Automation dependency stripped of political correctness.
Mansfield, 1201, re HF 
A single minded approach to remove the human from the flight deck achieves little; it’s unlikely to happen in the near term and may never be proven to be cost effective (as in safety). See #92 “Rather, accidents occur when combinations of breakdowns happen across human and engineering systems, often in the presence of threats posed by the external environment.”
I had difficulty with the second part of #93, but if it is like “Logic and repairing mistakes” then I agree; it’s nice to get out of the ‘office’ to find analogies of professionalism, experience, ... airmanship; as a master craftsman.
Also, an often overlooked essential skill Critical Thinking; in flying and debate.
Using ROW/ROPS as an example of a technical improvement (#94) might not be as good as the ‘maker’s label’; see EASA’s mauling in their ‘selected’ comments and responses to the proposed regulatory amendment (http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/d...%202013-09.pdf).
ROPS is a good idea, but as with most automation, a poor input can result in poor output (cf accuracy of runway braking action, proactive / reactive systems) – potentially an induced hazard of automation.
A single minded approach to remove the human from the flight deck achieves little; it’s unlikely to happen in the near term and may never be proven to be cost effective (as in safety). See #92 “Rather, accidents occur when combinations of breakdowns happen across human and engineering systems, often in the presence of threats posed by the external environment.”
I had difficulty with the second part of #93, but if it is like “Logic and repairing mistakes” then I agree; it’s nice to get out of the ‘office’ to find analogies of professionalism, experience, ... airmanship; as a master craftsman.
Also, an often overlooked essential skill Critical Thinking; in flying and debate.
Using ROW/ROPS as an example of a technical improvement (#94) might not be as good as the ‘maker’s label’; see EASA’s mauling in their ‘selected’ comments and responses to the proposed regulatory amendment (http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/d...%202013-09.pdf).
ROPS is a good idea, but as with most automation, a poor input can result in poor output (cf accuracy of runway braking action, proactive / reactive systems) – potentially an induced hazard of automation.
Tourist; your posts are starting to verge on trolling. I don't know what your motivation for this is, but you have called me ignorant - twice - and you have started using thinly disguised swear words in your posts.
I don't know why you are doing this or why you have such a hard-on for me? My posts reflect my personal technical and practical experience, and knowledge. I was an electronics engineer for 16 years. I fault-found analogue and digital systems and circuits using oscilloscopes, data loggers, noise measuring equipment, multimeters and other test equipment. I repaired circuits down to component level using soldering irons etc. I designed and built electronic circuits and systems. My colleagues and I set up microwave links and other radio transmission systems. I also worked solo in France and Italy operating mobile satellite uplink transmitter trucks - (hence my forum name).
I then re-trained as a pilot and am in my 15th year of flying commercial passenger aircraft. I have daily practical experience of using automated flying systems and manual flying in busy airspace.
This does not mean that I know it all - far from it. However, I have some relevant experience, so am hardly "ignorant" in this area.
Kind regards, Uplinker
PS: 'TT' means total time, not time on type. I have flown a total of 10 types and several variants, including piston, turbo-prop and jet; old and new.
I don't know why you are doing this or why you have such a hard-on for me? My posts reflect my personal technical and practical experience, and knowledge. I was an electronics engineer for 16 years. I fault-found analogue and digital systems and circuits using oscilloscopes, data loggers, noise measuring equipment, multimeters and other test equipment. I repaired circuits down to component level using soldering irons etc. I designed and built electronic circuits and systems. My colleagues and I set up microwave links and other radio transmission systems. I also worked solo in France and Italy operating mobile satellite uplink transmitter trucks - (hence my forum name).
I then re-trained as a pilot and am in my 15th year of flying commercial passenger aircraft. I have daily practical experience of using automated flying systems and manual flying in busy airspace.
This does not mean that I know it all - far from it. However, I have some relevant experience, so am hardly "ignorant" in this area.
Kind regards, Uplinker
PS: 'TT' means total time, not time on type. I have flown a total of 10 types and several variants, including piston, turbo-prop and jet; old and new.
Last edited by Uplinker; 19th Jan 2016 at 10:36.
Plus of course even a cursory knowledge of the Apollo landing would show that the pilot (Aldrin?) nearly screwed it up by being human. He messed with the computer when he should not have according to SOP and caused it buffer overrun failures.
If you had a bit more than cursory knowledge you'd know the program alarms weren't down to Aldrin or Armstrong - the "cycle stealing" that caused the program alarms was actually down to an oversight in the final flight plan/checklists that wasn't caught before flight .. In any event it was Human Beings, not a computer, that saved the descent (e.g. Bales and his support team in Mission Control) and a Human Being who cracked the problem just in time for the ascent ( George Silver at M.I.T. for one.)
Edit to add...anyhow don't take my word for it - https://www.hq.nasa.gov/alsj/a11/a11.1201-fm.html
(apologies for thread drift).
Last edited by wiggy; 19th Jan 2016 at 11:13.
The article linked in the OP, and other views, are based on the official investigation report. But the limitations in scope and reporting of accidents (Annex 13 – factual requirement) might not be suited to identifying safety improvements for an already very safe industry, particularly where accidents more often involve the interactions of many contributing factors.
Formal reports identify ‘what’ happened and to a limited extent ‘why’; the why is increasingly restricted by the variability of human involvement.
An alternative is to consider ‘how’ the accident could have occurred, not to establish any factual clarity, but with reasoned speculation identify contributory (latent) factors in the specific accident and similar events as a basis for proactive safety improvement.
A reactive safety process is guided by the report, but all that might achieve is avoiding the accident which has just occurred. Similarly a speculative approach seeking a single solution can be subject to hindsight bias, as reflected in many discussions with polarised views on the human vs automation.
