With regard to recovering from unusual attitudes. One well known SE Asian B737 operator has, in its simulator recurrent training syllabus, a requirement to conduct high and low altitude approach to stall recovery. The technique for recovery is different in each case.
For the low altitude case, company policy requires the aircraft to be placed in the landing configuration on a coupled approach. At 1500 feet the auto-throttle system is then disconnected and both thrust levers closed to idle. The autopilot is still coupled to the ILS resulting in the aircraft trying to maintain the ILS glide path by raising the nose and considerable back stabiliser trimming takes place. By the time the airspeed reaches VREF minus 30 knots, the stabiliser under the influence of the coupled autopilot, reaches close to its rear limit.
At that point the stick shaker operates and the pilot is required to recover from this condition. That is, on glide slope, VREF minus 30 knots and nearly maximum back stabiliser trim. This then is a recovery from a low altitude stall.
However...company policy is that, even in IMC, rather than going around, the pilot must continue the ILS approach during the stall recovery actions despite it being impossible to make a stabilised approach during recovery from VREF minus 30 knots at 1000 ft. This astoundingly dangerous policy can only encourage pilots to disregard stable approach criteria in real life. It becomes a box ticking challenge to maintain the ILS glide slope regardless of the high go-around thrust levels and varying pitch attitudes required to both recover from the stall - and yet maintain the ILS glide slope within mandated tolerances. Is it any wonder this operator has an appalling accident record when this type of low level stall recovery "training" is not only mandated by the airline but also approved by the Regulator of that country.