:O I have misread the tense & the subject of your sentence and understood it wrongly you meant capt Asseline still supports the discredited theories put forward by his legal defense. My apologies. Anyway, those still insisting computers have flown the aeroplane into trees represent interesting case of belief that lawyers provide us with objective aeronautical analysis.

Thanks, where did it come from?

Comma would be far more appropriate as the aeroplane exited the envelope at 2:10:54, thirty two seconds after the CM1 mentioned the alternate law.

Hi,
Clandestino
This investigation has very bad start of a judicial point of view when we know that both flight recorders (CVR and DFDR) disappear that evening of the crash, transported by air by the Director of the DGAC Daniel TENENBAUM without any judicial seal there is affixed by the Prosecutor of Mulhouse, Jean WOLF.
10 days after the accident, the judge Germain Sengelin will questions about the itinerary and location of the two "black boxes". They are going to will have seals, but after ten days without judicial review, it is too late to prevent the suspicion of being born.
So do not be surprised at all that has followed
What would have happened if we had learned that the recorders of AF447 had been recovered but had been for ten days at the hands of investigators without judicial knowledge of it ?

The question is, and i asked that before: Had the the crew a way to recognize the exact state of ALT Law, in this case ALT2B, which differs significantly from a variety of ALT Laws, and did they?

The listing from Turbine D does not offer any detailed information into what kind of ALT Law the FCS in the mentioned UAS events reverted.

We might as well have here with AF447 the only case, where ALT 2B was triggered and in all other cases more protections had been available. Thus creating a wrong mindset with the PF (...Alt Law, no problem, business as usual...)

Those initial side stick commands again ...
 

Try this planet for size:
Boeing pilot (deceased). With yoke. FO didn't intervene either.

And then of course you get the non-boeing pilots who pull the yoke right back on s/w and then pull right through the stick pusher. Again, FO didn't correct.

The other crews respected stall warnings and were not relying on the protections.

Clandestino #1509
 

Thank you for mentioning the F16D as a training aircraft.

I would suppose that Concorde COULD have been used/ MUST have been used, as a "training aircraft" too ! ( Perhaps a little expensive for most beginners...)

The point that I was attempting to make with reference to the DH86b was that positive hand-over of the control was VERY visible to both pilots.

Re: Those initial side stick commands again ...
 

HN39: Thx again!

Considering this as the Proportional and Integrated SS inputs, we need to know values for Ki and Kp to calculate the input to Pitch control channel(THS/Elevator), true or not?

Are you able to extract q(pitch rates) from the pitch traces?

Excuses if you already did before, if so then I've probably missed it.

Hi,

HazelNuts39
Some other did not respect the stall warning (discarded cause believing to be false) .. and you know that (already posted multiple times)

A33Zab,

The C* story is probably not as simple as I'm trying to make it. Anyway, I don't think I can get any closer to defining the coefficients.

jcjeant,

Point taken.

Hi Clandestino,
I saved this chart for reference, actually there was a second chart with less detail but the same reported events. It came from a posting back in the 4th or 5th thread, I believe it was a takata posting.

I also saved this which was part of the posting:

Turbine D,
Yes, you're right, it was takata on thread #5, post #128.

Touch and experience and training
 

Thanks for the opportunity, Clan...

I pointed this out early - the jet seems to have an excellent aerodynamic design. No extreme buffet, roll oscillations ( extreme, not the ones we see on the traces), etc.

I imagine the Concorde had the "standard" delta sink rate characteristics as the F-102 and other deltas - a slight buzz and then an unwinding altimeter and great directional control/stability. The buffet and shaking in most swept wing jets of the fighter genre had pronouced buffet and roll/yaw excursions. Ask Retired about the Double Ugly. I could feel the "buzz" in the F-102 as I lost those lifties and drag overcame lift. Many pilots could not, and their first clue was the unwinding altimeter or a sharp drop when in the "flare" ( gear damage was not uncommon).

That being said, I maintain that training for stall recognition and entry is possible, maybe even in the sim. I would advocate a stick shaker, but if your FBW system disregards AoA under certain laws, then that wouldn't work in the real jet, huh? OTOH, certainly the airframe buffet would be different enough from normal turbulence and spoiler deflection, etc. to provide a clue when the instruments are FUBAR. There might be a way to use the data from AF447 to introduce mechanical vibrations in the sim and let the folks "feel" it.

BTW, the Viper family models I flew were the "B" models, as in first ones ever manufactured. Not only were we in tandem cockpit seats, but the stick only moved 1/8 inch! Figuring out what Joe Baggodonuts in the front seat was doing was a bear.

I must express some concern. clandestino, that you do not consider

"The pitch attitude changes from
6° nose-down to 13° nose-up in
11 seconds then stabilises at
about 11° nose-up"

to be a rapid change in attitude, nor a pitch attitude peaking at 18 degrees to be 'extreme'?

Both in a heavy jet at high level. :confused:

I do. To me that is anything but 'benign'.

Final report finds pilot error behind Air France crash that killed 228: source
PARIS — The Globe and Mail
Published Wednesday, Jul. 04 2012, 1:58 PM EDT
Last updated Wednesday, Jul. 04 2012, 2:19 PM EDT

A French report has found that human error and technical malfunctions caused the 2009 crash of an Air France flight from Rio to Paris that killed 228 people, a source close to the case said Wednesday.

The judicial report – due to be presented to victims’ families on Tuesday next week – has concluded that pilot error and malfunctioning speed sensors were responsible, the source told AFP.

The French aviation safety authority BEA is due Thursday to present its final report on the crash. The paper is eagerly awaited amid a row between Airbus and Air France on who ultimately bears responsibility.

The source said the separate 356-page judicial report found that speed sensors froze up and failed, but also that the “captain had failed in his duties” and “prevented the co-pilot from reacting.”

The aircraft had entered a zone of turbulence two hours into the flight when the autopilot suddenly disengaged, the BEA had said earlier.

French magistrates are investigating Air France and Airbus for alleged manslaughter in connection with the crash, notably because of the malfunctioning speed sensors, known as Pitots.

The airline replaced the Pitots, manufactured by French company Thales, on its Airbus planes with a newer model after the crash.

Victims’s families have previously alleged that the involvement of big French corporations such as Airbus and Air France was influencing the affair.

Thales speed probes
 

I may point out to the honorable PPRuners that the initial approval ratification of the aircraft model had been made with probes Goodrich.
It is only afterward that Tales probes were 'approved by equivalence'.

And after june 2009 crash, Goodrich sensors are coming back :ok:

Hi,

Well .. another new story :)
There is no doubt that the accident of AF447 will enter in the list of mythical accidents :hmm:
BTW .. there are only a few hours to other speculations or last minute findings .. :)
EDIT:
Neofit
The only genuine link for the report will be tomorrow on the BEA site !

Final report: another Link (or leak?) 'surprise' factor
 

Final report: another Link

A large part of this 'paper' is Why? Why? Why?
The CCS AF serious event is also widely commented

mm43 #1482
Thank you very much to have translated the recommendations following the 1994 Tarom incident report, and much more to have described the brought improvements.

Your conclusion is expressed with a lot of wisdom:

jcjeant
I'll be busy tomorrow :{
It does not matter, next meeting with #9 thread.

Maybe, maybe not, but given the inputs on the right stick it wouldn't matter anyway, as low speed stability of ALT1 is easily overridden and bank angles would not have triggered the protection before the aeroplane was truly and deeply stalled.

It does not, but the listing at the end of interim 2 shows most of the incidents involved 2 or 3 pitots. If we combine it with A330 FCOM which unambiguously states that high AoA protection is lost if 2 ADR are lost or ADR disagree, we can conclude...

...that there is very good chance that majority (a large one) of incidents involved degrading to the same subset of ALT law AF447 experienced.

If you happen to be referring to other A33o/340 UAS events, then: nope. We don't know that yet. Notion was posted but without quote from reliable source so far.

BEA makes it pretty clear that only 13 of 36 discovered occurrences could be fully analyzed as there were insufficient data on the rest. 9 cases of stall warning and 5 cases of voluntary descent following it were recorded among the 13. Nowhere is mentioned that any crew has disregarded the stall warning or tried to climb when stall warning went off. Except in interim 3. Only one crew.

You are welcome. F-16D is combat capable trainer.

Unlike high-performance, combat single seaters, that require dedicated dual-control version for conversion and weapons training, airliners are required to have fully functional dual sets of controls per certification requirements. They can be used for base and line training without any modification.

Just as the myth about aeroplanes with interconnected yokes (especially those from Seattle) being immune to panic pull was getting seriously damaged, here comes the wink-wink-nudge-nudge that flight controls system of DeHavilland Express is in some, allegedly important, aspect superior to A330's. PPRuNE never ceases to amaze me.

True, just to add that this feature is purely incidental and definitively not by design. A330 was never supposed to get to alpha AF447 achieved.

It is unusual for normal, steady, cruise flight, but is very, very remote from what usually happens in upsets, such as Dynasty 006, Interflug at Moscow Tarom at Paris and there was no classic spin that Birgenair 757 displayed when stalled. 19 degrees of pitch change in 11 seconds is less than 2°/sec average - not very fast in my book. While CM2 actions were distinctively odd, aeroplane's post-stall behaviour would not be intuitive to me at all. I'd expect highly loaded, supercritical, swept wings when pulled really hard to develop asymmetric stall, drop and autorotate. I expected that damage to collected flotsam would turn out to be the final result of very flat spin. That AF447 went down in Cessna 150-like gentle mushing is amazing.

I wonder what conspiracy theorists will make out of it. :E

I think jcjeant is referring to the Air Caraibes memo, where the main issue is that their pilots considered the occurrence of (legitimate) stall warnings to be "inappropriate" and wanted to justify their decision to ignore the phrase in the Airbus UAS procedure which says: "respect stall warning and disregard RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING status message if displayed on ECAM".

From the Daily Telegaph (an apalling rag in my opinion)
 

It then goes on to say:
Contributed or caused? What appalling journalism.

I have my own ideas which are in line with many contributers to this thread however I find the headline from this rag says more about the newspaper than the Pilots.

Clandestino
I think that the original questioner, months ago, was really asking if "there were any ordinary civilian training aircraft with S/S controls?"

I would guess that you (or even I) might be able to define ordinary, without recourse to Law. That probably rules out the F-16D on cost grounds as well.

if "there were any ordinary civilian training aircraft with S/S controls?"

.. at the risk of being consigned to the Fires of Hell for my impertinent comment, I don't suppose you would consider the Victa AirTourer's fly by (thick) wire side stick as qualifying ? Not only can the other pilot see the controller's position and movement, he/she can grab a hold of it as required.

John
 

At last... an answer... Thanks !

Thanks to Hazelnuts recently passing a link to the engauge digitizing software, I have finally been able to perform roll behavior analysis on the initial movements of AF447. Admitted that this is the 11th hour and 59th minute before BEA releases their report, but the evidence is very strong that the crew encountered a roll PIO that took their full attention away from the proper control of their aircraft and concentrated their attention on the roll problem to the detriment of the big picture.

I was able to digitize the roll angle to a high degree of accuracy and then calculate the roll rate on a short interval basis. The roll rate data was then smoothed by a moving average technique. The result is as follows:

http://home.comcast.net/%7Eshademake...llBehavior.png

From this, it can be seen that the peak roll rates exceeded 10 degrees per second. This roll rate in an oscillation would not be ignored by a pilot and he would be unable to "look through" it to the larger picture.

We had a substantial discussion at the time I put forth the possibility of a roll PIO and rather than re-post that discussion, I will merely provide a link to that portion of thread number 7.
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/46839...no-7-a-35.html

There are ~5 different potential causes for PIO. BEA has not yet provided spoiler and aileron position data, so analysis of the causal aspect is not yet possible.

Thanks for the pointing towards Air Caraibe memo :ok:

It seems that initially, not just the pilots but also the safety pilot of Air Caraibe believed that stall warnings were undue. Is there full report on the incident? While the crew might have believed stall warning was false, it is obvious they kept AoA under control.

Cirrus SR20. We don't have ordinary civilian training aircraft with FBW and independent sidesticks because it would be far too expensive to retrofit something like C172 with hydraulic powered controls, air data computers, inertial reference and top it up with FBW electronics.

Nice picture. Could you, pretty please, extend it 30 seconds further?

Well, if it doesn't make it to the final report, you can always use page 112 of interim 3: lateral DFDR parameters. Ailerons and spoilers staunchly followed the sidesticks, their periods of fluttering like mad were occasionally interrupted by full LWD deflection with not much apparent effect, as expected in stall.

Clandestino;

I haven't found a "full report" on the Air Caraibe event. I don't think there is one.

Links to the original (French). The English translation has been unavailable for some time. This link takes you to an English version/discussion of the memo. It is close but not exactly the one I was able to retrieve a while back.

Been thinking about this respect the stall warning/ignore the stall warning matter....

The UAS QRH Drill / Checklist (dated Dec 01/08) states,

Technical recommendations:
– Respect Stall Warning, and disregard the “RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING” STATUS message, if displayed on ECAM.
– To monitor speed, refer to IRS Ground Speed, or GPS Ground Speed variations.

If remaining altitude indication is unreliable:
– Do not use FPV and/or V/S, which are affected.
– ATC altitude is affected. Notify the ATC.
– Refer to GPS altitude: altitude variations may be used to control level flight, and is an altitude cue.
– Refer to Radio Altimeter

The "Risk of Undue Stall Warn" message occurs on the STATUS page of the NAV ADR DISAGREE ECAM Checklist and occurs not on the ECAM page but on the STATUS page as an advisory message after everything else is sorted out. Here's what it says:

____________________________________________________________ __STATUS

– MAX SPEED ..............................330/.82______________|NOP SYS
_______________________________________________|____________ __|RUD TRV LIM
____________________________________________________________ | |CAT 3 DUAL


APPR PROC :
– FOR LDG ........................................ USE FLAP 3
This line is replaced by “FOR LDG : USE FLAP 3” when CONF 3 is
selected, as a reminder.
– LDG DIST PROC ...................................APPLY
Refer to the QRH 2.TOC.
CAT 3 SINGLE ONLY
RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARN
Undue stall warnings may mainly occur, in case of an AOA discrepancy.
RUD WITH CARE ABV 160 KT
The rudder travel limit value is frozen at the moment when the failure occurs.
Therefore, to prevent damage to the aircraft structure, use the rudder with care, when the speed is above 160 knots. At slats' extension, full rudder travel authority is recovered

The two messages shouldn't really be confused because the "Undue...etc" message is not seen on the ECAM until the correct ECAM SOPs have been completed for the NAV ADR ECAM.

The UAS Drill / Checklist and accompanying QRH notes is clear - Respect the stall warning.

The messages aren't contradictory but they can be made to appear so taken out of the operational context as I think the website to which I point, above, has.

That doesn't mean that it is not possible to confuse this! I think it is if one isn't paying attention. They're two different circumstances.

I frankly doubt if they had any training either way regarding whether to "respect the stall warning" or not. At the point they were at in the event that's pretty subtle stuff to be sorting out in the middle of all that was going on particularly the increasing anxiety.

If there were suggestions floating around that they may have picked up through discussion with other crews that "the stall warning could be false" and it "should" be ignored, that's a training, competency and cockpit discipline issue, not an ECAM/QRH issue I think. The message on every UAS drill I have is to respect the stall warning. We'll see what the report says, anyway...

PJ2

respecting stall warnings
 

PJ2
If there were suggestions floating around that they may have picked up through discussion with other crews that "the stall warning could be false" and it
"should" be ignored, that's a training, competency and cockpit discipline issue, not an ECAM/QRH issue I think. The message on every UAS drill I have
is to respect the stall warning. We'll see what the report says, anyway...

A procedural question from a non-pilot.

I assume that a stall warning requires a prompt response, while an event such as UAS requires a more considered response [and resort to a checklist].

If so, shouldn't the initial response to a stall warning be a memory item? With any caveats about ignoring stall warnings being part of that memory item.

This way there would be no place for confusion about when to ignore stall warnings. In particular, in-depth study of specific checklists in isolation would
not risk confounding the issue. Even when the checklists themselves may be context-specific and/or ambiguously worded.

Regards, Peter

Clandestino

Thank you for your many replies, pointing me, ultimately, to the Cirrus SR20. I expect that may be helpful to the original correspondent ( if I can find him !) More comfortable than the Dart Kitten or the Slingsby Motor Tutor in the winter, too.

LT

Thread #9 starts here.