However, hindsight, without bias of cause or blame could be used for learning, increasing industry’s knowledge of operations and of ourselves, and from this identify areas for improvement.
What could be learnt from this accident; what have we learnt and how – without the biases?
Learning is often based on enquiry or error, where concepts opposed to facts are more valued. We learn from history, we learn from others, and from activities not directly related to the proximity of an event; i.e.
The relative merits of factors, separately and in combination would still be debateable, but at least there might be a greater range of views to consider for implementation.
The choice of implementing ‘concepts’ (if that is possible) would not depend on regulation, or the factual limitations of past events; the choice would be ours, we choose what to learn, what to consider, what might be of value, what if …
From these thoughts we might then be able to turn the hindsight biases of media interpretation and individual views into the much needed foresight to maintain and hopefully improve safety.
Formal reports identify ‘what’ happened and to a limited extent ‘why’; the why is increasingly restricted by the variability of human involvement.
An alternative is to consider ‘how’ the accident could have occurred, not to establish any factual clarity, but with reasoned speculation identify contributory (latent) factors in the specific accident and similar events as a basis for proactive safety improvement.
A reactive safety process is guided by the report, but all that might achieve is avoiding the accident which has just occurred. Similarly a speculative approach seeking a single solution can be subject to hindsight bias, as reflected in many discussions with polarised views on the human vs automation.
However, hindsight, without bias of cause or blame could be used for learning, increasing industry’s knowledge of operations and of ourselves, and from this identify areas for improvement.
What could be learnt from this accident; what have we learnt and how – without the biases?
Learning is often based on enquiry or error, where concepts opposed to facts are more valued. We learn from history, we learn from others, and from activities not directly related to the proximity of an event; i.e.
- The contribution from regulation, the airworthiness process and how humans are viewed - a threat or an asset.
- The contribution of the training process, how are regulations interpreted by operators, implemented and presented to the crew; including formulation of drills and checklists.
- The contribution of behavioural shaping in normal operation, how crews gain experience, assess situations, and make decisions.
The relative merits of factors, separately and in combination would still be debateable, but at least there might be a greater range of views to consider for implementation.
The choice of implementing ‘concepts’ (if that is possible) would not depend on regulation, or the factual limitations of past events; the choice would be ours, we choose what to learn, what to consider, what might be of value, what if …
From these thoughts we might then be able to turn the hindsight biases of media interpretation and individual views into the much needed foresight to maintain and hopefully improve safety.
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"Auto pilot, autopilot, autopilot"
There is a case for going back to basics and reading from an actual accident report the fatal result of automation dependency. The report has been edited for brevity but is still quite terrifying to read. If only Regulators could take the trouble of reading such reports (and there are many), perhaps they would take more seriously the lessons learned from automation dependency and apply those lessons to the operators they are supposed to survey.
It is from Flash Airlines Flight 604 (Boeing 737) that crashed after take off from Sharm El Sheikh airport in January 2004.
............................................................ ....................................
U.S. Summary Comments on Draft Final Report of Aircraft Accident Flash Airlines flight 604, Boeing 737-300, SU-ZCF January 3, 2004, Red Sea near Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. Quote from page 5 of 7:
"Distraction. A few seconds before the captain called for the autopilot to be engaged, the airplane’s pitch began increasing and airspeed began decreasing. These deviations continued during and after the autopilot engagement/disengagement sequence. The captain ultimately allowed the airspeed to decrease to 35 knots below his commanded target airspeed of 220 knots and the climb pitch to reach 22°, which is 10° more than the standard climb pitch of about 12°.
During this time, the captain also allowed the airplane to enter a gradually steepening right bank, which was inconsistent with the flight crew’s departure clearance to perform a climbing left turn. These pitch, airspeed and bank angle deviations indicated that the captain directed his attention away from monitoring the attitude indications during and after the autopilot disengagement process.
Changes in the autoflight system’s mode status offer the best explanation for the captain’s distraction. The following changes occurred in the autoflight system’s mode status shortly before the initiation of the right roll: (1) manual engagement of the autopilot, (2) automatic transition of roll guidance from heading select to control wheel steering-roll (CWS-R), (3) manual disengagement of the autopilot, and (4) manual reengagement of heading select for roll guidance.
The transition to the CWS-R mode occurred in accordance with nominal system operation because the captain was not closely following the flight director guidance at the time of the autopilot engagement. The captain might not have expected the transition, and he might not have understood why it occurred. The captain was probably referring to the mode change from command mode to CWS-R when he stated, “see what the aircraft did?,” shortly after it occurred.
The available evidence indicates that the unexpected mode change and the flight crew’s subsequent focus of attention on reestablishing roll guidance for the autoflight system were the most likely reasons for the captain’s distraction from monitoring the attitude".
............................................................ .......................................
02:32:31 FO: Before start check list completed down to the after start.
02:33:00 ATT: Close two L please
02:33:16 CA: We rely on God, thank God, in the name of God.
02:33:25 ATT: Attention cabin crew doors in armed position and crosscheck
02:33:30 :Sounds for 47 seconds (may be cockpit door, jump seat and unknown ratcheting sounds)
02:34:08 CA: What is this
02:34:09 FO: In the name of God, we rely on God
02:34:11 FO: Duct pressure decrease start valve open
02:34:14 CA: N two
02:34:25 ATT: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning on behalf of Captain Kheder and his crew members welcome you on board Flas Airlines Boeing seven three seven three hundred proceeding to cairo, during our flight to Cairo we shall cover the distance at fifty minutes and altitude twenty seven thousand feet, you are kindly requested to fasten your seat belts and put back of your seats in full up right position, and observe the no smoking sign during all the flight, thank you.
02:39:03 CA: Standard briefing god willing.
