Airbubba
 

15

Autopilot operating modes, autothrottle and AFCS systems engagement status and operating modes.

I saw that briefing and I thought it odd that he did not mention the QAR, perhaps it was destroyed in the crash. Using industry standard software it is very easy to recreate the flight and crew actions from QAR data.

Airbubba, re, "I would think the FDR data would give autopilot mode status as well."

It may or may not.

I believe the prior reference to a QAR was intended to highlight the fact that QARs are often programmed with "richer" data frames, (more parameters, higher sample rates, higher resolutions) than SSFDRs.

Usually, data frames on DFDRs is somewhat standard from the manufacturer, (although I haven't met a truly standard data frame yet...nor do aircraft always have the best dataframe documentation). IIRC, there are about six or seven "standard" frames for the B737C (classic - 200, 300, 400).

Because QAR data is not legally scheduled and defined as with DFDRs, those who are capable of programming data frames from documentation can extend the utility (and available but not programmed parameters) of QARs substantially. It is intensely detailed work and therefore normally very expensive and time-consuming.

QARs are generally located either in the EE bay or the cockpit. If the installation is an older one with a "DAU*" (Digital Acquisition Unit), the QAR "mirrors" the DFDR. If the QAR is supported by a "DMU*", (Data Management Unit), it has it's own processor(s) and processes the data independently of the DFDR. With the substantial damage to the lower cockpit area I doubt if a QAR is available but if mounted in the cockpit it may be.

* terms may differ - the nice thing about standards within flight data systems is that there are so many to choose from.

tubby linton....re, "Using standard software it is very easy to recreate the flight and crew actions from QAR data."

I know what you mean but just so there isn't any misunderstanding regarding the term, "standard software" - such software is proprietary and very expensive - in other words, it can't be done using MS Excel, etc.

I know you know this but many who salivate at the thought of getting their mitts on accident flight data do not know this and believe everyone and anyone should have access to flight data so, not trusting those who do this work, they can make up their own minds about what happened.

PJ2

If you have never seen a QAR recreation of a flight, then I will describe it for you. The one my company uses has multiple windows which show the aircraft position overlaid on Google earth, the PFD with the modes selected, the position of slats flaps and gear , flying control positions and engine parameters.. There are probably other items displayed which I have forgotten but it is described here:
http://www.aerobytes.co.uk/docs/Aero...eyFeatures.pdf
By standard i meant industry standard software not something you can download for a few $$$$.
The PFD representation in the software replicates a 320 family pfd which consolidates all of the flight instruments on one screen. This is satisfactory for flight analysis purposes but differs slightly to a standard A300 PFD display.

PJ2
 

It is not optional, it is a ICAO required parameter.

Jeppesen regularly makes transcription errors (from source documents to their own documents) in my part of the woods. A recent one quite bad.

"Sink Rate" below 1000ft AAL in my outfit is an immediate Go Around, no questions asked.

In my outfit only "Pull up, Pull up!" is an immediate go-around. A "sink rate" is only a go-around if the flying pilot doesn't respond with "correcting" and actually makes said correction to the sink rate.

Seems to me that this whole thread goes through ALL the possible technical causes of the accident in great detail. IF this incident had involved an ASIAN carrier, we would by now be having ALL the torrid discussions about ASIAN pilots' lack of basic flying skills.

Quoted:

"I saw that briefing and I thought it odd that he did not mention the QAR, perhaps it was destroyed in the crash. Using industry standard software it is very easy to recreate the flight and crew actions from QAR data."


I've been intimately involved with the FOQA program with two airlines, and typically the Quick Access Recorder (QAR) and the FDR have the same data. Some airlines program their QARs to record additional parameters, but most just mirror the FDR. Modern FDRs record hundreds of parameters, and animations/recreations can certainly be made from those data.

At one airline, no QARs were installed, so the FOQA program ran off of data downloaded directly from the FDR. Each airline will have the data frame set up for both the QAR and FDR data (if different from each other), so it takes almost no time to view the data once it is on-hand. For instance, once our safety department had a download from either a QAR or FDR, we could be viewing the data in as little as 10 - 20 minutes, depending on the size of the file.

