@HN39:
 

A late reply on Your post #506 concerning the BUSS.
I'm behind with all the posts.

Maybe this image is of some help?

AFAIK, there is no MACH compensation and amber/red area is not changed for speedbrake.

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/r...USS_SPEEDS.jpg

Dozy

This argument is not to do with pilots, right, wrong, or indifferent. It has to do with the a/c, and what it is doing, strictly. AoA aside, my point is that there is room to entertain sensing/sussing anomalies with the autoflight, and the a/c basic modes to include Vselect, and work done prior to the Early June surprise sprung on the crew. This accident had its roots deep in the time frame prior to handoff, irrespective of ICE, turbulence, and Degraded Law. A working theory of Ice occluded probes suits me fine, but there is wiggle room in there for other sources of danger.... RetiredF4 I must say thank you for your work, your frame of PNF as a human, and not a foil for nothing more than a guess at CRM, well, thanks. There was ample confusion, and no less than two qualified pilots felt thoroughly in the weeds from the gitgo. If for no other reason, I will keep my objective view alive. There had to have been more than off target competence in play.

And HazelNuts39 thank you for a finer point on airmass/AOA. Five degrees? What was I thinking? :O

Lyman,

This is the definition of "Moderate" turbulence, but the bolding is mine:

From : Tutorial: wind shear and turbulence

Note that Moderate doesn't even come close to the equivalent of 100kts (50fps = 29.6kts).

Outside of the numbers, I sat in the sim - I saw it happen and I *heard* it happen. I experienced an infinitesimal fraction of the concern and fear those pilots felt as the aircraft ran away from me. I stand by the assertion that the climb, warning and deviation from assigned altitude were predominantly caused by deliberate action by the PF.

I can't convince you - of this I'm sure. But I've gone to further lengths than I ever have before - assisted by people to whom I am in eternal debt - to prove that I'm not talking out of my ar*e here, and I'm as certain as it's possible to be that the aircraft did nothing to make things harder for them.

Some off topic
Indeed this failure mode was not considered at the time the aircraft was designed
And for this kind of failure .. it's not possible to apply a procedure (pilot is not able to go plug the holes in F.O tanks) this failure required a structural correction ...
The problem is that along the life of the Concorde .. one of his main problem was the tires (many events) and so the design has to be reconsidered seriously (certainly after the important accident of Washington concerning tires and F.O tanks)
Another flaw design was the position of the tires relative to the engines ducts .. (this one was pratically impossible to correct .. lol)
But it was a possible solution for the dangerous tandem tires-F.O tanks ... and the solution was put in force .... after Gonesse ... unfortunately again too late for some people ...
Return to topic ...

Dozy

Be careful not to extrapolate from guesswork. Initially, the Airline reported "turbulence fortes". We were not there, and the accelerations on the airframe leave some important data out. Why would the airline make such a statement? Who knows, and we do not know if there is data that is available, from the line, that is not released. Met based on satellite IR? Hmm......

Some cells can exceed 60000 feet in height, and contain monster cylinders of highly energetic vertical air. The crew inter briefed "somewhat more intense than that we just experienced, etc" . Once accelerated, the airframe can report calm accelerations, but be moving rapidly Up, or Down. Besides, I am not interested in turbulence, but in well developed symmetrical, and independent air mass, mostly, Up. Imagine an a/ c that is rising vertically, but with a reasonable Pitch, and consider that an airliner can climb whilst essentially level. Rapid climb....

I am suggesting the discrepancy in AoA and Pitch suggest such a thing. A thirty second bonus of climb, that paid out, and left the a/c hanging on her Fans, basically, all the way down. PostStall, I think it is a reach to get too critical of anyone on deck.

I am a fan of this a/c; whatever happened, look elsewhere for bias against this airframe.

BA made an alteration to the MLG deflection guard - AF did not.

True - nowhere else to put them.

Well, BA altered the MLG setup, so one solution to that particular problem was in place on half the fleet years before Gonesse. However after Gonesse both operators did everything possible - and then some - to make sure the problem was completely resolved.

But there were only a dozen or so serviceable Concordes - it's a very different proposition compared to a type where the aircraft in service number in the hundreds or thousands.

But the point is that we're talking a catastrophic failure in which there is nothing any pilot could do to resolve the situation. This is very different from a UAS incident which is trained for even when there is no problem known on the type.