02:39:04 FO: before check list is completed down to the line God willing.
02:39:55 CA: To the line
02:40:01 FO: Engine start switches.
02:40:02 CA: On.
02:40:02 FO: Transponder
02:40:04 CA: On.
02:40:05 FO: Before takeoff checklist completed down to strobe lights.
02:40:07 CA: Completed god willing.
02:40:36 CA: Set it on take off ninety and half ...ready for departure.
02:40:38: FO: Flash six zero four ready for departure.
02:40:46 ATC: Flash six zero four surface wind two eight zero one three knots left turn to intercept radial three zero six, cleared for takeoff two two right.
02:40:55 FO: Clear for takeoff runway two two right whith left turn to establisk three zero six Sharm VOR our Flash six zero four clear for takeoff.
02:41:04 FO: God willing.
02:41:09 ATT: Cabin is clear.
02:41:12 CA: Thank you.
02:41:12 FO: Final is clear.
02:41:19 FO: Left turn to establish radial three zero six.
02:41:29 CA: Initially one four zero?
02:41:30 FO: God willing.
02:41:34 CA: Confirm initially one four zero.
02:41:35 FO: And Flash six zero four confirm to the left to establish three zero six.
02:41:40 CA: Initial one four zero.
02:41:43 ATC: God willing.
02:41:44 FO: and initially one four zero.
02:41:46 ATC: God willing.
02:41:48 CA: We rely on God
02:41:59 : Sound similar to increase of engine r.p.m
02:42:00 FO: Stabilized sir N one.
02:42:10 FO: Takeoff power set speed building up, eighty knots, throttle hold.
02:42:11 CA: Eighty knots (one thump sound).
02:42:26 FO: V one, rotate.
02:42:33 : One thump similar to gear retraction.
02:42:33 FO: ** positive rate.
02:42:34 CA: Heading select.
02:42:36 CA: Gear up.
02:42:36 FO: Ok.
02:42:43 CA: Four hundred heading select.
02:42:44 FO: Four hundred heading select sir.
02:42:48 CA: Level change.
02:42:49 FO: Level change, MCP speed, N1 armed sir.
02:42:59 FO: One thousand.
02:43:00 CA: N one speed two twenty flaps one.
02:43:04 CA: Left turn.
02:43:05 ATC: Flash six zero four airborne time four four when you ready to the left to intercept three zero six radial report on course, God willing.
02:43:11 CA: Left turn.
02:43:12 FO: Roger when ready God willing.
02:43:18 FO: Left turn to establish three zero six Sharm VOR.
02:43:22 FO: Speed available.
02:43:23 CA: Flaps up.
02:43:35 FO: Flaps up no light.
02:43:37 CA: After takeoff checklist.
02:43:55 CA: Autopilot.
02:43:58 CA: Not yet.
02:44:00 FO Autopilot in command sir.
02:44:01 CA: Exclamation remark.
02:44:02 : Sound of A/P disengage warning.
02:44:05 CA: Heading select.
02:44:07 FO: Heading select.
02:44:18 CA: See what the aircraft did!
02:44:27 FO: Turning right sir.
02:44:30 CA: What?
02:44:31 FO: Aircraft is turning right.
02:44:32 CA: AH.
02:44:35 CA: Turning right?
02:44:37 CA: How turning right.
02:44:41 CA: Ok come out.
02:44:41 FO: Over bank.
02:44:41 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:43 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:44 FO: Autopilot in command.
02:44:46 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:48 FO Over bank, over bank, over bank.
02:44:50 CA: OK.
02:44:52 FO: Over bank.
02:44:53 CA: OK, come out.
02:44:56 FO: No autopilot commander.
02:44:58 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:58 EC1: Retard power, retard power, retard power.
02:45:01 CA: Retard power.
02:45:02 : Sound similar to overspeed clacker.
02:45:04 CA: Come out.
02:35:05 FO: No god except...
02:35:05 SV: "whoop" sound similar to ground proximity warning
02:45:06 END OF RECORDING.
............................................................ ...................................................
Note the frantic cries of the captain of "Autopilot -Autopilot - Autopilot" as he attempts to recover from an unusual attitude of his own making. Just under three minutes since gear up to crash. If that is not automation dependency at its worst, I don't know what is...
It is from Flash Airlines Flight 604 (Boeing 737) that crashed after take off from Sharm El Sheikh airport in January 2004.
............................................................ ....................................
U.S. Summary Comments on Draft Final Report of Aircraft Accident Flash Airlines flight 604, Boeing 737-300, SU-ZCF January 3, 2004, Red Sea near Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. Quote from page 5 of 7:
"Distraction. A few seconds before the captain called for the autopilot to be engaged, the airplane’s pitch began increasing and airspeed began decreasing. These deviations continued during and after the autopilot engagement/disengagement sequence. The captain ultimately allowed the airspeed to decrease to 35 knots below his commanded target airspeed of 220 knots and the climb pitch to reach 22°, which is 10° more than the standard climb pitch of about 12°.
During this time, the captain also allowed the airplane to enter a gradually steepening right bank, which was inconsistent with the flight crew’s departure clearance to perform a climbing left turn. These pitch, airspeed and bank angle deviations indicated that the captain directed his attention away from monitoring the attitude indications during and after the autopilot disengagement process.
Changes in the autoflight system’s mode status offer the best explanation for the captain’s distraction. The following changes occurred in the autoflight system’s mode status shortly before the initiation of the right roll: (1) manual engagement of the autopilot, (2) automatic transition of roll guidance from heading select to control wheel steering-roll (CWS-R), (3) manual disengagement of the autopilot, and (4) manual reengagement of heading select for roll guidance.
