@ Ian WNot so sure about that! They could have been visual earlier, and as previously posited, got tempted for the Drive and Dive scenario. OTOH we don't know whether they acquired the PAPIs at a refracted angle, which lead them to believe they were high.

My overall impression of this approach is that it can be deceptive, be it daylight or night.:ouch:

vertical speed
 

The issue is that we do not know the plane vertical speed.

If they had a high descent rate, 13 seconds before tree impact(+/- 850ft), they could be high enough to see the runway assuming normal visibility. If they has a low descent rate, they would not see the rway as the top of the hill (800-820 ft) is only 4 500 ft from threshold (645ft).

@roulette,
... and I don't like to play "roulette russe".
That is the reason I wanted to emphasize the counterparts of "continuous descent". They are more than one. Once again poor automation had a part in these choices of design philosophy, not only the size and inertia of wide-bodies. You need a high rate of stabilization to realize autoland and have benefit of very low minima, generalized Cat II, Cat III.
RWY 18 in Birmingham,AL is another challenge aswell as many approaches in the middle of hills and mountains.
The last limitation against CFIT is the crew, AFTER GPWS... Dive&drive needs to know at any moment where you are. The different mandatory distances and heights are locked in the pilot's mind. Near of mountains wind may change during approach and with continuous descent method way of thinking you have illusion of ground stability, and you just ignore your real minimal marge, you are descending just like in a simulator with low concern. Only dive&drive way of thinking gives you insurance to be in the protected volume. If we use a distance/height table it is to be able to do a pitch/power correction depending if you are fast or late in your descending path.

Since they built continuous descent approaches they suppressed both the notion of the limits and the table, and sometimes worth : the FAF ! (LFST VOR-DME 05, AIR INTER 20. JAN 1990). But sold aircrafts with such commercial lies.

Freightdogs are used to be asked to land at time in every weather, and to take greater risk (it is a fact) as they have no passengers. The Transport letter LTA given to the crew show that everything has its own insurance. When I was freightdog the total to pay by insurances in case of crash was around 10 times what they would pay with aircraft full of passengers under Warsow/Montreal convention. Freight airlines have no concern with crash risk and costs. So their pilots are alone to protect their own safety, LOCKING in their mind exactly where they cannot go lower and in which hotizontal protection segment they are. That is what is safe in the dive&drive logic. But I know the risk exists to be one step forward in descending, (easy to avoid with good formation) but mean continuous descent is not enough to help if you forget the LIMITS.
Mean continuous descent was built to help automation who are still untrustful in TRANSIENT dynamic.

I do not say more than that when I say dive&drive is safer, as that method gives us more conscious pilots of the ground limits and respect of MDA.
Roulishollandais

Perhaps not. The autopilot was flying; they could have been distracted by the poor vis or confused about what they were actually seeing, all the while the autopilot is taking the aircraft lower and lower.

Nice Distance/Altitude table there, Dadanawa. Great minds think alike!

I wonder if it's possible that the PAPI was obscured by the hill, but a mix of red and white lights was seen in the rush hour traffic on the highway (Interstate 59) just beyond the opposite end of the runway? A crew that was very tired could possibly have been pulled in like this, particularly in the type of light one has at that time of morning.

Such an illusion could be even more convincing if most of the runway lights were also obscured by the hill.

-drl

Book & GroupThink (Board style)
 

Two questions with comments embedded;
1. What interest would there be amongst those PPRuNe-ers who have been active on thread (or following it closely) in a new thread for discussion amongst and between members who are reading the "Rethinking" book (Kindle, Majorly Tall Woman, Mortared Brick or from whatever source derived)? I hesitate beyond pausing to start a thread that would just draw contempt ridicule derision and derisive scorn from the cognoscenti for whom it would be intended to be interesting / useful / informative / maybe entertaining (though not while driving but I digress). If Oprah can have a book club, well, the million-plus PIC hours -(aggregate) frequent drivers club could have very stimulating and learned discussion of what those who are reading the book - promoted by the ghost of 1354 - think of particular arguments developed therein, and so on. Kind of like recurrent training, but not on the dynamic motion base six-degrees-of-freedom Magenta Line queen. Maybe it might even build toward consensus for a return to hand-flying as an emphasis in CAAs. What sayeth the Community herein?

