@ OK465 & CONF:
 

Agreed! ALT2 as function of FCPCs and FD Bars as function of FMGEC.

FWIW, FD Bars can be displayed on ground (no fwd speed) by selecting a V/S.
Pitch bar is limited to a value ~ +1000 ft/s even when selected V/S is at max. +6000ft/s.
If I remember it well the Pitch bar was just above the 2.5° mark (1.5° ND on ground makes ~ 4°).

BEA IR#3:
In ALT2B no Hi and Lo speed stabilty (= VMO2/ Vc prot).

This was not due to ADR DISAGREE but due ADR2 being the voted (median) value and not returning within Δ50kts of initial airspeed at -10s.

(ADR DISAGREE was set on 02:12:xx not before, at 02:10:08 there was a disagreement between ADRs but the duration was less then 10s.
Just before the 10th second ADR1 & ADR3 became consistent, but wrong)

NO, all ADR speeds were below VLS after 02:10:08.

If 2 speeds would have been above VLS then YES,... See VH-EBA

A33Zab:

Thank you sir.

ALT2"B" is an interesting animal.

At a time when things are happening that one has not experienced, when knowledge is life itself, this aircraft metamorphoses in complex ways. Many wonderful people here have said how simple it must be, to have recovered this aircraft. Well...

I am mystified that such complexity and crazy conditions can be designed to happen in abject chaos, when what is needed is straightforward expectation, simple and critical cues, and an aircraft that demands nothing, save an intuitive and experienced aircrew.

Tend to agree, but ... I don't believe that anyone ever expected that during the 40 seconds or so that the plumbing provided dud airspeed data, that the airspeed would be deliberately ditched in favor of altitude.:{

Viable means must be found to prevent a similar occurrence - probably resulting in something similar to the B787 VSYN.

A great deal has been made of the vigorous stick inputs. As an example, it in itself is tolerated. When pumping controls is not trained out, and the possibility for sensitive controls result from a controls process, (direct), can we see the potential for disaster? I am not convinced that enhanced training would improve the situation, especially when it involves a syllabus of counter intuitive process, along with a need for memory items that are arcane, and not conducive to simplicity in the face of panic...

Vsyn... Nice, but it treats the symptoms only. Eliminating failure is impossible, and in that sense, makes the issue more dangerous, and compelling. For example, had UAS been trained as a potential problem, and solutions provided, the accident may not have occurred. Something else to fail, and in its promised safety, eliminates the need to train for its failure, and then one is truly screwed, having not trained for duff speeds.....

MM43 The Ironies of Automation paper gives us a reason that the crew of AF447 did such a poor job. Aircraft handling (aviate) used to be our primary job with navigation and communication as secondary jobs. With the advent of RVSM airspace, there are fewer and fewer opportunities for pilots to aviate. That task is going over to OTTO and the crew is left with the navigation-communication part as their primary duty. These are not unimportant jobs, but when OTTO can't/won't aviate why should we think that a pilot who has bagged just a few minutes flying a stabilized airliner in a dirty configuration down to the runway on a few approaches each month over several years should be able to start up his scan and reliably take over in cruise in an unfamiliar control law.
If you are going to have problems with aviating, it is more likely to be a long haul guy that has a problem rather than a short haul guy. They just have that much less opportunity to practice.
IMHO, If they just add to the sim exercises to meet this recommendation, they will miss the mark. Pilots need to become much more involved in actual aviating in between the sim sessions. All that cruise flying going to waste is a crying shame. :(

My first airline job required two captains for long haul flights. My last one two fos were required. I think if a captain was in the left seat on this flight there would be no question who was in charge. He would not have allowed the PF to do what he did.

VLS is based on Vs1g, which depends on weight, flap/slat position and alphamax. Alphamax varies with Mach, similar to the stall warning threshold. IMO it would be logical that the system uses the same logic for alpha max as it does for alphaSW, i.e. the highest of the valid Mach values is used to determine alphamax. The display of VLS on a PFD reqires that the speed displayed (ADR1, 2 or 3) is not 'invalid' (SPD flag displayed), and that VLS is within the range of displayed speeds.

