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I was wondering whether (similar to wind speed and direction) the 'estimated sideslip' is a function of indicated airspeed and hence erroneous if airspeed is erroneous (AoA>25°). Does anybody know how it is calculated?
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estimated sideslip trace.
For the guys with the graphs:
The estimated sideslip (elaborated in FCPC) is NOT used in ALT2(& DIRECT) and replaced by Ny rear accelerometer. The FCPCs are located below cockpitfloor and the Ny rear accelerometer in the tail compartment. @HN39: Don't know the equation but it is Ny acceleration corrected by Rudder deflection and roll and yaw rate. (Inertial data) Seems to be ADR DATA is supplied also: http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/r...t_Sideslip.jpg |
@ Dozy, Owain Glyndwr, A33Zab;
Thanks for all your inputs, but as the sun is on the backside of the planet in this part of the world, I'll have a closer a look at all your contributions in my morning. |
A330 AF447 report leak?
The Daily Telegraph claims to have a leaked draft of AF447 (central Atlantic, all lost) final acc. reprt. Doesn't look too credible/accurate to me. Comments?
Air France Flight 447: 'Damn it, we're going to crash - Telegraph |
Nothing new, no leak
There is not one thing new, which would lead to the conclusion, that it originates on the future final report.
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There is not one thing new, which would lead to the conclusion, that it originates on the future final report. |
Originally Posted by Gegenbeispiel
(Post 7160859)
The Daily Telegraph claims to have a leaked draft of AF447 (central Atlantic, all lost) final acc. reprt. Doesn't look too credible/accurate to me. Comments?
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The telegraph throws in it's tuppence:
Air France Flight 447: 'Damn it, we’re going to crash’ - Telegraph |
Appalling performance
Yes GUMS,
Performance of big jets is appalling, compared to fighters. At optimum flight level, at cruise speed, pitch will be around 2 1/2 degrees nose up. For a climb to the next level, once you have burned off enough fuel so that optimum level will have increased by 2.000 ft, you increase thrust (wow, an extra sneeze is all you get) and you "pull up the nose" by about one degree. Of course you will not stall immediately if you pull up steeper, but you will not maintain speed if you do. If you want to speed up at cruise level, well you will accelerate with about 1 knot per 10 seconds - a long way removed from the 1 second per 10 knots of our previous life! The margin between high speed red line and low speed red line is not nearly as small as on the U-2, but thrust margin is not big; when you reach cruise level, 1.000 to 1.500 ft/min is all the climb capability that's left. In the handling of the situation by the pilots of AF447, the biggest communication error, in my opinion, is the talking about "climbing" and "descending" instead of "pitch, check pitch attitude, set pitch 0 degrees". |
DT masters of drivel & badly informed speculation as usual. :ok:
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Dairy Torygraph's journalists have seemingly trawled through the AF447 threads on the PPRuNe, being quite unselective what pieces of info they used for the article - some pretty realistic insight is indiscriminately mixed with utter tosh.
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Taken from the article
Boeing has always begged to differ, persisting with conventional controls on its fly-by-wire aircraft, including the new 787 Dreamliner, introduced into service this year. Boeing’s cluttering and old-fashioned levers still have to be pushed and turned like the old mechanical ones, even though they only send electronic impulses to computers. They need to be held in place for a climb or a turn to be accomplished, which some pilots think is archaic and distracting. Some say Boeing is so conservative because most American pilots graduate from flying schools where column-steering is the norm, whereas European airlines train more crew from scratch, allowing a quicker transition to side stick control |
Patchwork of different posts on the PPRuNe, stitched together in single sentence by someone whose knowledge of aviation is seemingly comparable to average Neanderthals knowledge of quantum physics.
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Hazelnuts,
AF33Zab' posting answers your question I think. They would need dynamic pressure (Vc) and Mach to calculate the rudder deflection correction, so if either of these go NCD the estimated sideslip will also. |
Thank you, EMIT.
