Clandestino;

With regard to "missing a basic aerodynamic fact", no, I don't think either of us are missing that point. It should be quite obvious that both procedures keep the airplane flying - that is the entire point of the discussion and doesn't need re-stating.

The FCTM is a guide and an expansion upon the AOM. That fact is made abundantly clear and it should be abundantly clear to operating crews that the AOM is the legal document as specified in a carrier's OC.

The reference to the FCTM is made because, first the FCTM expands on many operating and abnormal matters and is available, and second because it explains how the UAS drill and the ADR Disagree checklists are to be done, which has proven a point of contention and confusion.

There is some value in such information given the fact that almost everyone including the BEA in their press conference was of the opinion that initially setting 5deg was the correct way to perform the memory items. It is not. But setting 5deg does no harm unless it is kept for an extended period of time - clearly, both keep the airplane flying.

Regarding theories of why the PF pitched the aircraft up, I have stated that there are a number of plausible theories and this is one. We will see what the BEA has to say and even then that likely will not be conclusive. We simply do not know why.

CONF iture, thanks for the link to the video - I'll view when able - back on the road. Clearly however, Airbus thinks that it isn't useful otherwise they would enhance it, not remove it.

Sorry PJ2, under "both of you" I meant bubber44's Airbus flying friend that he had argument with, not you. I should have been more specific.

CONF, with all due respect that's a narrow way of looking at things.

Beginning with the "iron cross" indicator, an alternative to your "don't want the PNF to see what the PF is doing" could be expressed as a desire to avoid visual distractions from the primary instruments during a crucial phase of flight. As many have pointed out, the ADI is perfectly capable of showing the aircraft's response to inputs.

I'd imagine in fact, that before changing the sidestick indicator removal from 100ft RA to weight-on-wheels, they canvassed pilots to find out how many of them were using the indicator after rotation and found most weren't. The indicator itself was only ever intended to be a method for cross-checking control movement during pre-flight and taxi as far as I know.

We've done this dance for years, you and I - I'm aware of your position and understand it, although I've never been 100% sure of your motives or agenda. As I said to Lyman, I'm not advocating sidestick over yoke - both have pros and cons, even for pilots. There are hypotheticals which favour yokes (which you've already pointed out), and there are hypotheticals which favour non-connected sidesticks (including artificial feel unit failure and incapacitation scenarios in which the incapacitated pilot is restricting yoke movement - how do you get their yoke free in a two-pilot aircraft without leaving your seat and letting go of your yoke?).

Aviation will progress one way or the other, and some aviators will be resistant to change - the Wright Brothers considered aileron panels inferior to their wing-warping technique, many pilots resisted the introduction of the autopilot and CVR and many were concerned about the introduction of widebodies which relied entirely on hydraulics with no cable backup (notwithstanding the fact that cable backup was impossible with flight surfaces the size of those on the 747, L-1011 and DC-10).

Airbus's electronic sidestick design was no different in that respect, however over the years its reliability has been proven and the chorus of dissent has lessened. The simple truth is that preference for one over the other is personal and subjective, just as I said to Lyman.

Sidestick aside, some target Airbus because they feel that the introduction of advanced computer technology and advance of automation has led to the atrophy of manual handling skills - maybe it has, but Airbus aren't the only ones following that path. In fact there was a greater advance in computer control and automation technology between the 727 and 757 than there was between the 757 and A320. I suspect Boeing would have done away with the cable backup in the 737NG but for the fact that it would put the "grandfathering" certification clause in jeopardy.

Things move on. Both Airbus and Boeing have proven their designs as successful, reliable and safe - the fact that they've both stuck to their guns means that pilots have a choice. One thing that's always puzzled me is that despite your distrust for the Airbus design, you still fly the type. I don't know who you fly for, but I feel sure that they or others you're well-qualified for have yoke-equipped types. If you feel the design is a detriment to safety, why do you go to work in it every day?

@Dozy
While I do favor real yokes as a little extra safety insurance, notwithstanding those Boeing crashes where they didn't save the day, I find myself defending "joy sticks" in the case of your example. In answer to your rhetorical question above, I have to say, just push the override button! You prolly just forgot for a moment. :8

Why do you insist that CONF has "motives" or an "agenda?" My take is that he's truly concerned with safety above defending any one system; not such a bad thing, is it? Subtle imputation, dear me, that's not so nice.....