Vs1g (aka Valphamax) is only displayed in normal law. In alternate law Vs1g is replaced by Vsw. IMO a logical consequence of the loss of protections: at the high speed end of the envelope, alternate law reduces Mmo to 0.82.

Machinbird;
A long-haul transport will typically do about 4 to 6 hours per year of actual handling of the aircraft.

The takeoff phase would typically be in the neighbourhood of 4 minutes before the autoflight is engaged, (if the SID isn't complex, requiring the automation for navigational accuracy in which case its engaged above 100'), and the approach phase which typically is under two minutes in duration.

As you correctly point out, it is not legal to hand-fly in RVSM airspace, so "practise" is not possible there either.

In Canada, the CARS do not require approach-to-stall and recovery training for FBW aircraft for those transitioning from other types. Airlines may do this training by choice but sim scripts are so jammed with required items that the time available for actual hand-flying is minimal to nil.

I particularly agree with your observation that, "...If they just add to the sim exercises to meet this recommendation, they will miss the mark. Pilots need to become much more involved in actual aviating in between the sim sessions."

These concerns have been around since the mid-80s, expressed mainly by flight crews and flight safety people. AW&ST ran a series on this, first in 1989 and then in 1995.

That said, the record speaks for itself - automation has enhanced safety, (I include under the category of 'automation', the notion of "protections" as well as TCAS, EGPWS, CPDLC, GPS). But the character of accidents is changing wherein almost all accidents are not the result of mechanical failure, navigational error, serious weather encounters or mid-air collision but of LOC and CFIT which have HF elements to greater or lesser degrees.

bubber44;
Yes, but two F/O's, or one F/O and an RP (who isn't permitted to sit up front below cruise altitudes and who isn't permitted to takeoff/land), are cheaper... :uhoh:

A great deal has been made of the vigorous stick inputs. As an example, it in itself is tolerated. When pumping controls is not trained out, and the possibility for sensitive controls result from a controls process, (direct), can we see the potential for disaster? I am not convinced that enhanced training would improve the situation, especially when it involves a syllabus of counter intuitive process, along with a need for memory items that are arcane, and not conducive to simplicity in the face of panic...

Training and sim sessions came to this stick pumping, disagree? Or it was isolated, and couldn't have happened with any other pilot? Here we talk about something more endemic, and potentially lethal. Ignore the deluge of data in the cockpit in the midst of upset at our collective peril. When things go pear, there is either time to do it the way Airbus designed, or there is not.

When seconds count, they cannot be squandered on panicky attempts to remember !!!!. Things go simple, or they go South....period. The LAW had changed prior to the pilot's awareness of it, this is without question. When he finally knew what had changed, is debatable. Fine, let's us try to rmember the salient parts of AL2. Did he immediately soften his horizontal inputs? NO. Vertical? Again, NO. That is starting behind with a vengeance. Me? I am a sissy. I fly whilst constantly looking for a place to land. I chronically review safety actions and responses on the most hohum flight.

PF was cocky? Unaware? No matter, what he did not do is what most here would have done, so we hear....

Regardless the training, regardless the platform, if one is not ahead, one is behind. And behind is inside the gate of the graveyard. Can that be trained? Can it be practiced? Awareness is common to all pilots who have had a proper ab initio, and have not gotten complacent.

On the platform that commands ennui, and less than alert pilotage, the demons are waiting...

Lyman, I'm sorry but I am at an utter loss as to what you're talking about. It reads cryptically, with suggestive questions but no new understanding. My sense of the three IRs and what will likely form the body of the Final Report is that while interesting to ponder, none of what you have posited is relevant to finding out what happened and why. There have been recommendations from the BEA and acknowledgement that along with incorrect responses to the UAS event, some observations concerning the stall warning system.