So if UPS has QARs, they most likely do not contain any different data than the FDR, and the FDR data can be accessed and processed just as quickly as QAR data. They are functionally equivalent.

The one advantage to having a QAR is that if there is an incident, occasionally the NTSB will allow the airline to keep the QAR data media, and they can review the data independently from the NTSB. It appears that the NTSB is getting more permissive with its data policies, so that may become less of an advantage going forward.

Yep
 

[CODE]Seems to me that this whole thread goes through ALL the possible technical causes of the accident in great detail. IF this incident had involved an ASIAN carrier, we would by now be having ALL the torrid discussions about ASIAN pilots' lack of basic flying skills./CODE]

Sad but true.

sera

This UPS accident involves an instrument approach procedure with complex technical conditions and limitations.

Asiana fu*** up a visual approach on a wonderful clear day to a very benign runway.

That one was easy to throw stones at. The UPS accident is far more complex.

In any case, your rant is racist.

I'm a Captain with UPS (won't say which fleet) and work in our TC. Currently I am out of the country.

Our company charts for the LOC approach say NA at night. I'm not talking about the NA at night for lack of VGSI. This is due, undoubtedly to the terrain and black hole effect of night operations.

Also, interestingly, we have an RNAV GPS to 18 which does not have that restriction, but according to NTSB briefings they were using the LOC 18 as reference.

However, with the hourly observation, I would guess they shot a visual approach, "backed up" by the LOC and in that case, the reference for the LOC would be legit

I don't have much to say.. but if you all need facts that I can share, I will do so. It has been a long week of grieving for us.

I am not familiar with the A300, but I am typed in all of our other aircraft

I was there yesterday. The wreckage is in easy site range of the passenger terminal. I watched several of them go the end of the glass to take a look and snap some pictures. Sad. Tragic. Lots to learn from this. Could've been any one of us.

"This UPS accident involves an instrument approach procedure with complex technical conditions and limitations."

I'm not so sure.
To me, the NTSB briefings so far suggest a black hole illusion which seems to have resulted in CFIT. If so, it's not the first time and unlikely to be the last. So the mystery is in how this was set up?

It's extremely sad to lose assets both human and machine this way.
My sincerest sympathies go out to the entire UPS operation.

Willie :ok:

The QAR and the FDR typically have the same data, or at least very similar. Some airlines even directly download their FDR, instead of a QAR, for the FOQA program.

You use the approach plate issued by your company. Ours (not UPS) for the LOC 18 are tailored and state VGSI required at night, and the night minimums block says NA. An easy one to miss for sure.

I think it's become clear from the conversations and preliminary information that there likely was no technical flaw at the root of this (I'm not saying there wasn't one, but it would not have to be causal), nor was there any blatant crew misconduct apart from perhaps them not having shown the amount of discipline needed in a non precision approach.

There is no such thing as an "unsafe" instrument approach. They are all designed to have safety margins built in, IF the procedures outlined are adhered to. As JPJPs A300 FO friend states, no jet today flies a non precision approach as we used to in IFR school (dive and drive) the FMC will create an artifical glideslope (a continuous descent approach, or CDA, wiki for those who are not familiar: Continuous descent approach - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia), the MDA is substituted by a DH (e.g. MDA+50 to account for the GA transition) which should match with the missed approach point (MAP). What does that mean? You are always above the step altitudes published in the approach plates.

The CDA provides you with check altitudes just as well as the classically flown approach does. If your FMC does not calculate them for you, you have to calculate them yourself. But even without calculation, you can read off the charts as you fly off the points: "BASKN, check 2300 or above, next IMTOY, 1380 or above." then "Minimum, visual, landing" or "Minimum, no contact, go around!".

It takes discipline to always, always do this. Complacency settles in with all of us unfortunately, it would be wonderful if somehow we could have a less costly reminder to keep the basic skills running even on flights we've done a million times!

"You use the approach plate issued by your company. Ours (not UPS) for the LOC 18 are tailored and state VGSI required at night, and the night minimums block says NA. An easy one to miss for sure."