Addendumb
 

P.S. The sidestick's only good reason for being is that it saves money (reduced weight), plus the benefit of having a clear dashboard. The industry has always maintained that cost vs./safety is an equation that needs to be balanced. I, for one, feel that's just wrong. Cost should never trump safety. :=

This is not the problem .. nobody tell the contrary
The problem is to see the position of the stick
The ADI may well show an attitude of descent while the stick is in position to climb
The ADI don't show the stick position
You will (suppose) know his position after the aircraft response on the command (visually on the ADI)
Sometime (if wrong command by the stick) it's too late for counter command

Let's be specific. 447 shows us some very pertinent data. The SS is the heart of the life and death of this flight, agree? For three years, this thread has made abundantly clear that the two pilots were not a team, and PF tells, "I have been pulling back for some while"....

Inarguable. So let's look a bit further. The very device that could have saved the flight, did it in.

Moving the controls apart in the cockpit, from the front to the side, ISOLATED each stick from the other. (See Lufthansa, Tip Strike), To the extent that the Stick cannot be recognized by the partner/Pilot, sufficient to show the command, the aircraft is operating SINGLE PILOT. This is unacceptable. As jcjeant and CONFiture show, a belated display to show controls results is not best practice.

Explain, apologize, distract, insult, the truth cannot be hidden. Part of the direct cause of the crash involved a lack of proper brief of the Captain. When told to "Climb", PF says "I have been...." A critical and obvious 'brief' is the position of the controls, stop. It also requires no time to discuss, if visible to others.

I submit and suggest that the confusion that developed in the cockpit had more to do with the lack of visibility of the SS's than any other factor. And Confusion in the teeth of surprise is, obviously, in this case, Fatal......

Lyman said:


From Flight Global re:LH044:
I sez: This is scary stuff. I'm not going.

As far as I know, there's no override button on a mechanically-connected yoke, otherwise EgyptAir 990 would have had a happier ending.

There may be one on the T7's software-driven yokes, but I don't know.

As I said, we've been doing this dance for *years* - some time before you joined, at any rate. He's moderated his tone over time, but it always seems to come back to Habsheim, Asseline and Jacquet with him - as if he wants Airbus to be discredited as payback for the destruction of the careers of those two pilots.

That's your opinion and you're entitled to it, however there's more to it than that - a lot more. Airbus decided it was worth a punt and went for it, and the design has proven itself as safe as any other - as I said, there are benefits and drawbacks to both approaches.

How often is that really necessary though? To my mind there's only one incident where it might have helped (the aforementioned LH incident). In that incident, the landing conditions were marginal and the F/O should not really have been attempting the landing. The Captain broke procedure by snatching the stick without first overriding it.

Well yes, if you're levelling off after a descent...

Very, very rarely. These are airliners, not fighters - and as such even full deflection commands a relatively slow rate most of the time. If the PF's actions are doubtful then you can lock them out for a time with the override switch, whereas with a yoke you have to physically overcome the force they're exerting.

Again, benefits and drawbacks to both approaches.

No, it's standard airline practice. One pilot in control, the other monitoring - switching roles as and when necessary. The only time you need two pilots pulling is in the case of a cable-driven flight control system to get extra force on the surfaces - no modern airliner bar the 737 has cable connection to the yoke.

The problem with 447 was not confusion over the sidesticks, it was because on the two occasions the PNF took control, the PF continued making inputs on the sidestick, despite having acknowledged handing control over. The PNF should have seen the "DUAL INPUT" warning and could have held the override down to lock the PF out, but he did not.

@DW:
I apologize for misunderstanding your example. I read it as a point against SS. Rereading, I see that you were talking about yokes. Never mind, I'll be quiet now.

@Dozy....Quote:

Originally Posted by jcjeant
"The problem is to see the position of the stick......."


How often is that really necessary though? To my mind there's only one incident where it might have helped (the aforementioned LH incident). In that incident, the landing conditions were marginal and the F/O should not really have been attempting the landing. The Captain broke procedure by snatching the stick without first overriding it.

