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-   -   AF 447 Thread No. 8 (https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/482356-af-447-thread-no-8-a.html)

HazelNuts39 28th April 2012 07:36

I was wondering whether (similar to wind speed and direction) the 'estimated sideslip' is a function of indicated airspeed and hence erroneous if airspeed is erroneous (AoA>25°). Does anybody know how it is calculated?

A33Zab 28th April 2012 08:22

estimated sideslip trace.
 
For the guys with the graphs:

The estimated sideslip (elaborated in FCPC) is NOT used in ALT2(& DIRECT) and replaced by Ny rear accelerometer.

The FCPCs are located below cockpitfloor and the Ny rear accelerometer in the tail compartment.

@HN39:

Don't know the equation but it is Ny acceleration corrected by Rudder deflection and roll and yaw rate. (Inertial data)

Seems to be ADR DATA is supplied also:

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/r...t_Sideslip.jpg

mm43 28th April 2012 11:45

@ Dozy, Owain Glyndwr, A33Zab;

Thanks for all your inputs, but as the sun is on the backside of the planet in this part of the world, I'll have a closer a look at all your contributions in my morning.

Gegenbeispiel 28th April 2012 16:39

A330 AF447 report leak?
 
The Daily Telegraph claims to have a leaked draft of AF447 (central Atlantic, all lost) final acc. reprt. Doesn't look too credible/accurate to me. Comments?

Air France Flight 447: 'Damn it, we're going to crash - Telegraph

RetiredF4 28th April 2012 17:06

Nothing new, no leak
 
There is not one thing new, which would lead to the conclusion, that it originates on the future final report.

hetfield 28th April 2012 17:09


There is not one thing new, which would lead to the conclusion, that it originates on the future final report.
Indeed, but for the public it's a not so bad summary.

wozzo 28th April 2012 18:09


Originally Posted by Gegenbeispiel (Post 7160859)
The Daily Telegraph claims to have a leaked draft of AF447 (central Atlantic, all lost) final acc. reprt. Doesn't look too credible/accurate to me. Comments?

Maybe they changed the story, but I couldn't find any claim that they actually have a copy of the report (or its draft). Only wording like "All the indications are that the final crash report will confirm ...", which implies the opposite.

LiveryMan 28th April 2012 18:41

The telegraph throws in it's tuppence:

Air France Flight 447: 'Damn it, we’re going to crash’ - Telegraph

EMIT 28th April 2012 19:13

Appalling performance
 
Yes GUMS,

Performance of big jets is appalling, compared to fighters.
At optimum flight level, at cruise speed, pitch will be around 2 1/2 degrees nose up. For a climb to the next level, once you have burned off enough fuel so that optimum level will have increased by 2.000 ft, you increase thrust (wow, an extra sneeze is all you get) and you "pull up the nose" by about one degree. Of course you will not stall immediately if you pull up steeper, but you will not maintain speed if you do.
If you want to speed up at cruise level, well you will accelerate with about 1 knot per 10 seconds - a long way removed from the 1 second per 10 knots of our previous life!
The margin between high speed red line and low speed red line is not nearly as small as on the U-2, but thrust margin is not big; when you reach cruise level, 1.000 to 1.500 ft/min is all the climb capability that's left.

In the handling of the situation by the pilots of AF447, the biggest communication error, in my opinion, is the talking about "climbing" and "descending" instead of "pitch, check pitch attitude, set pitch 0 degrees".

up_down_n_out 28th April 2012 19:13

DT masters of drivel & badly informed speculation as usual. :ok:

Clandestino 28th April 2012 19:40

Dairy Torygraph's journalists have seemingly trawled through the AF447 threads on the PPRuNe, being quite unselective what pieces of info they used for the article - some pretty realistic insight is indiscriminately mixed with utter tosh.

cyrilroy21 28th April 2012 19:51

Taken from the article


Boeing has always begged to differ, persisting with conventional controls on its fly-by-wire aircraft, including the new 787 Dreamliner, introduced into service this year. Boeing’s cluttering and old-fashioned levers still have to be pushed and turned like the old mechanical ones, even though they only send electronic impulses to computers. They need to be held in place for a climb or a turn to be accomplished, which some pilots think is archaic and distracting. Some say Boeing is so conservative because most American pilots graduate from flying schools where column-steering is the norm, whereas European airlines train more crew from scratch, allowing a quicker transition to side stick control
Can someone explain what this particular sentence means :confused:

Clandestino 28th April 2012 20:12

Patchwork of different posts on the PPRuNe, stitched together in single sentence by someone whose knowledge of aviation is seemingly comparable to average Neanderthals knowledge of quantum physics.