All data was released. The Airline reported "fortes" to the press, which makes sense if you bear in mind that most passengers - even frequent fliers - rarely encounter anything more than what is considered "light" turbulence to pilots

This one didn't though - the pitch change preceded the climb according to the FDR.

If the PF had kept her on a relatively level pitch angle then I'd be happy to entertain your theory, but this is not the case. He pulled up and continued to pull up throughout the sequence. As I've said, this climb was commanded.

This isn't about bashing the crew. Sure, they made mistakes - but even if they did, the fact that at least two of them were placed in a position beyond their knowledge and experience is not their fault.

If the PF had kept her on a relatively level pitch angle then I'd be happy to entertain your theory, but this is not the case. He pulled up and continued to pull up throughout the sequence. As I've said, this climb was commanded.

Yes, Yes, Yes..... It was commanded. Yes there was a Pitch Up command. What evidence do you have that shows the PF's input was the only thing happening? How do you eliminate that some of the ascent was due airmass?

They are not mutually exclusive. See? The rate may have been in excess of PF's command? Additive, but masked in his Pull?

Highly unlikely since his full up commands were during a high climb rate from FL350 to 380 when it of course went into a full stall as all aircraft do handled that way.

Yes. But remember "full up commands" doesn't net him any more than one g.

So actually the 7000 fpm lends credence to an assisted ascent (U/D). What is your opinion on melding 7k fpm with One G?

Not true. The system will allow anything up to 2.5G.

In DIRECTLAW...... Pitch in AL 2 is g limited?

I think 1 G means you can not climb because as soon as you climb you will have to exceed it. Just a simple law of physics.

I think max g in the climb was 1.68? One g in unaccelerated flight, yes. But accelerated rate (limit) is one g, ok?

Why don't you take a rest Dozy, you're writing nonsenses one after the other. It is getting hard to know which one to comment :
You fail 2 ADRs to switch to Alternate Law, not to simulate UAS.

I have seen that before :
You understand nothing about Alpha Max, you understand nothing about the protections, you didn't read the Habsheim report, and obviously understand nothing about aerodynamics ...
But please comment further, I'm curious to know how deep you'll go in this nonsense.

Absolutely not. After the crash, EASA issued an AD, did it kill the 330 ?
Obviously the overkill has been to not treat the situation seriously enough before.

BUSS / AOA
 

.

Do I understand your insight correct, that the BUSS indications are not compensating for MACH or configuration and therefore the accuracy of the underlying AOA is therefore similar to the AOA indication we had in second generation fighter jets (F4)?

post of Owain Glyndwr
and
PJ2

RetF4,

The BUSS 'Slow' indication is adjusted for configuration as per the 'VSW-BackUp table'. (Second Table A in PJ2's post)

Since use of the BUSS is limited to FL250, the Mach at Vsw does not exceed 0.525 and therefore the threshold at 8.6 degrees is reasonable.

http://i.imgur.com/Uuw0K.gif?1

BUSS/AoA

To be strictly accurate the actual AoA doesn't need to be compensated for Mach, but if you mean that the surrounding limits are no better than you had on your F4 then yes, I think BUSS is no different. In fact it cannot be otherwise; to get stall AoA for the display in all flight conditions you need at least some estimate of Mach number, which is in principle not available in a UAS situation. It might be, as gums sort of suggested, that you could get by with an approximate value of Mach derived from (for example) inertial speeds and barometric altitude - this would probably be good enough to give the sort of protection one is looking for in an AF447 situation but this is not, AFAIK a feature of BUSS as currently offered.

Otherwise, as I see it, BUSS functions exactly like your F4 AoA indication. In particular it gives a good guide for approach, or anything below about 0.4M and apart from the mechanics of the display BUSS does exactly the same job on approach as did your indexer lights.

Gentlemen, thank you for quite useful discussion on AoA gauges. I don't have definite opinion on the matter of necessity of equipping the airliners with them and anyway I spent about 150 hours warming up the front right seat on A320 of mid 200s S/N vintage, that had AoA indicators; small, round, analog, mechanical, pretty devoid of markings on dial face (just some units which might have been degrees or indices or whatever, no bugs or typical AoA markings) and set outboard of PFDs. There was description of the way system works in our manuals but there was not a single procedure based upon them. They did provide some inflight entertainment, especially in CONF 1 as they were not config compensated.