The transition to the CWS-R mode occurred in accordance with nominal system operation because the captain was not closely following the flight director guidance at the time of the autopilot engagement. The captain might not have expected the transition, and he might not have understood why it occurred. The captain was probably referring to the mode change from command mode to CWS-R when he stated, “see what the aircraft did?,” shortly after it occurred.
The available evidence indicates that the unexpected mode change and the flight crew’s subsequent focus of attention on reestablishing roll guidance for the autoflight system were the most likely reasons for the captain’s distraction from monitoring the attitude".
............................................................ .......................................
02:32:31 FO: Before start check list completed down to the after start.
02:33:00 ATT: Close two L please
02:33:16 CA: We rely on God, thank God, in the name of God.
02:33:25 ATT: Attention cabin crew doors in armed position and crosscheck
02:33:30 :Sounds for 47 seconds (may be cockpit door, jump seat and unknown ratcheting sounds)
02:34:08 CA: What is this
02:34:09 FO: In the name of God, we rely on God
02:34:11 FO: Duct pressure decrease start valve open
02:34:14 CA: N two
02:34:25 ATT: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning on behalf of Captain Kheder and his crew members welcome you on board Flas Airlines Boeing seven three seven three hundred proceeding to cairo, during our flight to Cairo we shall cover the distance at fifty minutes and altitude twenty seven thousand feet, you are kindly requested to fasten your seat belts and put back of your seats in full up right position, and observe the no smoking sign during all the flight, thank you.
02:39:03 CA: Standard briefing god willing.
02:39:04 FO: before check list is completed down to the line God willing.
02:39:55 CA: To the line
02:40:01 FO: Engine start switches.
02:40:02 CA: On.
02:40:02 FO: Transponder
02:40:04 CA: On.
02:40:05 FO: Before takeoff checklist completed down to strobe lights.
02:40:07 CA: Completed god willing.
02:40:36 CA: Set it on take off ninety and half ...ready for departure.
02:40:38: FO: Flash six zero four ready for departure.
02:40:46 ATC: Flash six zero four surface wind two eight zero one three knots left turn to intercept radial three zero six, cleared for takeoff two two right.
02:40:55 FO: Clear for takeoff runway two two right whith left turn to establisk three zero six Sharm VOR our Flash six zero four clear for takeoff.
02:41:04 FO: God willing.
02:41:09 ATT: Cabin is clear.
02:41:12 CA: Thank you.
02:41:12 FO: Final is clear.
02:41:19 FO: Left turn to establish radial three zero six.
02:41:29 CA: Initially one four zero?
02:41:30 FO: God willing.
02:41:34 CA: Confirm initially one four zero.
02:41:35 FO: And Flash six zero four confirm to the left to establish three zero six.
02:41:40 CA: Initial one four zero.
02:41:43 ATC: God willing.
02:41:44 FO: and initially one four zero.
02:41:46 ATC: God willing.
02:41:48 CA: We rely on God
02:41:59 : Sound similar to increase of engine r.p.m
02:42:00 FO: Stabilized sir N one.
02:42:10 FO: Takeoff power set speed building up, eighty knots, throttle hold.
02:42:11 CA: Eighty knots (one thump sound).
02:42:26 FO: V one, rotate.
02:42:33 : One thump similar to gear retraction.
02:42:33 FO: ** positive rate.
02:42:34 CA: Heading select.
02:42:36 CA: Gear up.
02:42:36 FO: Ok.
02:42:43 CA: Four hundred heading select.
02:42:44 FO: Four hundred heading select sir.
02:42:48 CA: Level change.
02:42:49 FO: Level change, MCP speed, N1 armed sir.
02:42:59 FO: One thousand.
02:43:00 CA: N one speed two twenty flaps one.
02:43:04 CA: Left turn.
02:43:05 ATC: Flash six zero four airborne time four four when you ready to the left to intercept three zero six radial report on course, God willing.
02:43:11 CA: Left turn.
02:43:12 FO: Roger when ready God willing.
02:43:18 FO: Left turn to establish three zero six Sharm VOR.
02:43:22 FO: Speed available.
02:43:23 CA: Flaps up.
02:43:35 FO: Flaps up no light.
02:43:37 CA: After takeoff checklist.
02:43:55 CA: Autopilot.
02:43:58 CA: Not yet.
02:44:00 FO Autopilot in command sir.
02:44:01 CA: Exclamation remark.
02:44:02 : Sound of A/P disengage warning.
02:44:05 CA: Heading select.
02:44:07 FO: Heading select.
02:44:18 CA: See what the aircraft did!
02:44:27 FO: Turning right sir.
02:44:30 CA: What?
02:44:31 FO: Aircraft is turning right.
02:44:32 CA: AH.
02:44:35 CA: Turning right?
02:44:37 CA: How turning right.
02:44:41 CA: Ok come out.
02:44:41 FO: Over bank.
02:44:41 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:43 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:44 FO: Autopilot in command.
02:44:46 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:48 FO Over bank, over bank, over bank.
02:44:50 CA: OK.
02:44:52 FO: Over bank.
02:44:53 CA: OK, come out.
02:44:56 FO: No autopilot commander.
02:44:58 CA: Autopilot.
02:44:58 EC1: Retard power, retard power, retard power.
02:45:01 CA: Retard power.
02:45:02 : Sound similar to overspeed clacker.
02:45:04 CA: Come out.
02:35:05 FO: No god except...
02:35:05 SV: "whoop" sound similar to ground proximity warning
02:45:06 END OF RECORDING.
............................................................ ...................................................
Note the frantic cries of the captain of "Autopilot -Autopilot - Autopilot" as he attempts to recover from an unusual attitude of his own making. Just under three minutes since gear up to crash. If that is not automation dependency at its worst, I don't know what is...
