way low speed cues work on modern EFIS aeroplanes, without the need to know what's the actual weight. It was not meant to be taken literally as be-all and end-all definition of system operation. I strongly suspect your further line of thought, about showing wrong stall warning speed when IAS gets unreliable is correct and covers the reason why low speed cue gets shut off when IAS data is lost. BUSS is basically the same thing you are proposing: replacing IAS with AoA information. If someone said that having AoA display is great because fighter jocks use it would have shown impressive misunderstanding of the way things work in aviation. Yes, combat pilots of last thirtysomething years usually do have a little gizmo making their life easier during approach and landing, it's either doughnut & chevrons type AoA indexer or AoA bracket on HUD. It is there to make their already complicated life easier by reducing the need to accurately calculate their approach speed for actual weight plus any effect from external stores. No, it is not 100% reliable as AoA vanes do get stuck or birdstricken then it's reversion to monsieur Pitot again. Of course, one has to be proficient in its use, which can only be achieved through practice. It is of utmost importance to know that yellow light means stick back, red stick forward, not the other way around.

In transport aviation, we are more concerned with field and cruise performance maximization than with the shooting down the intruders or bombing the bunkers while dodging the flak. We're not great buyers of AoA gauges as airspeed indicators let us do that part of our job more precisely. What we do when we lose IAS and there's no AoA gauge to save our flying butts? We (well, most of us, most of the time) revert to old fashioned discipline, taught already on the basic trainers, called "pitch and power". I had to demonstrate safe visual circuit in C-150, with ASI covered, just using pitch and power to get my PPL and I'm pretty sure it wasn't just me.

Uh-huh. I can only imagine the rage, fury, indignation of the "If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going" brigade when Boeing abandons simple stick-to-control flight control arrangement and replaces it with hydraulic monstrosity that requires air data driven artificial pitch feel to be effective. If the day comes, we'd better hide the fact from them manual control freaks, lest we risk the riots.

In ideal world. I like better this one, it's more realistic:

It's wonderfully politically incorrect yet it perfectly explains regional safety statistics.

Nevertheless, suggestion that Airbus FBW raison d'etre is cost and that cheaper must be less safe is completely misinformed or an indicator of recklessly pushed agenda. Or both.

Is this really what you're trying to do? Eliciting certain reaction? Well, it's nothing personal, but IMHO airline pilot who enters the flight deck in night IMC and does not look for the clues on the instrument panel displays unprofessional behaviour, definition of which is not entirely arbitrary as not adhering to professional standards in aviation can be lethal.

It is not a fact; it is an opinion. In natural and technical sciences, opinions do not become facts just because some anonymous posters or mediapersonnae repeat them ad nauseam.

Now find me someone who really is an expert on the aeroplane flight controls and who can coherently, reasonably and non-anonymously state what you have written.

Completely unnecessary ad hominem directed at Old Carthusian.

Anyway, BEA or any other safety agency does not give a rat's stern about PPRuNe or any other anonymous pilots' forum. Those who are not on PPRuNe to "elicit certain reactions" and thus receive their pay through others' responses, but rather really seek an improvement in safety, should submit their concerns direct to BEA.

However, there are two problems: you can't submit your theory anonymously. Second is that theory that in multi-crew enviroment, the assisting pilot must always know what is the control position of the flying pilot runs afoul of the basic instrument flying model of closed loop feedback via instruments, so there's good chance BEA will simply bin the submission. Of course, some sensitive souls might see it as an evidence to conspiracy.

Nope. The evidence, so far, has been neatly and unemotionally put down in the three interim reports. Only ones yelling are those PPRuNers who are taking some evidence out of context and ignore lots of other to push their own unsubstantiated view on the matter. Seems that some are preparing to pour their indignation on BEA's findings when the final report is out. Certain Teutonic gentleman has already warned us of such an approach:

Anyway, there were 32 cases of at least two pitots blocked on 330/340 before AF447. Did we discuss them here on PPRuNE?

