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Good arguments for modifying procedures from operating manual

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Good arguments for modifying procedures from operating manual

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Old 31st May 2018, 06:46
  #21 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by stilton
I must be missing something
how did you start an engine with the fuel off ?


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Stilton,
I don't think Megan has much experience in the field.

Re. the BA B747 mentioned that continued to UK on three, the crew might have offended the sensibilities of armchair critics, but the crew committed no breaches of operating regulations, everything the Captain did was within his command prerogatives.

Under the same circumstances I would have done the same thing, I have done something very similar on the same type.

As to VH-OJH, QF 1 at Bangkok, that was a screw-up by the Captain, the reports covered many dead trees, mostly written by people of limited or no actual experience, but the underlying cause had nothing to do with an "unapproved procedure" , because that implies he followed a formal "procedure", to the end of his days, that pilot will never be able to explain, even to himself, the "why" of what happened. I knew him well, "uncharacteristic action " doesn't even come close.

Tootle pip!!
As for the "engine starting?

PS: Operating procedures and checklists are part of the aircraft certification, and all major manufacturers have procedures for customers to request changes. If such requested changes are accepted by the Type Certificate holder and relevant certifying authority (FAA etc) this ensures that the C.of A remains valid. To operate an aircraft in violation of the terms of the C.of A. brings with it all sorts of legal complications -- as well as operational pitfalls.
I am amazed at how little this is understood, particularly by personnel of aviation safety authorities of some smaller countries, who believe that they have the "authority" to dictate changes at their whim.

Last edited by LeadSled; 31st May 2018 at 07:00. Reason: PS added.
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Old 31st May 2018, 08:40
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LeadSled: A bit harsh on Megan!

The BA 747 "fly-on on 3" was certainly conducted well within the BA SOPs - HOWEVER - the fuel balancing procedure derived by BA never envisaged the situation where using the Override/Jettison Pumps for fuel balancing would not work once the tank fuel levels got down to the Standpipe levels! The crew then showed a stunning level of ignorance of the fuel system and failed to fuel balance correctly ( like on any other aircraft) thereby allowing the aircraft to land, off diversion, with very, very low fuel quantity in one of the tanks. BA has "history" with regard to modifying it's own SOPs away from the manufactures. (personel experience here )
With regard to the QF1 incident - had the captain been checking another crew who did what he did , then I suspect his debrief would have been most robust! As an aside the captain had, only a short time before, been delivering a talk to CX about CRM procedures at QF!!!! That incident should be a classic example of "things that should not be done in an aircraft".

Last edited by Meikleour; 31st May 2018 at 08:40. Reason: spelling
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Old 31st May 2018, 08:40
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Were the procedures written with 10 interruptions by cabin crew, handling agents or ATC?
Surely the problem of interruptions is a reason for following the checklist exactly - otherwise you may think you have already done something and, in fact, had not. Why did the Helios crew not notice the pressurisation switch was in the wrong position - had they been interrupted during the check-list?
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 05:46
  #24 (permalink)  
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I liked the Boeing system of splitting a checklist with a line and it was then possible to complete certain checklists, "Down to the line", where they were held until it was appropriate to continue.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 07:08
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Originally Posted by Meikleour
LeadSled: A bit harsh on Megan!

The BA 747 "fly-on on 3" was certainly conducted well within the BA SOPs - HOWEVER - the fuel balancing procedure derived by BA never envisaged the situation where using the Override/Jettison Pumps for fuel balancing would not work once the tank fuel levels got down to the Standpipe levels! The crew then showed a stunning level of ignorance of the fuel system and failed to fuel balance correctly ( like on any other aircraft) thereby allowing the aircraft to land, off diversion, with very, very low fuel quantity in one of the tanks. BA has "history" with regard to modifying it's own SOPs away from the manufactures. (personel experience here )
With regard to the QF1 incident - had the captain been checking another crew who did what he did , then I suspect his debrief would have been most robust! As an aside the captain had, only a short time before, been delivering a talk to CX about CRM procedures at QF!!!! That incident should be a classic example of "things that should not be done in an aircraft".
In broad terms I agree with your comments. Sorry, Megan.
Re. BA, many moons ago, a chap from Boeing (who was one of the best aeroplane handlers I have ever seen) made the interesting comment: " We have 199 customers for the B707, 198 do it our way, then there is BEA".
QF had a three engine diversion years ago, where not quite enough understanding of the fuel system resulted in a "very interesting" situation, but they finally got on the ground in one piece. In this case, the "expertise" of an E/O was a big part of the problem.
"Committees", whether in the office or the flightdeck, can have some very unfortunate outcomes, give me one person who really knows, versus a room full of "opinions" any day.
Tootle pip!!
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 07:57
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I liked the Boeing system of splitting a checklist with a line and it was then possible to complete certain checklists, "Down to the line", where they were held until it was appropriate to continue
Agree entirely. But Boeing for some unknown reason (to we pilots) changed the former split landing checklist in the 737 and certainly not for the better. It used to be Gear down, Flap 15 and landing checklist to flaps. This was done on the downwind leg of a circuit or at some appropriate time during an approach. On selection of landing flap the PF called "Flap 30 etc and "complete the Landing checklist". Boeing in their infinite wisdom decided to change a policy that had served well since the first 737-100 came out of the factory. Now the situation exists where the whole landing checklist is now called for once final flap is down. So that has led to a rushed checklist requiring several challenge and responses just as the PF is concentrating on flying the aircraft on late base or final while still responding to the landing checklist.
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In turn, at least one Australian 737 operator has adopted this new Boeing policy where the final flap is lowered late downwind and certainly before turning base if a visual circuit. There is a significant increase in thrust required to hold VREF +5 in level flight, just so that the landing checklist is completed early. Reason being with accent on use of full automation, some pilots lack the manual flying skills to stabilise on final even though weather CAVOK. Subsequent QAR pinged pilots for not being stable by 500 feet on final. Wonderful. So the powers that be reduced the number of pings by dirtying up a lot earlier and stuff the extra fuel consumption as the aircraft speed could be as low as 130 knots (Vref40+5) downwind will landing flap down. A bird strike in that configuration (low speed land flap selected) in level flight would require quick thinking by the PF to maintain a safe speed. All IMHO.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 08:18
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Never think in isolation. There are others also doing it. How do they do it? Get back to manufacturer. As one aviation cliche says in aviation if you have to learn everything through your own mistakes you probably won't live that long enough. A320 Cockpit preparation takes 5 to 7 minutes, the longest part is the briefing. Interuptions can definitely be put on hold or staggered between the preparations. The CL itself doesn't take much time to complet it should be done without interruption.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 08:25
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Centaurus,
In part, Boeing is probably falling into line with a general FAA "recommendation" that, for all visual circuits, all checks should be completed downwind.
This goes back quite a while now, and as you know, FAA has seriously frowned upon visual circling segments of a non-precision approaches for a long time, imposing MDAs generally 1000" AGL or above for most Part 121 operations of large aircraft, regardless of TERPS or Doc 8168 calculated MDA.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 09:06
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When the inbound airplane is late, or it's about to rain etc, it's quite common to see a pilot go down the jet bridge and do the walkaround before stepping onto the plane. SOP? No. Sensible and safe? Yes
If you go directly for a walk around in A320 with parking brakes off as normally they would be how do you check the brake wear? Or it is left to maintainance?
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 09:16
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vilas: brake wear - simple - just look at the length of "clean" area on the brake wear pins!
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 09:19
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According to checklist it requires parking brake on or is your procedure ammended?
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 09:24
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We did the test once. I was in the cockpit on the phone with my colleague standing next to the brakes and he could not notice any difference on the wear pin while I was setting the parking on and off. Unless he was not checking properly, I don’t undestand why the FCOM wants us to set the brakes in order to check the brake wear since the wear pin is visible anyway.

Last edited by pineteam; 1st Jun 2018 at 09:29. Reason: Typo.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 09:41
  #33 (permalink)  
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There is two sets of manuals, the regulatory one being the approved flight manual (AFM), and the suggested procedures these being in a pilot operating handbook or Fcom.

The AFM is a much smaller document be it for a Boeing or a Cessna that cannot be varied..

Pilot operating handbooks or FCOM contain generic techniques which expand on the AFM can and should be modified when local situations deem it necessary without modifying the core AFM requirements which are a subset.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 10:12
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- To ensure that main aircraft surfaces are in adequate position relative to surface control levers.
‐ To check that there are no leaks e.g. engine drain mast, hydraulic lines.
‐ To check the status of the essential visible sensors i.e. AOA, pitot and static probes.
‐ To observe any possible abnormalities on the landing gear status:
• Wheels and tires status (cut, wear, cracks)
• Safety pins are removed
• Brakes status (Brake wear pin length with parking brake ON)
This is from FCTM. If you directly go out you cannot perform the first and the last check correctly. If that's accepted by your airline then it's OK not if it's an opinion of an individual.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 11:05
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vilas:You are choosing dogma over practicality. These pins are only there to give a measure of how much brake pad thickness remains. With anything other than brand new brakes this is obvious to see. So, using your arguement what happens to the everyday operations with an airline that chooses to routinely set the park brake off on all turnarounds? Your logic would have the flightcrews having to wait until just before engine start (see checklist - brakes ON ) to then rush out and check the brake wear because now the brakes are set to PARK! From your previous postings you seem to be very involved in simulator training - do you get any line flying these days?
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 11:05
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Pineteam
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9th Nov 2010, 12:03
Hello mayday.call,
All A/C brakes (AIB and Boeing) should be checked with hydraulic pressure applied and the parking brake set or by somebody on the pedals.
I say , by somebody on the pedals just in case that the brake accumulator is not well charged ...
The "length" of the pins , in fact , the measurement will also depends on the brakes temperature ...
They should be checked when the brakes are cold ...
Usually , the brake should be changed when the pin is flushed to the retaining bracket ... some airlines get a company policy where they changed them before to save some money ...
Look carefully to these pins , it is not really an accurate measurement ...
Hope that clarifies.
Somebody a long time ago has already answered your doubt why parking brake should be on.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 11:25
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Meikleur
All along what I am trying to say is that procedures are not to be changed by individuals. It is not about little this or that. It sets up a culture, a psychology that deviations are OK and then it doesn't stop there. It portrudes into everything. If what you say is correct then the the airline should incorporate that in the OM. Any change requires an effort to find out the pros and cons and careful thought. Afterall when an incident happenes pilot is answerable so he should alone not bear the burden of on time performance. Shortcuts can go horribly wrong. A year back in a hurry without taking clearence pilot released brakes and applied power sucking the technician in the engine. It was horrendous to see even the photograph. What I do is not important but evaluate what I am saying.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 12:30
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Never flown the Airbus so can’t comment on them, however every Boeing that I’ve ever flown has something similar to this in the FCOM Normal Procedures Introduction:

”Normal procedures are done by memory and scan flow. The panel illustration in
this section shows the scan flow. The scan flow sequence may be changed as
needed.”

Says it it all really.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 12:34
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vilas: I hear what you are saying however rigid blind adherence to SOPs may or may not ensure we are safe! Just look at how often the manufactures change their SOPs due to operational experience! ( Airbus are particularly bad for this IMHO ) All I was pointing out was that the brake wear pins are simply a device to assess brake pad wear and that it is actually possible to determine that from the markings left by the pins during normal operations. For the avoidance of doubt, I am not suggesting that the brake wear be not examined just that sometimes SOPs may be impractical.
I suspect we may not see "eye to eye" on this matter! It is difficult to see how safety critical it may be to know that one has 10 landings left on a brake unit versus 100 left. One commonly sees widely different wear states on brake units due to partial replacements of individual units.
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Old 1st Jun 2018, 13:27
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We have what we term “flows.” A flow is the recommended method for accomplishing a procedure. For example the FO has a flow to accomplish his preflight procedure. The flow is the most efficient method to accomplish the procedure however the flow order is suggested.

Am I going to hammer the FO for not following the flow - no. If we, however, get to a checklist item, (ie altimeter setting) and his setting is incorrect that tells me that his flow is incomplete and then we will discuss why the flows are the most effecient and effective method for ensuring that a procedure is properly completed.

Do we have SOP I disagree with, of course. Have I tried to change that SOP, of course. Have I been successful, very, very rarely. Do I comply with company SOP to the best of my ability on every flight, of course. There are a hell of a lot of people smarter than me telling me this is the way we should do it, and there are to many smoking holes world wide because some pilots think they are smarter than all those people.

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