It is not acceptable to ignore an unsafe condition by asking a rhetorical question? "How often is that really necessary, though?"

I submit the Captain in Lufthansa incident was responding to a result of input, not a controls condition...ipso facto, your argument does not apply. Had he seen her 'wheel' command a bank radically to the right, he would have had a time advantage, and been able to avoid a 200kEuro repair.....

Throughout the CVR, and I mean no disrespect to the unfortunate souls on board, well, I'd post Abbott and Costello's "Who's on first?". Substantially, if not wholly, the confusion re: "climb, not climb, down not down, UP, no down, ok not down," was exacerbated by the lack of understanding v/v the SS, either/or or both. The 'handoffs' problem was collateral, and after the fact.....

Lyman, there are myriad potential unsafe conditions arising from connected yokes (e.g. EgyptAir 990), as well as several accidents where yoke position was not noted.

I'm not saying one is better or worse than the other, I'm saying that they are *both* valid designs.

The LH incident was a failure of procedure. The Captain should have been performing the landing in crosswinds of that magnitude in the first place. The Captain allowing the F/O to continue was a questionable command decision (as was AF447's CDB placing F/O Bonin in charge with doubtful weather ahead and a known icing problem on that type, but I digress), and he then compounded it by mishandling taking control.

With a yoke, the LH Captain would have had to fight the control forces his F/O was making, to which her reaction could have been to pull harder in the opposite direction. On top of that, dual yoke input may not do what you think. There's a school of thought on EgyptAir 990 which has the forward yoke command of the F/O and the rearward yoke command of the Captain causing the elevators to split (one up, one down), causing instant loss of control.

Again, the PNF on AF447 had the tools right in front of him to not only take control, but to lock the PF out for a period if necessary - tools put there by Airbus specifically to ensure safe operation of the aircraft if one of the pilots is not performing correctly. He did not use these tools - why?

"The LH incident was a failure of procedure. The Captain should have been performing the landing in crosswinds of that magnitude in the first place. The Captain allowing the F/O to continue was a questionable command decision (as was AF447's CDB placing F/O Bonin in charge with doubtful weather ahead and a known icing problem on that type, but I digress), and he then compounded it by mishandling taking control."

Erm....no.

1. But the F/O was landing, and not subject to your approval.

"With a yoke, the LH Captain would have had to fight the control forces his F/O was making, to which her reaction could have been to pull harder in the opposite direction. On top of that, dual yoke input may not do what you think. There's a school of thought on EgyptAir 990 which has the forward yoke command of the F/O and the rearward yoke command of the Captain causing the elevators to split (one up, one down), causing instant loss of control."

2. Fight? NO. The F/O removes her hands immediately when the Captain even touches his wheel. She won't even wait for "My aircraft".

3. It was the additive controls due to lack of command isolation that caused Lufthansa to strike the concrete with her sharklet. Again, Captain says... and takes, she drops. (With yokes). No cross command possible.

@Dozy..."Again, the PNF on AF447 had the tools right in front of him to not only take control, but to lock the PF out for a period if necessary - tools put there by Airbus specifically to ensure safe operation of the aircraft if one of the pilots is not performing correctly. He did not use these tools - why?

The BEA will tell us why... but let me anticipate. Command confusion due to one or more of several causes. PNF does not assuredly trust his displays, so to take command, he felt his evidence for doing so was questionable. Culture in Air France puts pressure on ego, and shame, just like Korea. It is very stressful for both people to change the command. Did we hear the Captain attempting to apportion command (control)? NO, and he is the Commander de vol. So Captain himself does not see a problem with PF's performance beyond some obvious corrections, Rudder Bar coming to mind. Captain notes PF "I have no VS..." and says, get this...."Ok"... "He's pulling UP...." "Well someone should, we're at 4000 feet"......Remember, the Captain enters and says "What the Hell are you doing?.....

Ah, I see - no worries. I hope bubbers44' neighbour is open-minded and willing to learn a bit.

I'm interested in your note regarding the FCTM.

First, I know that each airline determines for itself, within applicable limits, how it will operate a manufacturer's aircraft. A few decades ago, we used to re-write the manuals entirely and heaven help someone who transitioned from one airline to another. Today, most airlines adopt the Boeing and/or Airbus ramp-to-ramp SOPs with type-specific modifications.

