WR63:
To put a finer point on it, two rated Captains did not maintain airspeed, apparently from not paying attention to it. It doesn't get more basic than that.

In Birmingham, airspeed appears to have been OK based on info available. Something else went wrong.

As "what" becomes more clear, perhaps valid comparisons can be made between the two events. In SFO, the pilots were alive to share their experiences with NTSB. Not so in this case.

A nice illustration of my earlier post...
 

Speechless I am, Sir !

The difference between a crash caused by a competent crew that made an error and an incompetent crew that made an error finally explained! In remarkably few words! Should there be a vacancy at the head of the Flat Earth Society, you can count on my support :ugh:

Numbers can only approximate intangibles. If you want to know what kind of person Cerea Beal Jr was, read the guest book in his Charlotte Observer obituary. Cerea Beal Jr. Guest Book: sign their guest book, share your condolences, or read their obituary at Charlotte Observer Sure, most people wouldn't think of writing something bad, even if the person was bad, in an obituary guest book, but, that guest book would be pretty much empty. There are plenty of entries from fellow pilots, other colleagues, associates, and friends to paint a very good picture of Cerea Jr. One entry indicates he was a fixed wing pilot (I assume private pilot), while living in Chigago, before he was in the Marine Corps flying Jolly Green Giant CH-53 helicopters, and, at some point, was a fixed wing flight instructor for PPL's.

Agnostique75, Thanks. Brevity is the soul of wit! You can quote me on that, if you like. Although they are both errors, one is all but planned, the other is unexpected. Love the French Riviera, by the way!

Reading those tributes as well as those for his FO Shanda Fanning, it is obvious that not only were they both good people but they both also seemed to be regarded by their peers, as consummate professionals.

I spent the last 20 years of my flying career night-freighting. Despite the unsocial hours, it was bloody good fun when it came to the flying bit of the equation.

There was usually very little traffic at night and ATC were very relaxed. We would get airborne from our hub, check in with Maastricht and be cleared direct to Helsinki or Istanbul.

Going eastbound to somewhere like Hannover or Nurnberg, both of which were advertising the westerly runway on the ATIS, the easterly runway would usually be offered if the winds were light.

This of course was no problem as long as you realised that you were now high on the profile for the new runway and made an IMMEDIATE adjustment so that you could be back on the profile for the new runway by at least 1,500 ft. It has to be said that we knew our airfields well.

So we could just possibly be involved here in a situation where ATC offers a straight-in on to another runway or else the aircraft asked for the same thing.

Suddenly, we are too high (having planned for another runway) but we can hack it. The rate of descent is now higher than it should be for a stabilised approach but the runway is in sight so all is well. Then, the runway lights start to disappear.

Two things can be wrong;

1. The visibility has reduced so that we can't see the lights any more.

2. We are descending at such a rate that the runway lights have gone behind a hill.

I experienced the latter scenario out in the bundu one night in Arabia and luckily survived to tell the tale. I survived.

I suppose what I am trying to say is that only mistakes are made in a hurry.

How do you compare this with AF447? One involved a total lack of professional piloting skill in the face of a known issue while this is somehow much more sinister...

Here we appear to have two competent pilots who either made a very fundamental error or fell victim to an error of some type with either data or AP programming.

Incidentally, I have flown into BHM sitting in the left seat of a DC-10 (but never at night) and I don't recall anything difficult about the airfield.

A friend's observation over six packs...human error? Well if you wish to sugar coat it. Complacency and a case of skygod teflonism perhaps?

The only runway available that night was 18/36.

06/24 was NOTAM'd closed at the time of the accident for maintenance of runway centre line lights. They would have left Louisville 45 mins earlier, expecting to fly south and straight in to RWY18 presumably starting their descent at the appropriate time.

If they had briefed for 06/24 and were offered a straight in to 18, I can see a possible rushed descent but not the other way round.

With the ongoing discussion over the KBHM RWY 18 PAPI approach, I've constructed a profile with exaggerated height. The notes on the graphic probably explain all that is needed.

http://oi44.tinypic.com/2i131v6.jpg
Edit ::-
IMTOY distance to I-BXO LOC/DME is shown as 3.3NM on the AL-50 plate, but in fact is 3.349NM - which is shown correctly here. The PAPI 3.20° G/S equates to a RoD of 800 FPM at 140 KTS GS.

Rubbish. Those guys did the best they could. Throw a 12 year-old into a Formula 1 at max speed at night in the wet and they will make just as big a hash of it as the AF447 guys did.

Without prejudging the UPS accident, the same could well have happened here. A crew trained and checked to the required standard presented with an unusual situation which they could not resolve/cope with. Come to think of it, Asiana 214 was exactly the same thing.

