The smoking hole 1/2 mile from the threshold of the runway speaks for itself.

Do you really think they would have crashed if they were doing the ILS approach to runway 23 ?

Sink rate ... Sink rate ... I see the runway.

All you "Real" pilots have your head in the sand if you don't think the approach design criteria had anything to do with this accident.

A non-precision black hole approach over rising terrain, yeah it's prefectly safe. Have we not learned anything over the last 50 years of commerical aviation ?

Bunch of dinosours. Hate to tell you but the Global Earth generation is going to outlaw these stupid types of non-precison approaches, it's going to hurt your "real" pilots ego's, but at least it will save lives. Get with the times Grampa's.

And spare me this wait for the NTSB report BS, hello this isn't the NTSB, it's a pilots rumour forum on the internet FFS, what do you expect ?

I know you like to play those word games :ugh:, I meant 1200 ft AND/OR 1 mile ....
Actually in my SR22 I should be able to land fine even being 250 ft above the profile. I am not bound by where I should touch down...

Sure and like I was saying... they remain in their armchairs :rolleyes:

Then start your crusade, and start in Canada, plenty of such approaches remain...
We will see how far you get... :bored:

Word games? I simply responded to what you wrote; don't blame or criticise me for your inability to write what you meant. And now I come to think about it, "and/or" doesn't make any sense either.

Nice rant. The "authorities" are just as culpable as the ego-driven grandpas, IMO. The FAA could mandate VNAV-coupled approaches, or if unable to be flown by a type it could mandate an ILS. It could improve the charting. It could improve crew oversight. Companies could improve crew performance. The list goes on and on. To criticise crews for trying to do the job with the tools they have is simplistic and won't achieve anything.

RNAV RNP 0.1, already well underway.

I'm not critizing the crews at all, I'm critizing the "system" for not giving the crews the correct tools to do the job safely. I think we are on the same page, I'm just not expressing myself clearly.

JimField;

Thank you for your response.

I believe in civil exchanges above all, but courtesy does not excuse; - however the exchange may take place, the question must still be addressed regarding Flight aware data, please.

On your other points regarding training, automation etc, these have been under intense discussion for many years here in particular on the ten or eleven AF447 threads. The points made are thoroughly understood and frankly something new to add to the dialogue would likely be welcome.

Regarding "treatment of a newbie", well, no one's special when the conversation is about flight safety - if an idea or a view isn't cutting it, like CRM, there should be no beating about the bush - for me it's about "what, not who", and if you have something to add which respects fellow aviators' experience while advancing an interesting notion you're likely to get a hearing.

My own view regarding Flightaware "data" is abundantly clear because I do flight data and nothing on the web cuts it. To use such sources for detailed analyses in advance of anything substantive from the usual sources indicates a particular naivete regarding flight data work and the notions it can accidently impose on those who may have deep interests in what happened but who cannot distinguish investigative techniques when not done well.

Nothing personal of course - but this is about safety work and about finding out things in ways that have worked successfully. It is not about being first off the blocks with notions of what happened and possibly embarrassing oneself with clearly indefensible statements about speeds for example, with sample rates and resolutions like Flightaware's. Nor is it about making allies for one's point of view. As you've noticed, it is not always a friendly place, but neither is aviation, particularly at times like these. Thick skin and restraint kinda works.

Respectfully,

PJ2

From Robert Sumwalt's Friday NTSB presser, it looks like the UPS 1354 crew briefed and shot the LOC Rwy 18.

There are rumours, I stress rumors, of significant prior crew training issues, if so, I'm sure this will come out in the NTSB report.

So far, looks like there was no mechanical problem with the aircraft, as also apparently was the case with Asiana 214.

I wonder if the NTSB will harvest the chitchat about the company, the union, howya feelin', I'm tired, ready to go to the hotel, etc. from the CVR? They got a lot of what would previously be considered 'non-pertinent conversation' from the BUF Colgan 3407 crash.

Now wait a second, are you now saying, that NPA approaches are unsafe?

Apologies for the digression, but before yesterday I didn't know what a sockpuppet was either, and then I encountered the term twice in the space of a couple of hours.

The first was when I was Googling the "Streisand Effect", another term with which I wasn't familiar but came across when I saw it used in the context of recent events involving a large Irish airline. And then here on this thread, where its use appears to be entirely appropriate in this instance.