The FCTM is, as you say, more a resource than a manual and any disagreement between the AOM and other manuals is resolved in favour of the AOM. First such manual I saw was for the B727 around 1983. We've used a type of FCTM for years - the present Airbus one is a very helpful document. As you would know, it can be supplied by the manufacturer, earlier, moreso from Airbus than Boeing, and then modified to accommodate airline-specific procedures. The ones I've seen are very close in their presentations and procedures. The present response to the UAS showed up in about 2007, with the flow-schematic which included the 'do not do the memory items' qualification. IIRC I posted an image of the flow-chart.

You sound awfully sure. This sounds an awful lot like the unprovable "no pilot would ever..." assertion. Where's your proof?

The tools to isolate command were there with the sidesticks, even if she held on (Captain presses and holds the override button). Why weren't they used?

Come on Lyman, this is whataboutery and prejudice - I expect better.

O.F.;
No, it shouldn't.

But it does, mainly because most of the time such a decision is made (commercial versus safety priorities) the circumstances are complex, there are many factors pulling the decision-makers in both directions and on any one day, it is possible, given history, experience, competency, either decision could be, in the moment, the correct one.

I know of at least three A320 heavy landings which exceeded the certification limits in which the airplane flew again, right away. I know at least one was a commercial decision until Airbus got hold of the data and grounded the airplane. Often it isn't nearly as clear-cut and airlines have significant challenges today with horribly low fares and therefore precious little money with which to "do the right thing". The industry is so far retaining its enviable safety record and that says something about successful decision-making and cost-cutting. But the phrase, "Fine-tuning the Odds Until Something Breaks", was the title of a paper written by William Starbuck on the Challenger accident. Great title, great point. And Diane Vaughn has written a superb book entitled, "The Challenger Launch Decision" - an excellent examination of the organizational culture and the "normalization of deviance" at NASA which led to the first, and many agree, the second shuttle.

I think the same thing applies today and it takes awareness of these factors and strong leadership to cut costs at an airline and remain as safe as possible. It isn't black-and-white.

Dozy, you are the whatabouteryiste here. What I describe is the procedure with yokes at all times, without exception. "My aircraft" is based on many things, but always includes a peep at the controls.

You have ignored the time advantage in visible controls, if the PF is maneuvering incorrectly, the Captain (Lufthansa) does exactly what I describe, if in an a/c with visisble controls. I don't have to guess, and you saying that Captain would have a tug 'o War with F/O in a yoked airplane is absurd.

In support of PJ2, above, I would offer the deferred (illegally) and pencil whipped skin inspex on Southwest's 737's, and don't let's forget Aloha.....

Lyman - yep, that, and a whole lot of other things I personally witnessed during my flight data work. Thing is, I never understood why they perceived flight data as "just an opinion" that could be dismissed when inconvenient.

Further to the point and further off-topic, this came out today:

I'd say EgyptAir 990 is a bl**dy big exception!

I haven't - CONF made the point earlier, and I acknowledged that he made the point. All I did was provide a counterpoint.

Again, EgyptAir 990 along with many other incidents over the years proves that what should happen is not necessarily what does happen.

@PJ2 :

Flippin' 'eck! You'd have thought Alaska would be the last airline to let those kind of shenanigans happen again after the drubbing they got over Alaska 261...

Egan added that Horizon is replacing the fittings with ones that don't require such frequent inspections.

Anybody here ever notice an operator seeking applause after the fact, for what needed to be done as part of their work, before the fact?

Dozy, stop with the coy... You try to consistently conflate irrelevance with procedures....

Please elaborate. As far as I know, you stated that without exception, a junior PF will relinquish control to a senior PNF as soon as the latter's hand touches the controls, to which I expressed doubt.

You also stated that there would never be a "tug-of-war" on the yoke. I simply provided one example (and looked up some others, made some notes) of where that was precisely what happened.

Prior to that I stated that the Airbus flight deck provides a way of locking out a wayward PF that is impossible with connected yokes - but for whatever reason on two ocasions where it would have been helpful, it wasn't used.