If you flew, you'd know what I was talking about.

Rubbish. Those guys did the best they could. Throw a 12 year-old into a Formula 1 at max speed at night in the wet and they will make just as big a hash of it as the AF447 guys did.

Without prejudging the UPS accident, the same could well have happened here. A crew trained and checked to the required standard presented with an unusual situation which they could not resolve/cope with. Come to think of it, Asiana 214 was exactly the same thing.

If you flew, you'd know what I was talking about.

I have flown and I know exactly what I'm talking about. AF447 was and always will be simple incompetence. The scenario with the unreliable airspeed was a known event and should have been reviewed and briefed as a normal part of training. Had the PF flown pitch and power all would have been fine. Had the PM taken control of the aircraft all would have been fine.

Under no circumstances would a qualified and competent pilot fly higher where the margin of error would be less without reliable data. Beyond that it is impossible for me to comprehend any pilot holding full deflection for literally minutes....even a GA pilot understands that the 1st thing you do is unload the airframe...

Simple truth is the PF was not qualified to sit in the pointy end of a commercial airliner....period.

Well actually, I was just trying to get a better idea of what you meant by "not needed" before answering.

I frequently fly into runways which have no VGSI (Visual Glide Slope Indicator, Could be a VASI, PAPI, PLASI or other) so I would consider a VGSI "not needed" if on a visual approach in good visual conditions in daylight.

That said, if it's there, I'm going to use it, even on a nice clear day, and in fact in the US, if flying a large or turbine aircraft, you are required by regulation to use it and stay on or above it.

Sure, that could be considered as "not needed". Even in that case if the VGSI is visible I'd be referencing it.

Coagle,

There is a book you need to read...like yesterday.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/0754649644/ref=redir_mdp_mobile

Mis-understood. . .
 

It bothers me a little, well, maybe a lot. For those who thought when some said "it could happen to any one of us", I whole heartedly believe they mis-understood. We all know flying is and can be unforgiving. We know the risks involved from the very beginning of our flying careers. We still do it. We all do it for different reasons....I bet we all do it because we just love to fly. Only those who do can explain the feelings. There's plenty of good aviation quotes that I could never match in words. There is always plenty of room for error. Scary, really. Getting buried in the approach plates after this accident for me has be a huge wake up call---"it could happen to any one of us"....we are all susceptible to making mistakes. No one is perfect. That's all. Yes, we are professionals, but not perfect. I'd love to hear from any one here that has had a perfect flight. Two professional pilots died doing what they love...doing what we love. I was in SDF today...as we taxied to rwy 35L, and passed all those UPS jets, several A300s, I got chills. So sorry this happened. I hope this made sense. Just read their memorial pages, may Cerea and Shanda rest in peace.

@PEI

Thanks for the link. At the end of the day, its all to do with the interpretation of "numbers" and how they correlate with your own situational awareness. Stuff up one side of the triangle and either of the other sides will get you.

Exactly what the flight path was that lead them to this situation, can only be guessed at. The "runway in sight" call 4 secs prior to the initial contact, would as you suggest, indicate they were not visual immediately before the call.

Wow! At that price, I'll wait for the paperback to come out:ouch:.

Given mm43's chart. The only theory that reasonably explains the accident is a too early transition to a visual approach. Otherwise, how do you get so far down in the weeds, (assuming that the altimetry was functioning properly).

Even given an early transition to visual, there were some cross checks with the RADALT and altimeter should have been done that would have probably saved the day. Fatigue?

The CVR transcript will be interesting.

This incident impressed me nearly 40 years ago...

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...7%20G-AWNC.pdf

(British Airways B747 hit trees on approach Kuala Lumpur)

Interesting that despite all of the modern aids and devices this kind of thing is still happening.

That may be a bit of an assumption. The Board didn't say that was the first time someone called the runway in sight, nor did they say anything about what was said at minimums. I suspect further analysis of the CVR COULD indicate that the "runway in sight" call was intended to verbalize the reasoning behind not reacting to the EGPWS "Sink Rate" call. It may have been an attempt to clarify that they were now visual and not required (by policy or OPSPEC) to react to the EGPWS as they would in IMC. I'm clearly just speculating, however, it seems the whole group was ASSUMING that the call indicates they had just gone visual, even though this was significantly past the MAP. Just trying to find a way to make sense of the call at that time.

@ capnbloggs

What? Something a student pilot is expected to handle from their first solo - a visual descent to landing in CAVOK and daylight - is an "unusual situation"?

I hold no brief for the ethnic/cultural argument, and know full well that "western" pilots can prang aircraft like anyone else. But let's not get silly in presenting the counter-arguments.

