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-   -   UPS cargo crash near Birmingham AL (https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/521370-ups-cargo-crash-near-birmingham-al.html)

Desert185 22nd Aug 2013 05:37


Willow Run 6-3:

Questions: does NTSB have some review process by which it goes to (for example) ALPA with the results of its investigation, before preparing its report, and ask whether such a representative of pilots would add any other data or tests? Does NTSB vet an outline of its proposed analytic framework for identifying probable cause? Does it circulate a draft report to anyone outside the agency for comment before making and declaring it final?
The UPS pilot union, Independent Pilots Association, has their own accident investigation team involved with the NTSB investigation. The investigation process in very thorough, taking into account information from many sources.

roulishollandais 22nd Aug 2013 05:55

Edit : Approach charts with missing FAF F-GGED BEA report!
 

Originally Posted by roulishollandais
Since they built continuous descent approaches they suppressed both the notion of the limits and the table, and sometimes worth: the FAF ! (LFST VOR-DME 05, AIR INTER 20. JAN 1990). But sold aircrafts with such commercial lies.

It is clear today that our Accident Boards are no more free to publish something whose publishing would increase Air Safety, if private or public actors , Airlines, Private "work" or "think"teams or aviation industry, regulatorrs,etc. don't like it : I just wanted to show you the Air Fance/Atlas approach chart without "FAF", given to the pilots by Air Inter the day of the Mont Sainte Odile's crash .That chart is in the original BEA report aswell as the official - and very different - approach chart with wrong altitude of level lines.
Edit :
DELETE that quotation :

Surprise : Today these two charts have been removed from the official BEA Report on the BEA site !!!
Danger is considered coming from pointing the sources of the crash and their drama and not from life and aircraft destruction.
Limiting the responsability of the airlines who keep the income of money when selling tickets, and insurance paying alone and not very much (10,000$/Asiana's victims in SFO!) does no more help Air Safety. Crashes get an interesting industry.
Machinbird was right to near-suffocate at the price of the book, really undecent.
Airlines and their Leasing Associates in dirty money, must pay the true price of the crashes. So long it will not be the case, airlines will not do what it is needed to do not let the same wrong method leading to the next and next and next crashes.

WillowRun 6-3 22nd Aug 2013 07:50

Investigation, cont'd
 
@Desert185
I get that the union has its own investigatory team and that their effort is part of or co-ordinated with NTSB. And also that NTSB in general is very thorough. And while I truly appreciate the comtent of your post, yours did not answer a key part of my inquiries. Please allow me to clarify: I'm starting from a premise about the Quality, writ large, of the cumulative posts here. The content in-thread has: (1) depth (in the sense of sharp focus on detail and thoroughness so as to be comprehensive on any given substantive point);
(2) scope (in the sense of including all (or substantially all) the subject matters that make up the factual picture of this crash, and all the analytic or operational matters as well);
(3) veteran aviator perspective earned through vast accumulations of flight and PIC hours; and
(4) a robust give-and-take which demands participants to think before they post but then also -and this is key - continue thinking as the thread is spun.

If it is valid to say the Quality - again, writ large - of this thread would earn it placement at, say, the Ph.D. level at some hypothetical Naval War College program on administration of a CAA/safety regulation of civil aeronautics, then how would the NTSB investigation-in-fact compare? Is it "Ph.D." Quality? Perhaps even better? Or still slogging it out for a Master's?

I have my own opinion, and since it is an unqualified one, I'm refraining from expressing it expressly, though its veil is rather thin.

Ian W 22nd Aug 2013 08:42

Coagie/Capn Bloggs


Quote:
We can discuss mirages, refractions, tree heights, runway in sight call outs, etc., etc., but the basic fact is they were lower than published minimums.


I'm with you. They were way too low. I was just trying to figure out why, it seems, they were oblivious to being a couple hundred feet low.
"the basic fact is they were lower than published minimums."

The crew were visual with the runway (report on the CVR). What are the 'published minimums' once visual with the runway?

As the crew were visual it is a problem of visual approaches to 18 that should be addressed, not how to fly the NPA. The NPA had 'done its job' and the crew were now runway in sight landing visually. Something, in that visual approach led them to drop significantly below the visual glide path shown by the PAPIs/Approach lights/runway lights. Should the range/altitude checks of the NPA be continued despite being visual and inside/below MDA?

Was it in response to the 'sink rate' or a range/altitude check that the reassurance was given of 'runway in sight'? If so then that is an indication of some sort of visual illusion or an unforgivingly small vertical margin for visual approaches.

Speed of Sound 22nd Aug 2013 09:19


or an unforgivingly small vertical margin for visual approaches.
This seems to be a recurring theme in discussions of this approach.

Capn Bloggs 22nd Aug 2013 10:10

Ian,

Those quotes were not mine, but to take up a couple of your points:


The crew were visual with the runway (report on the CVR).
I'm not so sure. I don't understand why one of the pilots could be visual with the runway but fail to see the 4 reds of the PAPI, which should then illicit a startled response along the lines of "@#$% we're low!". A possibility is as mentioned previously that the caller called a road or other lights, not the runway.


What are the 'published minimums' once visual with the runway?
There are none. It's a Visual Approach from the point you get Visual. A distance/altitude scale would be of limited value at that point because eyes would be outside, on the PAPI.


The NPA had 'done its job' and the crew were now runway in sight landing visually.
Pure conjecture, but I don't think it did. It did not leave them at the MDA on the 2 whites and 2 reds of the PAPI. If one gets Visual beforehand eg off a Dive and Drive, you'll see 4 reds; I would then hold the altitude and fly into the PAPI 2W/2R and recommence descent.

Another concern is the "Sink Rate" call. The autopilot was still engaged; if in Vertical Speed set by the PF (I'm not familiar with Airbus), that would be a rate of descent of at least 1000ft/min (the warning in my aeroplane goes off at around 1700ft/min at 500ft AGL). The terrain was undulating, which can trick the system, but nevertheless the rate of descent would seem to be on the high side to me.


unforgivingly small vertical margin for visual approaches.
The excellent (unverified) profile diagram of MM43's shows that to be the case, in my opinion. By day, you'd see the ground close-by and subconsciously not go low. By night, it'd be invisible (apart from a red light mentioned earlier?) and if the crew got low for whatever reason they would have few visual cues about how dire the situation was.

Old Boeing Driver 22nd Aug 2013 11:06

Visual
 
Your comment appears correct regarding minimums when on a visual approach.

But, were they visually proceeding at the point of the runway in sight call?

At this time, there does not appear to be a confirmation by the PF that the runway was in sight, or that he was going to continue "on the gauges".

I'll have to re-read the time line about the call out and when things started turning bad.

However, there have been times when I have received a runway in sight call and my response was, "continuing on the approach", as I new that visual cues for that approach could be misleading. The approach to the west at San Diego comes to mind.

Just my opinion, but I don't think they slipped 200+ feet low because of that call out, or being on a visual approach at that moment.

Regards.

THEPRFCT10 22nd Aug 2013 11:32

A Squared: sorry, I may have missed it if mentioned earlier, but if the Jepp Plate is in fact in error, how would one know? Was it in the NOTAMs? Sorry, I must have missed it.

(Again, I don't seem to have an option to 'quote' any replies)

Speed of Sound 22nd Aug 2013 12:01


He also stated that he did not see the rotating beacon on the hill approximately 1 mi from the runway.
Does anyone have a link for that NASA report or an independent source for the rotating beacon?

The only two hills approximately a mile from the runway would be the the hill where the trees were hit and the hill where they impacted the ground.

In an attempt to ascertain the height of the trees and power poles, I used Google street view in conjunction with a photograph of the tree damage and another of an engineer fixing the power lines. At no time did I see either a rotating beacon or somewhere where a rotating beacon could be fixed above the height of the tallest pines.

Likewise there are many many photos of the hill of the crash site and again, no sight of a beacon, rotating or otherwise.

The report was from 1999. Is it possible that there was a beacon there at one time which has now been removed?

749CONNIE 22nd Aug 2013 12:21

Link to NASA report
 
F10 crew concerned about proximity to terrain on approach to runway 18 at bhm. - NASA ASRS...

aerolearner 22nd Aug 2013 12:36


Originally Posted by roulishollandais
It is clear today that our Accident Boards are no more free to publish something whose publishing would increase Air Safety, if private or public actors , Airlines, Private "work" or "think"teams or aviation industry, regulatorrs,etc. don't like it : I just wanted to show you the Air Fance/Atlas approach chart without "FAF", given to the pilots by Air Inter the day of the Mont Sainte Odile's crash .That chart was in the original BEA report aswell as the official (and very different) approach chart with wrong altitude of level lines.
Surprise : Today these two charts have been removed from the official BEA Report on the BEA site !!! Danger is considered coming from pointing the sources of the crash and their drama and not from life and aircraft destruction.

Do you mean these charts?
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1992/f-ed...es/annexe6.pdf
(The pdf has multiple pages)

You can find a link to the file in paragraph 111.43 - Volets de procédure:
F-GGED
where the absence of the FAF label is also mentioned.

The fact that you don't find something somewhere does not necessarily imply that it is not there.:}

PEI_3721 22nd Aug 2013 12:48

‘…why one of the pilots could be visual with the runway but fail to see…’
This is similar to the Zurich 29 CFIT accident many years ago. Here it was impossible to see the runway with the charted minimum visibility, but the crew could have seen the local village/road.
As shown in previous diagrams and incident links, the 18 approach is one of those situations where the sight of the runway can be interrupted if the approved approach path is not followed. It might even be possible to see the far end of the runway lights but not the PAPI; e.g. San Diego.

‘It did not leave them at the MDA on the 2 whites and 2 reds of the PAPI.’
This one of the key issues; as with most accidents the precursors and initial conditions have as much or more influence as might the final moments.

EGPWS Sink Rate’, this is not necessarily the aircraft vertical speed, but the terrain rate of closure (Rad Alt); thus an alert could originate from rapidly rising ground with the aircraft at constant vertical speed.

Re ASRS; excellent. The crew / operator asked ‘should we be doing this’? The crew/operator disseminated their safety concerns and took action on a safety report, Factual, Actual, Critical, Potential; … if only other operators / airports / regulators could take similar action.

Speed of Sound 22nd Aug 2013 13:14

749CONNIE
 
Thanks for that.

Re-reading it, there could be another way to see it.

The context is of the pilot who reported the approach claiming he 'did not see the rotating beacon on the hill'.

He may have been responding to someone who told him there was supposed to be a rotating beacon on the hill rather than saying there was a beacon but didn't see it on the night in question.

bubbers44 22nd Aug 2013 13:23

Large aircraft are not using different straight in descent angles than smaller aircraft. Circling approaches they require higher app. Speeds so minimums are higher.

749CONNIE 22nd Aug 2013 13:59

Departure off 36 vs approach to 18
 
Off another forum. Interesting process of TERPS criteria.
http://www.airlinepilotforums.com/safety/76529-ups...

IAP/PAPI vs TROUBLE T
DISCLAIMER: I haven’t seen this analysis depicted elsewhere to date, so here I go…Without (a) speculating into any details of the fatal incident which occurred at KBHM last week or (b) referring to any proprietary publications, practices, or property of any non-tax-funded entity, I would like to expand on my understanding of a significant issue. This interpretation comes from quite a few years of instruction (given and received) in military and civilian multi-engine aircraft operations and instrument flying. You may think this issue directly relates to the recent KBHM incident, but I am expanding on it independent of that. I am trying to document my understandings with hopes that others can correct any errors and/or help better explain how these issues may impact flying safe. Finally, please keep in mind that I am a pilot and not a TERPS certified engineer, but I think we all should hear from one.

SUMARY

Obstacle information for the area north of BHM RW18 over-laid with visual AND instrument approach path information do NOT depict safe vertical clearance of obstacles. Comparing actual vs. published approach path settings (on PAPIs for example) does nothing for ensuring that the resulting path will adequately guide a pilot clear of obstacles – that is merely an accuracy check against a book. There appears to be an error with FAA provided information given to pilots and that information needs to be changed OR obstacles/terrain need to be lowered OR approach paths, visual AND instrument, need to be altered to allow for safe vertical clearance of obstacles.

EXPANDED INFO

Source documents: Current FAA/NACO IAP for LOC 18 and ODP for KBHM; USAF flying regulations (real exciting – and available online)






1. In order to determine obstacle information for landing on RW 18, one can look at climb restrictions and data for departing RW 36. This is a somewhat counterintuitive idea that stems from the fact that if an airfield doesn’t have a published approach procedure, USAF pilots can’t depart it under IFR…it’s either TERPS validated both in and out of the field or it hasn’t been TERPS at all, and if it’s the former, all obstacle data should be accurate. Also, this is NOT a standard practice NOR procedure as it is assumed approach procedures and airfield approach lights are in place to safely avoid all obstacles in applicable flight path; it is a semi-advanced Instrument Instructor technique to examine fields surrounded by terrain to, if for nothing else, validate which direction from the airport has the most/least restrictive path in and out.

2. The required climb gradient of 420’/nm to 1000M can be used to determine the Obstacle Clearance Surface (OCS). The OCS line connects a starting point over the end of the runway with the peak of the most controlling obstacle or terrain through the altitude limit indicated.

2a. The OCS line must be assumed to start at ‘screen height’ or distance above the end of the runway of 35’ because the airfield analysis/approach procedures are developed by the FAA for military and civilian use (airports used only for specific branches of the military do not use a screen height, which provides more of a margin of safety for clearing obstacles).

2b. 48’/nm must be subtracted (it is the standard buffer used in published climb gradients per source document).

2c. The resulting 372’/nm forms the OCS line (high school math on 372’/6076’ derives a 3.5 deg angle…steeper than the 3.28 deg angle of the Precision Approach Path Indicator AND the 3.28 deg angle of the PAPI lights AND the path expected to be displayed on aircraft vertical navigation or profile indication systems.

3. PAPI lights alone are supposed to provide obstacle clearance within 3.5nm of the landing runway and a TERPS’ed approach procedure should do the same from the point one is established on the procedure until you get to minimums at take over visual navigation to the runway (in this case aided only by the aforementioned PAPIs). The instrument approach procedure should comply with Required Obstacle Clearance standards (starting at 250’ clearance above obstacles and tapering down to a lower but safe amount of clearance as the aircraft nears the runway). Given the data derived below using basic trigonometry, I don’t see how the FAA provided data can be construed as the most safe or compliant.

[IMG][/IMG]

CONCLUSION: According to my calculations, there appears to be an error with FAA provided information given to pilots and that information needs to be changed OR obstacles/terrain need to be lowered OR approach paths, visual and instrument, need to be altered (increased descent angle and or higher runway crossing height) to allow for safe vertical clearance of obstacles. If my calculations are off, I think they are close enough to validate imposing restrictions on the use of ANY vertical path guidance for transport category aircraft to RW 18 in anything but day/VMC conditions.

NOTE: Several years back, I nearly put two student pilots to sleep with the concept outlined in step 1 above during pre-flight. We/I didn’t work through the data crunching and plotting process, but needless to say their eyes were opened when I took them into KBHM to get a close-up view of the terrain to the north. It was day/vmc in the overhead/closed traffic pattern, but we all learned why KBHM was highlighted (with the likes of Eagle County and Jackson Hole) in the USAF instrument flying regulations. I wish I had crunched these numbers and challenged someone up the flagpole…

Lonewolf_50 22nd Aug 2013 14:02

The perfect and A squared:

Indeed, A, had they followed the NA on the Jepps they'd not have shot the LOC approach. The error in question seems to have no impact on this accident. Being lower than mins at a given distance did ... so I'd say Old Boeing Driver has a valid point.

Reaching back to Somewherefaraway and his post, his point was that the approach in question is not kosher to shoot at night per a UPS SOP or rule. I'll take that at face value, and ask myself: what approach were these gents flying?

kenneth house 22nd Aug 2013 14:09

Beacon on a hill
 
Can it be seen in this photo?
http://avherald.com/img/ups_a306_n15...m_130814_2.jpg

olasek 22nd Aug 2013 14:35


May I suggest that if you do not have a solution you quit jumping on here and berating Asians, the French and other pilots who are "obviously incompetent" saying "they learnt that in flight school".
Because they did learn it and we are correct to demand from them the same performance as from 99.9% of their colleagues who went through the same training and will never destroy a perfectly good aircraft in their lifetime. Clearly it is something not terribly difficult.

Speed of Sound 22nd Aug 2013 15:01

I did see that and took it to be a light belonging to either the TV crews that were parked up there or the power company engineers who were up the poles.

The only fixed lights I could find on that hill are three of those susended traffic lights that are so popular in the US.

PopeSweetJesus 22nd Aug 2013 16:18


Pure conjecture, but I don't think it did. It did not leave them at the MDA on the 2 whites and 2 reds of the PAPI.
There are non precision approaches that will not leave you with 2 whites/reds at the MDA/DDA. Someone mentioned 27 in San Diego. That approach will leave you slightly low on the VGSI which is why I tend to click off the AP earlier if I have a good visual on the field. I've seen others that leave you a bit high if you follow them all the way down. In both cases I've seen pilots in visual conditions elect to leave things coupled up to MDA/DDA on such approaches. Although there are things that make me believe they were using V/S, the fact of the matter is we still don't know what mode they were in. At this point, this is easily the biggest question about the accident for me.

I wish the NTSB wouldn't say the sink rate call was an EGPWS callout vs a GPWS callout because of the predictive vs reactive nature of those systems. That difference could end up being a big clue in what happened that morning.

JW411 22nd Aug 2013 16:45

Sorry if I have missed something (it's my age). Surely an NPA is designed so that you can find the airport and then make a visual adjustment to find the runway and land or else make a go-around at the MAP. That is why the minima is given as an MDA (Minimum Descent Altitude) and not as a DH (Decision Height) as given for a Precission Approach which is designed to take you to the runway.

Lonewolf_50 22nd Aug 2013 18:00


Although there are things that make me believe they were using V/S, the fact of the matter is we still don't know what mode they were in. At this point, this is easily the biggest question about the accident for me.
You said it better than I did. Thanks.

Reaching back to Somewherefaraway and his post ... LOC 18 is not kosher to shoot at night per a UPS ... what approach were these gents flying?
JW:

... an NPA is designed so that you can find the airport and then make a visual adjustment to find the runway and land or else make a go-around at the MAP.
While true, the LOC to 18 is built to take you to the runway ... per the approach plate. No offset. As you point out, it isn't meant to take you to touchdown (industry best practice of CDA considered ... ).

Coagie 22nd Aug 2013 18:21


How does one decide that a crew error could never be made by another crew in similar circumstances? To me it's a dangerous precedent to make the assumption that no one else could ever make the same mistake. I'd much rather see an investigation that looks for elements of the system that allowed the error to occur in the first place. And corrections need not always be major SOP changes or technical improvements. Sometimes raising awareness through training can be quite effective.
That's part of the challenge. People have to step back, and see if the error is encouraged by the system or if it's an anomalous error by the individual. There's also a grey area, where it's a combination of the two, where the system needs to be tweaked and the individual trained. Using William Edwards Deming's quality principles would be a good idea.

Ct.Yankee 22nd Aug 2013 18:45

Old Boeing Driver
 
As a fellow aviator with about the same level of experience as you, we
used to have a term when we were still 16year F/O's "Y.A.R.C." (You're absolutely correct Captain)! Good post!!

Old Boeing Driver 22nd Aug 2013 19:44

PopeSweetJesus
 
I mentioned the RWY 27 Localizer approach at KSAN for an example of the visual cues to have flying down the side of the hill. It is a strange illusion sometimes, especially at night.

That particular approach will leave you low on the PAPI's if you hustle to minimums from the FAF, which calls for crossing REEBO at 1,800 and descending to an MDA of 680.

However, the approach shows a 3.14 degree glide path from REEBO to the TCH of 66'

The PAPI's are set with a glide path of 3.50 degrees.

If one setup a descent at about 6-700 FPM at REEBO, you would probably stay on the PAPI's

If one stayed level at 1,800 after passing REEBO, you would capture the PAPI's a little farther in and begin your descent.

I know we should not be discussing this approach on this thread, but it makes the point on the KBHM Localizer 18 approach, that even if they had stayed at 1,380 after IMTOY, they would have eventually seen the 2red/2white PAPI's

The same is true if they had descended to 1,200 after IMTOY. They would have eventually seen the 2red/2white PAPI's.

The mystery still is why were they 200+ feet low, inside of IMTOY.

Sorry to be so wordy on this one.

Regards

mixduptransistor 22nd Aug 2013 20:04

Apparently the airport had paid to have those trees in Ms. Benson's yard cut in the past...

After UPS 1354 crash, neighbors vent fear and anger with Birmingham Airport Authority | al.com


Barbara Benson, whose home was struck with falling debris after the A600-300 struck trees in her yard, demanded to know why the airport had once paid to cut the treetops in her yard but had left her house there.

tubby linton 22nd Aug 2013 20:35

MM43 would you please recompute your chart . The threshold is 644ft. The threshold crossing height is 692 ft. The papis are set at 3.2 degrees and the approach descent angle is 3.28 degrees. The approach speed was 140 kt ias but there may have been a 5kt tailwind.
Where would the aircraft been 16 sec and 9 seconds before the end of the recording and more importantly with a circa 800 ft/ min V/S at what altitude?

Desert185 22nd Aug 2013 21:55

WillowRun 6-3:

I get that the union has its own investigatory team and that their effort is part of or co-ordinated with NTSB. And also that NTSB in general is very thorough. And while I truly appreciate the comtent of your post, yours did not answer a key part of my inquiries. Please allow me to clarify: I'm starting from a premise about the Quality, writ large, of the cumulative posts here. The content in-thread has: (1) depth (in the sense of sharp focus on detail and thoroughness so as to be comprehensive on any given substantive point);
(2) scope (in the sense of including all (or substantially all) the subject matters that make up the factual picture of this crash, and all the analytic or operational matters as well);
(3) veteran aviator perspective earned through vast accumulations of flight and PIC hours; and
(4) a robust give-and-take which demands participants to think before they post but then also -and this is key - continue thinking as the thread is spun.
Counselor:

As a pilot with more high school than college, along with 46 years of accident, incident and violation free, professional aviating from GA spam cans to airline heavies, I am of the opinion that much of what is happening in aviation these days is due to overthinking within the industry. We've lost track of the basics.

There's a lot of talk about details that don't matter in this thread. From my standpoint as a pilot, I manage the idiosyncracies of the airplane systems to make the approach down to mins, PAPI's insight, land. Some airplanes are easy, some are not. Deal with it.

You don't need a PhD to fly an airplane, and you don't need PhD level discussion to learn the facts of the accident. Quality, from my pilot's perspective, is being safe, efficient and reliable in the pursuit of my profession. We have high tech airplanes with hoop-jumping hiring requirements and yet we still have AF447, a 777 smacking into the sea wall at SFO on a perfect day, a 737 operated by essentially a short haul airline biffing a landing, and an Airbus from a company with a damn good safety record apparently having an issue with an NPA.

What to do? Having people with a passion for the profession who are detail oriented...and who have a talent for the job will go a long way towards improving safety. When I was hiring, 80% of the interview was the sim ride. These days, 80% of the qualifying interview is the chit-chat portion. People with practical experience and desire are dropped in the prioritizing below those with more education, ethnic background and gender. Diversity is not necessarily a good hiring priority when hiring pilots. I always practiced equality in that the best pilots got the job by demonstrating their abilities, regardless of how fancy their resumes were, or what color or flavor they were. Everyone deserves a shot at the game, but only the best sticks get hired...period. Call it quality control.

Focus on airplane capability (common sense, reliable, user-friendly design) and pilot capability/training, because whether things go to hell or not, the airplane/pilot team is the formula for success. All the other details are important, but the magenta line cockpit, increasing pilot minimum hours and the eyewash of fiddling with crewrest regulations doesn't resolve the core problem. I may be accused of over-simplifying the issue, but over-complicating the issue with minutiae isn't going to solve anything either.

At least that's my perspective as an old-school, pro pilot who has never dented aluminum or bruised a body. A dinosaur perhaps, but this dino is still alive and still successfully flying heavies and spam cans with a firm grasp on the basics.

Old Boeing Driver 22nd Aug 2013 22:02

Desert 185
 
Amen Brother!

I believe you and I are on the same sheet of music.

Automation is a good thing, but at the end of the day, it is just a tool.

Eventually you have to just fly the airplane within the limits of it and yourself.

Great post.

Regards.

tubby linton 22nd Aug 2013 22:23

Old Boeing Driver, can you suggest why this crew still had the autoflight engaged below MDA on a clear night?

Old Boeing Driver 22nd Aug 2013 22:32

Tubby Linton
 
I've been wondering that myself.

As a very speculative guess, I would say that they were using the V/S on the automation and possibly forgot about it, or were otherwise distracted.

Taking from memory from some previous posts, they were pretty fast, pretty close in.

I know I have used the V/S mode to work a descent and speed change.

As a further guess, I think they set the MA altitude somewhere along there.

If that is the case, there would never have been an altitude capture.

I saw your earlier post, and I think you are are on the right track.

Regards.

pipeliner 22nd Aug 2013 22:43

NTSB outside 'quality check'
 
Willow Run,


Questions: does NTSB have some review process by which it goes to (for example) ALPA with the results of its investigation, before preparing its report, and ask whether such a representative of pilots would add any other data or tests? Does NTSB vet an outline of its proposed analytic framework for identifying probable cause? Does it circulate a draft report to anyone outside the agency for comment before making and declaring it final?
Short answer, Yes. The final report is circulated as a draft to all parties and they are allowed to provide input in the form of 'Submissions'. The NTSB is free to ignore the submissions, however, they form a portion of the docket when the report is released. You may not see the information in the actual report but each submission is in the docket.

mm43 22nd Aug 2013 23:02

@ Tubby Linton;

As per your suggestions, have realigned the PAPI. The PAPI height is 630.6 feet and 3 feet below the RWY at TDZ. The threshold is 1166 feet to the north.

The graphic at Post #554 has been changed. A larger scale graphic is here.

I think the NTSB reference to 140 KTS IAS was probably taken prior to the initial contact, and time-wise the distance from impact to the top of the hill to the north of Bethel Dr equates to 9 secs and 130kts. I suggest that the tree felling had an impact on the final speed.

Old Boeing Driver 22nd Aug 2013 23:23

Speeds and Altitudes
 
I know this has probably been posted, but I didn't want to look back through 658 posts.

