On 20-21 March the Royal Aeronautical Society held its first 'The Aircraft Commander in the 21st Century' conference. Organised by the RAeS Flight Operations Group, the conference sought to explore the changing role of the aircraft commander, particularly as civil airliners get ever more automated and complex. This issue has recently been thrown into sharp focus, as incidents such as Qantas QF32 and Air France AF447 have demonstrated differing responses from pilots to ever more complex aircraft.

In particular, the industry now is reassessing the training given to pilots. A major theme that emerged from the conference was that, in the past 20 years, pilots have been taught to 'Follow the ECAM [(Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor]' - the computerised glass display that in Airbus aircraft (and Boeing aircraft as the EICAS Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) which shows critical engine and systems information. While this ECAM display makes life easy in many respects, (but which), if followed blindly, can lead to disaster. Previous training, said one speaker, relied on following the ECAM procedure step-by-step and pilots 'never considered not doing the procedure'.

This issue of displays showing spurious information was highlighted graphically by the keynote speaker at the conference Captain David Evans who, as a Qantas A380 training and check captain, was one of the five flight deck pilots who successfully resolved the QF32 incident in November 2010 after the 02 Trent engine suffered an uncontained failure. With the ECAM 'information overload' deluging the crew with a barrage of error messages the experienced captains had to sort through and examine what these meant for the aircraft. In particular, the ECAM recommended that the crew shift the fuel balance from one wing to another, as an error message said 'wings not balanced' as the imbalance limit had been exceeded. However, the reason why the aircraft was becoming unbalanced was that there was a serious fuel leak caused by the exploding engine - a situation that was obvious to anyone looking out of the window and seeing the damaged left hand wing leaking fuel.

Yet, had the crew followed procedure to the letter instead of 'using the force' and disregarding the computer, they would have ended up pumping fuel into a leaking fuel tank with consequences. At the very least this would have dramatically shortened the available time for the crew to think through and solve the problem.

Reliance and dependence that the computer always knows best can be dangerous. As Captain Evans notes: "What needs to be brought back into the skies is a 'healthy scepticism' about technology". This view was echoed in a later presentation by Captain Scott Martin, an experimental test pilot at Gulfstream, who said the correct approach was to treat the cockpit automation
'like a third pilot' but to be prepared to question it if it was not making sense. In the final analysis, says Evans - 'airmanship' or 'does this seem sensible?' should trump any automated ECAM/EICAS messages.

Yet this natural suspicion of technology runs counter to the future generations of pilots who will be drawn from today's 'Generation Y and Z' now at college or school. As Evans and others point out, these future captains born in the 1980s and 90s, while being able to grasp new technology and systems far quicker than their predecessors as well as absorb new information, will also, growing up with computers, iPads and smart phones, instinctively trust technology more.

The problem is not only one of younger pilots relying on technology too much but also of older pilots who may be losing touch with basic flying skills after years of relying on the autopilot. Though aircraft accidents remain rare - a noteworthy statistic from the conference showed that while the most common incident was a runway incursion/penetration - the most lethal in terms of lives lost is now loss of control in flight (LOC-I).

Lessons from QF32 are already making their way into Qantas' training. At the conference Captain Evans explained how Qantas has started to introduce simulator scenarios based on real (but rare) scenarios to expose pilots to difficult command decisions.
One example chosen for a recent simulator LOFT (Line oriented flight training) exercise was the scenario of flying an A380 through a volcano ash cloud, which could simultaneously set off fire alarms on the flightdeck and elsewhere (thanks to smoke detectors) as well as flame out the engines.
In the simulator exercise, pitot tubes would also be blocked by ash.
So what happened? With smoke warnings, engines flamed out, the airspeed went blank and the aircraft went into direct law with no autopilot. In particular, Evans noted, the ECAM logic prioritised the multiple ( spurious) fire warnings over the engine flame out warning. However for the pilots, understanding that the ash had caused the smoke detectors to trip, the priority should be to restart the engines.
This simulator exercise clearly demonstrates to pilots how a highly automated aircraft could revert to a challenging manual flying task for the pilots - whilst simultaneously presenting them with information overload in the form of ECAM messages.
However, doing this in the sim allows them to hone their command and decision making skills in a safe environment.

Emirates Airlines is also adapting its approach to training in the light of recent events and is aiming at the highest standards, a point well made by Captain Martin Mahoney, SVP Flight Training at Emirates. To that end, the carrier has introduced a 'basic aerodynamics' course to refresh new entrants about the fundamentals of flight. Intriguingly, it has also reversed the trend for distance learning in favour of a return to 'chalk and blackboard' classroom learning.
Why? Captain Mahoney contends that not only do pilots learn better by being in the presence of other pilots (as well as reinforcing the pilot culture - an important factor in multicultural airline like Emirates) - but also in that the instructor can watch the students' eyes to see if the lessons have really understood. . In addition, Emirates is also boosting its pilots' skills with two manual handling simulator sessions every year for new commanders.