Nevertheless, I am not convinced that AoA gauge would have been necessary or even helpful to get AF447 crew out of their predicament as 1) UAS was never recognized and prescribed actions were never initiated 2) 36 other crews managed to do just fine under similar circumstances just relying on attitude and power 3) CVR and FDR don't paint a pretty picture; it seems that both pilots got utterly confused simultaneously and did not realize what was going on. In my opinion the IFR pilot that is unable comprehend the implication of the attitude he's putting the aeroplane into and does not realize what is that synthetic voice shouting "STALL STALL" trying to convey has zero chance of understanding what AoA gauge is telling him.

No. The wording of the manual does leave many possibilities for creative misinterpretation but I am pretty sure I've spent about a dozen hours overhead Lambourne, watching it creep up during turns.

Another misconception is that low speed cues are g-sensitive. They are not. They are alpha sensitive, just as the Cl is, therefore change of AoA will simultaneously change low speed cue position and wing lift which leads to Nz (colloquially: G) change. Applying post hoc, ergo propter hoc one can come to fallacious conclusion you need inertial source to drive low speed cue.

Valiant effort, but if you tried to prove there was significant turbulence that has affected the flight, you needed not bothered. Interim 3, page 42 shows difference between control induced Nz and measured one - which is indication of turbulence. +/- 0.4 G is moderate. Also very short lived.


...but their PPS has sinister looking, dark figure of pilot on almost every page. Perchance compensating slight and not so slight distortions of facts with stage effects?

DGAC and EASA did know about far more than just AF's 9 pitot blockages. Consideration was given to changing SB regarding the replacement of Thales probes with Goodrich ones to AD somewhere in late 2008 but change was not effected. If it suits you, you may believe it to be a conspiracy. However, I have no problems seeing how the already more than twenty incidents that ended uneventfully could lead EASA to belief that every crew knows what to do when loosing IAS.

While Goodrich pitots perform far better than Thales, they are not perfectly immune from same type of clogging and their installation will not absolve the pilots from obligation to recognize UAS, know appropriate procedures for it and apply them. Law of self-preservation demands so.

Actually, for last three years, I have been earnin' my daily bread by staring through wide angle Head-up Guidance System grafted onto my Q400. It's a wonderful thing. It has flight path vector. It has inertially driven energy caret so you know you'll lose or gain speed before IAS makes a slightest movement. It has speed error column on FPV so you don't need as much as look left across the HUD to check your speed, let alone perform quick glances inside the cockpit to check ASI on primary flight display while maneuvering manually during final approach. It's not direct measure or readout, but vertical distance between aeroplane reference and your FPV represents your AoA. There are pitch limit indicators preventing you from whacking your tail on takeoff rotation, unusual attitude recovery help, flight path limit showing you margin to stickshaker, TCAS RA flightpath (instead of VSI) guidance and lots of other neat stuff.

Is there a downside to it? Of course there is; it's too good and too easy to use and aeroplane can be dispatched with HUD or IRS failed so you are back to classic instruments scan. It's easy to let your classic scan get rusty so I make a habit of using HUD only on about half of the flights, to stay in shape.

Did my company buy this neat gizmo to make my life easier? Of course not. Our base gets pretty foggy in winter and HGS enables us to perform low visibility approaches down to 200m RVR and 50 ft DH, rather than 300m/100ft we had before HGS. It was cheaper to install HGS then to develop autoland capable autopilot cum autotorque.

i`m quite in line with DW.we do not know,what happend when the cpt gave command to bonin.
maybe there was a discussion,a look,a grumble.maybe there were some frictions.
ithink we will read a lot about the personal and prof-history of PF/PNF in the BEA report.he was afraid that it will look like he took the first opportunity to go at bonin and that it may reflect bad on him if it was not necessary.
that`s why he was so eager for the return of the cpt: "come back and see was your `wunderkind` has done."
but to his surprise dubois didNt have a clue too.so he was reluctant to tell the cpt what bonin did,because now he thought maybe i`m wrong .
and bonin was afraid to brief the cpt. because he knew or felt that he had made a miistake.

It is getting pretty sporty at Qantas these days ... but not unrealistic at all I must say.

No need to look, that's the first thing that will jump in your face : 2 yokes in that very unusual full aft position as soon as you enter the flightdeck. That's the first elephant in the room. Instruments reading only when get closer.

Second elephant in the room is the STALL WRN but that one unfortunately quits when the Captain is back. Still the Captain is fully aware of it as he could hear it when he was attempting to penetrate the flightdeck.