Clandestino said:
OK, I accept the contention that I am, er, "completely misinformed," but, pray tell us, what are the advantages to the AB sidestick system if cost (weight savings) are removed as a factor? That is the only justification I've ever seen for such a design. Sure, it must be great to have a work table to fold down, but, what else? If you want to attack my opinion, please supply some solid facts. (add "it's OK, I'm not mad at you" emoticon) :)

Now, as for Mr. Glyndwr's contribution....
Thank you! It's a relief, to me, to see these factors being considered so sensibly. I say this because no-one has seen fit to comment on what could have started a very interesting discussion on something besides side-sticks and incompetent pilots. :D

DW:
OK, OK, I DO live in Boeing's back yard (and I don't mean Chicago!), and have for 60 years, but they get no halos or blank checks (cheques?) from me!

Could we look at this more objectively? I'm aware that the 'low speed awareness' markings are fundamentally different from Airbus' markings of 'characteristic speeds'. But when airspeed has 'gone south' and in Alternate Law, may be the 'low speed awareness' is better? While the speed tape is faulty (maybe it should be 'greyed'), the 'low speed awareness' tape is valid, correctly displaying the stall margin. It would have informed the pilots of the 'validity' of the first brief stall warnings, that they were transient and no reason for concern at that time, and would have informed them of the approaching stall warning and stall later on. Would it, by confirming the PNF's feeling that things were going 'the wrong way', have convinced him to step in with more determination?

It doesn't have the big drawbacks of the BUSS that you lose all three ADR's for the remainder of the flight, and that it is virtually useless above (IIRC) FL250.

Clandestino
No .. neither the BEA or DGAC for those on AF aircraft that were involved in this type of incident
PPrune , BEA and DGAC begin to discuss after AF447 case

@Clandestino

Quote:
Anyway, there were 32 cases of at least two pitots blocked on 330/340 before AF447. Did we discuss them here on PPRuNe?


And where were the wise ones? "no harm no foul" ? PPretty myopic, imho.

Another one who believes that things they do not know about does not exist. Those who do not know how much they do not know, usually believes they know much.

Add petty francophobia to the mix and much is explained.

Re: Myopia. Mr. Magoo, et al.

To those who believe that the Aviation industry is proactively concerned with Safety issues to the exclusion of profit, convenience, (profit), scheduling (profit), and low maintenance (profit), a klarion: Not Always....

Then there's Hubris, and arrogance. On top of Tradition, Culture, and Politics.

No one who is informed will clamor for perfection, it is not in the cards. We rely on others to assess our level of risk, and for 99 per cent of the Public, ignorance is bliss.

When Pilots go activist, pay attention. After 447, and it became clear that UAS was lurking out there for the unwary (which was everyone, by definition), a labor action was called, and wot, ho, get out the spanner Clive, (Laurent, Kim, Robin, et al).

Push, Shove, Pull. Politics is alot like flying....and verse for vise.

Was anyone not astounded that Airbus had the clout and power to demand a memorandum from BEA prior to the Show? I was not, anyone?

How much clearer can the rules be? Pay the Fife and drum, call the tune.....

Frankly, the more passion due prior ignorance, the better. Safety is directly proportional to the clamor of the client....especially so when the responsibles are not paying attention.

addend... PJ2. I included the Radome involvement in UAS generically, and here's why....

If the Final report is narrow, and addresses a limited number of issues, so as to frustrate the need for further understanding v/v the way a plane flies, and falls, more's the pity. UAS should be completely embraced and understood, to squeeeze it into the vernacular. How many airline pilots are fluent in Radome loss? It is an opportunity to further understanding of the event and its genesis, in this case and/or others. The readership of this document will be large, and I promise you, if stones are left unturned there will be pushback... It is in the interests of all for the report to be voluminous....

just my opinion....

This is a red letter day, because, for once, I totally agree with Lyman.

Sincerely,
Mr. Magoo's Seeing-Eye Dog

P.S. Arf.

I don't believe that it is, nor that it should be.

Heartily agree.

Nothing shady about that though. It's not like they asked the BEA to falsify anything, just make public the information that they already knew - i.e. that no evidence of technical malfunction had been found.