With hindsight, the very first post made, as well as being disingenuous, also demonstrated the level of understanding of what FlightAware "data" was and wasn't capable of telling us:

Excerpts from the FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual:

i. Vertical Descent Angle (VDA) on Nonprecision Approaches. FAA policy is to publish VDAs on all nonprecision approaches. Published along with VDA is the threshold crossing height (TCH) that was used to compute the angle. The descent angle may be computed from either the final approach fix (FAF), or a stepdown fix, to the runway threshold at the published TCH. A stepdown fix is only used as the start point when an angle computed from the FAF would place the aircraft below the stepdown fix altitude. The descent angle and TCH information are charted on the profile view of the instrument approach chart following the fix the angle was based on. The optimum descent angle is 3.00 degrees; and whenever possible the approach will be designed using this angle.

1. The VDA provides the pilot with information not previously available on nonprecision approaches. It provides a means for the pilot to establish a stabilized descent from the FAF or stepdown fix to the MDA. Stabilized descent is a key factor in the reduction of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) incidents. However, pilots should be aware that the published angle is for information only - it is strictly advisory in nature. There is no implicit additional obstacle protection below the MDA. Pilots must still respect the published minimum descent altitude (MDA) unless the visual cues stated 14 CFR Section 91.175 are present and they can visually acquire and avoid obstacles once below the MDA. The presence of a VDA does not guarantee obstacle protection in the visual segment and does not change any of the requirements for flying a nonprecision approach.

2. Additional protection for the visual segment below the MDA is provided if a VDP is published and descent below the MDA is started at or after the VDP. Protection is also provided, if a Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI); e.g., VASI or PAPI, is installed and the aircraft remains on the VGSI glide path angle from the MDA. In either case, a chart note will indicate if the VDP or VGSI are not coincident with the VDA. On RNAV approach charts, a small shaded arrowhead shaped symbol (see the legend of the U.S. Terminal Procedures books, page H1) from the end of the VDA to the runway indicates that the 34:1 visual surface is clear.

3. Pilots may use the published angle and estimated/actual groundspeed to find a target rate of descent from the rate of descent table published in the back of the U.S. Terminal Procedures Publication. This rate of descent can be flown with the Vertical Velocity Indicator (VVI) in order to use the VDA as an aid to flying a stabilized descent. No special equipment is required.

4. Since one of the reasons for publishing a circling only instrument landing procedure is that the descent rate required exceeds the maximum allowed for a straight in approach, circling only procedures may have VDAs which are considerably steeper than the standard 3 degree angle on final. In this case, the VDA provides the crew with information about the descent rate required to land straight in from the FAF or step down fix to the threshold. This is not intended to imply that landing straight ahead is recommended, or even possible, since the descent rate may exceed the capabilities of many aircraft. The pilot must determine how to best maneuver the aircraft within the circling obstacle clearance area in order to land.

5. In rare cases the LNAV minima may have a lower HAT than minima with a glide path due to the location of the obstacles. This should be a clear indication to the pilot that obstacles exist below the MDA which the pilot must see in order to ensure adequate clearance. In those cases, the glide path may be treated as a VDA and used to descend to the LNAV MDA as long as all the rules for a nonprecision approach are applied at the MDA. However, the pilot must keep in mind the information in this paragraph and in paragraph 5-4-5j.

j. Pilot Operational Considerations When Flying Nonprecision Approaches. The missed approach point (MAP) on a nonprecision approach is not designed with any consideration to where the aircraft must begin descent to execute a safe landing. It is developed based on terrain, obstructions, NAVAID location and possibly air traffic considerations. Because the MAP may be located anywhere from well prior to the runway threshold to past the opposite end of the runway, the descent from the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) to the runway threshold cannot be determined based on the MAP location. Descent from MDA at the MAP when the MAP is located close to the threshold would require an excessively steep descent gradient to land in the normal touchdown zone. Any turn from the final approach course to the runway heading may also be a factor in when to begin the descent.

1. Pilots are cautioned that descent to a straight-in landing from the MDA at the MAP may be inadvisable or impossible, on a nonprecision approach, even if current weather conditions meet the published ceiling and visibility. Aircraft speed, height above the runway, descent rate, amount of turn and runway length are some of the factors which must be considered by the pilot to determine if a landing can be accomplished.