BTW who opened the door ? Did he have to use the emergency code to unlock the door ?
BEA, you have to produce much more that you did up to now.

For you Clandestino, too much to comment on your earlier post (467)
See you later.

No, that was not the reason for posting. I referred to page 42 in the same post and at several earlier occasions.

I was wondering whether to dignify this with a reply, but I'm in a realtively good mood, so what the hell...

Aah... I love the smell of ad hominem in the morning - smells like, er, ad hominem.

Yes, and the TRE also failed the speed tape and altimeter on my PFD to simulate the conditions (the sim couldn't fail one or the other - only both), so I read the altitude from the standby. I wasn't giving Lyman an in-depth blow-by-blow account because I wrote about it in extensive detail on an earlier thread, I was simply giving an overall view.

Failing 2 ADCs switches to Alternate Law, as will a UAS event - that was the point I was making.

Now let's see - Alpha Max isn't a protection, it's a variable value indicating the maximum AoA an aerofoil can reach before it stops generating lift (this is simplified, but you catch my drift). AoA is determined by the coefficient of lift, the formula for calculating which includes airspeed/Mach as a variable.

I hope I'm more-or-less right so far, and incidentally, damn you to hell for making me revise algebra for this. :8

Alpha Prot is a layer of protection within the flight control logic and is the first protection triggered as AoA approaches Alpha Max. This protection inhibits further pitch-up, retracts speedbrakes if deployed and limits bank angle to 45 degrees.

Alpha Floor is a protection within the autothrottle logic and is triggered at a predetermined point between the onset of Alpha Prot and arrival at Alpha Max, and primarily sets thrust to TO/GA.

Neither of these protections are a direct function of airspeed, purely that of AoA - but because airspeed is a variable used in the calculation of AoA there is an indirect relationship. In short, because you can increase your AoA by increasing pitch and by bleeding off airspeed, the relative pitch of Alpha Max (and the protection triggers) will decrease if you bleed off airspeed.

Alpha Prot and Alpha Floor both activate just short of Alpha Max, so when you state that the logic prevents Alpha Max from being reached you are technically correct. However, the reason for holding just short of Alpha Max is because it provides a safety margin. If Alpha Prot triggered at Alpha Max itself, it would take only a small gust to stall the aircraft and the protection would be much less effective.

Well no, but let's not ignore the fact that a significant percentage of the fleet had already had the SB work carried out prior to AF447. And it's not about "killing" a type, it's about airlines kicking up a stink because their aircraft aren't making money while they're on the ground.

Your opinion, to which you are both welcome and entitled. In an ideal world I'd agree - but this isn't an ideal world. As I said, the risk posed by the Thales AA pitot tubes strikes me as considerably less than that posed by the 737 rudder PCU issue, and yet the latter was never deemed worthy of an AD with grounding to take effect immediately or otherwise.

Again with the presentation of your opinion as fact. A few posts back I listed four accidents just off the top of my head where the yoke cue was not acted upon. I'm not disputing that it *might* have helped, but it's a considerable stretch to claim it as a certainty (or an "elephant in the room").

I hate to use a driving analogy because it's not really the same, but when you've been driving for a while you rarely, if ever, *look* at the steering wheel. You're either looking out of the windscreen and reading the road, or glancing at your instruments - the latter of which causes you to look *through* the wheel, which after a time becomes automatic. I'd imagine it's the same for pilots, although they spent a much greater amount of time looking at the instruments and "through" the yoke, if there is one. I suspect this is one reason why there are so many incidents where the yoke position was not taken as a cue.

I'm genuinely curious as to why you think how he opened the door is so important.

Myself dunno if it's more or less important than all other movements .. actions and chatters of the pilots during this night
Anyways .. as this accident seem's very complicated ( flight deck and pilots matter) any clues can be important to find what happened ...
Actually we have ony the sparcely clues provided by BEA in the interim N°3

DW, in utter denial mode, wrote:
IMO, the 737 should have been grounded. This was a (poorly-decided) risk/benefit equation. There were, arguably, more than the three well-known accidents/incidents of rudder hardover/reversals. In hindsight, given the particulars of AF447, the Thales-equipped planes, too, ought to have been grounded. The crash sequence began there and ended hundreds of lives. "...risk...less serious"??? Oy veh! Here's how worried I am about airlines' profits: not one bit. If they can't be safe, they can jolly well fold their tents and get outta the business.