I've already said that CONF makes good points about tactile response being a positive aspect of the yoke design, and provided examples of where the sidestick arrangement has positives over the yoke from a safety/piloting perspective.

I've stated categorically that I don't consider one better than the other, and that both have benefits and drawbacks.

Tell me where I'm going wrong here, because I can't see it.

Dozy;
I agree. I recall that there was at least one suicide over the outfall of 261.

Clearly here, money has a longer shadow than memory of how and why things went wrong.

The problem with constant change at the top is that memory disappears with people who have moved on but the pressure for profit is inherited but without the history. The usual obvious "solutions" are invoked.

You not only have to come clean you have to be clean to start with but the problems are not sourced nor resident in individual airlines. The same sources that are now being discussed in the popular press regarding families under enormous financial stress (sometimes resulting in violence) are not that different from the financial forces that cause ordinarily rational people to compromise their own long-held professional or management values especially if one's job is on the line due to performance pressures. Standards cost, one way or another.

PJ2

You have a habit of oscillating between big picture, small picture, and enlisting absolutes if necessary to distract from a currently well framed discussion. We were discussing 447, and Lufty/Hamburg. Up jumps Egypt, and Lyman is in the weeds.

Simples. LH Captain/F/O dynamic with yokes: "Fräulein, Geben sie mir"
"Naturlich, Kaptain"...... Sharklet remains virgin. Ja?

Because her yoke is visible, the commander acts quickly, and there is no cross command, IMHO.

They hadn't jihadists aboard, and the Captain was not wearing an hatchet handle out his skull, nicht wahr?

Klaar?

This ongoing Yoke v SS argument is IMHO not relevant to the loss of AF447. Why? Because in this case other factors were at work, i.e.

• Lack of CRM,
• Lack of communication,
• Lack of knowledge,
• Lack of relevant training, and
• Failure to follow SOPs.

Yes, it may have helped the situation if the SS position was being displayed on the PFDs, but it wasn't and with all the other problems just listed, there is no guarantee that the outcome would have been much different. To give Capt Dubois some credit, I suspect that if he had seen the SS position floating up high on the overly blue PFDs on his return to the cockpit, in all probability he would have regained the LHS and done something about it.

I raised the issue of the "Iron Cross" displaying when in ground mode, and the possibility of it being displayed in flight mode when the A/P is disconnected in AF447 Thread No.3. CON fiture disagreed at the time, but if it were displayed, it would certainly identify the "mayonnaise makers" whether SIM borne or airborne.

My only other suggestion is that the color of the cross change to orange for dual inputs and to red if priority control has been taken.

Hmmm.... Not relevant? Not contributory in any way shape or form?

That is quite a relief.

Done then, with the SS issue. No complaints.

, I suspect that if he had seen the SS position floating up high on the overly blue PFDs on his return to the cockpit, in all probability he would have regained the LHS and done something about it.

He didn't have to, he had just climbed an aisle canted at 16 degrees, uphill...

mm43. What color if mayonnaise? (rate)

:ok:

Which highlight shortcomings in the Airbus sidestick system when used improperly...

Which highlights shortcomings with connected yokes...

So you only want to talk about things that the sidestick detractors agree with. With you. I respectfully decline.

It would have worked the same if the override system had been used properly with sidesticks. The issue is using the tools to hand *correctly*. Done properly with the sidestick or yoke system, there'd have been no issue. The problem was that the system was used incorrectly, and could have been used incorrectly no matter what the control method.

Opinion yes. It's not a certainty.

El-Batouti was no jihadist - he was a man with financial problems who'd just been disqualified from transatlantic routes.

mm43 - I agree absolutely it's irrelevant here, but sadly we're at that point on the hamster wheel again.

I disagree that having the SS position indicator on the PFD would help particularly though. The reason I disagree is because there have been too many incidents where the yoke position has been ignored during a pressure situation - I really don't think it's as big a deal as some make it out to be. The Captain of AF447 didn't put the evidence of roll and pitch instability plus a rapidly unwinding altimeter together in time, so all a position indicator would likely have done would be to have contributed to information overload. Besides, in the A320 sim, standing over the centre console I could see enough of the sidesticks to judge position to some degree - and I'm not a tall guy!