Asiana: visual - daylight - clear weather - over flat terrain (water) - slowed to stick-shaker speed
UPS: instrument - night - clouds - over hills - maintained flying speed

No useful comparison.

----------------------
@ mm64, et al. Thanks for the diagram. I wanted to post something similar, to point out that - among other things - the RA would be bouncing around as they crossed all those hills and hollers on final, and thus an imperfect cross-check.

It's possible (not necessarily probable) that they lost the real PAPI in the hills or scud, and then picked up "false" lights - street lights, house lights, or car lights, on Bethel Ave. or the surrounding hills - and followed those right to their "landing."

@ pipeliner

The reason I didn't plot a position for the "runway in sight" call, was to avoid muddying the waters as to where the aircraft actually was. We know the NTSB released 9 sec time from initial contact until CVR EOR, and that data fitted neatly as plotted.

You are right, it could just have been a procedural call, and nothing should be read into it.

NASA report
 

1999 NASA report on 18 approach.

The approach to runway 18 at bhm is marginally safe at best and is a setup for an accident at worst. Runway 5/23 was closed from XA00Z to XK00Z. As a result, we briefed the localizer runway 18 approach. It was my first officer's leg and neither of us had flown to this runway before. We were both acutely aware of the high terrain to the north of the field and paid particular attention to that fact in our approach briefing. The only depiction of the high terrain is on the airport page. The WX was clear with excellent visibility. Bhm approach cleared us for the visual but we indicated we wanted to intercept the final outside of baskin and fly the final part of the localizer 18 approach. Although not listed on the approach page, there is a PAPI on the left side of runway 18 which has been in use for about 1 yr. We calculated the appropriate vdp based on timing as well as on the ibxo DME. From the vdp it was clear to us that if the field was not in sight at the 1300 ft altitude at the ibxo 3.3 DME, it would not be possible to complete the approach safely. The PAPI was visible from the 3.3 DME and we began a 700 FPM descent when on GS. The first officer and I were both bothered by the close visual proximity of the ground while on the final stages of the approach. At about 1 mi from touchdown, a car passed under us on an east/west road. It was between 100 ft and 80 ftAGL. I again verified visually that we were on the PAPI glide path and that the glide path was visually correct with the runway visual presentation. It was clear that we were correct and the radio altimeter then began to show the ground dropping away a bit. We passed over the threshold at 50 ft AGL having been centered on the glide path the entire time. By use of the ft scale and the graphic presentation on the airport page, I believe the radio altimeter was accurate and that we were on or even slightly above the glide path when we had the 80-100 ft reading. How high are the trees on that hill? Although the approach and landing were uneventful, the following problems are presented: 1) there is no note about the extremely close proximity to high terrain when on this approach. The mandatory airport review page does not address runway 18 or runway 36. 2) there is no PAPI depicted in commercial chart despite having been in service for about 1 yr according to the bhm tower. 3) using a 3 degree GS and an aim point 1000 ft down runway 18, the 884 ft terrain 4000 ft north of the field calculates to a ht above ground of less than 100 ft. Trees are of course not included in this calculation. 4) runway 18 slopes down to the south and complicates the landing. A 7100 ft runway means a 6100 ft area to stop in and the downslope tends to have the effect of falling away from an aircraft in the flare. Unless you fly it on to the runway fairly aggressively, the distance could be even less. 5) NOTAM 11/023 reports runway 18 is ungrooved from 1550 to 2490. NOTAM 11/024 reports runway 36 is ungrooved from 4610-5550 ft. This obviously would have an affect on stopping under most instrument conditions, ie, a wet runway. I respectfully submit the following recommendation: discontinue use of runway 18 for company operations due to the high terrain present under the normal glide path. This is a dangerous approach so prohibit it. If the use of runway 18 is not prohibited, then I make the following recommendations: 1) include a picture of the runway 18 and runway 36 approachs on the mandatory airport review pages. 2) include specific notes on the operations pages about the high terrain to the north giving radio altimeter readings of 80-100 ft, 1 mi north of the field. 3) restrict use of runway 18 to day VFR conditions only and require the localizer runway 18 approach be flown. 4) update the bhm page forthwith to show the PAPI for runway 18. To be blunt, I will not fly to this runway in the WX or to a wet runway. If it is the only runway open in those conditions I will divert. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter states that he has followed up with company, and they have issued a prohibition against using runways 18/36 except during day VFR conditions. He also stated that he did not see the rotating beacon on the hill approximately 1 mi from the runway. The GPWS indication did not show any red during the approach, but varied from green to amber. The first officer was flying the approach and the captain monitored the descent. He said that they did not exceed about 700 FPM rate throughout the final approach, and that after landing, both pilots debriefed their impressions to each other. They felt that they had taken prudent precautions, but that this approach was hazardous.