I had an hour and re-read the last interim report and mainly the annotated CVR with system conditions and sensor readouts and..... I still cry. If was already a ghost ( not there quite there yet), and whispering in those guys' ears, I think I could have helped a lot. A surprising thing I saw and not focused upon was the bank angles. They re-inforced my initial feeling that the jet was in a really good stall and close to a spin or other completed loss of control. I had previously believed it was more stable in the roll and yaw axis. And BTW, I flew about 500 hours in the T-33 and we had a climb rate at 35,000 ft of about 1,000 fpm. BFD. I come back to the basic control laws and the blatant disregard for AoA when airspeed data is deemed unreliable by Hal. So I took my primitive FBW system laws and divided by eight. - max AoA about 4 degrees - max gee about 1 or 2 gees That seemed close enough to fit the 'bus, IMHO. Our system used the gee input until it hit the AoA limit, then AoA ruled! Our body rates were also in the loop and would come to play if the speed, gee and AoA stuff went FUBAR. So I look at the traces and annotation and can't understand why the AoA inputs couldn't "limit" or "protect" compared to what I had experienced. So my feeling is that the crew was still locked into the belief that the jet could not be pulled hard enough to stall. And some of the comments seem to indicate this - "we have been trying to climb", and similar. I then cut the crew some slack and blame the system for the disregard of AoA if weight is off the gear, regardless of the airspeed inputs' validity. AoA rules!! It's something we were taught as clueless yutes when 15 or 16 years old and learning to fly in Cessnas and Luscombes and Aeronicas and.... Further, the warning/advisory systems didn't seem to help. The "connected" side sticks" argument still has life, but pitch and power still rules, as does some good comm between the folks in the multi-pilot planes. I don't buy all of the side stick complaints, but they do have merit. As with another contributor here, the final report and recommendations shall be a landmark. |
A33Zab,
Thanks, that answers my question.
Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
They would need dynamic pressure (Vc) and Mach to calculate the rudder deflection correction, so if either of these go NCD the estimated sideslip will also.
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#HN39:
Doesn't A33Zab say that in Alt2 it is replaced by Ny without correction? The rudder deflection in ALT2 (ALTERNATE YAW) is only a function of pedal and/or Yaw damper input. (based upon the yaw rate). In ALT2 Yaw damper has a limited authority of +/- 4 degrees in CONFIG 0 (=CLEAN) |
Written in layman speak but generally nails the issue. And I say that as an Airbus pilot. Non repeating side sticks and frozen thrust levers have always been a problem along with general lack of physical feedback - a fault first revealed in the Air- Inter A320 prang.
I say to Airbus: spend the $ and buy a few servo motors to make things repeat and move! |
Inaccurate and Ill Researched
"and the jet was state-of-the-art, a type that had never before been involved in a fatal accident."
1994 at Toulouse 7 people died in a take off accident, not commercial flight however still unfortunately a fatal accident. The title of my post says the rest. |
D.Laminate wrote:
Written in layman speak but generally nails the issue. And I say that as an Airbus pilot. Non repeating side sticks and frozen thrust levers have always been a problem along with general lack of physical feedback - a fault first revealed in the Air- Inter A320 prang. I say to Airbus: spend the $ and buy a few servo motors to make things repeat and move! |
Hidden situations
Originally Posted by A33Zab
The estimated sideslip (elaborated in FCPC) is NOT used in ALT2(& DIRECT) and replaced by Ny rear accelerometer.
I realize that this can be potentially be a time consuming area to research, but it might be useful to "sweep out" this corner of the Yaw control system for things that could induce a yaw input in Alternate2 law. FCOM search has been non-productive. TIA :ok: |
Pilots or airplane? or both?
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This crash says the pilot not flying needs to be more aggresive in taking over when the other is AFU. A little forward pressure on the side stick would have solved the situation. Most Boeing pilots seeing a control wheel in their gut would do so instantly. Just say I have the airplane and problem is solved. Side sticks make that harder to do. You can not tell what the other pilot is doing from your seat. Airbus isn't going to change anything so I guess noticing the little annunciator is their only clue what the other pilot is doing. Guess this will be happening again.
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I really don't see the problem here.