Last edited by Tee Emm; 19th Jan 2016 at 12:09.
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wiggy
My bad, thank you for correcting me! I obviously was not paying enough attention when I thought I knew about Apollo.
Thank you also for providing a reference to back up your fact.
Here is another one which would slightly even the balance
"Due to an error in the checklist manual, the rendezvous radar switch was placed in the wrong position. This caused it to send erroneous signals to the computer. The result was that the computer was being asked to perform all of its normal functions for landing while receiving an extra load of spurious data which used up 15% of its time. The computer (or rather the software in it) was smart enough to recognize that it was being asked to perform more tasks than it should be performing. It then sent out an alarm, which meant to the astronaut, I'm overloaded with more tasks than I should be doing at this time and I'm going to keep only the more important tasks; i.e., the ones needed for landing ... Actually, the computer was programmed to do more than recognize error conditions. A complete set of recovery programs was incorporated into the software. The software's action, in this case, was to eliminate lower priority tasks and re-establish the more important ones ... If the computer hadn't recognized this problem and taken recovery action, I doubt if Apollo 11 would have been the successful [M]oon landing it was.[21][a]
— Letter from Margaret H. Hamilton, Director of Apollo Flight Computer Programming
My bad, thank you for correcting me! I obviously was not paying enough attention when I thought I knew about Apollo.
Thank you also for providing a reference to back up your fact.
Here is another one which would slightly even the balance
"Due to an error in the checklist manual, the rendezvous radar switch was placed in the wrong position. This caused it to send erroneous signals to the computer. The result was that the computer was being asked to perform all of its normal functions for landing while receiving an extra load of spurious data which used up 15% of its time. The computer (or rather the software in it) was smart enough to recognize that it was being asked to perform more tasks than it should be performing. It then sent out an alarm, which meant to the astronaut, I'm overloaded with more tasks than I should be doing at this time and I'm going to keep only the more important tasks; i.e., the ones needed for landing ... Actually, the computer was programmed to do more than recognize error conditions. A complete set of recovery programs was incorporated into the software. The software's action, in this case, was to eliminate lower priority tasks and re-establish the more important ones ... If the computer hadn't recognized this problem and taken recovery action, I doubt if Apollo 11 would have been the successful [M]oon landing it was.[21][a]
— Letter from Margaret H. Hamilton, Director of Apollo Flight Computer Programming
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The airlines you mention would strongly deny that they have CRM problems, just like they would strongly deny that they have pilot ability problems. I couldn't comment on either.
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I would counter that what you are doing is closer to the definition of trolling.
You state a "fact"
When evidence is produced that disproves that "fact" you refuse to acknowledge it at all and move on.
You then appear on a new thread spouting the same "fact"
I disagree.
I don't think you have relevant experience of modern capabilities in automation.
Looking to the past is no way to judge future capabilities.
You refuse to read or acknowledge references from luminaries such as NASA if they disagree with your narrative.
You state a "fact"
When evidence is produced that disproves that "fact" you refuse to acknowledge it at all and move on.
You then appear on a new thread spouting the same "fact"
I was an electronics engineer for 16 years. I fault-found analogue and digital systems and circuits using oscilloscopes, data loggers, noise measuring equipment, multimeters and other test equipment. I repaired circuits down to component level using soldering irons etc. I designed and built electronic circuits and systems. My colleagues and I set up microwave links and other radio transmission systems. I also worked solo in France and Italy operating mobile satellite uplink transmitter trucks - (hence my forum name).
I then re-trained as a pilot and am in my 15th year of flying commercial passenger aircraft. I have daily practical experience of using automated flying systems and manual flying in busy airspace.
This does not mean that I know it all - far from it. However, I have some relevant experience, so am hardly "ignorant" in this area.
I then re-trained as a pilot and am in my 15th year of flying commercial passenger aircraft. I have daily practical experience of using automated flying systems and manual flying in busy airspace.
This does not mean that I know it all - far from it. However, I have some relevant experience, so am hardly "ignorant" in this area.
I don't think you have relevant experience of modern capabilities in automation.
Looking to the past is no way to judge future capabilities.
You refuse to read or acknowledge references from luminaries such as NASA if they disagree with your narrative.
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https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...ess-he-420306/
Very interesting article, and it makes very clear the reasons for the policy.
The way you have presented the tone of the article might be considered perhaps a little disingenuous?
It has nothing to do with capability, and everything to do with the trust between flight crew and troops. This is a very reasonable policy in the short term.
Interesting that the article also states that
"The army’s new chief of staff Gen Mark Milley last week expressed strong interest in convoys of autonomous ground vehicle for cargo resupply, delivering “water, beans and bullets” to troops.
He says pilotless helicopters are less technologically challenging because of the complex terrain those ground vehicles must navigate, but the bigger challenge for rotorcraft is perhaps institutional."
This reiterates exactly what I said earlier. The challenge is not technological.
Incidentally, the challenge of a military rotorcraft is for obvious reasons far greater than for an airliner.
Thread Starter
Interesting article by Dave Unwin writing in UK "Pilot" magazine, on the Air Asia Indonesia prang. That accident heavily involved lack of basic instrument flying skills in IMC and is worth reading.
I can, however, provide a range of evidence to back up my belief that the average pilot is awful.
What would you like?
Shall we discuss the recent crashes of a fully serviceable 777 into a San Francisco runway?
The Air France A330 with nothing wrong with it into the Atlantic?
Colgan?
The list is painfully long.....
What would you like?
Shall we discuss the recent crashes of a fully serviceable 777 into a San Francisco runway?
The Air France A330 with nothing wrong with it into the Atlantic?
Colgan?
The list is painfully long.....
Can you offer evidence that they were an average pilot.
