Flight International "Pilots must go back to basics>"
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"Fact remains both AF 447 and Asiana pilots didn't come from the so called new generation of pilots."
Maybe not, but they were definately no barnstorming aces either.
Maybe not, but they were definately no barnstorming aces either.
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From a rough translation, the key issues being debated / contested are:-
“Inappropriate response of the crew”,
“Lack of structured failure analysis",
“Not understanding the situation"
“The division of labor in the cockpit."
“Inadequate pilot training in the application of the unreliable IAS procedure."
“Inappropriate response of the crew”,
“Lack of structured failure analysis",
“Not understanding the situation"
“The division of labor in the cockpit."
“Inadequate pilot training in the application of the unreliable IAS procedure."
Kefuddle, essentially yes. I prefer to avoid ‘CRM’ as it consists of many aspects, like airmanship, and there are few universal definitions of these; and if there is, the application varies.
Latetonight, well taught IFR instrument flight will contain many these aspects, but overall it’s the application of skills in managing a wide range of situations which appears to be deficient.
Previously many of the required skills were attained by experience; they are tacit knowledge which comes with time, exposure, and example. Modern operations severely restrict these opportunities and there might be false belief that the skills can be taught with more of this or that.
Applying the basics of these skills during automatic flight might sharpen up some of them, but only if they are there in the first palace … …
Latetonight, well taught IFR instrument flight will contain many these aspects, but overall it’s the application of skills in managing a wide range of situations which appears to be deficient.
Previously many of the required skills were attained by experience; they are tacit knowledge which comes with time, exposure, and example. Modern operations severely restrict these opportunities and there might be false belief that the skills can be taught with more of this or that.
Applying the basics of these skills during automatic flight might sharpen up some of them, but only if they are there in the first palace … …
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Kfuddle
If you rearrange what you pasted it makes very clear.
1. "Inadequate pilot training in the application of the unreliable IAS procedure." Read "formality of a demo of UAS procedure was completed during their type rating"
2. "Not understanding the situation" Read " they had no clue as to what had happened"
3. "Lack of structured failure analysis", Read " they failed to plan threat management."
4. "Inappropriate response of the crew" Read " Since they couldn't figure out the situation they decided to do something which turned out to be disastrous.
5. "The division of labor in the cockpit." Read " Since the other pilot was equally in the dark about the situation he could not suggest another course of action and did not take any part in the proceedings."
If you rearrange what you pasted it makes very clear.
1. "Inadequate pilot training in the application of the unreliable IAS procedure." Read "formality of a demo of UAS procedure was completed during their type rating"
2. "Not understanding the situation" Read " they had no clue as to what had happened"
3. "Lack of structured failure analysis", Read " they failed to plan threat management."
4. "Inappropriate response of the crew" Read " Since they couldn't figure out the situation they decided to do something which turned out to be disastrous.
5. "The division of labor in the cockpit." Read " Since the other pilot was equally in the dark about the situation he could not suggest another course of action and did not take any part in the proceedings."
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I lost my ASI at 13000', at night, single pilot IMC. Broke clouds at 400' on the ILS. No FD, let alone FMC. Not even a co pilot.
Another time on a ferry flight lost all airspeed during TO in a A310. Came VMC at 10.000'.
In both cases I relied on raw data and hand flying. Worked as advertised without indept knowledge of non technical CRM skills.
Have to say though, that where I come from, we spend 60 hrs in a Frasca box before we were even allowed to take up IFR training in an airplane.
Nowadays I see so called airline pilots with 'frozen ATPL's, MCC courses, Jet conversions and what have you not, not being able to determine a holding entry raw data.
The industry invented many gadgets to make flying easier.
Problem is that pilots nowadays rely on it 100%.
And I strongly disagree that one learns to fly by watching an autopilot fly.
Another time on a ferry flight lost all airspeed during TO in a A310. Came VMC at 10.000'.
In both cases I relied on raw data and hand flying. Worked as advertised without indept knowledge of non technical CRM skills.
Have to say though, that where I come from, we spend 60 hrs in a Frasca box before we were even allowed to take up IFR training in an airplane.
Nowadays I see so called airline pilots with 'frozen ATPL's, MCC courses, Jet conversions and what have you not, not being able to determine a holding entry raw data.
The industry invented many gadgets to make flying easier.
Problem is that pilots nowadays rely on it 100%.
And I strongly disagree that one learns to fly by watching an autopilot fly.
