Hand flying in todays jet transports
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a/c has a simple problem that downgrades it to manual control. Perhaps there is even a slight fight control problem, flap or thrust problem. All controllable, or should be by a competent pilot, but they crash.
Investigation deems it to be pilot error, yet the host airline forbids/discourages daily manual flying & approaches.
Is it simply pilot error or has airline Flt OPs got some blame in this?
Remember the (AA?) Airbus out of JFK where, in a wake turbulence encounter, the PF ripped the rudder off. Pilot error, indeed, but it was traced back to the host training dept. PF did what he had been taught. In another case PF ends up in a scenario where their manual flying skills are not up to the task and crash. However, in other airlines, where the pilots are encouraged to keep sharp, the crash might/probably would have been avoided. So where does the blame truly lie?
Investigation deems it to be pilot error, yet the host airline forbids/discourages daily manual flying & approaches.
Is it simply pilot error or has airline Flt OPs got some blame in this?
Remember the (AA?) Airbus out of JFK where, in a wake turbulence encounter, the PF ripped the rudder off. Pilot error, indeed, but it was traced back to the host training dept. PF did what he had been taught. In another case PF ends up in a scenario where their manual flying skills are not up to the task and crash. However, in other airlines, where the pilots are encouraged to keep sharp, the crash might/probably would have been avoided. So where does the blame truly lie?
Last edited by RAT 5; 25th Mar 2018 at 10:57.
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No bad soldiers!
The decline in manual flying skills lies firmly at the feet of senior managers in airlines who discourage and sometimes prohibit line pilots practicing what is a perishable skill.
To put it bluntly there are no bad soldiers, just bad officers.
To put it bluntly there are no bad soldiers, just bad officers.
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Manual flight practise in a sim every 3 - 6 months is not going to sufficiently prepare for dark night, strange airfield, bad weather and abnormal procedures in the real thing. Sure, autoflight is normally the preferred option if possible, but I believe it is clear to ppruners that some on-line hand flying operation is needed to prepare for the case where there is no other choice.
Captains who are permitted to allow hand flying can give F/O more than 50% PF time, due most are busting to improve their experience. The trade off for this consideration would be their grateful acceptance of some appropriate hand flying. Lost count of my different F/Os but can sure remember that there was only one who didn't think this was a great deal.
Captains who are permitted to allow hand flying can give F/O more than 50% PF time, due most are busting to improve their experience. The trade off for this consideration would be their grateful acceptance of some appropriate hand flying. Lost count of my different F/Os but can sure remember that there was only one who didn't think this was a great deal.
a/c has a simple problem that downgrades it to manual control. Perhaps there is even a slight fight control problem, flap or thrust problem. All controllable, or should be by a competent pilot, but they crash.
Investigation deems it to be pilot error, yet the host airline forbids/discourages daily manual flying & approaches.
Is it simply pilot error or has airline Flt OPs got some blame in this?
Remember the (AA?) Airbus out of JFK where, in a wake turbulence encounter, the PF ripped the rudder off. Pilot error, indeed, but it was traced back to the host training dept. PF did what he had been taught. In another case PF ends up in a scenario where their manual flying skills are not up to the task and crash. However, in other airlines, where the pilots are encouraged to keep sharp, the crash might/probably would have been avoided. So where does the blame truly lie?
Investigation deems it to be pilot error, yet the host airline forbids/discourages daily manual flying & approaches.
Is it simply pilot error or has airline Flt OPs got some blame in this?
Remember the (AA?) Airbus out of JFK where, in a wake turbulence encounter, the PF ripped the rudder off. Pilot error, indeed, but it was traced back to the host training dept. PF did what he had been taught. In another case PF ends up in a scenario where their manual flying skills are not up to the task and crash. However, in other airlines, where the pilots are encouraged to keep sharp, the crash might/probably would have been avoided. So where does the blame truly lie?
GF
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He was a civilian pilot who had been hired by AA at age 24. He'd flown Shorts 360's. Beech 99s and Twin Otters.
Well, then I’m wrong, somehow he was known by a friend who flew BUFFs and I thought they were in the same unit. Then, AA Training might “own” it.
GF
GF
“not so much rudder” in simple maneuvers like turn to final.
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I had a similar problem. I come from a background of mostly teaching in taildraggers with significant adverse yaw. Then I flew a King Air a while, with yaw damp and where the pedals moved with the yaw damp (they were hard-linked to the rudder). So in turbulence I could feel them moving under my feet, and what I thought the rudder should be doing, was in nice sync with what it was doing, whether it was commanded by me or by the yaw damp.
Fast forward to the CRJ, where the pedals don't move with the yaw damp so the feedback loop to my brain was broken. So in turbulence, my brain instinctively wanted to make all these inputs, and was not satisfied (like it was in the King Air) that they were happening. So my feet made them happen. Of course the yaw damp was also making them happen (and of course not at the exact same time), so the sum total was a big sloppy mess.