In terms of 'demons waiting', that is the very definition of aviation: "At every moment, the machine is trying its damndest to kill you." QED.

In terms of 'demons waiting', that is the very definition of aviation: "At every moment, the machine is trying its damndest to kill you." QED.

Now that is hyperbole. You must know I address complacency, and am making a point to wit: a platform that does all the work, deflects all the challenge, and lullabies to an awake inertia is an accident waiting to happen. My money is on that being addressed as well as sleep inertia, perhaps in conjunction with training. I could well be way off the mark, but the Airbus, as designed in 1980, and with all follow on, is not a good fit for today's young at entry pilot. There is a special and untrained format waiting to pounce, demon or no. I say it from the outset, at a time of startle, in stink, and with vital cues missing, the "sophistication" of the "degradations" is counter recovery..... In the seconds it took for PF to lose the plot of his PITCH, and hence his a/s (as a 'complement' to the ADR's desertion), he was deluged with mostly irrelevant pages of ECAM, a ROLL that had his hands baffled, and a PNF who was only half there, insofar as being helpful, rather than reticent, and calling a CAPTAIN who should have been at the helm in the first place.

There is a chasm as wide as all cattle between the Airbus and the pilot, in conditions that demand piloting rather than systems management. The euphemism "graceful degradation" is descriptive of the change in personality demanded by the aircraft from systems manager to Pilot, in emergency conditions, when one is functionally nothing at all like the other. Imho. One may as well have a third and fourth seat, with pilots, who can take over from the "systems guys".

Over-analytical, precious, and inscrutable in the worst of times...A sweetheart and mistress in the good times. As it is a machine, the difference lies in the misunderstandings of the designers, not necessarily the rarely seen and occasionally lethal shortcomings of unsuspecting aircrew.

PJ2, I had thought that it was just helicopter pilots who thought that way! :E

(reference is to Harry Reasoner's piece called "Helicopter Pilots are Different." )

Well, as I hear it, helicopters do not FLY. They beat the air into submission....

Not off the mark, but backwards. You are saying a platform designed in 1980 is not a good fit for a training / recruitment program from thirty years later.

Rather than decrying the inadequacy of the engineers' crystal ball, shouldn't we be considering what should be being fitted to what ?

Why only "the Airbus" and not "the automated glass-cockpit" ? Which is the more important factor ?

Are non-buses falling out of the sky due to systems managers failing at being pilots when things go suddenly wrong ? Hell yes.

In one recent crash report the airline's response has been to blame the plane because otto doesn't engage when the systems managers are yanking the controls around - that's right, the airline thinks otto should jump in to dig the pilots out of the merde they have gotten themselves into and ignore their control inputs. Can't be the airbus "philosophy" at fault though - because it wasn't a bus.

Didn't pan out too well at Schiphol did it. When the three of them woke up to the mess they were in, it was the trainee PF who started with the right response. They might have been doomed anyway, but at least he was trying the right things - then the ex-mil "real pilot" captain took over and made sure of the result...

PJ2, Bubbers, OK465, and many other old hands who actually used to be proficient in hand flying are now retired. The newer pilots have few opportunities to hand fly their aircraft and operate mostly supervising the navigation computers of their aircraft and communicating with ATC, the second and third legs of the Aviate, Navigate, Communicate priority mandate. Why should they be comfortable stepping into the Aviate role when situation or system failures demand it? This is not an A or B thing. Pilots who are expected to save they day when everything else goes south had better be comfortable aviating, but how can they do this in a regime that demands extreme precision in altitude maintenance? That was the point I hope I made earlier with the concept of an autopilot protected training mode where the autopilot would ensure an acceptable level of altitude maintenance and the pilot would attempt to operate inside a deadband where the autopilot would not interfere. If the deadband was exceeded, the autopilot would make a brief correction toward the center of the band (and perhaps a brief disrespectful noise :) to let the trainee know he had been corrected.) The result of this training opportunity would be pilots with fully functional scans who were well attuned to their aircraft's handling characteristics.