Vilas, formal demonstration – exam / tests, may have little relevance in unusual and surprising situations. Part of the national authority’ clearance to continue flying until all aircraft had modified pitots included refresher training of UAS procedures. If the operators put this into practice without further explanation, then simulator instructors could easily over-focus on the loss of airspeed during takeoff.
Both take off and cruise are on the same check list, to the uninitiated the dynamic after-takeoff case is more demanding and has memory items, ideal simulator material. This would refresh and possibly bias crews’ initial reaction to any IAS failure towards the after takeoff case, particularly if associated with many other faults and warnings. If the incorrect procedure was used, crew’s should be able to identify their error, but this will depend on the level of distraction, available mental resource, and degree of surprise.
Rather than conclude that the crew ‘had no clue’ or ‘did not plan’, it might be better to consider and post, what might have been done or how we all might avoid such errors.
Latetonight, my post did not state nor I hope infer that crew’s should just watch the autopilot. Crews have to mentally engage with all of the aircraft systems with skills of awareness, understanding, planning, thinking ahead, and most important learning about themselves and the aircraft.
Both take off and cruise are on the same check list, to the uninitiated the dynamic after-takeoff case is more demanding and has memory items, ideal simulator material. This would refresh and possibly bias crews’ initial reaction to any IAS failure towards the after takeoff case, particularly if associated with many other faults and warnings. If the incorrect procedure was used, crew’s should be able to identify their error, but this will depend on the level of distraction, available mental resource, and degree of surprise.
Rather than conclude that the crew ‘had no clue’ or ‘did not plan’, it might be better to consider and post, what might have been done or how we all might avoid such errors.
Latetonight, my post did not state nor I hope infer that crew’s should just watch the autopilot. Crews have to mentally engage with all of the aircraft systems with skills of awareness, understanding, planning, thinking ahead, and most important learning about themselves and the aircraft.
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I'd say that the initial catalyst for the situation was very much a handling problem - the failure to effectively diagnose and rectify the problem was more within the CRM "domain".
DW, your view depends on how you define ‘handling’; is this the physical flying skills or the more wider management skills, where awareness (mental activity) should precede action.
Re CRM, which part, which aspect? There may be a consistent understanding of what CRM is for – definitions can be quoted, but as to what CRM involves in application, then there is a vast range of views, personal, operational, cultural, national, etc.
How might CRM help to diagnose or rectify a problem; please don’t quote ‘the use of all resources …’ as this is meaningless without defining which resources can be of value in a particular situation, which requires understanding the situation, etc, etc.
Re CRM, which part, which aspect? There may be a consistent understanding of what CRM is for – definitions can be quoted, but as to what CRM involves in application, then there is a vast range of views, personal, operational, cultural, national, etc.
How might CRM help to diagnose or rectify a problem; please don’t quote ‘the use of all resources …’ as this is meaningless without defining which resources can be of value in a particular situation, which requires understanding the situation, etc, etc.
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Re CRM, which part, which aspect?
In fact it could arguably go back to the Captain's somewhat sketchy handover to the two F/Os before taking his rest period, as the flight deck gradient was never explicitly stated and confirmed.
The non-handling F/O therefore seems to have been reticent to act decisively and instead defers to the Captain, calling him back from rest. By the time the Captain arrived, a significant amount of time had been lost, and the situation had deteriorated almost to the point of being unrecoverable.
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Rather than conclude that the crew ‘had no clue’ or ‘did not plan’, it might be better to consider and post, what might have been done or how we all might avoid such errors.
Your argument displays all the cheap elements of diversion most regulators, manufacturers and many busy contributors to these forums use:
"Give me solutions or shut up".
Apart from it's poor weight as a contribution, because you yourself have no solution but to shut up and you don't, it is simply wrong:
Read the title of the thread ffs!
Last edited by glofish; 15th May 2014 at 08:56.
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alf5071
UAS is taught as a guided exercise/demo in type rating. Since it is not part of regulatory tick boxes of OPC/refresher it is not practiced again. This is not my idea. I stated the reality. There are more than 100 posts about. should, would. could have been done. You can't add more to that. To learn something from a disaster we need to take in the reality and that is they didn't know what happened and when they knew they didn't know how to deal with it. Then comes why and how. SFO and 447 are not same. One is about degraded ability to scan and the other is about lack knowledge to deal with a specific abnormality.