I would be more inclined to believe the cases above involved significantly below average... but then, by definition, 50% of the worlds commercial pilots must be "below average".
The average pilot probably wouldn't have ended up in those situations.
Skill can be a factor in everything, poor skill can compound the outcome, good skill can negate it.
Are you seriously using the fact that over 30 crews didn't crash when faced with a minor indication error in the cruise as an example of how good pilots are?
The fact that a single crew crashed under those circumstances is a searing indictment of the state of piloting skill in the industry.
The fact that a single crew crashed under those circumstances is a searing indictment of the state of piloting skill in the industry.
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That is a reasonable thing to do.
Three experienced pilots at a national airline took 3 minutes to utterly fail to fly an aircraft with a minor indication error.
They were not pay to fly.
They were not from a far eastern airline with a "dodgy" reputation.
They did not have an extensive history of poor check rides.
They were, to all intents and purposes "average" pilots.
The post crash reports have not recommended continuing as normal, they have recommended retraining on a huge scale across the piste.
It is not, however, reasonable to use not crashing a serviceable aircraft as an example of good piloting.
Can you see?
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"it couldn't happen to me. They only died because they were not very good"
Before the accident, there was no evidence to suggest that they were below average.
To decide afterwards that they were is putting your head in the sand.
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Originally Posted by grounded27
The vast majority of aircraft crashes are a direct result of PILOT ERROR. It would be simple to take every other event and compile the data utilizing unconventional methods used to save or mitigate loss creating a database of logic based response to an event. Loss will always factor in, it will just be less when we remove pilot error.
Your above quote would likely read "The vast majority of aircraft crashes are a direct result of COMPUTER ERROR" ...or at least would say programmer error for not anticipating whatever event was the probable cause. What I am saying is crashes are often pilot error because they are the ones there to blame the crash on. Even if you take a gross example of error like AF447, sure those pilots could have done 10 things differently to save things, but you say could some of the same things about the automation, such as.... Why wasn't there a degraded auto pilot mode, why wasn't there a different sensor mode to estimate the plane's airspeed, etc, etc.
In any case, I'm waiting to see how automated cars turn out first before I become worrried about HAL taking all the pilot jobs away.
For practical and technical discussion, consider a hypothetical accident, what might be learnt, what safety concepts are involved, or what might trigger checks of current operations:-
An afterthought; ‘what if’ a simultaneous malfunction of engines was considered instead of pitot error - engines are only a larger pitot; would crews be required to be trained for flight without power.
Not in the case of recent restrictions on two aircraft types which stressed Cb avoidance to minimise the risk of engine malfunction in ice crystals (software being updated).
Was this learned from the pitot events; more likely that the powerplant departments knew about the problems of ice crystals before pitot events occurred - since 1990s; but this information would only be of value if shared, learned, and remembered – back to the process of airworthiness and regulation – beware ivory towers.
So this has nothing to do with automation dependency ... ... exactly.
- The contribution from regulation.
The process of continuing-airworthiness identifies a weakness in pitot systems, which if simultaneously blocked by ice crystals generate erroneous displays of airspeed and abnormalities in other systems. The severity of the problem warrants major modification (three pitot per aircraft). This will take time, but in mitigation at least one pitot per aircraft should to be changed as soon as possible, but a small residual risk remains if an unmodified aircraft encounters the rare conditions.
In mitigation all flight crews should have refresher training for flight without airspeed. With this the regulatory focus has changed to human failure vice system fault; the human is seen as the threat to be re-trained to minimise risk.
Alternatively and more technically correct, the threat to the aircraft is ice crystals associated with large storms. Thence with a focus on the human as an asset, Cb identification and avoidance may be the better mitigation, which is based on normal everyday activity; emphasised with an alerting awareness of the ‘real’ threat.
- The contribution of the training process.
Crews were (erroneously) required to have refresher training for flight without airspeed; anyway shouldn't qualified crews be capable without refreshing. Operators interpret and delegate the training requirements in house or to third party simulation. Was there any checking that the output of the training matched the need, what need, not just the requirement but the real threat; did operators /trainers know of, or consider the real threat?
The abnormal and emergency checklist has a drill for abnormal airspeed. How might a crew decide to select this drill, what is abnormal? With three ‘independent’ airspeed systems it is assumed that with any system disagreement the odd one out will be disregarded … but what if two or all three are in error.
If the additional training focussed on loss of airspeed how was this simulated, just the removal of the airspeed display without consequential failures of other systems / warnings; would this training be consistent with a real event.
The UAS drill has both memory and follow up items, but initially they relate to different situations delineated by a preceding conditional statement – ‘if an emergency follow memory actions, or otherwise go to subsequent actions’.
Consider a situation which may only be an event to an experienced captain, but might be interpreted as an emergency to a less experienced first officer.
Why should drills need conditions before memory items, should there ever be an unboxed item before a memory drill? What if the drills are the sole basis of training?
The manufacturer and regulator probably knew what was meant (dynamic vs static situations), but left the ‘definition’ of emergency to each operator … thence to each crew.
Training to identify and avoid Cbs, together with a reminder to increase the miss distance for ice crystals could be simpler, cheaper, and directly related to the threat.
Why focus on recovery in preference to avoidance, c.f. stall training.
Do SOPs require control to be transferred to the Captain with a major emergency (including simulation), if so then first officers may never get to feel the aircraft in an abnormal condition – they only read the checklist and thus inappropriate boxed items become the basis of their learning.
- The contribution of behavioural shaping in normal operation.
Normal operations involve crews detecting and avoiding large storms. Good CRM practices require shared decision making. Do captains state “we should deviate 15deg left of the storm ahead” seeking crew cross check / concurrence, which is easily given if there is no gross misjudgement; what do first officers learn from this?
