Mansfield, 1201, re HF
A single minded approach to remove the human from the flight deck achieves little; it’s unlikely to happen in the near term and may never be proven to be cost effective (as in safety). See #92
“Rather, accidents occur when combinations of breakdowns happen across human and engineering systems, often in the presence of threats posed by the external environment.”
I had difficulty with the second part of #93, but if it is like
“Logic and repairing mistakes” then I agree; it’s nice to get out of the ‘office’ to find analogies of professionalism, experience, ... airmanship; as a master craftsman.
Also, an often overlooked essential skill
Critical Thinking; in flying and debate.
Using ROW/ROPS as an example of a technical improvement (#94) might not be as good as the ‘maker’s label’; see EASA’s mauling in their ‘selected’ comments and responses to the proposed regulatory amendment (
http://easa.europa.eu/system/files/d...%202013-09.pdf).
ROPS is a good idea, but as with most automation, a poor input can result in poor output (cf accuracy of runway braking action, proactive / reactive systems) – potentially an induced hazard of automation.