The note on the standar minima page for KBHM states that the LOC procedure is not to be used at night.I compared it to other LOC procedures at different airfield and it seem specific to KBHM.
The provision of approach lighting would draw your vision towards the runway threshold and the rest of the runway surface. At Gatwick when they are using the standby runway two strobes are used to draw the pilots vision towards the runway threshold.
The only airfield I operate into at night without approach lights is Corfu on RW 17 but the runway stands out well as there is little lighting around it.
The argument is not about how I would fly the approach differently but the fact that the basic underlying terrain and obstace survey is not homogemous across the charts and is depicted differently by two different charting agencies. When was the last terrain and obstacle survey completed? I would also like to know the tolerances of the + and minus against one of the heights.
I have been wondering why a LOC was specified for this runway and I can only think it has been used to provide the necessary accuracy to funnel an aircraft into a path between the numerous obstacles. The RNAV approach is purely GPS and does not allow DME/DME 0.3 as I would imagine that it is not accurate enough.

MOOC model
 

That title is an attention-getting device. I'll explain (succinctly) and ask a plain and simple question.
A MOOC is a current innovation in higher ed and stands for massively open on-line course. It challenges the business model of higher ed and is built upon the massive power of Internet to provide a "place and a means" for many people in many different locations and situations to contribute information and learn from one another. ("asynchronous teaching and learning")

This thread seems to POSSIBLY represent a substantial example of how a message board concept isn't just people talking - it can be a place and a means for analysis to get done, for data to be sifted, and for the next set of questions to be identified (and for canards, malapropisms and the hobgoblins of small minds to be sent packing).

Question predicate: A-Squared says:
"At this point it seems we can be fairly certain that the airplane started striking trees about a mile from the threshold, at an altitude somewhere around 300 feet or more below MDA, 150 feet or more below the PAPI, and at least 100 feet above airport TDZE.

So the question becomes 'how did they arrive at that point, that far below the MDA and that far below the commissioned slope of the PAPI?'"

Question:
Should a layperson (that is, like me) understand phrase "fairly certain" as used by A-Squared to mean either: (a) no more certain than in the old order, before Internet communication such as this, and therefore all meaninglessly preliminary, because Only NTSB Knows, or (b) representative of a shift in relevant knowledge and communication parameters large enough to suggest a new order?

In an on-line course, if students posted the kind of data the cognoscenti have posted here, the discussion and analysis would proceed apace, waiting naught for any slow-moving authority outside of "the conversation", let alone one administered by Washington. A new order exists in the Academy, but not on the Flight Deck as in macrocosm? I object.

No, the note says that the approach is N/A at night *IF* the PAPI is inop. So far I have seen nothing which suggests the PAPI was inop.


Well, yeah, it is. I'm making a point with the question, and you're refusing to answer the question because you know that as soon as you answer the question, you have to concede the point.
So, I'll answer the question for you: Of course you wouldn't fly the approach one iota differently if you knew the trees had grown from 915 ft to 921 ft. Which leads inevitably to the conclusion that the 6 ft you're making such a noise about is completely inconsequential.

Ummm, yeah. Hey, did you notice that Runway 18 at Birmingham is equipped with REILs ? Do you know what REILs are? They're big-ass strobe lights located at the runway threshold to draw your eye to the runway threshold, just like at Gatwick.


Uhhh, maybe because there's no conveniently located VOR to provide an IAP to the runway? Regardless, the procedure has you remaining more than 250 feet above all relevant obstacles until you have the runway in sight. You're drawing inferences that just don't make sense here.

They had great big strobes on the runway to draw the pilots eye to the threshold, just like at Gatwick, they had a clever visual descent aid that would tell them at a glance whether they had strayed a fraction of a degree below a safe glidepath, and they had a published altitude that would keep them from hitting anything if they stayed above it.

Not sure how you can argue they had nothing to help them.

Well, let me answer this way: If this were the pre-internet, pre Google-earth days, I could come to the same conclusions I stated using the USGS topo maps for the area, a scale, and the news report with Ms Benson's statement about the plane striking her trees and the location of her property

It just would have taken a little more effort.