Absolutely -- anyone reading the minimums block is going to go left to right until they get a hit. When I looked at the approach plate for the first time, I went to MDA with IMTOY, then to Cat C/D. There is no reason to look any farther. In fact, I probably looked at the chart fifteen times before I twigged that night block.

If there is a condition where mins are NA -- meaning the approach itself is NA -- then it needs to be in the first column, not the last.

Aterpster, Where exactly do you perceive racism in serangga's honest observation?

Do you guys check the PAPI even when you don't need it, just as a sanity check?

-drl

Can you give me an example of a time when it's not needed?

I assume that means "yes", and so how did these guys lose track of it, given that they knew this was a tricky approach?

-drl

This is unreal, Aterpster! No. Barring a tech problem either they bust minima or messed up a visual - which sounds quite 'similar' to me.. I think Asiana is pretty 'complex', actually. As to 'racisct' - rubbish. Merely observing facts.

SoS, re "It is not optional, it is a ICAO required parameter. "

I understand that.

I don't want to take the thread off-topic nor do I mean to be blunt but if I may, it's a lot more complex than that.

To clarify my "may or may not" statement, "autopilot engaged/not-engaged" is indeed a required parameter almost everywhere flight data comes under the country's aviation regulations for FDRs. What is less certain under both ICAO Annex 6 and most country's regulations including Canada's and the United States is the requirement for autoflight parameters beyond that basic AP "on-off" parameter. In some documents, (§121.344), automatic flight control system modes and engagement parameters are stated as required but what is not stated is what parameters would satisfy the regulation.

There are many parameters such as MCP / FCU selections and autoflight modes which would be extremely useful but which are not required in law for all types. As you probably are aware, the rules for required parameters are not simple to navigate but I believe this aircraft (first flight, November, 2003, Part 121) may be under the "88-parameter" requirement, but I would be happy to be corrected, with references to documentation.

PJ2

asquared....when tracking an electronic glideslope..

I value your inputs a lot.

But what leads you to that statement?
What's so complex in a technical way or concerning limitations on this NP approach?

Why and what exactly would, if it is complex, lead to hitting terrain on the extended centerline?

I think there are striking similarities between all three incidents (I'm including the SW nose wheel). For one, it would be difficult to deny that in all three the aircrew appear to have driven perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground.

'Could have been any one of us'


Sorry, don't accept that. For one it's too early to state a definite reason for this crash.


But let's say it is CFIT, we go through a lot of training and checking at my airline to operate into airports with surrounding high terrain and in the 26 years i've been here we've managed to avoid hitting it.


Saying 'it could have been any one of us' presupposes it's just fate and some luck that keeps us out of the rocks.


If that's what you are relying on you should get out of this business.

Enough of these "Stockholm Syndrome" enabling cliches:=

It will not happen to those who head the warnings issued by our aircraft.

Pride and prejudice
 

This thread has been, from start, characterised by a very cautious and balanced approach from most PPrune contributors. Many factors, other than pilot performance, have been put forward and discussed: mechanical/technical failure, optical illusion, inaccuracy/imprecision of the charts, plane performance, bird strikes, the potential contribution of fatigue etc…

This seems, to me, the right and positive way to approach any accident. I’ll refrain from using the much tainted terms of “fair and balanced”, but that’s the overall spirit. Such restraint has also characterised the “Southwest KLGA gear collapse” thread, with a very neutral title and, again, a rather impartial approach.

However, this was not the case with the “Asiana flight crash at San Francisco” thread, which from the onset was plagued with a number of downright xenophobic comments and frequent, broad and negative characterisation of “Asian” pilots. This reveals, by the way, a deep lack of knowledge: There are no more “Asian” pilots than “African” pilots, but that’s besides my point here.

I am not suggesting that factors such as culture, whether induced by nationality or fostered inside a given company, should not be examined during any in-depth investigation. But they cannot serve as an initial, catch-all “explanation”. Sadly and ironically, this prejudiced approach was mainly expressed bluntly by some members posting from the United States, the handful of usual offenders.