2. Visual descent points (VDPs) provide pilots with a reference for the optimal location to begin descent from the MDA, based on the designed vertical descent angle (VDA) for the approach procedure, assuming required visual references are available. Approaches without VDPs have not been assessed for terrain clearance below the MDA, and may not provide a clear vertical path to the runway at the normally expected descent angle. Therefore, pilots must be especially vigilant when descending below the MDA at locations without VDPs. This does not necessarily prevent flying the normal angle; it only means that obstacle clearance in the visual segment could be less and greater care should be exercised in looking for obstacles in the visual segment. Use of visual glide slope indicator (VGSI) systems can aid the pilot in determining if the aircraft is in a position to make the descent from the MDA. However, when the visibility is close to minimums, the VGSI may not be visible at the start descent point for a “normal” glidepath, due to its location down the runway.

3. Accordingly, pilots are advised to carefully review approach procedures, prior to initiating the approach, to identify the optimum position(s), and any unacceptable positions, from which a descent to landing can be initiated (in accordance with 14 CFR Section 91.175(c)).

the CVR reveals "low altitude" warning, not specific about what callout was heard

JC:

The VGSI criteria are not part of the FAA's instrument procedures design criteria. They are contained in an FAA Airport Division's 1500 series advisory circular. I recalled from memory a 15 degree splay for the VGSI. That was an incorrect recollection. It is 10 degrees. I don't have the criteria at hand but the 10 degrees is from a 2004 article on the subject I wrote for Business and Commercial Aviation. I had the VGSI criteria in hand at that time.

If, and I emphasize if, the PAPI at hand were designed correctly, the Birmingham airport authority would have had a competent survey team survey all obstacles out to 4 miles to assure the 3.2 degree PAPI surface had not less than 1 degree of obstacle clearance.

Apparently the NTSB is now very interested in verifying such a survey.

In any cases my work involves assessing the IMC phase of instrument procedures, not VGSIs. The FAA has a big computer in OKC where the design work (prior to flight inspection) is done at a desk. As good as the obstacle data are, they are insufficient to design the final approach segment of approaches with vertical guidance "APVs (ILS, LPV, LNAV/VNAV, and RNP AR). On site surveys are usually required for APVs.

I have no doubt all the special RNP AR IAPs that exist in Canada today were most, if not all, subject to a rigorous survey for the final segment.

Sometime in the 1990s I wrote an article for IFR Refresher article, "What's Below DH or MDA." The FAA stance was worse then with respect to NPAs with straight-in MDAs than it is today. You can ferret out that article at www.terps.com if you care to.

Or...stick a profile on the chart...

You may have missed it, the alert was "SINK RATE", "SINK RATE".

See 3:09 here: Member Robert Sumwalt holds third press briefing on UPS flight 1354 crash in Birmingham, Alabama - YouTube

The approach was over a heavily wooded area, possibility of bird strikes in the engines causing the engine spluttering heard. Speculation but add it to the chain of probables please.

PJ2

I was so very pleased to see your recent posts. I know nothing about Flightaware data and analysis but I do know quite a lot about FDR analysis in a major airline. We used to study the traces each month to provide useful operational feedback to our pilots, to modify SOPs and improve training programmes as required, etc.

You are so right to draw people's attention to the need to study genuine FDR data rather than the speculative attempts being made by too many amateurs from imprecise information.

The NTSB will, in due time, publish their findings based on the most reliable FACTS - not idle speculation. There are several professionals on this website who, based on their expertise, do their best to provide sound opinions. To a certain extent these are valuable but until facts are available they are only opinions.

In another post someone said too many people want instant results. In my experience, it is only after extensive analysis by the right experts that useful information emerges.

May I urge all those who want to know what really happened to await the published information from the NTSB.

7.10 INTRODUCTION. The Visual Glide Slope Indicators (VGSI) are ground devices that use lights to define a vertical approach path during the final approach to a runway. The visual signal must consist of not less than two and not more than four colors. Allowable colors are red, amber, green, or white. Color sectors must be distinct and identifiable throughout the horizontal beam width at all intensity settings. Only red is used to indicate the lowest below-path sector of the system.