Ny is computed from an accelerometer mounted near the top of the rear bulkhead. If it is to be used to estimate sideslip then the reading needs to be corrected for rudder sideforce (deflection) roll and yaw rates. If airspeed information goes south then so does the estimated sideslip. So far as I can see, the only use of Ny and/or sideslip in the EFCS is a part of the lateral turbulence alleviation function. In Alt2 there is no bank protection (and therefore no spiral stability term). Consequently the EFCS neither needs nor uses either Ny or estimated sideslip for roll control in this mode. In Alt2 the rudder deflection is controlled by pedal angle and yaw damper commands. The yaw damper uses yaw rate; there is no Ny or sideslip term. Consequently the EFCS doesn't use Ny at all when Alt2 is engaged. The estimated sideslip is sent to the PFD. That's it. Full stop. |
Originally posted by Owain Glyndwr ... Philosophically, the yaw damper is a follower and shouldn't be driving the motion unless the system designers really fouled up and produced an unstable system (which they did not). The DFDR Lateral Acceleration (sideslip) trace is reflected in the YD output and its amplitude appears to have increased marginally during the descent and has a natural period of around 7 - 8 seconds which only gets interrupted by prolonged left bank commands. As pointed out earlier, the clockwise heading change is greatest when the Ny driven oscillation is dampened by hard over and held left SS inputs. So my feeling is that the PF managed to dampen the Ny oscillations that could have easily resulted in a total LOC. Having written the above, then noted your latest comments, I am no further ahead in resolving what I still consider is the YD driving the Rudder and "leading" the Roll/Bank. I've had a look at the Pitch Attitude trace and find that maximum yaw coupled with side-slip tended to occur when pitched up with a RH roll bias. You say that, "In Alt2 the rudder deflection is controlled by pedal angle and yaw damper commands", and yet in the period we have been looking at, only YD commands have been presented to the rudder. How or why does the Lateral Acceleration trace then synchronize with the YD / Rudder traces? To answer my own question, I have previously posited that the aircraft was effectively 'fish tailing'.:confused: Its not important to the outcome, though helpful in understanding what is actually happening in what appears on the surface to be an aircraft in a benign stall and retaining some lateral stability, i.e. avoiding the 'spiral dive'.:( |
Hi mm43,
As pointed out earlier, the clockwise heading change is greatest when the Ny driven oscillation is dampened by hard over and held left SS inputs. I think that was first explained by Owain. edit: So my feeling is that the PF managed to dampen the Ny oscillations that could have easily resulted in a total LOC. |
However, it is somewhat difficult to follow what inputs the YD is getting, and what effect NCD data may be having on the Ny Accelerometer inputs to the YD calculation. The DFDR Lateral Acceleration (sideslip) trace is reflected in the YD output and its amplitude appears to have increased marginally during the descent and has a natural period of around 7 - 8 seconds which only gets interrupted by prolonged left bank commands. As pointed out earlier, the clockwise heading change is greatest when the Ny driven oscillation is dampened by hard over and held left SS inputs. So my feeling is that the PF managed to dampen the Ny oscillations that could have easily resulted in a total LOC. Having written the above, then noted your latest comments, I am no further ahead in resolving what I still consider is the YD driving the Rudder and "leading" the Roll/Bank. I've had a look at the Pitch Attitude trace and find that maximum yaw coupled with side-slip tended to occur when pitched up with a RH roll bias. You say that, "In Alt2 the rudder deflection is controlled by pedal angle and yaw damper commands", and yet in the period we have been looking at, only YD commands have been presented to the rudder. How or why does the Lateral Acceleration trace then synchronize with the YD / Rudder traces? To answer my own question, I have previously posited that the aircraft was effectively 'fish tailing' Its not important to the outcome, though helpful in understanding what is actually happening in what appears on the surface to be an aircraft in a benign stall and retaining some lateral stability, i.e. avoiding the 'spiral dive' |
Originally Posted by bubbers44
Side sticks make that harder to do. You can not tell what the other pilot is doing from your seat. Airbus isn't going to change anything so I guess noticing the little annunciator is their only clue what the other pilot is doing.
The article has the merit to state the commun sense analysis regarding the sidestick concept by Airbus. Never, the BEA would mention anything in that direction in the contributory factors chapter. |
The estimated sideslip is sent to the PFD. That's it. Full stop. These are normally such small variances, they are probably rarely noticed. :) |
Thought, neither of the two 757's lost due to inaccurate ADR..granted for different reasons had side sticks, and yet nether one was control regained...also a "little sidestick forward" might well not been enough to counter the THS position....might have indeed required full stick forward, AND manual dose down trim...
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Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
I really don't see the problem here.