The rusty pilot problem is one of the regulator's making. It is they who must fix the problem. In their haste to provide higher traffic capacity, they have ignored the long term problems they have created. They are going to have find a way for pilots to actually fly again within the route structure, and they should probably mandate hand flying minimums time requirements for pilots. AF447 is one of their chickens that came home to roost.

Machinbird :D

New Press Release on BEA site.
 

Press release, 30/05/2011

Hi,

In the french press :
Google Traduction

Le crash Rio-Paris bientôt élucidé, les responsabilités pénales à venir - Yahoo! Actualités France

Guess I'll see you all in July then folks. :)

Later!

@Machinbird....

The rusty pilot problem is one of the regulator's making. It is they who must fix the problem. In their haste to provide higher traffic capacity, they have ignored the long term problems they have created. They are going to have find a way for pilots to actually fly again within the route structure, and they should probably mandate hand flying minimums time requirements for pilots. AF447 is one of their chickens that came home to roost.

Yes. And no.

You ignore the complicity of the line....

The WHAT???

The regulator does not live in a vacuum. There is enormous pressure, political, and economic, for the regulator to demure to profit. Whence comes the pressure?

You seem very surprised? Have you been following the evolution of Air France v/v their public presentation of this accident, from the beginning?

Proactive and moral concern for others departed the gate long ago...for profits.

See: "pencil whip", "deferred in the field", and more obvious, though less quantifiable bud/bud "degradation" of what was once a functional system....

Your dudgeon is affected, yes? (You Kid?)

In the course of time, things produce what cannot be avoided. BEA acquiesced to AIRBUS to release a memo to burnish the reputation of the a/c manufacturer. Had they refused, there would have been trouble....and improvement in AirBus commitment to safety, in all ways.....

Airbus engineered a new technology for the 380.To save the weight of six passengers, they tried a composite/metal sandwich that was new. Ribs are fracturing. RR engineered a stub pipe for the Trent. Boeing developed a huge leap in application of two phase construction, the Dreamliner. Throughout its testing, their was applause, or chagrin, as if in some kind of ego filled soccer match.

The Shuttle program exhibited the same sort of fan interest, but the astronauts knew the risks....

If you don't know exactly what you are doing, work for the Space program, where risk is acknowledged. The hustle for money and prestige belongs NOT in airline transport....

I am a partisan. You should consider becoming one.

Lyman;
Now this, I understand. In fact, I have been "partisan" during my entire tenure here on PPRuNe and have written extensively on a neoliberal political economy since the 70's and government's increasing complicity especially post-deregulation in the late 80's, in enabling the legal circumstances under which shareholder value and corporate profit have singularly governed the approach to corporate behaviours over the past three decades. To the exclusion of all other values, this is how business these days is conducting itself and airlines are no exception. While shortcuts in aviation are not new, there is a brashness and robustness to cost-control which is, in my view, inappropriate to the tasks at hand in aviation.

But the BEA Report is not going to address any of these, and in fact the themes which you broach and with which I agree, require an in-depth and informed discussion all by themselves. Read from this pov, your entries make complete sense.

Lyman,
I answered you in that way because you sometimes make up obscure phrases that don't always communicate what you're trying to say. I was left completely boggled by, "You ignore the complicity of the line...."

I know what complicity is but I didn't know what you meant by "the line."

In fact, I pretty-much agree with your take on this, and have long-mistrusted the ties between industry and regulators. I'm 62 years old and I've seen it time and again. (Hope I don't have to argue this with Dozy a hundredth time) But the worst....please don't accuse me of being non-partisan. I am always on the side of The People, and suspicious of avaricious bottom-line corporations and their bedfellows. I've tried to keep an open mind throughout this thread, since this accident was so complex, but by this time, it is apparent that Machinebird's assessment, "They are going to have find a way for pilots to actually fly again within the route structure, and they should probably mandate hand flying minimums time requirements for pilots. AF447 is one of their chickens that came home to roost" is absolutely dead-on, pun intended.