Does anyone know what their speeds and altitudes were at BAKSN and IMTOY?

Regards.

Old Boeing Driver 23rd Aug 2013 00:05

MM43
 
I need a little education.

I thought the 3.28 degree glide path from IMTOY to the 48' TCH was just an angle between those 2 points.

Does the PAPI angle actually hit IMTOY as depicted on your diagram?

I know the angles posted are just slightly different, but just wondered.

Thanks for your great work.

Regards.

mm43 23rd Aug 2013 03:32

@ Old Boeing Driver

The RWY 18 TCH is 47.7 feet on the 3.20 degree PAPI Glide Slope. The RWY TDZ is 3 feet above the PAPI (630.6') which is the zero baseline for the drawing, i.e. 630 feet above MSL.

Below is a large scale high res portion of the graphic, showing the PAPI origin, with runway in blue which is 644 feet at threshold and a TCH height of 48 feet. So as drawn, the runway negative slope is increased by 3 feet over 1166, but that has no affect on the position of anything else.

http://oi40.tinypic.com/21csa4g.jpg

The intercept of the PAPI centerline at IMTOY appears to be correct, but I haven't checked the coordinates, and the I-BXO LOC/DME may not be 'exact'.

ironbutt57 23rd Aug 2013 06:33

the "sink rate" callout would lead one to believe the VS was in excess of 1000fpm at that point...

A Squared 23rd Aug 2013 06:49


Originally Posted by THEPRFCT10
A Squared: sorry, I may have missed it if mentioned earlier, but if the Jepp Plate is in fact in error, how would one know? Was it in the NOTAMs? Sorry, I must have missed it.

(Again, I don't seem to have an option to 'quote' any replies)

Apparently the change was at one time included in the FDC NOTAMS. Presumably it was not at the time of the accident as the correction hd been made to the FAA charts and FDC NOTAMS are deleted once the change has been published on the charts.

Regardless, they were in fact on an authorized procedure. The fact that their charts may have indicated otherwise in error is completely irrelevant to the accident itself.

regarding quoting a post. As far as I nobody has the option to automatically quote a previous post, you have to type it in yourself. In your reply to window, click on the little yellow dialog symbol just at the top of the box. This inserts (quote) (/quote) except that it's they're enclosed in square brackets, not parentheses. In between these type or cut and paste the text you want to quote. When done correctly, it will show as shaded, quoted text when in your post.

Cyrano 23rd Aug 2013 08:10

Automatically quoting a previous post
 

Originally Posted by A Squared (Post 8007592)
regarding quoting a post. As far as I nobody has the option to automatically quote a previous post, you have to type it in yourself. In your reply to window, click on the little yellow dialog symbol just at the top of the box. This inserts (quote) (/quote) except that it's they're enclosed in square brackets, not parentheses. In between these type or cut and paste the text you want to quote. When done correctly, it will show as shaded, quoted text when in your post.

Just a little public-service message from someone who is appreciating the discussion here:

When you click on the "Reply" icon, the URL in the browser address bar is filled in and you are redirected to a blank message pane where you can start writing. For example, when I clicked on "Reply" just now, the browser showed
and gave me an empty "Reply to Thread" message box in which to start writing this.

When you are replying to a post and want it automatically quoted in your reply, click on "Reply", but don't start writing yet. Instead, go up to the string in the address bar and manually delete the last "1" (you can delete the whole "&noquote=1" if you want, but simply deleting the "1" has the same effect), and hit return to reload the page. Hey presto, you're back at the the previous "Reply to Thread" box but the post you're replying to is pre-loaded as a quote.

Hope that helps. It's easier to do than to explain!

slowjet 23rd Aug 2013 08:21

Cyrano & A squared, thanks V much. I am not comfortable in this modern cyber world & have admired, greatly, those with the skills I lack. Can't wait to highlight (shaded) somebody now ! Cheers.


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