The final approach area for VGSI(s) is 10° either side of the runway centerline extended, measured from the forward most bar or light extending from the threshold outward to a point a normal glidepath can commence from the en route or procedural altitude. VGSI(s) are aligned to provide a glidepath not less than 1.0° above obstacles 10° either side of the runway centerline to a distance specified for the system, usually 4 miles. Lateral guidance is obtained by reference to either visual cues or electronic aids.

Threshold crossing height (TCH) is the height of the lowest on-path signal at the threshold. The minimum TCH is determined by the most critical aircraft that normally operates on the runway. The TCH of VGSI(s) will normally be 25 to 75 ft. Specific TCH criteria for each type system is located in FAA Order 6850.2, Visual Guidance Lighting Systems.

Box Identification. The U.S. practice, as found in FAA Order 6850.5, Maintenance of Lighted Navigational Aids, is that individual VASI or PAPI light boxes are numbered starting at (1), with the box nearest the runway on each side and working outboard. ICAO Annex 14 and Aerodrome Design Manual reverse this, and number or letter the boxes starting with (1) or (A) at the outermost box and working toward the runway.

There are several different types of VGSI(s). The primary systems covered in this chapter are visual approach slope indicators (VASI), precision approach path indicators (PAPI), pulsating visual approach slope indicators (PVASI), T-VASI, three-color VASI, and helicopter approach path indicator (HAPI). Each of these systems presents a different type of visual indication to the pilot and requires different in-flight interpretation.

aterpster

Further to my comments above, may I thank you for your good background information. This type of factual information educates and informs, and is a very valuable contribution to the debate.

So, I am a low time/high wing pilot myself...But spend a pretty fair amount of time in heavy iron cockpit jumpseats for Day Job. Actually have a, "I learned about CFIT from that" story when I was once in the jumpseat of a tired DC-9 with an even more tired crew dealing with a last minute change to BHM RWY 1 (that was how long ago this was...its since been redesignated to 36/18) night arrival, due to a pranged check runner Aerostar on the long runway that I can share....

Also flew light GA aircraft into BHM back then too and routinely landed on the north south runway. The terrain was actually alot more scary back then on that north end.

Anyway...Just for historical perspective, in the late '80s the high terrain on the north end of the north south runway, and the east end of what was then 7/25 was considered unsafe and an impediment to growth at the airport. Indeed 1/19 didnt even have an instrument approach from the north as I remember. So the city bought the property where the crash site is and also on the east side of the field and scraped off a massive amount of both hills. Took a number of years to complete the project. This allowed extensions to be added to both runways and an approach from the north to be implemented (and I also think enough obstacle clearance for a CATII to the east as well if memory serves correctly).

The area where the crash site is was actually some of the earliest settled part of the city and was dotted with houses. There was one house that was dismantled which turned out to be an extension of one of the earliest built dwellings in the community, and which had been added onto and absorbed in a larger structure. So, the speculation that the houses were built on the north side after the airport was is incorrect.

As for my CFIT experience, it was the ridgeline of Red Mountain on the south side of town that nearly got us in that DC-9 into some twisted knickers (this was not too long after the AAL crash in Cali BTW).

And I'll tell yah...Don't ever think it can't happen to you.

Retired F4
I don't think that is what was meant.

NPA approaches are 'safe' but an RNAV RNP AR approach to RNP 0.1 is safer that is why when flying them you have lower limits.

This is going to be a repeated argument. There were comments that the crash at SFO would not have happened if there had been a serviceable ILS or the crew had carried out an RNAV RNP APV and that perhaps visual approaches were less safe. These comments were immediately followed by the: "whaddya mean unsafe?!! - we do visual approaches from slam dunks all the time to that runway" comments.

So the question is a simple one. Why, with aircraft that are capable of flying RNP LPV approaches to RNP 0.1, are pilots and operators still using NPA that are less safe? Not only less safe by calculation but also, unfortunately, demonstrably less safe by accidents.

The argument that "I can do it so those {think of an epithet} other pilots should be able to as well or they should not be flying" does not impress the relatives of the dead SLF or people on the ground. Especially, when safer approach procedures are available.

NPAs, fully visual approaches, asymmetric and flapless landings etc etc., should all be practiced but perhaps they should be seen as what they are - less safe alternates to the approaches that the aircraft systems are capable of and only used in exception.