The use of language by some on here (e.g. "demand" and "suppress") is very telling. "Request" would have been more valid and correct in this case.

@Lyman:
 

Neither was I,

If experts are convinced the apparatus didn't fail, there is nothing wrong with protecting your business.
Boeing will do exactly the same when appropriate to Boeing.

If a serious flaw was detected the world would have know about it months ago.
(Like the Thales probes)

.

Let me explain what is meant by expectation pattern.
On your instruments you are flying straight and level and unaccelerated. You want to climb and for that you pull the stick back some amount and you expect the corresponding action of your aircraft on the instruments or by other appropriate means. Reaching the desired altitude you put the stick forward and you expect the pitch to decrease, the climb to stop and you check that again on the instruments, do some necessary corrections until you are again in level unaccelerated flight. By the way, if you didn´t expect an speed decrease due to climb, you probably forgot to adjust power.

If you are doing this on Automatics, you turn the necessary switches or / and pusch the buttons and expect again the automatics doing same as above, you monitor the action and the outcome on your instruments.

When PF is flying, PNF expects the PF to do all the steps above either in Automode or manual until the desired outcome is achieved, and again PNF will monitor on the instruments the correct application and the outcome.

If PNF does not expect a climb from autopilot or from PF, because it was neither intended nor anounced, and the instruments indicate a climb, he will not know, wether it is an instrument malfunction, turbulence, an autopilot malfunction, an intended or unintended climb by the PF. But the knowledge what caused the climb might be necessary to apply the correct action.

Let´s use speed as a further example to make my point clear:
Again straight and level, unaccelerating flight. On the instruments the speed tape is indicating an unplanned decrease in speed. Again it could be due to UAS (do nothing), due to unintentional climb (stop climb, descent back down), thrust change, autothrust malfunction (use manual thrust, set correct setting). Sure you check the other intruments, which will tell you why the speed is decreasing. This one shows, that you can get the necessary information of "what and why" from the instruments, but that will not work as nicely with the control around the axis of the airframe (pitch, bank, yaw), because the instruments only will tell you what and not always why.

If we can agree to replace "expecting" with "guessing", i´m 100% with you.

But to control the effectiveness of an input, you have to rely on an corresponding reaction pattern. Simplest one being taught in the first flying hour: Pull on yoke, houses get smaller; push yoke, houses get bigger; Yoke left, house left side; yoke right, houses right side; throttle forward (depending on aircraft) engine noise louder, throttle backward, engine more quiet.

Ever trained unusual attitudes with closed eyes? Instructor mistrims the aircraft in pitch and yaw and hands you the aircraft over while hanging upside down? You see the situation on the instruments and make the appropriate flightcontrol inputs, but you stop fightig the aircraft during recoveryy the moment you recognize the wrong trim (the why), because now you know why it handles that bad and you know the correct solution.


No, it is not. Guessing kills you already in peacetime albeit in war.

That is absolutely correct, but it does not make the "knowing why" unnecessary. It is not an either / or. It is a sequential thing. You have to know "what is happening" and the best path for an appropriate correction is to "know why" it happend.

It makes life easier.

Owain Glyndwr;
Not at all, as such was the case in most scenarios we did. The 20,000ft + scenario had a number of factors which delayed recovery including a NU SS held, and thrust in the CLB detent.



What I have learned in these discussions with Owain Glyndwr and HN39 are the aerodynamics behind recovery and that one need not necessarily be extraordinarily aggressive with the airplane to effect a recovery. Now, maintaining a 10deg ND pitch initially required full-forward SS. The FPA indicator moved upwards from about 30deg ND to < 10degND at a rate of about 1 to 2deg/sec, more rapidly as the 10deg's was approached.

These understandings are not normally conveyed or taught in initial or recurrent groundschool or simulator sessions.

Even for those who have a deeper-than-expected understanding of high-altitude, high-Mach Number, swept-wing aerodynamics, I think there is great value for airline pilots in the following, which is I believe a rare glimpse into aerodynamic thinking which is quite apart from our traditional understanding autoflight systems and SOPs...

From Owain Glyndwr's Post #175