UAS is taught as a guided exercise/demo in type rating. Since it is not part of regulatory tick boxes of OPC/refresher it is not practiced again. This is not my idea. I stated the reality. There are more than 100 posts about. should, would. could have been done. You can't add more to that. To learn something from a disaster we need to take in the reality and that is they didn't know what happened and when they knew they didn't know how to deal with it. Then comes why and how. SFO and 447 are not same. One is about degraded ability to scan and the other is about lack knowledge to deal with a specific abnormality.
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Lateonite,
No, but one essential aspect of learning to fly is by knowing how the autopilot works, what modes are best suited for what situations, how to respond to unexpected behavior, when to use a specific level of automation and when not to and anticipating specific inadequacies and complications. As well as having the wherewithal to brief such strategies in a brief, concise and informative manner. Oh and watching it fly too!
Alf,
That's my angle alright 
I was not sure if CRM would cause such a question. Let's forget the term CRM and lets use the term NOTECHS which is black and white. This is the basis of the CRM at my place and I think it is an excellent model to kills the waffle.
And I strongly disagree that one learns to fly by watching an autopilot fly.
Alf,
DW, your view depends on how you define ‘handling’; is this the physical flying skills or the more wider management skills, where awareness (mental activity) should precede action.
Re CRM, which part, which aspect? There may be a consistent understanding of what CRM is for – definitions can be quoted, but as to what CRM involves in application, then there is a vast range of views, personal, operational, cultural, national, etc. How might CRM help to diagnose or rectify a problem; please don’t quote ‘the use of all resources …’ as this is meaningless without defining which resources can be of value in a particular situation, which requires understanding the situation, etc, etc.
DW thanks. I am sure that you appreciate accidents have many contributions, but focus on a single issue can distort understanding.
w.r.t. a ‘reticent F/O’ failing to intervene, this assumes that the F/O’s understanding was superior to that of the PF. This might have been so, yet equally whilst the understand was different it, was similarly confused and insufficient to act on. Both crew members were attempting to understand the situation, unfortunately one acted, perhaps further complicating the situation requiring more assessment … and the rest is history which is formed in hindsight.
Kefuddle, “Let’s forget the term CRM”
NOTECHS is a valuable assessment / rating tool, but does not address how such skills are acquired or maintained. A danger is that rating puts issues into boxes – good / not so, the latter is often addressed with more training, but what training, how do we teach awareness, decision making, etc.
Some views of human behaviour suggest replacing awareness and understanding with ‘sensemaking’; see ‘Perspectives on Sensemaking’. These are erudite views, but with some thought and practical interpretation key points might be established.
Consideration and application of these points may help improve thinking basics, thus aiding the choice and application of the basic physical flying skills. Think before acting.
http://xstar.ihmc.us/research/projec...ensemaking.pdf
http://xstar.ihmc.us/research/projec...semaking.2.pdf
w.r.t. a ‘reticent F/O’ failing to intervene, this assumes that the F/O’s understanding was superior to that of the PF. This might have been so, yet equally whilst the understand was different it, was similarly confused and insufficient to act on. Both crew members were attempting to understand the situation, unfortunately one acted, perhaps further complicating the situation requiring more assessment … and the rest is history which is formed in hindsight.
Kefuddle, “Let’s forget the term CRM”
NOTECHS is a valuable assessment / rating tool, but does not address how such skills are acquired or maintained. A danger is that rating puts issues into boxes – good / not so, the latter is often addressed with more training, but what training, how do we teach awareness, decision making, etc.
Some views of human behaviour suggest replacing awareness and understanding with ‘sensemaking’; see ‘Perspectives on Sensemaking’. These are erudite views, but with some thought and practical interpretation key points might be established.
- sensemaking is about the process of achieving these kinds of outcomes, the strategies, and the barriers encountered.
- simply connecting the dots; no, it’s understand what constitutes a dot in a given situation – what is important and why.
- When people try to make sense of events, they begin with some perspective, viewpoint, or framework
- Sensemaking can involve elaborating the frame by adding details, and questioning the frame and doubting the explanations it provides
- Mental model vs mental simulation (thinking ahead)
- Training might be better aimed at increasing the range and richness of frames, particularly causal mental models, and skill at noticing anomalies.
- Training scenarios and decision support might be developed for all the sensemaking activities questioning a frame, evaluating a frame, comparing alternative frames, reframing a situation, and seeking anchors to generate a useful frame.
- Training would aim to provide a larger, richer repertoire of frames rather than to improve each aspect of sensemaking as if it were a separate skill.