I guess that what I’m trying to say, along with several other members, is that the three events present one commonality: all three flights ended up with an accident, of a severe and potentially life threatening nature. It would be refreshing to see the same cautious and balanced approach taken in all three cases, without the level of prejudice expressed by some.

But it’s just a wish…

A.

I swore I wasn't going to contribute to this thread anymore, only observe for anything interesting to come out, but...

Now, to get away from the personal vitriol, with a reply to a few earlier comments.

CHARTING Issues

Re discrepancies between Jepp (or other provider, or company special) and FAA charts, obviously the national provider's charts and data reign (even if they have things that could be improved). Jepp, like all authorised chart providers and DB coding and packing organisations, have pretty rigorous quality procedures including independent checking methods. But systems are never perfect and any human interaction also has the potential to contribute error.

Re the 910' vs 915' obstacle just after the IMTOY stepdown mentioned earlier, Jepp sometimes does add margins to obstacles and terrain and/or other obstacles and higher terrain points based on their own data sets. I'm not sure they should (and maybe this varies depending on the LoA they have with the relevant supplying country), but they do. (I have seen this in charts for different countries and have verified through direct correspondence with them on various occasions in this specific regard.)

At the same time, Jeppesen have always been extremely quick to respond to any queries raised with them and in my experience have always been very quick to assist and resolve such issues.

Re any liabilities for errors made by them, well I guess that's probably why (I'm sure) they have pretty big insurance coverage somewhere within the Boeing umbrella.

CHART NIGHT MIN Box

I'd suggest that if you're flying at night, this would be the first box that you'd look at and this would part of your SOP.

Re the Jepp charting discrepancy (at least on the 17-AUG-2012 version posted by Aterpster), while the NIGHT MIN box was blank, Note 2 is a repeat of the FAA note for the Amdt 2A 08-MAR-2012: 'When VGSI inop, procedure not authorized at night'.
So, even 5 months later the chart is unclear in this regard (to me, anyway).
That said, even if the publisher hasn't pick up an error, inconsistency or something that is confusing themselves, it's strange that such a long period can go by before an industry user raises a query. Has this procedure not been used based on a Jepp chart at night before? What of preflight briefings?

UPS Charts & LOC RWY18 at Night

What's more interesting is what SomewhereFarAway had to say (bold emphasis is mine):If (and only if) this is the case, and if true that there were no mechanical or aircraft/system-related technical errors (as indicated so far by the NTSB briefings), then sadly it does look as though - for whatever reason - the cause could potentially be related to that same old Distance+Altitude equation (ie, failure to maintain sufficient altitude at the appropriate distance from the landing location).

In the case of the Asiana accident at SFO my personal opinion that it was a bad case of get-there-itis (as well as potentially fear of company reprisals based on FOQA stats) and they should have gone around long before as it was evidently a very unstable approach from 5+ miles out.

In this BMH accident - I'm prepared to await more NTSB findings.

[Gawd it never looks this long when I write this stuff. Sorry :uhoh:]

With respect for your experience, I'll offer a thought: professional pilots know how to read an approach plate -- the whole thing. It's part of the arcane lore acquired and passed down that makes professional pilots different from other people.

If that fundamental skill is being lost, or has lost emphasis due to automation, then Lord help us.

On the other hand, I appreciate the point you make. You use the tools the company has chosen. Who in the company reviews the products for errata such as the above, or contacts Jepps with questions? I suppose it depends upon the company.

@Somewherefaraway:
Thank you for the insight.

I think there is/was a Jepp notam to say that the LOC 18 approach was usable at night with the VGSI operative. I still feel like the most likely reason for the LOC approach vs. the RNAV is that neither approach was line selectable in their database meaning no Profile(VNAV) approaches available to 18.

I read that the other runway was closed for repairs or maintenance, at the time of the crash. At the risk of oversimplification, is it possible, that they'd never flown into runway 18, even in daylight, and made the assumption, that it was just like landing at the other one? It doesn't seem possible as Birmingham's varied terrain is pretty obvious, at least, in the daylight. Also, the pilots were from North Carolina and Tennessee, nearby states with similar varied terrain. It does seem like there was some wrong scale or wrong decimal place involved. It's hard to believe, they'd make such a leap of faith, that a runway, running in a different direction, would be the same as landing on the other.