This highlights a change in operations from ground aid supported to GNSS and internal aid supported. It is no longer necessary to have an expensive FAA (or *AA) certified landing system for each runway, just approved RNAV RNP AR procedures. So small regional airports could have the same Cat III capability as hubs. This raises all the questions on deskilling pilots and therefore is seen as a threat and a safety risk in its own right.

Non-Precision Approaches are accepted as safe enough for normal operations, Nevertheless, it is unarguable that Non Precision Approaches are less safe than Precision Approaches with vertical guidance. The aircraft are capable of RNAV RNP LPV all that is needed is approved procedures.

This is not a technical question any more. Stand in front of an audience of family members of dead flight crew and SLF, and tell them why a less safe procedure was 'good enough'.

This is not an easy debate, but it should not be avoided.

Ian W,

Some good points there but:

- Does the A300-600 have the gear to be RNP-AR (or indeed LPV or LNAV/VNAV) capable;

- Why doesn't KBHM 18 have a glideslope? I suspect cost or terrain (which was collided-with) prohibits (could also preclude an RNP-AR approach).

- RNP LNAV works well when the aircraft can use the FMS database-coded approach slope/VNAV (even if just following it with VS/FPA or handflying), but aircraft must be capable.

Capn Bloggs,
I was responding to the issues raised by Retired F4's more generic question on safety of NPAs.

An RNAV LPV does not need to follow the 'rules' of an ILS as it is not constrained by needing to be 'in the beam'. The aircraft can be 'established' on the procedure while in a turn and with varying descent rates. Look at the approach into DCA along the Potomac. This makes RNP LPV approaches and departures more suited to complex terrain: there are some in China that zigzag along mountainous valleys.

I do not know whether the particular UPS A306 fit was capable of RNP LPV. However, if crews have a choice on which approach aids and procedures to use I would hope that they use the aid/procedure that provides the highest safety level; unless there is a justified requirement for doing otherwise.

RNP arrival and departure procedures could have been rolled out US wide but the rate has been very slow. Moreover, in many cases to make procedure generation and use simple the RNP arrival procedures are merely overlays of the existing ILS procedures. This means the ROI on equipping aircraft and training crews is insufficient for companies to do so. Therefore, despite the RNP LPV capability being nearly a decade old we are still seeing NPAs in use.

This is another discussion that perhaps could move to Tech Log

Was BHM Runway 06-24 really closed?
 

Hey guys,

Take a look at FlightAware's arrival history for BHM on Aug. 14 just before and just after the UPS crash at 4:49 a.m.

All reports so far have said RW06-24 (the long runway with an ILS to 06) was closed, BUT Mountain Air landed on RW06 at 3:32am and FedEx landed on RW06 at 5:08 a.m. FlightAware's track log confirms this.

So,
a) was Runway 06/24 really closed at the time of the UPS crash?
b) if so what were the closure times?
c) if not, why did the UPS crew elect to use RW 18 if RW 06 was available?

None of these questions however, no matter what the answer, change the apparent cause of the accident as crew error (barring some sort of ground or flight equipment malfunction, which is unlikely here).

1) failure of situational awareness,

2) failure to fly the standard instrument approach to RW 18 until glide path on final could be assured by visual PAPI light indications,

3) failure to monitor sink rate and observe altitude limitations on approach, and

4) apparent failure to either acquire PAPI visually (which would have shown all red lights) or initiate immediate go-around if that indication was acquired.

Update on AvHerald including last 16 seconds of CVR transcript.....no surprises there...

Crash: UPS A306 at Birmingham on Aug 14th 2013, contacted trees and touched down outside airport

Gentlemen,
may I ask you to hold your breath for a second and re-read skysign´s testimony again. He seems to be the only one on this forum who has actually been there and done an NPA into Birmingham´s RWY 18. What I like most: he doesn´t judge, he just supplies useful information:
here
here

i have done as well in the past, just found it unremarkable....

Keep in mind that they can all emit erroneous light signals due to light beam refraction in weather conditions of low mist especially when the dew bulb and dry bulb temperatures are close together.

I wonder why they chose to fly the localizer and not the RNAV GPS approach which the A300 is capable of and the crews are trained for. I'm also curious if the standard of setting the missed approach altitude in the window instead of setting the MDA is a player.