2. Does anyone know whether, and if so to what extent, the attitude and expertise very manifest in-thread -- the drill into it, hit all the details, keep going until the facts are assembled Complete(ly), speak your mind freely on all matters of interpretation or conjecture, and just a general refusal to accept the Big Shrug (in my steel mill youth, I recall, a Safety placard read: Accidents Don't Just Happen. They Have Causes. no shrug allowed) -- this level of expertise exists and is applied at NTSB, right? Right? But do they (the Board staff) have a process like the GroupThink that has produced this thread? Yeah, that too: I hope the Board staff is right over yonder, lurkin' away.

I'm WillowRun 6-3, which BTW does not stand for "verbose lawyer". Good Day and "be careful out there"

WillowRun 6-3, perhaps you could send the NTSB an email and ask them to have a look at this thread.

Email?
 

tubby, do you think really that would be a good idea? I mean what with dispatching Go Teams a lot lately, they're already pretty busy. Besides, I wouldn't want them to call me a non-profit and then audit my taxes (all those gov't agencies work really closely together, you know). But I might use a safer method of communication: I'll go back to where I used to perch my rack in the summertime during my Zen Vagabonding at O'Hare trip, and mark the message up in chalk on the flat vertical concrete sides of the 15-foot (approx) semi-circular vents left and right of the CT (the old one), you know alongside the walks between T-2 and the hotel - just as I weekly chalked the University of MICHIGAN football scores in Fall Term 1983 (until I returned to Ann Arbor, anyway). True story. Do you think NTSB knows where to look? I mean at O'Hare, for chalk signs??

Fair comment but not accepted (I did read the report you linked to). Before the approach-proper commences (further out than the FAF, we use 10nm if not doing a VNAV approach) the aircraft would be protected by the Altitude Selector set at the MSA.

Approaching the commencement point as shown by the distance, the ALT SEL is wound down to MDA and the approach commenced. Thereafter, it is easier to monitor your profile error by checking the altitude against upcoming DME distances eg "8 DME, 100ft Low" "correcting!". You know exactly what the error is and how much you need to correct to be back on profile by the next mile. If it was "4000ft, .4nm too far out", it's harder to conceptualise and fix the profile error, high or low.

That said, one-time checks such as checks at the FAF should be as you say: "FAF check 2500ft" (obviously called before you get there!) is more logical because it is a catch-all check, not a profile monitor/correction technique.

Done many hundreds of these; Distance/Altitude is easier than Altitude/Distance.

737er, Thanks. I'll see if I can dig it up and check it out. You seemed to have peaked interest in the book among those in this thread. 737er, you may rival Don Imus or Oprah Winfrey, in getting a book on the New York Times Best Seller list! Good work! I'm sure everyone, who reads the suggested book, will get something useful out of it. The whole Human Factors thing is fascinating, and can be applied in a broad array of endeavors.

WilloRun 6-3, if you're paid by the word, rather than the hour, you must be a very wealthy lawyer! Kidding aside, although the thin skinned should proceed with caution when participating, it's good to see you appreciate the value of Internet brainstorming.

Total rubbish, in other words thousands pilot are being 'set up' by their employers every day.

There was an accident years ago on a night approach to one of Hawaiian airports, crew of a business jet lost sight of PAPI but interpreted this that a small cloud got between them and the PAPI, in fact they were wrong, there was no cloud, they were too low. Everyone perished.

olasek, it's been unusually rainy around Birmingham this summer, and 5 in the morning is prime time for fog. Your example may very well have happened in this crash. The pilots thinking the lights were obscured by a low lying cloud or bank of fog, not realizing it was a hill. There's also a chance of light refracting over the crest of the hill, as sometimes happens in moist conditions, making it seem like they had straight line of sight to the runway, when actually, the light was "bent" over the crest of the hill by refraction.

Not only more satisfying, but, in most cases more comfortable for people, because they feel less guilty blaming a large, soulless entity, than an individual, who might get their feelings hurt. Sometimes the problem is with the system, but the problem with blaming the system, when it's an individual problem, is, often the solution on a systemic problem involves changing things that are working, thus risking throwing the baby out with the bathwater, otherwise know as the law of unintended consequences, where solving one problem, causes other, perhaps more significant problems. Giving merits and demerits to an individual isn't as risky to what works in the system. That's why it's important to see the big picture, and identify an error as systemic, or an individual anomaly, as the solutions are often different.

Altitude vs Range
 

The Papi and Loc/Dme for 18 were notamed u/s today, the notams show them unservicable for 48 hours.

Just the facts Ma'am
 

Dear Aviator Friends:

I've been a lurker on this forum for years and have enjoyed reading the information posted. I've come to know that there are a lot of people here that are a lot smarter than me.

However, after 40 years of flying 2, 3,and 4 engine jets all over the world, I have come to a point where I have to make a few comments.

I may get flamed for my opinion, but here goes.

1. The fact that the procedure was NA on some charts does not matter
2. The fact that Mrs. Benson's trees were 921' instead of 915' does not matter
3. The fact that the controller saw their lights does not matter.

What matters is that they were over 200' lower than the MDA for the approach.

Had they leveled off at an MDA of 1,200 and flown until they saw 2 white/2red PAPI's and the REIL's, they would be home with their families, and we would not be having these discussions.

We can discuss mirages, refractions, tree heights, runway in sight call outs, etc., etc., but the basic fact is they were lower than published minimums.

Now, why were they low? The NTSB should have plenty of data to tell us soon.

In the meantime, let me throw out a few more points for discussion.

The NTSB only noted EGPWS warnings and sounds consistent with hitting the trees, however the CVR went on for quite a while. Why weren't there other “expletives deleted” or call outs?

Did the A/P miss a level off? (maybe due to setting the MA altitude before it captured?)

Was there a pilot incapacitation at a critical moment?

Were both heads in the cockpit for some reason? (Remember EAL in the Everglades?)

Thanks to my fellow aviators for your comments here.

Regards

Recording the View from the Cockpit ??
 

In investigating incidents, it seemingly could be helpful to have a record of what the flight crew might have seen while looking outward from the cockpit at critical times, to help understand why the crew took (or didn't take) certain actions, and to improve future design, training, and procedures.

For instance, on this thread some are busily speculating whether the view of the runway might briefly (or partly) have been obscured by patchy clouds or fog, or perhaps by trees mistaken for patchy clouds or fog. Did they see the entire runway, or only the far end? Could they see the PAPI and the strobe near the runway threshold? (I won't even touch the "mirage" theories. And yes, perhaps what the crew saw is pointless, as they never should have been so low at that location and immediately should have initiated a go-around, but for some reason they didn't and we need to understand why).

There have been other instances in which questions arose about whether a crew might have mistaken a nearby road for the runway, or if a crew's view was seriously impaired by the rising sun or blowing sand or heavy rain. Then there are (alleged or actual) laser beams impairing view or sunlight reflecting, taxiway collisions, runway excursions, various illusions....

I could list dozens of other examples, but the point seems self-evident.
Recording inside the cockpit (showing the flight crew) understandably is very controversial. But would it make sense (and is it technically feasible) to record outward, and capture that data on future data recorders?

A camera cannot exactly replicate what a crew could see -- camera height, angle, positioning, focal length, color, and light sensitivity are just some variables (though software can try to compensate). Unlike a camera the crew also must do more than constantly scan outward, with nary a blink.

There also is the "ghoul" factor. In the YouTube era, the NTSB or other applicable entity would have to safeguard the video as it does the CVR tape.

Still, is this an idea worth considering, or is it unnecessary (or too controversial as potentially the nose of the camel entering the tent)?