The 10-9s chart published by Jepp for KBHM has two notes associated with the LOC approach for RW18. The first is that Minima is based on a CDFA, the second states that the approach is not authorised at night. This may be operator specific to our coverage but I thought most European operators are now using this.
Thank you for the education as to what the strobes are called. It has been a while since I read the Airway manual text. I don't remember seeing them in the clip posted of an approach onto this runway.
You seem to have decided from your personal experience that this crew had enough information provided to them to manage a succesfull aproach and landing but if so why did they fail in this task? Why were they ignoring the Papi and why were they slightly east of the centre line?
I am not sure what you mean by published altitude. You have to get low to land a friend of mine says and that means descending below MDA/DA at some point.
This aircraft has a fully functioning Radalt on both PFDs. It also has auto call out of pre programmed heights. If EGPWS was fitted they should have had a warning about approaching terrain in the undershoot, but only the Sink Rate warning has been disclosed.
I still stand by my assertion that there are charting discepancies at this airport.

Well, I don't have a 10-9s in front of me, so I cant see what you're referring to. There was some discussion of this earlier. the Jepp plate for the LOC approach (posted in post #228 of this thread) seems to suggest in the minima section that it's N/A at night. However it also contains the note that the procedure is N/A *if* the PAPI is inop. That taken by itself implies the the procedure is approved for night ops if the PAPI is operative. So there seems to be conflicting information on the Jepp chart.

However, no such conflict exists (or if it does, I can't see it) on the Federal chart for the same procedure, only the not that the procedure is n/a at night if PAPI inop. So which is correct? Jeppesen or the FAA who designed the approach?

I don't know that they were ignoring the PAPI, or if they were, why they were.

Ms Benson's house, where they first struck trees is almost precisely on the extended runway center line.

The MDA. If they hadn't descended below MDA, they wouldn't have hit anything. Obviously, you have to do that to land. But if you *don't* descend below MDA until you are on the PAPI with 2 white and 2 red, you won't hit anything after you leave MDA.

That of course assumes:

1) No gross altimetry errors
2) The PAPI was working correctly as commissioned.

As far as I know, 1 and 2 haven't been ruled out, but if both are true, then in order to arrive where they did, they must have descended below MDA before being established on the PAPI g/s.

Why, we can only speculate at this point.

As far as the terrain warning, EGPWS will inhibit the terrain warning within a certain distance of a published runway. I don't know the specific parameters of thier system, but they may have been within that distance where the system doesn't give terrain warning.

God speed noble crew.
 

I'm afraid that our flight crew was unaware of their situation. The Cockpit Voice Recorder will be a witness to that if that is indeed the case. The Airbus A300 was and is a very very good aircraft. Just by looking at the Service Difficulty Report on this particular A300 one could only conclude that this A300 was an exceptional aircraft. Everything released so far has indicated that the aircraft was functioning perfectly. At 3 am to 4:30 am the radio airwaves are fairly quiet. Although they were flying parallel to the busiest airport in the world; even Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport is relatively peaceful at this hour of the morning. The old expression Hours of Boredom... applies.
My sole hope is they never knew what happened. I'm sure the Crew Rest rules that the FAA applied to the Passenger Carriers recently will surely come under fire for neglecting the Cargo Haulers even though they often fly the exact same equipment in the exact same environment. They just don't say good bye to every package flown. The Professionalism required is nearly identical. If you don't believe this is possible, There was a two man crew flying a commercial airliner bound for MSP that overflew the airport by a long long way before a Flight Attendant sensed something was wrong and demanded the Flight Crew's attention.

They weren't.

The trees they hit and where they first impacted the ground are both exactly on the extended centre line of RWY18.

On the question of what they could or could not see once they were below the scattered cloud, a witness in the tower (possibly a controller) could see the aircraft's landing lights between the first impact and the impact with the ground.

The distance from the tower to a position between Mrs Benson's house and the ground impact position is roughly double the distance from Mrs Benson's house to the PAPIs. Does anyone have any data on relative intensities between PAPI and landing lights? I do know that maintenance staff are advised to wear welding goggles when doing a daylight ground verification check on a PAPI but have never heard of that being recommended when within 20-30 metres of an aircraft landing light during daylight, so I will make the assumption that PAPIs are quite a bit brighter than a landing light.