As for CONFiture's opinion, I (as well as others far more qualified) fully agree. Some opinions are more informed than others. It Just Make Sense. Your opinion seems to me to be arbitrary and capricious, with no offense intended, sir. Once more, with feeling, just because it didn't prevent some accidents proves nothing. As we all know, one cannot prove a negative.

Organfreak, please note the part where I said that in an ideal world, I'd agree with him re:ADs and grounding.

You're as free to believe what you wish about yokes as he is, but the fact is that he stated flat out that the yoke position would automatically have been noted. I provide evidence to refute that, while noting that it *might* have made a difference, and *I'm* the arbitrary and capricious one?

Look, I know that a popular conception among some has the Airbus FBW control system being dreamed up by a bunch of us computer geeks, none of whom had ever set foot inside a flight deck, but it just isn't true. I've mentioned this before, but the system was overseen by none other than the late Captain Gordon Corps, who was not only one of the most respected pilots of his day but also a colleague (and briefly the successor) of the late D.P. Davies, who wrote the seminal book on heavy jet operation still in use today. In terms of informed knowledge on the technical and operations aspect of airliners you simply can't get much more clout than that.

As for "It Just Makes Sense" - just about the most subjective statement in existence, because what makes sense to one individual may very well not make sense to others, and in terms of qualitative appraisal is about as useful as "My Dad Always Said", "It Stands To Reason" and "Some Bloke In The Pub Told Me".

[EDIT : Think for a second about the knock-on effect of grounding the 737. In a matter of days you'd be looking at a significant number of airlines - even the safest - folding completely through no fault of their own, if they couldn't find some way of making alternative arrangements. The only recourse they'd have would have been to seek compensation from Boeing, and before long you're looking at a collapse of a large chunk of the industry.

The A330 and A340 are not as widespread, but they make up a significant percentage of long-haul fleets these days.

As safe as air travel has become, the simple physics of what it involves means that there will always be an inherent risk even when everything is plain sailing. Mitigating that risk is a careful balancing act, and sometimes that means making a call that is not only cutting things finer than many (including myself) would like, but also has every potential of blowing up in your face. Real life by definition means compromising ideals and balancing risk on the occasions where the alternative would definitely be worse.]

DW:
I was afraid you'd point out the "in an ideal world" part. I saw it; I should have addressed it. When it comes to air safety, I think we should strive for the ideal, even tho we all know that perfection is unattainable (something I learned long ago as a musician). "Good enough" is the friend of shoddy.

It is obvious that CONF's contention was an opinion-- good writing guidelines tell us that an opinion is obvious and the statement ID-ing it as such should be left out. But it the opinion of someone with a great deal of piloting experience, unlike yourself, or me for that matter. He did not state it as fact because it can't be fact, only a very-informed opinion.

As for the rest of your answer: it doesn't apply. When premier experts design things, we still have to look at mistakes made, ones that could not have been foreseen by any designer-god.

I think we're talking at cross-purposes here. I agree.

Me too.

This wasn't a case of "good enough" as much as "the best that could be done in the circumstances". In this case guarding as much as possible against the risks inherent in doing things one way which could potentially have a bad outcome because to do things the other way would inevitably have a bad outcome.

Whoever wrote those guidelines had clearly never encountered an internet forum before... :E

Certainly, and if we were talking about airline operations, aeronautics and the like then I'd be all ears. But we're discussing an opinion he formed before he got that piloting experience on political grounds and one he has rigidly stuck to since. The equivalent with me would be over a decade of software engineering experience having no effect on the fact that I find Apple a loathsome company and have done since 1994 - not that it seems to have done them any harm over the last decade or so, so make of that what you will.

Capt. Corps didn't design it, he was responsible for making sure that the system provided a safe and effective way of operating the aircraft, and doing so in a way that a majority of pilots would find relatively natural. By any objective measure, he succeeded. Seeing doing away with the yoke as a "mistake" is very much a minority opinion - and a dwindling one at that.

DW:
Just for fun, and something completely different (I'll never win this argument with you anyway), I've picked out the one part with which I entirely agree! Don't even let me get started on that!

@Organfreak

I'm not trying to win any arguments, I assure you. I'm just presenting rational evidence-based counterpoints to sweeping statements that we're expected to take as gospel.

Just as anyone asking me about Apple needs to take into account my visceral (to put it mildly) dislike of the company and their products when evaluating my words, so it goes with CONF iture and Airbus.