An alternative is to ask “what action should we take for the storm ahead”, this requires all crew to participate with active assessment and judgement, which provides opportunity for practicing decision making skills and gain experience of the situation.
In situations where a first officer deputises for a captain on long flights, are the existing views or implementation of CRM sufficient for all operations, to avoid Cbs by a reasonable margin, or even greater with ice crystals?
An afterthought; ‘what if’ a simultaneous malfunction of engines was considered instead of pitot error - engines are only a larger pitot; would crews be required to be trained for flight without power.
Not in the case of recent restrictions on two aircraft types which stressed Cb avoidance to minimise the risk of engine malfunction in ice crystals (software being updated).
Was this learned from the pitot events; more likely that the powerplant departments knew about the problems of ice crystals before pitot events occurred - since 1990s; but this information would only be of value if shared, learned, and remembered – back to the process of airworthiness and regulation – beware ivory towers.
So this has nothing to do with automation dependency ... ... exactly.
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There is another factor in play here, and it is likely present in the AF447 accident.
Part of my work as a contractor to the FAA has been to build an inflight and ground icing accident database. This involved the review of a very large number of icing incidents and accidents; for the 309 events dating back to 1983 that were deemed applicable, I reviewed all of the available data, i.e., NTSB dockets, pilot statements, ATC transcripts, DFDR plots, etc. In this set of events, I identified 19 cases yielding enough information to determine that the pilot’s first response to an ice contaminated stall was to pitch the aircraft nose up. This ranges from twin Cessnas to the ATR at Roselawn to an A300 at West Palm Beach.
Now, in many of these cases, the pilot’s next response was to push the nose down. But what has interested me is this initial response; it is almost always immediately following the initial pitch down and/or altitude loss resulting from the stall.
This has led me to suspect that we have a strong “compliance” reflex. The first response is aimed at returning to compliance.
Several years ago, shortly after returning to work for the world’s largest airline, I was in the right seat of a 767 returning from Europe. The relief pilot was in the left seat as we approached Labrador. We had been given a re-routing at the other end of the North Atlantic Route, and when we loaded that into the FMC, it dumped the NAR out of the route. Consequently, we were about four miles from a route discontinuity. The poor relief pilot was in a near panic, because he did not want to be seen as straying off course. As it happened, the correct track for the now-missing NAR was exactly the track we were on, so all that was imminent was a change from LNAV to HDG HLD, followed shortly by a return to LNAV once we reloaded the NAR. (In the end, I was able to reload the NAR before we reached the discontinuity.)
In another example, while recently executing a fairly prompt return to landing when my MD80 started emitting a burning odor shortly after departure, my ex-military, newly hired first officer was likewise very concerned about the prospect of landing a thousand pounds overweight. I pointed out afterward that such was the value of declaring an emergency.
It occurs to me that these are forms of the same compliance reflex. The relief pilot in this 767 case was visibly stressed about being seen as non-compliant by Canadian ATC. My MD80 FO was worried about deviating from the approved limitations. It seems possible that such a stress response may be at the root of the 19 events in our icing database. The same thing may have been involved in the first few seconds of the AF447 sequence; I don’t know.
So in parallel with the question of automation dependence may be a fear of violation or non-compliance. This goes straight back to the sense of autonomy that should be inherent when ensuring that “the successful outcome of the maneuver is never in doubt” (ATP Practical Test Guide…or at least it used to say that).
Many companies and some authorities tend to behave in ways that reinforce this. Years ago I remember an internal company training video in which an MD80 captain was interviewed regarding a high altitude stall that he had managed to get himself into, and obviously out of, with a 4000 foot altitude loss. They had actually blurred the fellow’s face as if he was in some kind of witness protection program, and the whole theme was about how you really, really did not want to have to “one of those meetings” with the FAA.
After 30+ years of accident investigation, I can tell you that what you really, really don’t want to do is have “one of those meetings” with the crewmembers’ family members. The FAA can take a hike.
Just food for thought…
Part of my work as a contractor to the FAA has been to build an inflight and ground icing accident database. This involved the review of a very large number of icing incidents and accidents; for the 309 events dating back to 1983 that were deemed applicable, I reviewed all of the available data, i.e., NTSB dockets, pilot statements, ATC transcripts, DFDR plots, etc. In this set of events, I identified 19 cases yielding enough information to determine that the pilot’s first response to an ice contaminated stall was to pitch the aircraft nose up. This ranges from twin Cessnas to the ATR at Roselawn to an A300 at West Palm Beach.
Now, in many of these cases, the pilot’s next response was to push the nose down. But what has interested me is this initial response; it is almost always immediately following the initial pitch down and/or altitude loss resulting from the stall.
This has led me to suspect that we have a strong “compliance” reflex. The first response is aimed at returning to compliance.
Several years ago, shortly after returning to work for the world’s largest airline, I was in the right seat of a 767 returning from Europe. The relief pilot was in the left seat as we approached Labrador. We had been given a re-routing at the other end of the North Atlantic Route, and when we loaded that into the FMC, it dumped the NAR out of the route. Consequently, we were about four miles from a route discontinuity. The poor relief pilot was in a near panic, because he did not want to be seen as straying off course. As it happened, the correct track for the now-missing NAR was exactly the track we were on, so all that was imminent was a change from LNAV to HDG HLD, followed shortly by a return to LNAV once we reloaded the NAR. (In the end, I was able to reload the NAR before we reached the discontinuity.)
In another example, while recently executing a fairly prompt return to landing when my MD80 started emitting a burning odor shortly after departure, my ex-military, newly hired first officer was likewise very concerned about the prospect of landing a thousand pounds overweight. I pointed out afterward that such was the value of declaring an emergency.