Consideration and application of these points may help improve thinking basics, thus aiding the choice and application of the basic physical flying skills. Think before acting.
http://xstar.ihmc.us/research/projec...ensemaking.pdf
http://xstar.ihmc.us/research/projec...semaking.2.pdf
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With regard to recovering from unusual attitudes. One well known SE Asian B737 operator has, in its simulator recurrent training syllabus, a requirement to conduct high and low altitude approach to stall recovery. The technique for recovery is different in each case.
For the low altitude case, company policy requires the aircraft to be placed in the landing configuration on a coupled approach. At 1500 feet the auto-throttle system is then disconnected and both thrust levers closed to idle. The autopilot is still coupled to the ILS resulting in the aircraft trying to maintain the ILS glide path by raising the nose and considerable back stabiliser trimming takes place. By the time the airspeed reaches VREF minus 30 knots, the stabiliser under the influence of the coupled autopilot, reaches close to its rear limit.
At that point the stick shaker operates and the pilot is required to recover from this condition. That is, on glide slope, VREF minus 30 knots and nearly maximum back stabiliser trim. This then is a recovery from a low altitude stall.
However...company policy is that, even in IMC, rather than going around, the pilot must continue the ILS approach during the stall recovery actions despite it being impossible to make a stabilised approach during recovery from VREF minus 30 knots at 1000 ft. This astoundingly dangerous policy can only encourage pilots to disregard stable approach criteria in real life. It becomes a box ticking challenge to maintain the ILS glide slope regardless of the high go-around thrust levels and varying pitch attitudes required to both recover from the stall - and yet maintain the ILS glide slope within mandated tolerances. Is it any wonder this operator has an appalling accident record when this type of low level stall recovery "training" is not only mandated by the airline but also approved by the Regulator of that country.
For the low altitude case, company policy requires the aircraft to be placed in the landing configuration on a coupled approach. At 1500 feet the auto-throttle system is then disconnected and both thrust levers closed to idle. The autopilot is still coupled to the ILS resulting in the aircraft trying to maintain the ILS glide path by raising the nose and considerable back stabiliser trimming takes place. By the time the airspeed reaches VREF minus 30 knots, the stabiliser under the influence of the coupled autopilot, reaches close to its rear limit.
At that point the stick shaker operates and the pilot is required to recover from this condition. That is, on glide slope, VREF minus 30 knots and nearly maximum back stabiliser trim. This then is a recovery from a low altitude stall.
However...company policy is that, even in IMC, rather than going around, the pilot must continue the ILS approach during the stall recovery actions despite it being impossible to make a stabilised approach during recovery from VREF minus 30 knots at 1000 ft. This astoundingly dangerous policy can only encourage pilots to disregard stable approach criteria in real life. It becomes a box ticking challenge to maintain the ILS glide slope regardless of the high go-around thrust levels and varying pitch attitudes required to both recover from the stall - and yet maintain the ILS glide slope within mandated tolerances. Is it any wonder this operator has an appalling accident record when this type of low level stall recovery "training" is not only mandated by the airline but also approved by the Regulator of that country.
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Simple recovery though.. Leave the autopilot engaged and firewall the power!! The aircraft will stay on the ILS, the stab trim won't have to be fully nose up due to the pitch couple of the engines, and the speed will increase back to Vref as required!!
Maybe they've stumbled on something there??
Maybe they've stumbled on something there??
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Maybe they've stumbled on something there??
Last edited by Kefuddle; 17th May 2014 at 15:25.
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The non-handling F/O therefore seems to have been reticent to act decisively and instead defers to the Captain, calling him back from rest.
Staggering! Was it not the case, s someone has said, that these pilots did not come from the 'new generation'. From this I would suppose that they had considerable experience and that the SFO was on the command upgrade list. Why then not exercise the qualities one would look for in a suitable future commander? It is unbelievable that 2 trained & experienced pilots could not recover this a/c, and they felt that only the captain could save the day. Anyone who is in the same (boat) should return their salary forthwith.
Staggering! Was it not the case, s someone has said, that these pilots did not come from the 'new generation'. From this I would suppose that they had considerable experience and that the SFO was on the command upgrade list. Why then not exercise the qualities one would look for in a suitable future commander? It is unbelievable that 2 trained & experienced pilots could not recover this a/c, and they felt that only the captain could save the day. Anyone who is in the same (boat) should return their salary forthwith.
Maybe they've stumbled on something there??
See 737 QRH MAN.1.1 where it states "Initiate the recovery.....hold the control column firmly.....disconnect the autopilot and autothrottle"