Right - let's get back on-topic.

[EDIT : Hostile? Nah - my natural manner is fairly jovial. Persistent almost to the point of being irritating? Guilty as charged, m'lud. :} ]

Your Honour, I submit that the witness is hostile.

:O

Jobs and Boyd would have been buds. What makes Apple wildly successful is its genesis in product, and its disdain for tradition, and corporate corrosion, in Boyd's case "stale rank"....

Jobs..."Be Brutal, keep moving, and don't be satisfied..."THINK MOTION"

Boyd... "The victor is agile..."

Neither tolerated the status quo, and rejected explanations that took longer than two seconds...

The death of corporate agility started with the first committee.....

The evolution of the cockpit abandoned command in favor of democracy...

How precious....

Not at all. CRM may have been kryptonite to the "Captain God" philosophy, but in order to work effectively, a clear and well-understood command gradient is essential. Authority can be exercised without being a martinet about it.

In this case, both F/Os understood that they were under the captain's authority, but at least one of them seemed unsure as to his own.

If you pause, you will note that you may have affirmed my opinion. The flightdeck from BEA information, only, suggests a gauzy and illdefined working group. I like your summary of the PNF's intentions. I don't necessarily agree, but here, the format failed due surprise, mainly. Leaderless enterprises seldom succeed. There was precious little to hold on to, and the environment had an unfriendly ambience. It cannot have been as bad as it seems, per BEA #3.

It simply can't....

bubbers44: Yes, I know.

Dozy, your comment on the diagnosis bit misses the mark, handsomely.

The point of the AoA gage discussion over numerous AF 447 threads hinges upon how easy it is to see, on an AoA gage, if you are or are not stalled.

The other means of diagnosing pale in comparison when it comes to simplicity, though one must admit that a stall warning horn is usually a clue that one must pay serious attention to one's performance! :eek:
(I guess on this next bit, but I suspect that the pilots in the cockpit associated stall warning with Airspeed being unreliable, and for that reason ignored it as assumed to be spurious ... may be wrong on that).
While that is my feeling as well, I do appreciate the counter to any of us recommending that added indication:

the plane isn't supposed to be flown into stall, and pilots ought to be aware enough in their flying to take stall prevention steps when warning of impending stall (via scan or other alerts) tells them that they are about to stall. AoA would help that, but it is an additional scan item, as a supplemental scan, which takes us back to "if the scan is breaking down, or has broken down, what will the pilot look at next, and what will register?"

The requirements folks can make a decent case against. It takes something like AF 447 to demonstrate where that reasonable approach may still not account for how that gage helps when needed most.

Mainly?

If you had said, "The format failed due to lousy/non-existent training, mainly" then I'd completely agree!

OF,
-"Afflicting the comfortable since 1950"

They were surprised by their lack of training?

Comforting the afflicted, since.....

Maybe it would help some drivers if the warning stall, stall was replaced by the instruction stick forward, nose down.

In some cases, dont pay attention with STALL WARNING
 

Hi,

'NAV ADR DISAGREE : RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARN'

But
'AIRBUS incite les pilotes .... ne pas tenir compte des alarmes STALL'
= 'Don't take care with Stall Alarm'
Make your choice

AoA and HUD on commercial jets
 

Glad to hear from Cland that a few carriers are using a HUD.

His observations agree with mine to a large degree. That is, instrument approaches are much easier and safer. The down side is you can get spoiled and have to do the "human" reversion laws if the doofer fails. Just a few days until my digitized video is posted, and you will have no trouble seeing what was there to help.

I am not sure that any display should emphasize AoA in all flight regimes. However, even cruising, an AoA symbol referenced to the flight path marker would let you know within a second that something was gonna get bad and soon.

I have seen zero accident references to failed AoA sensors or inputs to the flight control system computers or even the old jets with basic control systems.

As some have pointed out, the basic airliners are much more sensitive to a mach stall than the jets I flew. Still, a display that shows a ridiculous AoA and low speed should be a clue for the pilot to use. You don't even need "bitching Betty" to tell you that you're about to stall. If that AoA bracket is way above the flight path marker, then....... duh?

Lastly, the solid-state HUD electronics were vastly more reliable than many old display systems. They either worked when you powered up or kept working unless you got hit by lightning.

Where was that quoted?

[AIRBUS encourages pilots to ignore the STALL warning]