I'm afraid that PJ2 may be right, that this will not be addressed. If it's not, I'm not going flying anymore.

SS v CC
 

Not wishing to reignite the Airbus sidestick versus Boeing control column debate, but read this in a recent Flight International article on the Thomson Airways B767-300 heavy landing at Bristol in Oct 2010.
It said: "The main gear contacted the runway at 2.05G - enough to classify as a heavy landing - but the crown damage occurred when the jet rapidly de-rotated and its nose-gear struck the runway, possibly as a result of the pilot being thrown forward and pushing on the control column".
I speculate this would be less likely to happen in a SS controlled aircraft?

,
The regulator EASA is "european" (what is that "Europe"?), but the BEA is French, as 'Europe' is unable to defend air safety, and French aviation has been destroyed !
EASA - European Aviation Safety Agencywww.easa.europa.eu/ :
"The European Aviation Safety Agency is the centrepiece of the European Union's strategy for aviation safety" (sic)

Pressure are only politic.
You see nice aircrafts, but it is a black and brown story.

If you want to make money choose an other activity than aviation !

If you want to travel in safety, "take the train !" (Tenenbaum Director of DGAC after Habsheim crash)

They are also human problems : in the early 80's automation was going victorious to artificial intelligence . A lot of the very fews of that speciality disapeared with AIDS : today's "intelligence articielle" (IA in French, AI in English not to be confused with Airbus Industry in our threads) is limited in some expert systems, and domestics robots, with exception of chess game. IA needs very long studies mixed to hard work experience. Airbus wanted to do IA, but were not able.

@roulish

&(/%DO/%D%CL(&t53iug ??????????????????

What's your point?

roulishollandais;

Some very interesting comments, thank you...I'll read carefully. It's complicated, to be sure.

SRMman, If the restraints were being used properly, he goes nowhere. All systems are interdependent to some extent, and control columns depend on accurate and appropriate physical movement, as do SS. Does the elbow strap in?

We think from the evidence that the restraints aboard 447 may have been in other than appropriate attach. To me, the SS seems more vulnerable to an unrestrained crew member than the column, (turbulence comes to mind), but it makes for interesting discussion.


BEA acquiesced to AIRBUS to release a memo to burnish the reputation of the a/c manufacturer. Had they refused, there would have been trouble....and improvement in AirBus commitment to safety, in all ways.....

Don't be surprised if BEA does in fact push back for this "accomodation". They have taken heat, for the memo, and for other things. The game is dynamic, and no one entity calls the shots, it is qpq, tit for tat, and the balance sheet is not written, it is carried, mentally, sub rosa, and used as ammunition in time of WAR. Though co-operative, they remain distinct, and in time if great upset, they retreat into their own particular fortress, for a time....

PJ2. Thank you, my friend, it is most welcome to find common ground.

Re PJ2's comments:



I htink PJ is shining a light on what is fast becoming the prime (yet oft hidden) contributing factor to a vast array of accidents and incidents.

Though this may seem to be "off thread" in the specific sense, it is on topic in the general sense (of contributing factors to this accident).

I am currently involved in various types of aviation safety assessments in many diverse parts of the world (including Europe, North America, Asia and Africa). I can say with no hesitation that what PJ alludes to is as widespread as civil aviation itself. From airport operators building fancy new terminals whilst their operational infrastructure (runways, nav aids, etc.) are not up to standard; to ANSP's refusing to staff enough controllers or install needed equipment whilst engaging in "revenue generation" activities; to air carriers providing inadequate ongoing training to air crew, and exerting pressure to always operate on time. All of the above exist in ALL areas of the globe.

There are many reasons (IMO) for this current lack of balance between "production" and "protection" (profit v/s safety) but overall there is a direct relationship to the composition and philosophy of the senior management and Boards of Directors of today's "commercialised" entities.

We are all partisans.