Anyway, the point I am making is that in the absence of any other limiting factors, if the controller could see the landing lights from the tower, the flight crew should have been able to see the PAPIs at half that distance.

We know the PAPIs were switched on and working post crash, and we know that the were correctly calibrated (to within 1/100th of a degree).

Do we know that they were switched on during the approach?

If they were operating and we assume that the CVR recording ended around the time of impact with the ground, then the call "runway in sight", 13 seconds before that, would have been made half a mile from impact at 140KTS and a couple of seconds before they hit the trees.

Is it possible that they were so low that their view of the runway was obscured by the line of trees at the Tarrant-Huffman/Treadwell Road junction until 3 seconds before they hit those trees?

SoS;

The line of sight along the PAPIs ends at the touch down zone, right?
If then, we know they impacted a hillside, that means they vere below the top of the hill. The runway on the other side of the hill is well below the top of the hill, don't remember by how many foot. That means they could NOT see the PAPIs in the moment before they impacted the hillside. Have anyone done some triangulation calculations to see if the top of the hill also was blocking the line of sight to the PAPIs so they couldnt see the PAPIs when they cut the first threes? Maybe they vere too low so early that they never saw the PAPIs?

I was looking at this as well. Perhaps they were below the hill and could see the PAPI and the controller could see them -IF- there was some kind of refraction of the lights (both ways) due to humid air lying over the crest of the hill and they were effectively looking through a mirage. That would explain how a controller could see an aircraft that was below topographic line of sight and the otherwise inexplicable descent of the aircraft.

I am not sure how much refraction of the lights would be made by very humid colder air. But with the terrain being that close perhaps not much is needed.

There is also an interesting presentation from Airbus on Visual Illusions Awareness that could apply...

http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/medi..._PER-SEQ11.pdf

see in particular pages 8 and 9

Ian W;

The point i'm making is the fact that the controller could see the planes landing lights doesn't necessarily mean the pilots could see the PAPIs. The controller is in a tower well above the runway and well past the PAPIs, and have a very different line of sight to the plane than the planes line of sight to the PAPIs. I probably have to sift through this thread to gather some height and distance data and do the calculations whether the pilots could see the PAPIs when they cut the first threes.

Yes I understand the issue of the higher tower someone will have to see if the tower line of sight allows them to see the Benson residence.

However, I was raising the possibility of what I have now found out is called a 'Superior Mirage' that is a mirage that allows objects be seen 'over the horizon'. Here is one example showing what appears to be a hole in a hill.
http://astrophys-assist.com/vvla/images/vt001121.jpg

from VLA Pic o' Day, 11/21/00

Any FAA assessment of the PAPIs and runway lighting would need to be done in identical meteorological conditions or any potential mirage would not be visible.

Why else would an experienced crew descend further and call 'runway in sight' after a 'SINK RATE' warning?



Edit to add a video URL

Here is a video from a weather helo - Viewing a superior mirage from Chopper 7 | Sam Argier's Weather Blog | www.kirotv.com
http://astrophys-assist.com/vvla/vt001121.htm

We need a North-South terrain profile to do this. We know exactly where the PAPIS are located to the left of RWY18 and we know that it was set at 3.2 degrees.

We also need to know whether the "runway in sight" call was a response to their first sighting of the runway or whether it was a response to 'reacquiring' a visual after temporary loss for whatever reason.

Was there an earlier 'runway in sight" call that hasn't been reported?

In one of the NTSB briefings we were told that the CVR group will sit down and transcribe every single voice and noise second by second, but prior to that they will inform the investigator of anything of significance that comes to their attention from a 'first listen' to the tape.

I'm assuming again I know, but in an investigation of a probable CFIT, any clues as to what that crew could or could not see is significant.

What we can probably draw from the call is that neither crew member was incapacitated prior to the first impact.

Autopilot/throttle setting
 

Latest info is that autopilot/throttles were engaged essentially until ground contact. Doesn't this imply that the autopilot data base was inadequqte or in error, or that the wrong mode was engaged by the pilots? Presumably pilots thought that the auto pilot was managing the descent path as it seems that they weren't. Just asking.

Poorly stated
 

Sorry. Do we yet know what settings were entered by the crew, or what mode of autopilot functionwas engaged?

I assume the "sink rate" warning overrode the "100" callout. The former is often ignored, the latter might have been a wake-up call.