Based on what I know I can only conclude that sidestick position is a red herring here. The PNF could have locked the PF out at any point and didn't - he seemed unsure as to whether he had the authority to do so and was waiting for the Captain. When he arrived, the Captain's first action was to take the troubleshooting phase back to square one, which cost them more time than they had. Judging by the CVR, the PNF had a handle on what was wrong from the outset and consistently showed better judgment than the PF. Unfortunately, for whatever reason, he lacked the confidence to act directly on what he believed to be the best course of action.

LymanPurple! :E

Mais non. Blanc. :p

DozyWannabeNeither did he have the "b:mad:lls" to appraise Dubois on what had happened in the past 1 - 2 minutes.:(

Exactly - that worries me far more than the sidestick or automation debate.

...the PNF had a handle on what was wrong from the outset .... for whatever reason, he lacked the confidence to act directly on what he believed to be the best course of action......

mm43.....
Neither did he have the "blls" to appraise Dubois on what had happened in the past 1 - 2 minutes.

Both you guys are confident PNF actually knew what had been happening?
See, when BEA flesh out the CVR, I think HF will take front and center. PNF may only appear to have a handle on the moment, we'll just have to see....

Doze, I really have to call bs on your comment. "...he lacked the confidence to act directly...etc." Embarrassingly presumptuous, IMO.

He told the PF to stop climbing, told him not to deploy speedbrakes and during the few seconds he had control tried to get the nose down. He seems to have figured out what was happening - why he didn't communicate this is one for the BEA HF bods.

@Lyman, I'm only going on the information in front of me. Every call he made prior to the Captain's arrival was correct, and yet he seems to have felt he had to wait for the captain rather than put his foot down and take control himself. I'm no expert, but it reads a lot like lack of confidence to me.

@mm43
 

Exact!
I fully agree with you.:ok:

Concerning your suggestion, maybe a compromize will be acceptable for CONF?

Show the PF SS on the PNF display, so PF will not be distracted by information he already knows.
The information only shown if SS is moved from neutral so the pop up will trigger the monitoring pilot.

@Lyman:

Once the captain opened the door and sat down,
the SW ceased, all AS were gone (FPV Flags were present when he selected it) - no FD bars and ..... pitch - at that time - returned to even
negative values for approx. 1 minute.

The only clue he had visible was the boxed V/S, the unwinding ALT and very poor briefing.

DW
I think everyone can agree with your analysis
After all you are not the only one to have this view
As there are disadvantages to both .. and if we want to be practical there are two choices:
Either correct the problems on the two or choose to concentrate all efforts on a single
Indeed .. in an effort to standardize it would be smarter to keep for the future a single system that would have been perfect (after the needed corrections)
Indeed .. it is possible to steer a bicycle or a motorcycle with handlebars or a steering wheel
The handlebar was chosen as standard .. and nobody would think to currently building a bike equipped with a steering wheel ....
Hope this made sens ...

Why? Things are working as well now as, if not better than when all airliners had yokes, are they not?

If a klutz like me can take off, land and recover from high-altitude stall in an A320 sim on my first or second attempt, then there can't be too much wrong with the setup.

If you can use Windows, you can use MacOS with no real issues. Same if you can drive with the steering wheel on the right as opposed to the left. If you can fly with a yoke you can fly with a sidestick. If both approaches work with no significant impact on safety, there's no compelling reason to standardise on one.

I think you are heading on the right track.:ok:

Basically a software adaption to make use of data already available.

If the PNF does not feel they have the authority to override the PF, it makes no difference if they can see the inputs or not. The F/O in the Birgenair 757 crash must have practically had the yoke in his lap and he *still* didn't take control.

The software change mm43 describes wouldn't be difficult to implement, but would it have helped? I'm not convinced.

On the contrary, we think PF did NOT know where his SS was, relative to its own index, hence: "inadvertent aft input".

With a proper display of his own input, scratch "inadvertent".

Quote:
Originally posted by A33Zab ...

Show the PF SS on the PNF display, so PF will not be distracted by information he already knows.
The information only shown if SS is moved from neutral so the pop up will trigger the monitoring pilot.

There is no way to know if it would have, or not. But it might have. Isn't that good enough? I think so.