The airline has also introduced personality profiles for command upgrade candidates which are pilot's eyes only (management does not see them) and which provides potential captains with individual, practical feedback on their leadership style as well as strengths and weaknesses. However, Captain Mahoney had harsh words for ICAO's Level 4 English standards - arguing that they are "not worth the paper they are written on". In fact, he revealed that recent simulator tests of pilots from an unnamed defunct European charter carrier saw a 50% failure rate due to their English not being up to the standard needed by Emirates

Though the flightdeck is regarded as the gold standard for CRM (crew resource management), there maybe lessons from the medical sector, especially from surgeons, who have a similar high-skilled job with large responsibilities and operate in teams.
Indeed, Professor Rhona Flin, an industrial psychology expert at the University of Aberdeen observed that that in order to access and fully exploit the 'working memory' (analytical, which experts now believe can hold up to four 'chunks' at the same time), it may be a case of the 'slower the better'. She noted that one surgeon had once been given advice "Don't just do something, stand there", indicating that slowing down rather than rushing into action may contribute to better decision making in medical operations.
Though this may not be possible in some circumstances (Captain Sullenberger's Hudson ditching and the BA 777 Heathrow landing short of the runway needing fast reactions), taking a step back from the flashing displays and warnings may actually improve critical thinking. Was it perhaps due to the extra critical thinking time brought to the QF32 incident by five experienced captains that resolved the problem successfully?
Conversely, when thinking time is limited decision-making relies on long-term memory containing models of the world that we use, together with procedures and experience. These might be characterised by 'the gut feeling' or 'we've always done it this way'. This may work in some instances but, in more novel or unexpected situations, may make pilots (or surgeons) make the wrong choices or continue down an incorrect path - even when it is obvious in hindsight that the decision was the wrong one.

That aircraft (and crews) are now safer than ever is not in doubt and the statistics bear this out. However, the aviation industry is always striving for perfection. Furthermore, there is a growing unease that the previous ways of learning (and command) need adapting to new and future generations of automated aircraft. Ex-military pilots with 'nerves of steel', experience of flying at the edges of the envelope yet unwilling to talk to juniors have given way to systems managers and team players. However, these new pilots, fluent in the latest crew management skills, may also be lacking some basic 'stick and rudder' skills and be too willing to trust the computer.

The highly automated aircraft also provides fresh challenges. The issue is not the technology itself but the gulf between normal and non-normal (i.e. emergency) operations. In normal operations a highly automated airliner is easier to fly than previous generations of aircraft but, in a non-normal situation, it is comparatively harder.
It is this gulf between normal and non- normal which is the issue and is so difficult to train for because of the extreme rarity of non-normal emergencies. As one speaker pointed out, in the old days he had flown as a third pilot observing the crew routine and watching them deal with multiple engine failures as part of his apprenticeship to command. Today, a trainee captain riding a jump seat as an observer would be extremely unlikely to witness an in-flight emergency to 'learn' from the more experienced crews.
In short, some forward-thinking airlines are already adapting their approach to training and command issues in making sure that the aircraft commander of the future has the correct mix of technical and non-technical skills and, more importantly, knows when to ignore, question or override the computers. As Captain David Evans observes, the commander must: "work out
the solutions with the help of technology, not depend on technology for the solution".

OC
your instruments will tell you what is actually going on not what you believe the position of the stick is.

OC
We have a flight crew non performance here and given the evidence we have this crew would have not been able to deal with the situation no matter what their input device was. That is the sad reality.

OC
I have no problem with you preferring the yoke but once you depart from the objective standpoint you end up in the area of speculation.

....suggestion that Airbus FBW raison d'etre is cost and that cheaper must be less safe is completely misinformed or an indicator of recklessly pushed agenda. Or both.

Anyway, there were 32 cases of at least two pitots blocked on 330/340 before AF447. Did we discuss them here on PPRuNe?

Was anyone not astounded that Airbus had the clout and power to demand a memorandum from BEA prior to the Show? I was not, anyone?

OC
Indeed some interesting points - however, I would go as far as to suggest that one shouldn't be operating on an expectation pattern

OC
My instructors always taught me that you don't expect anything but you accept what the instruments tell you. Once you start to expect you run the risk of deviating from how things are and getting into a mess.

OC
Our instructors didnīt have to emphasize the why after the what, because we had the yoke or stick in our hands and knew why we where off the desired parameters.

OC
Of course this may be different in military aviation but this is what I learned.

OC
Knowing what is often a vital factor and could be said to have more importance than why.

I don't think PJ2 will be upset if I say that in my conversations with him he confirmed that on at least one occasion he executed a recovery from 30 deg AoA using 10 deg ND pitch - it took about 15000 ft.

Suppose we start with pitch +15, Gamma -25, AoA +40 and instantaneously pitch
down through 25 deg to -10. (this is a thought experiment so we can do
that):

AoA remains at +40 for the moment as you suggest, but that means gamma goes
to -50. EAS hasn't changed, neither have CL and Cd at constant AoA so drag and
lift are unchanged. However we now have a large additional gravity component so
the aircraft will accelerate in absolute terms, i.e.TAS will increase, again as
suggested in a later post.

But in addition the aircraft is now descending more rapidly into denser air
so there is a double effect on EAS, and the thrust is also increasing due to
altitude effects which also helps a bit although this is not anything like as
important as the gravity effect since the maximum thrust one might get at say
FL350 is only about 7%W whereas a 25 deg FPA shift is worth 42%W.

If EAS increases at constant AoA the aircraft will develop an upwards
acceleration normal to the flight path and thence an upward velocity component
which, with the increased airspeed will result in a reduction in FPA. You can
see this in HN39's traces. [It will also of course experience an increase in
drag which partially offsets the benefits, but I think this only partially
offsets them]

A reduction in FPA, WITH PITCH HELD CONSTANT, will
give a reduction in AoA.

Cd is very sensitive to AoA above the stall, so the drag reduces more than
the effect of increased EAS and the whole response is "speed unstable" as it
were, with an increasing acceleration and reduction in AoA as time goes on until
the AoA is reduced to below S/W limits.