So the training captain told me to put my feet on the floor. This was an insult to my sensibilities, but I did it and it worked. And up to that point I had thought "feet on the floor" was only an expression for us true stick & rudder pilots to sneer at!
Fast forward to the CRJ, where the pedals don't move with the yaw damp so the feedback loop to my brain was broken. So in turbulence, my brain instinctively wanted to make all these inputs, and was not satisfied (like it was in the King Air) that they were happening. So my feet made them happen. Of course the yaw damp was also making them happen (and of course not at the exact same time), so the sum total was a big sloppy mess.
So the training captain told me to put my feet on the floor. This was an insult to my sensibilities, but I did it and it worked. And up to that point I had thought "feet on the floor" was only an expression for us true stick & rudder pilots to sneer at!
Last edited by Vessbot; 26th Mar 2018 at 19:14.
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This thread is drifting slightly, into nostalgia, but I'll add to it; what the heck. Then we can get back to the real crux of the matter.
Transiting from Navajo to B732. G/A in the jet ended up in rock & roll. Training captain flummoxed. Then he jumped 'in the seat' and realised as I gave it the umph for G/A in went the rudder à la prop induced yaw prevention. I too learnt 'feet on the floor' until we encountered SE G/A's then I was happy.
The other time I taught rudder in B737 was in manual reversion, but gently.
Transiting from Navajo to B732. G/A in the jet ended up in rock & roll. Training captain flummoxed. Then he jumped 'in the seat' and realised as I gave it the umph for G/A in went the rudder à la prop induced yaw prevention. I too learnt 'feet on the floor' until we encountered SE G/A's then I was happy.
The other time I taught rudder in B737 was in manual reversion, but gently.
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a/c has a simple problem that downgrades it to manual control. Perhaps there is even a slight fight control problem, flap or thrust problem. All controllable, or should be by a competent pilot, but they crash.
Investigation deems it to be pilot error, yet the host airline forbids/discourages daily manual flying & approaches.
Is it simply pilot error or has airline Flt OPs got some blame in this?
Remember the (AA?) Airbus out of JFK where, in a wake turbulence encounter, the PF ripped the rudder off. Pilot error, indeed, but it was traced back to the host training dept. PF did what he had been taught. In another case PF ends up in a scenario where their manual flying skills are not up to the task and crash. However, in other airlines, where the pilots are encouraged to keep sharp, the crash might/probably would have been avoided. So where does the blame truly lie?
Investigation deems it to be pilot error, yet the host airline forbids/discourages daily manual flying & approaches.
Is it simply pilot error or has airline Flt OPs got some blame in this?
Remember the (AA?) Airbus out of JFK where, in a wake turbulence encounter, the PF ripped the rudder off. Pilot error, indeed, but it was traced back to the host training dept. PF did what he had been taught. In another case PF ends up in a scenario where their manual flying skills are not up to the task and crash. However, in other airlines, where the pilots are encouraged to keep sharp, the crash might/probably would have been avoided. So where does the blame truly lie?
AA has very relaxed use of automation demands.
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The AAMP training videos are on YouTube. They don’t teach the rudder use the way you’re stating they did.
I thought I was reiterating what was said on Air Crash Investigation. If I am in error I apologise and stand corrected. I have not read the NTSB report, but I thought they had an input into ACI.
I thought I was reiterating what was said on Air Crash Investigation. If I am in error I apologise and stand corrected. I have not read the NTSB report, but I thought they had an input into ACI.
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The AAMP training videos are on YouTube. They don’t teach the rudder use the way you’re stating they did.
I thought I was reiterating what was said on Air Crash Investigation. If I am in error I apologise and stand corrected. I have not read the NTSB report, but I thought they had an input into ACI.
I thought I was reiterating what was said on Air Crash Investigation. If I am in error I apologise and stand corrected. I have not read the NTSB report, but I thought they had an input into ACI.
Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.211
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What does “and elements of the AAMP program” mean?
The video never recommends, nor taught, to do alternating rudder inputs or to use rudders for roll control in normal flight conditions. Start watching the video at the 35:00 mark.
And then compare the flight conditions AA587 was at - normal pitch, normal bank, normal AOA, normal speed. The accident had nothing to do with high AOA, or an ability to roll, or a requirement for improved roll performance to recover the aircraft.
The training program didn’t teach what Rat5 posted.