Owain Glyndwr 28th April 2012 21:08

Hazelnuts,

AF33Zab' posting answers your question I think.
They would need dynamic pressure (Vc) and Mach to calculate the rudder deflection correction, so if either of these go NCD the estimated sideslip will also.

gums 28th April 2012 21:38

Thank you, EMIT.

I had an hour and re-read the last interim report and mainly the annotated CVR with system conditions and sensor readouts and.....

I still cry. If was already a ghost ( not there quite there yet), and whispering in those guys' ears, I think I could have helped a lot.

A surprising thing I saw and not focused upon was the bank angles. They re-inforced my initial feeling that the jet was in a really good stall and close to a spin or other completed loss of control. I had previously believed it was more stable in the roll and yaw axis.

And BTW, I flew about 500 hours in the T-33 and we had a climb rate at 35,000 ft of about 1,000 fpm. BFD.

I come back to the basic control laws and the blatant disregard for AoA when airspeed data is deemed unreliable by Hal. So I took my primitive FBW system laws and divided by eight.

- max AoA about 4 degrees
- max gee about 1 or 2 gees

That seemed close enough to fit the 'bus, IMHO.

Our system used the gee input until it hit the AoA limit, then AoA ruled! Our body rates were also in the loop and would come to play if the speed, gee and AoA stuff went FUBAR.

So I look at the traces and annotation and can't understand why the AoA inputs couldn't "limit" or "protect" compared to what I had experienced. So my feeling is that the crew was still locked into the belief that the jet could not be pulled hard enough to stall. And some of the comments seem to indicate this - "we have been trying to climb", and similar.

I then cut the crew some slack and blame the system for the disregard of AoA if weight is off the gear, regardless of the airspeed inputs' validity. AoA rules!! It's something we were taught as clueless yutes when 15 or 16 years old and learning to fly in Cessnas and Luscombes and Aeronicas and....

Further, the warning/advisory systems didn't seem to help.

The "connected" side sticks" argument still has life, but pitch and power still rules, as does some good comm between the folks in the multi-pilot planes. I don't buy all of the side stick complaints, but they do have merit.

As with another contributor here, the final report and recommendations shall be a landmark.

HazelNuts39 28th April 2012 21:45

A33Zab,
Thanks, that answers my question.


Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
They would need dynamic pressure (Vc) and Mach to calculate the rudder deflection correction, so if either of these go NCD the estimated sideslip will also.

Maybe that is so, but I don't see it in the trace. Doesn't A33Zab say that in Alt2 it is replaced by Ny without correction?

A33Zab 29th April 2012 00:37

#HN39:
 

Doesn't A33Zab say that in Alt2 it is replaced by Ny without correction?
Indeed!,and IMO the Ny in ALT2 (Yaw = ALTERNATE YAW LAW) is used for indication of the PFD sideslip indication. (+/- 0.3g max).

The rudder deflection in ALT2 (ALTERNATE YAW) is only a function of pedal and/or Yaw damper input. (based upon the yaw rate).
In ALT2 Yaw damper has a limited authority of +/- 4 degrees in CONFIG 0 (=CLEAN)

D.Lamination 29th April 2012 00:46

Written in layman speak but generally nails the issue. And I say that as an Airbus pilot. Non repeating side sticks and frozen thrust levers have always been a problem along with general lack of physical feedback - a fault first revealed in the Air- Inter A320 prang.
I say to Airbus: spend the $ and buy a few servo motors to make things repeat and move!

View From The Ground 29th April 2012 01:25

Inaccurate and Ill Researched
 
"and the jet was state-of-the-art, a type that had never before been involved in a fatal accident."

1994 at Toulouse 7 people died in a take off accident, not commercial flight however still unfortunately a fatal accident. The title of my post says the rest.

Gary Brown 29th April 2012 01:34

D.Laminate wrote:

Written in layman speak but generally nails the issue. And I say that as an Airbus pilot. Non repeating side sticks and frozen thrust levers have always been a problem along with general lack of physical feedback - a fault first revealed in the Air- Inter A320 prang.
I say to Airbus: spend the $ and buy a few servo motors to make things repeat and move!
And Boeing pilots of course *always* notice Autothrust disconnects, and the levers moving back to Idle.....

Machinbird 29th April 2012 03:22

Hidden situations
 

Originally Posted by A33Zab
The estimated sideslip (elaborated in FCPC) is NOT used in ALT2(& DIRECT) and replaced by Ny rear accelerometer.

Does the Ny rear accelerometer have a fixed mounting position or is there a range of adjustment to zero out lateral g sensing? If adjustable, are there any procedures in setting up this accelerometer that could be non-responsive if the aircraft was in Normal law instead of Alternate law? Is the Ny rear accelerometer used in Normal law?

I realize that this can be potentially be a time consuming area to research, but it might be useful to "sweep out" this corner of the Yaw control system for things that could induce a yaw input in Alternate2 law. FCOM search has been non-productive. TIA :ok:

bubbers44 29th April 2012 05:30

Pilots or airplane? or both?
 
Air France Flight 447: 'Damn it, we’re going to crash’ - Telegraph

bubbers44 29th April 2012 06:20

This crash says the pilot not flying needs to be more aggresive in taking over when the other is AFU. A little forward pressure on the side stick would have solved the situation. Most Boeing pilots seeing a control wheel in their gut would do so instantly. Just say I have the airplane and problem is solved. Side sticks make that harder to do. You can not tell what the other pilot is doing from your seat. Airbus isn't going to change anything so I guess noticing the little annunciator is their only clue what the other pilot is doing. Guess this will be happening again.

Owain Glyndwr 29th April 2012 06:56

I really don't see the problem here.

Ny is computed from an accelerometer mounted near the top of the rear bulkhead.
If it is to be used to estimate sideslip then the reading needs to be corrected for rudder sideforce (deflection) roll and yaw rates. If airspeed information goes south then so does the estimated sideslip.
So far as I can see, the only use of Ny and/or sideslip in the EFCS is a part of the lateral turbulence alleviation function.

In Alt2 there is no bank protection (and therefore no spiral stability term). Consequently the EFCS neither needs nor uses either Ny or estimated sideslip for roll control in this mode.
In Alt2 the rudder deflection is controlled by pedal angle and yaw damper commands. The yaw damper uses yaw rate; there is no Ny or sideslip term.

Consequently the EFCS doesn't use Ny at all when Alt2 is engaged.

The estimated sideslip is sent to the PFD.

That's it. Full stop.

mm43 29th April 2012 10:27


Originally posted by Owain Glyndwr ...
Philosophically, the yaw damper is a follower and shouldn't be driving the motion unless the system designers really fouled up and produced an unstable system (which they did not).
Agreed, and thanks for your generous reply. However, it is somewhat difficult to follow what inputs the YD is getting, and what effect NCD data may be having on the Ny Accelerometer inputs to the YD calculation.

The DFDR Lateral Acceleration (sideslip) trace is reflected in the YD output and its amplitude appears to have increased marginally during the descent and has a natural period of around 7 - 8 seconds which only gets interrupted by prolonged left bank commands. As pointed out earlier, the clockwise heading change is greatest when the Ny driven oscillation is dampened by hard over and held left SS inputs. So my feeling is that the PF managed to dampen the Ny oscillations that could have easily resulted in a total LOC.

Having written the above, then noted your latest comments, I am no further ahead in resolving what I still consider is the YD driving the Rudder and "leading" the Roll/Bank. I've had a look at the Pitch Attitude trace and find that maximum yaw coupled with side-slip tended to occur when pitched up with a RH roll bias.

You say that, "In Alt2 the rudder deflection is controlled by pedal angle and yaw damper commands", and yet in the period we have been looking at, only YD commands have been presented to the rudder. How or why does the Lateral Acceleration trace then synchronize with the YD / Rudder traces? To answer my own question, I have previously posited that the aircraft was effectively 'fish tailing'.:confused:

Its not important to the outcome, though helpful in understanding what is actually happening in what appears on the surface to be an aircraft in a benign stall and retaining some lateral stability, i.e. avoiding the 'spiral dive'.:(

rudderrudderrat 29th April 2012 11:09

Hi mm43,

As pointed out earlier, the clockwise heading change is greatest when the Ny driven oscillation is dampened by hard over and held left SS inputs.
I think the clockwise heading change was due to adverse aileron drag when the wing was stalled. The differential spoilers would have been ineffective in the turbulent flow above the wing. But the RH down going aileron would present more drag to the forward aircraft direction and induce a turn to the right, effectively "the wrong way".

I think that was first explained by Owain.

edit:

So my feeling is that the PF managed to dampen the Ny oscillations that could have easily resulted in a total LOC.
I don't think PF managed to do anything other than mostly pull back during the stall. His roll commands were ineffective once the wing was stalled.

Owain Glyndwr 29th April 2012 11:31


However, it is somewhat difficult to follow what inputs the YD is getting, and what effect NCD data may be having on the Ny Accelerometer inputs to the YD calculation.
The answer to that I think is that there isn't any Ny accelerometer input to the YD calculation when Alt2 is operative. So as as I know, the sole short term input to the YD in this state is rate of yaw. Ny does affect the YD operation when in normal law in that the lateral turbulence damping commands are fed through the YD, and if you want to reduce motion at the back end of the cabin then an accelerometer on the rear bulkhead would be a good starting point but as I understand it this is a pilot selectable option


The DFDR Lateral Acceleration (sideslip) trace is reflected in the YD output and its amplitude appears to have increased marginally during the descent and has a natural period of around 7 - 8 seconds which only gets interrupted by prolonged left bank commands. As pointed out earlier, the clockwise heading change is greatest when the Ny driven oscillation is dampened by hard over and held left SS inputs. So my feeling is that the PF managed to dampen the Ny oscillations that could have easily resulted in a total LOC.
The DFDR trace is Ny, which is not simply the lateral acceleration due to sideslip - there is a substantial contribution from the gravity component when banked. And as I said, at high AoA bank generates sideslip directly although there will be additional slip associated with accelerations along the y axis coming from sideforce. Up to 02:13:00 there is very little rudder application, then it is active for about 45 secs after which it goes quiescent again, and while the rudder application was active there is little sense of any reduction in the rolling motion, so I'm not at all sure that your feeling is justified.


Having written the above, then noted your latest comments, I am no further ahead in resolving what I still consider is the YD driving the Rudder and "leading" the Roll/Bank. I've had a look at the Pitch Attitude trace and find that maximum yaw coupled with side-slip tended to occur when pitched up with a RH roll bias.
I'm sticking with my feeling that it is lagging.


You say that, "In Alt2 the rudder deflection is controlled by pedal angle and yaw damper commands", and yet in the period we have been looking at, only YD commands have been presented to the rudder.
That is simply because the PF made no rudder pedal movement surely?


How or why does the Lateral Acceleration trace then synchronize with the YD / Rudder traces? To answer my own question, I have previously posited that the aircraft was effectively 'fish tailing'
They both synchronize with the aircraft dutch roll/roll oscillation motion - the measured lateral acceleration with bank angle plus some additional 'g' from yaw movements (assuming that Ny comes from that rear bulkhead accelerometer); the YD traces synchronize with yaw rate.


Its not important to the outcome, though helpful in understanding what is actually happening in what appears on the surface to be an aircraft in a benign stall and retaining some lateral stability, i.e. avoiding the 'spiral dive'
Yes I agree it is not a be all/end all point. One additional remark may be relevant though - when you get into or towards that high AoA/roll oscillation condition it tends to be a situation where roll due to sideslip is high and weathercock stability low, which is the condition for more positive spiral stability, which makes the reason for the continued roll right even more mysterious! [I've seen this before - in my youth we tested a free flight model which had this roll oscillation and even when we cut the complete fin off it simply wallowed in a straight line with no spiral divergence]

CONF iture 29th April 2012 14:04


Originally Posted by bubbers44
Side sticks make that harder to do. You can not tell what the other pilot is doing from your seat. Airbus isn't going to change anything so I guess noticing the little annunciator is their only clue what the other pilot is doing.

There is no such thing as 'the little annunciator' in flight.

The article has the merit to state the commun sense analysis regarding the sidestick concept by Airbus.

Never, the BEA would mention anything in that direction in the contributory factors chapter.

OK465 29th April 2012 14:47


The estimated sideslip is sent to the PFD.

That's it. Full stop.
FWIW, with a reliable air data source, any sideslip will also cause the computed displayed winds on the ND to be in error. As a result, the GS displayed on the ND may also be erroneous during the uncoordinated condition.

These are normally such small variances, they are probably rarely noticed.

:)

ironbutt57 29th April 2012 17:35

Thought, neither of the two 757's lost due to inaccurate ADR..granted for different reasons had side sticks, and yet nether one was control regained...also a "little sidestick forward" might well not been enough to counter the THS position....might have indeed required full stick forward, AND manual dose down trim...

Machinbird 29th April 2012 17:55


Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
I really don't see the problem here.

Ny is computed from an accelerometer mounted near the top of the rear bulkhead.
If it is to be used to estimate sideslip then the reading needs to be corrected for rudder sideforce (deflection) roll and yaw rates. If airspeed information goes south then so does the estimated sideslip.
So far as I can see, the only use of Ny and/or sideslip in the EFCS is a part of the lateral turbulence alleviation function.

In Alt2 there is no bank protection (and therefore no spiral stability term). Consequently the EFCS neither needs nor uses either Ny or estimated sideslip for roll control in this mode.
In Alt2 the rudder deflection is controlled by pedal angle and yaw damper commands. The yaw damper uses yaw rate; there is no Ny or sideslip term.

Consequently the EFCS doesn't use Ny at all when Alt2 is engaged.

The estimated sideslip is sent to the PFD.

In the old days before automation, we pilots were confronted with a bunch of steam gages, one of which was the old needle-ball indicator. Ny is the analog of the old ball indicator. The rule was "step on the ball" to center it. All the jets I flew including a straight wing one had a yaw damper controlled by a yaw rate gyro. If Ny is used in the EFCS, it is not for yaw damping, but for biasing out lateral g through rudder deflection.

You seem to be in the possession of inside information regarding the arrangement of the 'bus control system, however how certain are we that the bus EFCS in Alt2 does not have authority to "center the ball" in Alt2, and only sends a signal to the PFD equivalent of the ball telling the crew to center the ball.
This seems to conflict with:

Originally Posted by A33Zab
The estimated sideslip (elaborated in FCPC) is NOT used in ALT2(& DIRECT) and replaced by Ny rear accelerometer.

mm43 29th April 2012 19:04

Hi rudderrudderrat,

But the RH down going aileron would present more drag to the forward aircraft direction and induce a turn to the right, effectively "the wrong way".
Yes, and that is exactly what I had concluded ...

From Post #219 ... This lead me to looking at the Inner Aileron traces, and I believe that the RH Inner Aileron when down was effectively creating drag, whereas the LH Inner Aileron when up was in the wake vortex and ineffectual. This drag on the right was causing yaw ...
Owain Glyndwr;

Many thanks for sharing your experience in this debate.

I've seen this before - in my youth we tested a free flight model which had this roll oscillation and even when we cut the complete fin off it simply wallowed in a straight line with no spiral divergence
Maybe just a case where the overall drag and the wake vortex conspire to provide a stable outcome.:ok:

jcjeant 29th April 2012 20:22

Hi,

A nice graphic representation

http://i.imgur.com/buorH.jpg

The BEA cartoon ....

http://i.imgur.com/3JCdd.jpg

bubbers44 29th April 2012 20:57

CONF, so the Airbus people that say there is an annunciator showing what the other pilot is doing is not true? I have never flown an Airbus by choice so assumed the annunciation from Airbus pilots was a true statement. Maybe there is no annunciation of what the other pilot is doing. That is even worse than what I thought about one pilot knowing what the other is doing In a dark cockpit. Please tell me this is not true.