You've answered your own question. ;)

Tubby: being NOTAM'd today means what, exactly, in relation to the mishap in the past? :confused:

Just a guess, they're doing flight checking or other testing on those systems today

Some earlier discussion here:

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...mandatory.html

Like so many of these safety reporting and recording innovations (CVR, QAR, ASAP), we'll be assured initially that the information can never be used for discipline, is totally anonymous and is only harvested to promote safety. However, over time things will somehow change...

I looked again at the notams and changed the data source to FAA and the equipment is listed out of service until further notice.. I did wonder if this is for testing. Will the NTSB fly an A300 down the approach or will they do it in a simulator?

The NTSB brought not just any A300, but a UPS A300 to Birmingham to do flight testing.

High sink rate?
 

The late EQPWS alerts might seem consistent with a higher than normal sink rate. What might account for a high sink rate in the visual segment?

How many approaches did they fly and were any at night? Was this before the notams were issued today?

Old Boeing Driver:

Old school attitude and comments. I like it.

For those who picked a anomaly with my recent posts and quotes, here is what I posted (it had been deleted by the mods):

This came from one of the links PEI_3721 posted.

To Olasek and Coagie, I ask you this. Given that you both believe that blaming the institution is easier than the individual by letting the pilots off the hook, what then is your solution to the accidents where apparently incompetent pilots crash perfectly serviceable aircraft (or ones that have temporarily U/S ASIs) into the ground? Are you happy that they have been removed from the gene pool and won't do it again? How many others are there out there that do not deliberately violate SOPs but are still going to have a accident and what are you going to do to find them and stop them having that accident?

The only thing we do differently is to set it on the MDA (catchbasket). We don't use it down the approach.

Not quite: the aircraft is positively controlled down that profile. I think the whole concept of starting at the FAF and simply flying a constant rate of descent or FPA and hoping you won't clip steps or get to the MDA prior to the MAPt is fundamentally flawed.

That is precisely why having and using a detailed distance/altitude scale is superior; profile errors are picked up immediately they manifest themselves instead of waiting until a "not below" step comes up on the chart. A couple of those "TAWS Saves" involved crews that did not use the distance/altitude profile, even though it was published on their charts.

Old Boeing Driver,

A worthy first post after all that lurking. We have come full circle with airplane accidents. Right from the dreadful toll of accidents in the early days that were almost always blamed on "pilot error" to today's accident situation where, to misquote somebody else, whenever we hear hoof beats we think Zebras and not Horses.

OLD BOEING DRIVER said that NA on the approach plate doesn't matter. I disagree. Like most of this thread where the discussion talks about the confusing plate, it definitely matters. Errors, inconsistencies, NOTAMs, whatever. I keep looking at the plate and I can easily see how there could very well be some confusion. Not saying they had confusion, but possibly. It certainly could have been at least partly causal. Time will tell.

Capn Bloggs, you missed my point. I'll try again. I meant people, in general, find it easier to blame a big, soulless entity, than blame an individual, for fear it would hurt that individual's or his/her associates' or family's feelings. I never said it I thought it was the right way of thinking. It can cause changes, that don't need to be made, to be made. I pointed out, that if the error is on the pilot, then corrective action on that pilot should take place, however, if the error is systemic, in other words, if the pilot's error is encouraged by the system, be it in training, operations, accounting, or elsewhere, then corrective action should be taken on the system. If a good system is changed, because of one pilot's non-systemic error, because people are too afraid of hurt feelings, it may no longer be a good system (the law of unintended consequences).

I'm with you. They were way too low. I was just trying to figure out why, it seems, they were oblivious to being a couple hundred feet low.

Coagie, OK, understand. I haven't seen that approach in the aviation world.

How does it matter? THe notation on the Jepp chart was in error, and had they been using the FAA charts instead of Jepps, there wouldn't have been any question. Regardless, if they had flown the procedure as published, the accident wouldn't have happened.

A SQuared: you just said it yourself: "THe notation on the Jepp chart was in error"....(sorry, I have no option to quote posts for some reason). If the chart was in error, how could one not consider that partly causal? What minimums if at night it was NA anyway? Note 2 on top adds to the confusion.