Ny is computed from an accelerometer mounted near the top of the rear bulkhead. If it is to be used to estimate sideslip then the reading needs to be corrected for rudder sideforce (deflection) roll and yaw rates. If airspeed information goes south then so does the estimated sideslip. So far as I can see, the only use of Ny and/or sideslip in the EFCS is a part of the lateral turbulence alleviation function. In Alt2 there is no bank protection (and therefore no spiral stability term). Consequently the EFCS neither needs nor uses either Ny or estimated sideslip for roll control in this mode. In Alt2 the rudder deflection is controlled by pedal angle and yaw damper commands. The yaw damper uses yaw rate; there is no Ny or sideslip term. Consequently the EFCS doesn't use Ny at all when Alt2 is engaged. The estimated sideslip is sent to the PFD. You seem to be in the possession of inside information regarding the arrangement of the 'bus control system, however how certain are we that the bus EFCS in Alt2 does not have authority to "center the ball" in Alt2, and only sends a signal to the PFD equivalent of the ball telling the crew to center the ball. This seems to conflict with: Originally Posted by A33Zab The estimated sideslip (elaborated in FCPC) is NOT used in ALT2(& DIRECT) and replaced by Ny rear accelerometer. |
Hi rudderrudderrat,
But the RH down going aileron would present more drag to the forward aircraft direction and induce a turn to the right, effectively "the wrong way". From Post #219 ... This lead me to looking at the Inner Aileron traces, and I believe that the RH Inner Aileron when down was effectively creating drag, whereas the LH Inner Aileron when up was in the wake vortex and ineffectual. This drag on the right was causing yaw ... Many thanks for sharing your experience in this debate. I've seen this before - in my youth we tested a free flight model which had this roll oscillation and even when we cut the complete fin off it simply wallowed in a straight line with no spiral divergence |
Hi,
A nice graphic representation http://i.imgur.com/buorH.jpg The BEA cartoon .... http://i.imgur.com/3JCdd.jpg |
CONF, so the Airbus people that say there is an annunciator showing what the other pilot is doing is not true? I have never flown an Airbus by choice so assumed the annunciation from Airbus pilots was a true statement. Maybe there is no annunciation of what the other pilot is doing. That is even worse than what I thought about one pilot knowing what the other is doing In a dark cockpit. Please tell me this is not true.
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Machinbird
You seem to be in the possession of inside information regarding the arrangement of the 'bus control system, however how certain are we that the bus EFCS in Alt2 does not have authority to "center the ball" in Alt2, and only sends a signal to the PFD equivalent of the ball telling the crew to center the ball. Dutch roll damping is provided with authority limited to 4 deg in CONF 0, 15 deg in other configurations. Turn coordination is provided except in CONF 0 So for the AF447 case the EFCS does not centre the ball, although in most other cases if does. |
Adding to the above;
From Airbus A330 Instructors Support Manual - NOTE: Depending on the failure type, ALTN is split in 2: ALTN 1 and ALTN 2. In ALTN 2 the roll control is roll direct. In certain failure cases such as loss of VS1g computation or loss of 2ADR, the longitudinal static stability cannot be restored at low speed; in case of loss of 3ADR it cannot be restored at high speed. The yaw is then also degraded. |
Originally Posted by bubbers44
Please tell me this is not true.
Originally Posted by ironbutt57
Thought, neither of the two 757's lost due to inaccurate ADR..granted for different reasons had side sticks, and yet nether one was control regained...also a "little sidestick forward" might well not been enough to counter the THS position....might have indeed required full stick forward, AND manual dose down trim...
For the THS, don't get me started again please. I am still amazed how the THS got almost full up :
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I have never flown an aircraft that one pilot did not know what the other was doing. What a strange way to design an airliner.
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Salute!
c'mon Bubbers..... Airmanship! Flew one jet with no second seat, so we flew "chase" and could only see/feel what the nugget was doing. No big deal, as just ask if he was putting in "x" stick. In the Viper we flew chase for the guy's "solo" mission just to keep USAF happy. We had already flown a few hours in the family model. And like the 'bus, no visual or feeling what the nugget was doing with his sidestick. I like the tacit feel and look of the yoke for a "crew" plane. but in this case the clue is to look at what the indicators were showing. 'course, seems the indicators were FUBAR and the crew had to deal with all the nuances of the reversion modes and....... Gonna be a landmark finding report, as others have suggested. |
I have never flown an aircraft that one pilot did not know what the other was doing. What a strange way to design an airliner. I used to have a bumper sticker on my briefcase - " Boeing, my way " History for me now of course, but nothing will persuade me otherwise, bigotted if you like. Don't care. The Daily Telegraph claims to have a leaked draft of AF447 (central Atlantic, all lost) final acc. reprt. Doesn't look too credible/accurate to me. Comments? |
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