I'd be happy to explore this discussion further on the safety forum.

Yes. The Boardroom. And the GO room. They are hand in hand, and they too have those to whom they answer, and it is not you and I....The safety forum?

Hi,

Safety and airlines profits .... ?

http://i.imgur.com/cFPRi.jpg

Put another way, the BEA were willing to put their reputation on the line by stating that there were no technical failures over and above the blocked pitot tubes at Airbus's request just prior to a major industry event. There's nothing nefarious about it, and I'm sure that the situation would have been the same across the pond if something similar had happened.

Right - see you in July!

Yes.......NOTED July.

Hi,

DW
That's not a problem for the BEA .. they are used to .... :}
Stormy sky on Independence
Google*Traduction
Ciel orageux sur l

Keep your powder dry till July, jcj.

Organfreak;
I believe that the circumstances which built and delineated the wider context for AF447 and other accidents were at least burnished in the historical and the current political economy.

The name, “neoliberal”really doesn’t describe it anymore but merely describes the changes in the “arrangements”between private corporate interests and governments of western countries slowly awakening to a post-war, post-Keynesian world.

This doesn’t mean it’s all going to 'h' in a handbasket and that we should avoid all flying...not at all. Our highest risks by far, are the cab or car rides to the airport.

Agree or no, Kahneman has some interesting things to say about making such assessments; - I think the book is worth at least an examination.

Within a troubling political economy there are many more successes than failures if we are in the discourse of business and technology which counts multi-trillion dollar economies as "successful", (...and if we are in the discourse of ecology and livable systems, the present arrangements are inhumane, but...another thread).

"Success" within a troublesome mainstream doesn’t mean outcomes such as those being discussed here are acceptableand should be tolerated because of the flim-flam notion that the good fortunes of the unbelievably, privately wealthy will trickle down upon the masses if we just let greed have its way. These are social and organizational issues which profit renders invisible or at least inconvenient. Inconvenient truths in the safety data are almost universally unwelcome if fixing the problems revealed in the data is going to increase costs. That must change. Put voice and video recorders in board rooms for a start.

I think there are millions of innocent victims in such social systems as governed by the present rules of economic engagement which are mostly invisible to all. Here, with AF447, tragically, sadly, the two F/Os are in a scintillatingly-harsh spotlight which could shine on any one of us at any moment in circumstances far removed from our own making.

If this phenomenon isn’t understood for whatit is, both politics and the law will continue the trend to find out who to blame and then crucify individuals at the pointy end.

If we are looking for the pattern that connects all this, failing to comprehend the true sources of this accident and others like it, guarantees repetition until such outcomes are no longer tolerable to the very system which fostered them.

This does not excuse the absence of fundamental and trained responses designed to maintain cockpit order and discipline, as well as to deal with mere abnormalities via procedures considered quietly, between many experts at their desks and then tried over and over in simulators before making it into the AOM. Making one's own responses up and then acting out of instinct as opposed recalling one’s SOP and CRM training is inexcusable for a professional airline pilot, but truly, the sources of these errors do not entirely originate within individual pilots no matter who they could have been.

I hope the BEA, mindful of the legal cases pending, are able to strike a fine balance in these two very large and significant themes.

Balance.

Equilibrium is the enemy of the entrepreneur, and in service to his own, and the culture of his clients and investors, the goals are set.

Action impels interest. Interest compels venture. Success breeds competition, and great success breeds ruinous competition. In the ashes of the ruins of failed schemes, survivors merge, freeze out competition, create their own credo and tacit co-operation, to create a stasis. Unsatisfying and not profitable, the goal shifts from value and service to survival, and it is these instincts that create danger. Success long gone, survival makes animals of men, and liars of the shepherds.

BEA will do nothing out of the ordinary, save to "maintain the status quo"

The document will be pure joy to dissect. In its language will be the compromise discussion of what I have just written. The industry is failing.

White knuckles used to have no basis in reality...

Hi,

DW
It was just a warning shot :)