I'm not judging the crew because I truly believe in "there but for the grace of God" and these things can happen to any of us.

RIP Shanda and Cerea (my friend)

IAN W:

In order to have what the FAA these days calls an Approach with Vertical Guidance (APV), which could be either an ILS, LNAV/VNAV, LPV, GLS, or RNP AR, requires that an area between DA and the runway threshold be fairly flat. This is the Glideslope Qualification Surface (GQS). Because of the terrain in this area for KBHM Runway 18, an APV is not possible. If it was, the RNAV approach to Runway 18 at KBHM would have both an LPV and LNAV/VNAV line of minima.

As to RNP AR and its values as low as RNP AR 0.10, the accuracy and integrity of such an approach is not as good as an unrestricted ILS within the last approximate one and one-half miles of the runway. The advantage of RNP AR approaches are the use of RF legs to avoid terrain. If there is no significant terrain above several hundred feet, RNP AR offers no advantage whatsoever and requires an inordinate amount of aircraft avionics, particularly to values of less then RNP 0.30 or RNP AR missed approaches with RNP of less than 1.0

KBHM has two RNP AR approaches, one to Runway 6, and one to Runway 24.

These RNP AR IAPs have DAs and visibilities considerably higher than the Runway 6 CAT I and II IAPs, and the Runway 24 LPV IAP.

Outside of the airline world RNP AR is essentially a myth. OTOH, where runways qualify LPV is ubiquitous, but even LPV (thus far) cannot compare to a CAT II and especially a CAT III ILS.

Finally, thus far there are no RNP AR approaches that use LPV for the final segment. RNP AR was a concept to use air carrier avionics in use at the time; i.e., IRUs and Baro VNAV.

Was the gear down?

I was also puzzled why they would do the LOC instead of the RNAV (GPS).

It's been a long time since I've flown the A306, are you implying that perhaps the missed approach altitude instead of MDA was set prior to the FAF so there was no path guidance and a late descent was initiated when the error was realized?

Bingo. :ugh:

No. On the A306 once you start down on a profile approach, inside the FAF, you set the missed approach altitude, not MDA. (I don't remember if it's the same on a V/S approach but guessing it is) But that makes it possible to go below MDA without having the field in sight, the airplane won't automatically level off.

It doesn't seem that it would have made any difference either way. Except for the source of the lateral guidance, the two procedures are essentially identical inside of Baskn. The FMS I use would have given a VNAV descent cue down to MDA but not below.

yes, true because I was incorrectly assuming they used v/s on the localizer approach. They could have used profile either way.

If you would go back and read the post, you will find that the speculation wasn't a general speculation. It was specifically about whether the runway was there when the woman complaining about the hazards of the airport (a Ms Benson) purchased her current house (which she wishes would be purchased from her by the airport) I'd say that the chances that it *wasn't* are very slim.

"It doesn't seem that it would have made any difference either way"
(A Squared)

Correct.

But why would you want to "level off" at MDA??

I thought it was established "big planes" do not do "dive and drive", they fly a constant flight path approach and at (M)DA they either continue to descend (visually) or GA. In the event you put MDA in, and mistakenly, even though visual, allowed the AP to level you off you have now destabilised the approach significantly enough to require a GA anyway.

There are auto call outs, SOPs and 2 pilots to prevent inadvertent descent below (M)DA without the required visual refs.

PS the above is not intended to relate to the UPS accident - just the post above.

NoD

JimField:

I retired from UPS as a crewmember after almost 20 years. I have been involved with flight crew/pilot training for almost my entire aviation career. I found their crew training to be within the top two of the five airlines and three corporate jobs with whom I was employed. Did something fall between the cracks? Possible, but we don't know yet.

As far as fatigue, I may have a better tolerance for it than most, but learning to mitigate it is, and should be, part of the job. Flying, for me, never was a job (which is probably why I still have a post-retirement hobby job), so perhaps that helped in the fatigue department. I still fly the occasional ten hour all-nighter. :ok:

There are cry babies in the industry who cry fatigue even after a three-day layover. Boo hoo. Sorry. Get a King Air job flying the owner to his ranch on the weekend.

When you don't have the field in sight...

In a perfect world, yes.