It occurs to me that these are forms of the same compliance reflex. The relief pilot in this 767 case was visibly stressed about being seen as non-compliant by Canadian ATC. My MD80 FO was worried about deviating from the approved limitations. It seems possible that such a stress response may be at the root of the 19 events in our icing database. The same thing may have been involved in the first few seconds of the AF447 sequence; I don’t know.
So in parallel with the question of automation dependence may be a fear of violation or non-compliance. This goes straight back to the sense of autonomy that should be inherent when ensuring that “the successful outcome of the maneuver is never in doubt” (ATP Practical Test Guide…or at least it used to say that).
Many companies and some authorities tend to behave in ways that reinforce this. Years ago I remember an internal company training video in which an MD80 captain was interviewed regarding a high altitude stall that he had managed to get himself into, and obviously out of, with a 4000 foot altitude loss. They had actually blurred the fellow’s face as if he was in some kind of witness protection program, and the whole theme was about how you really, really did not want to have to “one of those meetings” with the FAA.
After 30+ years of accident investigation, I can tell you that what you really, really don’t want to do is have “one of those meetings” with the crewmembers’ family members. The FAA can take a hike.
Just food for thought…
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Tourist, you come over as obsessed and spring loaded, and you make conclusions about people which are of your own making.
Mostly to make it easy for pilots not to make mistakes while keeping the final authority with the human with regard to what is really appropriate action.
You believe. Finally some modesty and reasonableness.
The biggest challenge is to construct a highly complex system where all the systems (which right now are independantly operating from each other) coordinate themselves automatically and without human input and decision making.
Do I? Well, I think you need to calm down a bit and stop making conclusions about people.
No I don't.
You believe.
Well, I believe that it won't be possible to construct a complex machine like an airliner that will operate fully autonomously in an real world environment at the same cost and with a safety rate of 1 in 10 million. It will just not be handable, it will be too complex, and do way too much "funny" stuff.
However what is clear there will be more automated systems that support pilots in their task. Some have already been mentioned here.
ECAM is another way of removing error prone humans from the system as much as possible because we make so many mistakes.
I don't like what I'm saying, I just happen to believe it is true.
The only challenges unique to the civil aviation sphere are certification, legal and public opinion.
I think you need to research the difference between correlation and causation
You think that:-
Pilots fly aircraft.
Aircraft have had less accidents.
Pilots must have got better.
Pilots fly aircraft.
Aircraft have had less accidents.
Pilots must have got better.
I believe that.
Pilots fly aircraft a lot less than they used to.
Aircraft design and engineering has improved beyond measure.
Systems have been fitted to catch pilot errors, and despite the drop in skill levels, they are doing an excellent job.
Pilots fly aircraft a lot less than they used to.
Aircraft design and engineering has improved beyond measure.
Systems have been fitted to catch pilot errors, and despite the drop in skill levels, they are doing an excellent job.
Well, I believe that it won't be possible to construct a complex machine like an airliner that will operate fully autonomously in an real world environment at the same cost and with a safety rate of 1 in 10 million. It will just not be handable, it will be too complex, and do way too much "funny" stuff.
However what is clear there will be more automated systems that support pilots in their task. Some have already been mentioned here.
Mansfield,
You have introduced a really interesting aspect to this debate - the psychological effect from being conditioned to comply. Is this a result of companies over-emphasising the need to comply with SOPs and company procedures rather than educating pilots to understand aerodynamics, their aircraft and its systems so that they can work from first principles?
Don't get me wrong - SOPs are the bedrock of a good safe standard operation, and adherence to them is vital. BUT - there are times when it is necessary to apply basic understanding - and this requires education rather than the slavish following of rules.
For example the basic application of correct attitude and power to achieve the desired speed.
You have introduced a really interesting aspect to this debate - the psychological effect from being conditioned to comply. Is this a result of companies over-emphasising the need to comply with SOPs and company procedures rather than educating pilots to understand aerodynamics, their aircraft and its systems so that they can work from first principles?
Don't get me wrong - SOPs are the bedrock of a good safe standard operation, and adherence to them is vital. BUT - there are times when it is necessary to apply basic understanding - and this requires education rather than the slavish following of rules.
For example the basic application of correct attitude and power to achieve the desired speed.
One has to laugh at the often asserted notion of driverless autonomous cars dominating the roads within a decade or so. It would be automation dependency stripped of political correctness AND The Big Sky Theory.
It won't happen before artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is so much in its infancy that it still doesn't exist.
Good times. Back to reading my 1950's Popular Science articles about how everyone will have a flying car within a couple years.
There sure are a lot of liars in high places out there and PT Barnum was right.
Someday....of course...but it's frustrating watching the public get conned on this so much. At least there are people like Gill Pratt out there.
Thread creep...well sort of.
It won't happen before artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is so much in its infancy that it still doesn't exist.
Good times. Back to reading my 1950's Popular Science articles about how everyone will have a flying car within a couple years.
There sure are a lot of liars in high places out there and PT Barnum was right.
Someday....of course...but it's frustrating watching the public get conned on this so much. At least there are people like Gill Pratt out there.
Thread creep...well sort of.
Moderator
Folks,
We appear to have a tendency towards agitation in some quarters.
As you are aware, I avoid interfering unless things get out of hand.
Please keep things on an emotional even keel and play the ball, not the player ..
Knowing who some of the posters are, there is a lot of pertinent knowledge horsepower in the arena here .. the rest of us can benefit from listening intelligently.
regards, John
We appear to have a tendency towards agitation in some quarters.
As you are aware, I avoid interfering unless things get out of hand.
Please keep things on an emotional even keel and play the ball, not the player ..
Knowing who some of the posters are, there is a lot of pertinent knowledge horsepower in the arena here .. the rest of us can benefit from listening intelligently.
regards, John