NA on the Plate
 

I meant from the point that it is simply a restriction on paper.

Just because it said NA, if they had been at the MDA until PAPI and REIL's were completely visual, there would have possibly have been a different outcome.

Granted, that if they saw that restriction and diverted due to the other runwat being closed, there probably would also have been a different ending.

There should be some good data soon.

How does one decide that a crew error could never be made by another crew in similar circumstances? To me it's a dangerous precedent to make the assumption that no one else could ever make the same mistake. I'd much rather see an investigation that looks for elements of the system that allowed the error to occur in the first place. And corrections need not always be major SOP changes or technical improvements. Sometimes raising awareness through training can be quite effective.

Apparently you didn't understand what I wrote.

I'll try again. The approach is authorized at Night.

The Note on the Jepp Chart saying there are no authorized minimums at night is in error. There was previous discussion on this matter earlier in this thread.

According to the chart published by the FAA, the procedure *is* authorized at night (provided the PAPI is operating)

So my question to you is *if* the procedure *is* authorized at night (which is is) what causal factor does an erroneous note on a chart have that says it is not authorized?

And who said there must be a 'solution'?? Do you have a solution for lapses in human judgement?
What is a solution for a perfectly competent driver who one day decides to run a red light or overtake another car on a windy mountain road with not enough room to spare?
I suggest you read some accident reports from GA when many of them state 'lost control for unknown reason' or 'decided to descend below MDA in poor weather', etc, etc. What institution can be blamed since no airline is involved??? FAA for not flunking a pilot in his verly early career?. How can you predict that a pilot who keeps passing all known competency checks will do something irrational or will be guilty of major abrogation of his duties in say 8333 hr of his career??
I don't have a solution but certainly consider it a gross naïveté to think you can subject pilots to more training or 'better' training and somehow avoid those accidents unless you can unambiguously enumerate deficienices in their training (like in the caseof the Polish Tupolev pilots that crashed their presidential Tu-154).

Pause
 

Lord Wingspan almighty, maker of all Lift, what a thread! I give thanks for it. May it be some comfort to those who grieve for 1354's fliers that herein, on this thread, many fine, wise knowledgeable and dedicated Professional aviators are busy positing and counter-posting and vetting and sorting out whatever fact or conjecture might be relevant. Think of the crashing sound of The Doors song, Waiting for the Sun. Waiting (for an NTSB probe followed by analysis followed by report-writing followed by report approval and sometime in the somewhat foreseeable future: issuance) is not what we choose to do

Questions: does NTSB have some review process by which it goes to (for example) ALPA with the results of its investigation, before preparing its report, and ask whether such a representative of pilots would add any other data or tests? Does NTSB vet an outline of its proposed analytic framework for identifying probable cause? Does it circulate a draft report to anyone outside the agency for comment before making and declaring it final?

I don't trust bureaucracy. I trust leadership. I am just not convinced, at this time, that the leadership on causal analysis being publicly developed in very quick order on this thread, is something which both FAA and NTSB are prepared to integrate into their far more 'analog' worlds. This accident should send up a red flag that something was deeply flawed somewhere. And even if that supposition on my part turns out to have been alarmist or merely incorrect, the challenges posed by the Triple 7 CFIT in Dirty Harry Town are much greater, aren't they, because they reach into ICAO realms.

Yes, I am advocating a kind of mobilization, a kind of increased operational tempo, a surge (not a bad word), to get to the root cause. My engineering education, limited and informal though it may be, did strike Truth at least in this: The Careful Enough Statement of the Problem Implies the Solution.

One quickly notices the difference in the levels of information release between a union and non union airline..

Quite frankly, It is not my concern that bugsmasher pilots kill themselves because of press-on-itis, carelessness, incapacity or neglect.

But we're talking major commercial operations here, where the passengers reasonably expect that the pilots will cope, and that pilots will not do something silly, or if they do, then defences in the system will catch them.

May I suggest that if you do not have a solution you quit jumping on here and berating Asians, the French and other pilots who are "obviously incompetent" saying "they learnt that in flight school".