For those discussing tree damage and elevation.
 

Maybe Sorry Dog could give us an estimate of the height of those electricity poles, although the cables may have been damaged by falling tree branches rather than the landing gears.

Unless the perspective is way out however, they must have been less than 50 feet AGL when those trees were hit and below the tops of the other trees nearby. :-(

http://i1280.photobucket.com/albums/...ps82ef6d19.jpg

http://i1280.photobucket.com/albums/...pse443cbe0.jpg

PJ2's point restated for emphasis.
QFT
Aside: to whomever posted the CFIT pdf from flight safety ... that's using the forum to inform. Well done. For aterpster: your educational value in this thread has been great. Many thanks.
Info from the FAA approach plate, dated July 2013.
Tubby: If Jepp and the FAA have a disagreement, to whom should you default?
Per A squared: Is Jepp liable?
TubbyHave you collected the data on how many approaches have been flown into this runway under IMC conditions in the past year? The past three years? The NTSB may, in the end, agree with you ... or not. We shall see.
Had not thought of that. Good question.

And actually, the Jepp chart, 11-2 dated 17 AUG 12, LOC Rwy 18 indeed has both notations.

Note 2. at the top says 'When VGSI inop, procedure not authorized at night.'

And, in the minima boxes at the bottom of the approach plate under 'NIGHT' it says 'NA'.

Since the minima boxes are recently shuffled on Jepp charts and some precision approaches now have Cat I,II and III depicted on the same chart, I've certainly grabbed the wrong MDA or DA before through the habit of looking in the same place on the minima matrix as in years past.

Like most of us in large planes, I usually shoot either precision approaches (e.g. ILS) or visual approaches with precision guidance for backup. And I normally have the luxury of operating out of larger international airports. I'm pretty sure I would not have caught the discrepancy between Note 2. and the night minima box. I looked long and hard at that approach plate last week sitting at a desk and never saw the night minima notation at the bottom.

The NA on this Jepp chart is thought to be a typo given the note at the top and the lack of night minima NA on the corresponding government chart:

http://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/1308/00050L18.PDF

The UPS crew had paper Jepps from what I've read elsewhere.

In my experience, it is not at all normal to hear "SINK RATE" on any approach, it would sure get my undivided attention on a night non-precision approach to an unfamiliar runway. Sadly, as others have noted, the warning came very late for this crew.

FAA has it one way, Jepp the other (?) (evidently)
 

Per Lonewolf_50 @ post #481:

"Per A squared:
Quote:
the Jepp plate for the LOC approach (posted in post #228 of this thread) seems to suggest in the minima section that it's N/A at night. However it also contains the note that the procedure is N/A *if* the PAPI is inop. That taken by itself implies the the procedure is approved for night ops if the PAPI is operative. So there seems to be conflicting information on the Jepp chart."
Is Jepp liable?
_____
Is this question (as to liability) a suggestion for a legal analysis (subject to all applicable caveats as to information flows and validity, lack of a full "totality of the queries" analytic framework, and others of similar kind or circumstance)? My client can spare me for a bit of time, I should think (particularly on such a subject both high in public importance and captivatingly interesting to WR63), though unsolicited legal garble is worse than sour beer in the pub, both to be avoided among friends and compatriots.

The tree (leftmost) of the first picture is a pine. I cannot tell which variety it is from that photo (likely are slash or longleaf). Typical crown height (when it reaches full maturity) is anywhere between 70-100 feet AGL. Some older examples of longleaf go up to 120-feet. The 17 y/o longleafs I have here are growing at roughly 3-feet/year. Many are over 60-feet tall.

AirBubba, your last post has reinforced my statement that there are charting discrepancies at this airport. It also probably explains why for Eu-OPs this procedure is not authorised at night, as there is no straight in landing minima published for night operations.The GPS approach for RW18 does not have this restriction even though it has the same caveat as to the servicability of the Papi.for night operations. Would anyone care to explain why these anomalies exist?
For those interested in tree heights in Alabama search for "Champion Trees of Alabama" published by the Alabama Forestry Commision.