Trying to read the minds of dead pilots is a frustrating line of inquiry, to be sure.

From the accounts of his neighbors and his obituary, the pilot, Cerea Beal Jr, was a good and righteous family man. Cerea Beal Jr. Obituary: View Cerea Beal's Obituary by Charlotte Observer It's sad to read, that his beautiful daughter, Sarah, was just starting college on a basketball scholarship and to think how proud he would have been to see his daughter play, and how proud she would have been to play in front of her beloved father. https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?f...type=3&theater Sure, no man is an island entire of itself, but good, family men, seem to be in short supply these days, so I hate to see one go. Small world. Years ago, I dated a girl from Cerea's birthplace, Greenville, Mississippi. RIP Cerea Beal Jr., may your family's faith give them the strength to get through this tragedy.

Loss of Fundemental Skills
 

Ever since this thread started, I've been thinking of AF447.

In that video, he says PAPI angle was tested and found to be within 1/100 of a degree accurate. Not sure how meaningful that is. Think it would change more than that with wind and temperature (materials expanding and contracting). A PAPI vendor only specs it to within +/- 3 minutes of arc (1/20 of a degree).

Practically, this is no big deal regarding PAPI but it makes me wonder how reasonable NTSB is with other units of measure. Just because your calculator can read 9 digits . . .

Asiana does not equal UPS
 

I cannot find the right word to express the combination of 'intrigued by' and "troubled by'. I am X word by the notion that the Network here has viewed the SFO 777 crash through a prism of racism, even in part, whilst trying to understand what MIGHT have happened to the UPS A300 in purely technical terms (and plenty of technical terms, and factors, there are).

I wonder whether readers and posters would find it helpful to think about whether there are simply two different kinds of human factors analytic mindsets involved in the two different mishaps. In SFO, the crash seems to have been an act of obliviousness to really obvious flying conditions. Coupled with the fact that hand-flying is an alien art form to the 'children of the magenta line'. Or something like that.

While on the other hand, what happened in Alabama seems more caught up in the very fine points of fairly detailed information on an approach plate; discrepancies between the FAA and the Jepp; speculation about mirages (thankfully no Mysteres) and also about black hole sighting, and many other really interesting - but hard to comprehend let alone intergrate into a non-PIC -- like regulatory -- framework - RNAV VGSI PAPI MDA MAP MAPt you get the idea. Please, I am not trying to add to the talk-amongst-the-aviators - just trying to collect terms and simplify to some reasonable first-order approximation.

May it be said with a fair degree of accuracy and assurance of not being walked-down-plank (wing) that there is a differential yielded by:
(ONE) the fact that the Korean air carrier has some history, at least to some extent, of over reliance on authoritarian hierarchy on flight decks and when coupled with Airbus glass cockpit over-automation (if that's what it is) this is highly susceptible to CFIT runway-threshold style, and

(TWO) flying at night just changes everything, particularly when there are lighting, approach details, and terrain issues? Don't you sometimes notice the depth perception of your vision making a fine adjustment when you get into your motor vehicle at night after being in a lighted establishment for a while? And a sense of having been disoriented for a short moment but only after some light has hit the retina that reestablishes where you're at? I get that the cognoscenti here may well say but of course this is true, Mr. Obvious. But if it is obvious, then it explains (ed.: does it not??) why looking at UPS is like writing a mystery novel. SFO runway debris - Res Ipsa Loquitor (Latin-law for, The Thing Speaks for Itself, named for a legal doctrine which apocryphally arose when a barrel rolled out a warehouse second-floor window).

The difference is, in the Asiana San Francisco crash was caused by incompetent pilots, from a country, whose educational culture, may have contributed to their incompetence. The UPS Birmingham crash may have been caused, by competent pilots, who made a human error. If you don't think there's a difference, there is no explaining it to you.