Owain Glyndwr 29th April 2012 21:50

Machinbird


You seem to be in the possession of inside information regarding the arrangement of the 'bus control system, however how certain are we that the bus EFCS in Alt2 does not have authority to "center the ball" in Alt2, and only sends a signal to the PFD equivalent of the ball telling the crew to center the ball.
Sorry, I don't have any inside information, but I do have a downloaded copy of an A330 FCOM which states that for Yaw control in Alternate 2:

Dutch roll damping is provided with authority limited to 4 deg in CONF 0, 15 deg in other configurations.
Turn coordination is provided except in CONF 0

So for the AF447 case the EFCS does not centre the ball, although in most other cases if does.

mm43 29th April 2012 22:44

Adding to the above;

From Airbus A330 Instructors Support Manual -

NOTE:
Depending on the failure type, ALTN is split in 2: ALTN 1 and ALTN 2. In ALTN 2 the roll control is roll direct. In certain failure cases such as loss of VS1g computation or loss of 2ADR, the longitudinal static stability cannot be restored at low speed; in case of loss of 3ADR it cannot be restored at high speed.

The yaw is then also degraded.
It appears the comment on yaw applies to any of those conditions mentioned for ALTN 2.

CONF iture 30th April 2012 02:40


Originally Posted by bubbers44
Please tell me this is not true.

Nothing but the truth. For the 30 sec period the PF was full back stick, both captain and PNF were unaware of such vital piece of information.


Originally Posted by ironbutt57
Thought, neither of the two 757's lost due to inaccurate ADR..granted for different reasons had side sticks, and yet nether one was control regained...also a "little sidestick forward" might well not been enough to counter the THS position....might have indeed required full stick forward, AND manual dose down trim...

Correct but ...
  • In the Birgenair case, the PNF had that priviledge to witness how the displacement of the yoke by the AP was consistant with its own side instrumentation. He tried to tell the captain but maybe was not confident enough to intervene ...
  • The Aeroperu was a nightmare scenario where airspeed altitude V/S were all wrong. The end result was a CFIT where flight control displacements were minimal. In that case I agree, to have coupled yokes was not an advantage to the independant sidesticks (but neither a disadvantage).

For the THS, don't get me started again please. I am still amazed how the THS got almost full up :
  1. automatically
  2. under stall warning
  3. the command by the sidestick for the period was more up than down but nothing that drastic

bubbers44 30th April 2012 03:16

I have never flown an aircraft that one pilot did not know what the other was doing. What a strange way to design an airliner.

gums 30th April 2012 03:28

Salute!

c'mon Bubbers.....

Airmanship!

Flew one jet with no second seat, so we flew "chase" and could only see/feel what the nugget was doing. No big deal, as just ask if he was putting in "x" stick.

In the Viper we flew chase for the guy's "solo" mission just to keep USAF happy. We had already flown a few hours in the family model. And like the 'bus, no visual or feeling what the nugget was doing with his sidestick.

I like the tacit feel and look of the yoke for a "crew" plane. but in this case the clue is to look at what the indicators were showing. 'course, seems the indicators were FUBAR and the crew had to deal with all the nuances of the reversion modes and.......

Gonna be a landmark finding report, as others have suggested.

ExSp33db1rd 30th April 2012 03:34


I have never flown an aircraft that one pilot did not know what the other was doing. What a strange way to design an airliner.
Boeing even let you see what the Auto-pilot is doing, it was vaguely comforting on a dark night to see the controls columns and throttles gently rocking or rolling back and forth, just as they would do if the other pilot was hand-flying. Kept one in the loop, so to speak.

I used to have a bumper sticker on my briefcase - " Boeing, my way "

History for me now of course, but nothing will persuade me otherwise, bigotted if you like. Don't care.


The Daily Telegraph claims to have a leaked draft of AF447 (central Atlantic, all lost) final acc. reprt. Doesn't look too credible/accurate to me. Comments?
What don't you like about it, nothing new, just putting it all together in non-pilot-speak. Don't need the emotional stuff about children, and a few pax, of course, leave that to the other merdia.


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