The FAA chart is correct. The Jepp chart is in error. Jepp picked up the Amendment 2A note but failed to update their minima section. Here are links to the applicable four pages of source documents for those who care to see them:

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC181_zpsc9733eda.jpg

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC182_zps27053a33.jpg

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC183_zps2d25df9b.jpg

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KBMHLOC184_zps87fe4799.jpg

If it helps, the typical utility pole for 12.47/7.2KV Wye primary service (which is what this appears to be) is 45 feet with about 6 feet of that buried in the ground. This would make the primary conductors about 40 feet AGL.

Looking at these two pictures, it certainly looks like the distribution secondary/cable/phone were taken out by falling tree limbs, but I'm not sure about the primary. Primary conductors running both parallel to the flight path and perpendicular to it seem to be missing which seems unusual to me for tree damage.

"The FAA chart is correct. The Jepp chart is in error. Jepp picked up the Amendment 2A note but failed to update their minima section."

Wanna bet that total ban on LOC at night (and maybe more) is re-instated PDQ?

Aterpster, what criteria would the originator of the LOC procedure have used to decide that it was not to be used at night and then a few years later change this policy? I have not had time to perform a thorough analysis of how many aircraft have used this approach since its inception but perhaps somebody with local knowledge could provide an estimate.
When was the last time the procedure was flight checked?

I am certainly confused - what makes a LOC n/a at night but other approaches OK? With the published DAs there is no obstacle issue, and once you are visual off ANY approach................................ Was it just a typo?

aerobat
 

Thanks for that.

That is higher than my rough estimate based on the height of the engineers in the pic I posted, and the height of a semi trailer passing a pole on a Google streetview pic on a road nearby.

I made the poles about 25 feet tall with the cables at about 20 feet.

tubby:

Penetrations of the visual segment's 20:1 surface. Later, the PAPI was determined to be accurate, thus (as is done on a case-by-case basis) the PAPI, when operating, was determined to be mitigating.

I still cannot understand why the 'LOC' was special - the visual is surely the same for all from MDA?

I agree, but from one who 'knows'???? So why not ALL night visuals???

Is there a published procedure for an GPS-RNP approach to 18? If there is not, you cannot do it. Is the company/aircraft authorised and trained for Rnav-Vnav approaches? If not, you cannot do it.



And regards why they may have descended below the nominal glideslope. One possible reason is mistaking/confusing the perspective of the approach, especially if you are not used to doing non-precision approaches.

There have been quite a number of aircraft over the years that have drifted below the glideslope, on a nice visual approach, and not realised it. Especially when making a 'black hole ' approach, where there are no ground lights below you to gain perspective from. There was an incident with a corporate jet, many years ago, on a gin-clear visual night approach to an island runway just inland from the sea in Scotland. The sea was, of course, completely pitch black. And they flew down so low, while still thinking they were on the perfect approach, that they touched down in the sea.



Silver

Do UPS have a FOQA programme and if they do was the aircraft fitted with a QAR? No mention has been made of a QAR module but if it exists the NTSB would know quite quickly what autopilot modes were being used and how the flight was conducted if the disc was readable.

For those of you curious about how a UPS A300 flies the LOC18 and RNAV18 into KBHM, here's a pretty detailed answer. From a UPS A300 F.O. -

I pose the question again: if Jepps and the FFA approach plate are not the same on a bit of detail, to which one would you default? You are the captain on a given mission, or you are the FO preparing for a flight and you note a discrepancy in the approach info ... what do you do?

Willow: in this case, while "liability" may be an interesting question as you rephrase it, if the crew were using Jeppson and took the NA at night on Jeppson for guidance (even if it is an error) then they'd not have shot that approach at night. They'd have flown another approach to that airport.

For an error to have the kind of liability a lawyer might make a civil case over, I suspect it would need to be in the other direction: mark something as "OK" when it's not. In this case, the error would have the crew try a different approach, even though the FAA chart allows it with VGSI working.

(PS: aterpster once again shows up with facts and some expertise on this topic. Many thanks, sir! :ok: )

Aviation Week summary of what is known about this accident as of August 18.

Just because the crew could see some of the runway lights over the crest of the hill doesn't mean the aircraft would clear the crest of the hill.

NTSB member Sumwalt addresses the recovery of non-volatile memory from various electronic modules at 8:25 in this briefing:


I would think the FDR data would give autopilot mode status as well.