Pattern is full, you can bang on all you like about what student pilots can/could do. The fact of the matter is that all of these pilots were rated as competent by their authorities and companies. All were at the controls when aircraft crashed. To a large extent, IMO AF447 and Asiana were "set up" by their employers. Do you really think they crashed due to a devil-may-care, deliberate breaking-of-the-rules attitude? Do you really think that if they had had more exposure (looks to me like Asiana had virtually none) to their respective problems in the SIM or on the line they'd still have crashed? Probably not. It remains to be seen whether the UPS pilots were in the same boat.

At some point in complex operations, you simply can't just "blame the crew".

The OLD Dive&Drive is safer than continuous descent.

I realize you are probably just trolling but if not please enlighten us as to how dive and drive is safer.


And while you're at it, explain why no major Airline still uses that technique.


We used to do d & v back in my 727 days and it was dodgy then,
In my modern Boeing we do a constant rate descent LNAV / VNAV
to a DDA on a non precision approach and there's no comparison.


It is 100% safer.

roulishollandais thinks...

Perhaps in a 1 ton PA28 or C182. We only had dual Navs and NDBs. when flying the old B737-100/200 and 727. We didn't have the advantage of GPS with 20 meter accuracy. We had to acquire ground contact with immediate effect, however with safety in mind being first. Today, with modern technology, I'll take a CDA to the DDA as my first option. Safety comes first.

Not sure why you think it's safer to do the CD approach, maybe you are a wide body driver, I always liked the dive and drive because you're at the MDA for a while, easy to do in light twins, deck angle not to severe.

That Nasa report
 

The NASA Report is absolutely clear about runway 18. It says:" I respectfully submit the following recommendation: discontinue use of runway 18 for company operations due to the high terrain present under the normal glide path. This is a dangerous approach so prohibit it."

mm landing profile
 

Very interesting profile. I made one (not nearly as clear) for myself and came to the same conclusions.

I used the latest USGS map (2003 elevation database) with the following altitude curves:
Mrs Benson house: 780 ft
Top of the hill: 800-820 ft
Threshold: 645 ft
Papi: 640 ft

Assuming a 75 to 100 ft. tall pine tree (850 to 880 ft alt) at Mrs Benson house (on Google street view, there is a tall one there, much taller than the utility pole), pilots could not possibly see REILs (hidden by the 820ft hill), they may barely have spotted a red PAPI, definitively not a pink one.

If you have seen what I have seen in simulator sessions then believe me you would treat what you have said in the highlighted paragraph above, with a fair amount of skepticism. Certified competent means nothing apart from an administrative entry into a pilots log book.

Dream Land asks...

As close to a stabilized approach one can be as if conducting a Precision Approach.

Dreamland, dive n drive works ok in light aircraft, but it usually requires a change in aircraft trajectory and energy which is undesirable at low altitudes in heavy aircraft

Yep, fully understand. :ok:

Continuous Descent Table
 

The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents
 

Machinbird [commenting on the price of $118.70 at www.amazon.com]
Wow! At that price, I'll wait for the paperback to come out

The paperback is out, and amazon quote $35.35
Amazon.com: The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents (9780754649656): R. Key Dismukes, Benjamin A. Berman, Loukia D. Loukopoulos: Books

As usual, you may find a better price at BookFinder.com: New & Used Books, Textbooks, Rare Books & Out-of-Print Books

Regards, Peter

Continuous Descent/Constant Angle vs Dive & Drive
 

Hey RoulisHollandais, you've been doing too many Dutch rolls! :hmm:

There's been lots of research that's pretty well proved that Constant Angle/Constant Descent Final Approaches (NPAs) are far safer than Dive & Drive for a whole bunch of reasons. In addition to the performance issues raised previously by others, note that following Distance/Altitude guidance checklists on charts - whether flying AP+(advisory)VNAV or especially if flying manually (with or without FD) - helps assure situational awareness - particularly for GPS procedures.

For those who don't have access to the FSF ALAR toolkits, check out the same material for free on SKYbrary - Flight Safety Foundation ALAR Toolkit, and ref ALAR Briefing Note 7.2 CANPA (http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/811.pdf)

The Limits of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents
 

Kindle version only $28

MM43 http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/5...ml#post8003816 a very useful diagram.

From an NTSB briefing on the CVR: "Thirteen seconds to the end, one crew member reported the runway was in sight."

If you were to extend the flight path back where the 'runway in sight' call would have been made from - that's adding under half as much of that dotted flight path, how would the runway have been 'in sight'? Certainly not the touchdown end, PAPIs and approach lights they would be hidden by the crest of the hill.

Would you agree it is looking more like the crew suffered a visual illusion pf some sort?