This article does a good job reviewing the NTSB’s report. The simulator program didn’t teach rudder inputs inappropriately rather it over-exaggerated the impact of wake turbulence - (from the ainonline article) - “The NTSB said that American Airlines’ Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program (AAMP) contributed to the accident by providing an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence on heavy transport-category aircraft.” The simulator program would take the aircraft to a high pitch altitude with very large bank angles. The NTSB animation shows that the impact on AA 587 from the preceding 747 wasn’t anything like the postion the simulator would out the aircraft in.
https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-n...-spreads-blame
The video never recommends, nor taught, to do alternating rudder inputs or to use rudders for roll control in normal flight conditions. Start watching the video at the 35:00 mark.
And then compare the flight conditions AA587 was at - normal pitch, normal bank, normal AOA, normal speed. The accident had nothing to do with high AOA, or an ability to roll, or a requirement for improved roll performance to recover the aircraft.
The training program didn’t teach what Rat5 posted.
This article does a good job reviewing the NTSB’s report. The simulator program didn’t teach rudder inputs inappropriately rather it over-exaggerated the impact of wake turbulence - (from the ainonline article) - “The NTSB said that American Airlines’ Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program (AAMP) contributed to the accident by providing an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence on heavy transport-category aircraft.” The simulator program would take the aircraft to a high pitch altitude with very large bank angles. The NTSB animation shows that the impact on AA 587 from the preceding 747 wasn’t anything like the postion the simulator would out the aircraft in.
https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-n...-spreads-blame
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Gentlemen: To clarify. I had not seen these videos until now, and very interesting they are; also the 'ainonline' link. I refer to the conclusions of ACI and the NTSB inputs. As I understand it, PF made full left/right rudder inputs to try and 'recover' the a/c during wake turbulence upsets. Was that necessary? I doubt it as I'm sure aileron would have been sufficient. In the ACI program it inferred that the use of rudder in this way was part of the AA training program and that after this crash their training program had been adjusted.
If this is the training video they referred to I'm surprised at the connection, because I agree it never says what was inferred. Equally, the training program continued with extensive simulator scenarios. I'm sure the instructor would not have allowed full left/right rudder technique to have been used.
Thus it might be considered that this was an individuals misunderstanding, and to blame an in-house training program for him using that technique might be overly severe. Yet that is what ACI/NTSB seemed to imply.
Don't shoot the messenger, but this video information does cause some reassessment of the message.
One could think they NTSB was too harsh. In the video the only mention of rudder was coordinated delicate use in a nose high scenario to help lower the nose towards the horizon in a coordinated rolling escape. In a nose low, bank in excess of 90, it was full rudder to help keep the nose up during roll towards the horizon, and then only until the bank reduced passing 60. The wake turbulence did not create either of these scenarios.
Curious as to how the finger wagging ended up targeting this training program, unless there are other videos specifically to low speed wake turbulence encounters. But as 'misd-agin' says,
"And then compare the flight conditions AA587 was at - normal pitch, normal bank, normal AOA, normal speed. The accident had nothing to do with high AOA, or an ability to roll, or a requirement for improved roll performance to recover the aircraft.
The training program didn’t teach what Rat5 posted."
and I agree with you. What was the response of AA to the report? It was suggested that the training program was adjusted. Is that true?
If this is the training video they referred to I'm surprised at the connection, because I agree it never says what was inferred. Equally, the training program continued with extensive simulator scenarios. I'm sure the instructor would not have allowed full left/right rudder technique to have been used.
Thus it might be considered that this was an individuals misunderstanding, and to blame an in-house training program for him using that technique might be overly severe. Yet that is what ACI/NTSB seemed to imply.
Don't shoot the messenger, but this video information does cause some reassessment of the message.
One could think they NTSB was too harsh. In the video the only mention of rudder was coordinated delicate use in a nose high scenario to help lower the nose towards the horizon in a coordinated rolling escape. In a nose low, bank in excess of 90, it was full rudder to help keep the nose up during roll towards the horizon, and then only until the bank reduced passing 60. The wake turbulence did not create either of these scenarios.
Curious as to how the finger wagging ended up targeting this training program, unless there are other videos specifically to low speed wake turbulence encounters. But as 'misd-agin' says,
"And then compare the flight conditions AA587 was at - normal pitch, normal bank, normal AOA, normal speed. The accident had nothing to do with high AOA, or an ability to roll, or a requirement for improved roll performance to recover the aircraft.
The training program didn’t teach what Rat5 posted."
and I agree with you. What was the response of AA to the report? It was suggested that the training program was adjusted. Is that true?
Factual report?
IIRC the investigation data was based on rudder position and there was some doubt as to whether it was pilot error and not a software problem. Having put out a May day with a similar, albeit analogue,problem on a heavy where we had zero feedback through the pedals and knowing several instances where systems do not always do what it says on the box I would hesitate to believe the official report. I would add that I have yet to meet a pilot,even glider pilot who leads with rudder, especially relevant as some of the gliders I have instructed on needed full rudder to compensate aileron drag with 1/3 stick displacement.
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The reconstruction video: