Once a pilot - now a computer's sidekick
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Once a pilot - now a computer's sidekick
Following the Air France Airbus A330 accident in the South Atlantic on 1 June 2009, the French Authority BEA made several recommendations to prevent future accidents of this type. Aviation Week magazine reports that a human factors working group has been set up as part of the BEA investigation. Better training is likely to become a crucial follow-up action as the report is absorbed and discussed across the industry.
Talk-fests on the subject are a dime a dozen and will get nowhere until operators realise that the solution is straight forward. And that is the accent on flight simulator training must be reversed from automation back to basic principles of flying an aeroplane on raw data manual flying. Raw data includes flight director turned off; despite what some airline instructors think.
Currently 90 percent of simulator training involves automation. In spite of this it has been known for many years that automation addiction forced upon crews by manufacturers and operators leads to complacency and loss of basic instrument flying skills. Besides the spectacular demise of the Air France A330 there have been numerous other jet transport accidents where the cause has been poor instrument flying ability caused in part by over-reliance on automation.
Below is an article extract cut and pasted from the latest issue of Curt Lewis & Associates Flight safety website No 147. It should be absorbed by every automation dependant airline pilot. The author makes his point very clearly that operators must grasp the nettle and fix the problem before the inevitable next accident caused by the pilot's lack of basic instrument flying ability.
The article is headed Once a pilot, now a computer's sidekick
Industry analysts estimated last week that in the next 20 years, the airlines are going to need 466,000 new pilots. When I said to an airline pilot friend that such a job market would make it easy for his son to follow in his footsteps, he smiled.
"I think he wants a flying job instead," he replied.
I noted that this sounded odd coming from a fellow who just flew a planeload of passengers back from overseas.
"I didn't fly," he replied. "The computer flew. I sat in the front office, monitoring systems."
"Who flies better," I asked, "you or the computer?"
"Oh, the computer," he replied. "No contest, as long as things function. When they stop functioning, it's a different story. Then the computer quits, and I go to work. Provided I still remember how."
The dilemma isn't new, but it's being discussed more and more frequently. Pilots don't fly enough. They get rusty, and when they really need to call upon their flying muscles, they find them either atrophied or insufficiently developed in the first place. The symbol of the problem has become Air France's Flight 447, an Airbus dropped by its pilots into the ocean three years ago, according to a French inquiry's final report released last month.
When a faulty speed sensor made the autopilot quit, two co-pilots on the flight deck would have needed to hand-fly their Airbus 330, established in cruise at 35,000 feet over the Atlantic, until the captain, who was taking his scheduled nap, returned to the cockpit. Their task was to fly straight and level for two or three minutes on instruments, with no visual reference to the horizon, without reliable airspeed indication, in light turbulence. They couldn't do it. By the time the captain came back, the Airbus had stopped flying and was about a minute from contacting the water.
In 1915, Arthur Roy Brown, the flying ace credited with bringing down Manfred von Richthofen, the Red Baron, had his pilot's license issued with six hours of flight time. By comparison, even the least experienced pilot on AF447 had 2,800 hours in his logbook. It isn't that today's pilots train fewer hours; it's that the study of increasingly complex systems and regulations compete for time and emphasis with flying skills. Airmanship and command authority are being boxed in by petty rules, for the comfort of lawyers and bureaucrats rather than to enhance operational efficiency and flight safety.
Before leaving the flight deck for his scheduled rest, the captain of Air France's ill-fated Flight 447 was obliged, as part of his briefing, to ask his relief pilot if he had a commercial pilot's license. Why would anyone weigh down the captain's workload with such a query? Would an unlicensed impostor say to the captain: "Crikey, skipper, I didn't know you needed a license for this gig" or would he just lie and say: "Yes, sir."
The crew whose fate it was to be flying Flight 447 had the necessary qualifications. The problem was that they had them in their wallets, rather than in their heads. Qualifications in wallets satisfy bureaucracies, but only qualifications in heads ensure the safety of a flight.
It was a "Thales"-type speed sensor that iced up as the Airbus was skirting a thunderstorm high above the South Atlantic. Air France, aware of the limitations of the device, had just begun to replace the $3,500 units. It hadn't gotten around to changing it in the ill-fated airplane before it departed Rio de Janeiro for Paris on the night of June 1, 2009. Grounding the entire Airbus fleet until all units were replaced may have cost only a fraction of what the accident, investigation and lawsuits will end up costing Air France, to say nothing of the tragic loss of 228 lives. Some analysts argue, though, that turning all potential flaws into mandatory "no go" items would make air transportation unaffordable.
The "Thales" sensors were more susceptible to icing than other designs, but they didn't all ice up, and the planes carrying those that did remained flyable and were landed safely by their Air France crews. So were two other Airbus 330s belonging to Paris-based Air Caraibes Atlantique. Only Flight 447 fell into the ocean. One disaster is one too many, of course, but it was no more an inevitable consequence than it would be for a blown tire to flip a car.
Airspeed is crucial to flight. Too fast and the plane can break up; too slow and it can fall out of the sky. When airspeed indicators become unreliable, the computerized systems - autopilot and auto-throttles - quit. On the Airbus, this is announced by the aural warning of a cavalry charge, the computer's way of calling the human pilot to the rescue.
Aviation is full of pithy sayings. One is that an airspeed sensor has no backup except airmanship. Losing airspeed readings can range from a non-event to a dire emergency depending on the pilot's skill and additional circumstances. The autopilot quitting on AF447, as it was designed to do after losing reliable airspeed indication, could and should have been a non-event. It left an airworthy aircraft flying straight and level in light turbulence. All Flight 447 needed was a pilot to fly it - or just let the plane fly itself, which is what planes trimmed for cruise flight tend to do in stable air, especially if their wings are kept level - but, as the cockpit voice recorder revealed, there were no pilots on the flight deck. There were two systems managers being confronted by a system that suddenly had become unmanageable.
Real pilots would have disregarded the rebellious computers going viral with flashing lights, cavalry charges, buzzers and bells, huffily announcing all the things they stopped doing for the humans aboard or required the humans to do for them. They would have let the computers crash and concentrated on flying the plane. The systems managers stopped flying and crashed with their computers.
This isn't how the French inquiry puts it, needless to say. I wouldn't put it this way in an inquiry myself. I'm exaggerating to make the point that our technology may be getting ahead of itself. If so, we may hire 466,000 systems managers of an unmanageable system in the next 20 years.
Once a pilot, now a computer
Talk-fests on the subject are a dime a dozen and will get nowhere until operators realise that the solution is straight forward. And that is the accent on flight simulator training must be reversed from automation back to basic principles of flying an aeroplane on raw data manual flying. Raw data includes flight director turned off; despite what some airline instructors think.
Currently 90 percent of simulator training involves automation. In spite of this it has been known for many years that automation addiction forced upon crews by manufacturers and operators leads to complacency and loss of basic instrument flying skills. Besides the spectacular demise of the Air France A330 there have been numerous other jet transport accidents where the cause has been poor instrument flying ability caused in part by over-reliance on automation.
Below is an article extract cut and pasted from the latest issue of Curt Lewis & Associates Flight safety website No 147. It should be absorbed by every automation dependant airline pilot. The author makes his point very clearly that operators must grasp the nettle and fix the problem before the inevitable next accident caused by the pilot's lack of basic instrument flying ability.
The article is headed Once a pilot, now a computer's sidekick
Industry analysts estimated last week that in the next 20 years, the airlines are going to need 466,000 new pilots. When I said to an airline pilot friend that such a job market would make it easy for his son to follow in his footsteps, he smiled.
"I think he wants a flying job instead," he replied.
I noted that this sounded odd coming from a fellow who just flew a planeload of passengers back from overseas.
"I didn't fly," he replied. "The computer flew. I sat in the front office, monitoring systems."
"Who flies better," I asked, "you or the computer?"
"Oh, the computer," he replied. "No contest, as long as things function. When they stop functioning, it's a different story. Then the computer quits, and I go to work. Provided I still remember how."
The dilemma isn't new, but it's being discussed more and more frequently. Pilots don't fly enough. They get rusty, and when they really need to call upon their flying muscles, they find them either atrophied or insufficiently developed in the first place. The symbol of the problem has become Air France's Flight 447, an Airbus dropped by its pilots into the ocean three years ago, according to a French inquiry's final report released last month.
When a faulty speed sensor made the autopilot quit, two co-pilots on the flight deck would have needed to hand-fly their Airbus 330, established in cruise at 35,000 feet over the Atlantic, until the captain, who was taking his scheduled nap, returned to the cockpit. Their task was to fly straight and level for two or three minutes on instruments, with no visual reference to the horizon, without reliable airspeed indication, in light turbulence. They couldn't do it. By the time the captain came back, the Airbus had stopped flying and was about a minute from contacting the water.
In 1915, Arthur Roy Brown, the flying ace credited with bringing down Manfred von Richthofen, the Red Baron, had his pilot's license issued with six hours of flight time. By comparison, even the least experienced pilot on AF447 had 2,800 hours in his logbook. It isn't that today's pilots train fewer hours; it's that the study of increasingly complex systems and regulations compete for time and emphasis with flying skills. Airmanship and command authority are being boxed in by petty rules, for the comfort of lawyers and bureaucrats rather than to enhance operational efficiency and flight safety.
Before leaving the flight deck for his scheduled rest, the captain of Air France's ill-fated Flight 447 was obliged, as part of his briefing, to ask his relief pilot if he had a commercial pilot's license. Why would anyone weigh down the captain's workload with such a query? Would an unlicensed impostor say to the captain: "Crikey, skipper, I didn't know you needed a license for this gig" or would he just lie and say: "Yes, sir."
The crew whose fate it was to be flying Flight 447 had the necessary qualifications. The problem was that they had them in their wallets, rather than in their heads. Qualifications in wallets satisfy bureaucracies, but only qualifications in heads ensure the safety of a flight.
It was a "Thales"-type speed sensor that iced up as the Airbus was skirting a thunderstorm high above the South Atlantic. Air France, aware of the limitations of the device, had just begun to replace the $3,500 units. It hadn't gotten around to changing it in the ill-fated airplane before it departed Rio de Janeiro for Paris on the night of June 1, 2009. Grounding the entire Airbus fleet until all units were replaced may have cost only a fraction of what the accident, investigation and lawsuits will end up costing Air France, to say nothing of the tragic loss of 228 lives. Some analysts argue, though, that turning all potential flaws into mandatory "no go" items would make air transportation unaffordable.
The "Thales" sensors were more susceptible to icing than other designs, but they didn't all ice up, and the planes carrying those that did remained flyable and were landed safely by their Air France crews. So were two other Airbus 330s belonging to Paris-based Air Caraibes Atlantique. Only Flight 447 fell into the ocean. One disaster is one too many, of course, but it was no more an inevitable consequence than it would be for a blown tire to flip a car.
Airspeed is crucial to flight. Too fast and the plane can break up; too slow and it can fall out of the sky. When airspeed indicators become unreliable, the computerized systems - autopilot and auto-throttles - quit. On the Airbus, this is announced by the aural warning of a cavalry charge, the computer's way of calling the human pilot to the rescue.
Aviation is full of pithy sayings. One is that an airspeed sensor has no backup except airmanship. Losing airspeed readings can range from a non-event to a dire emergency depending on the pilot's skill and additional circumstances. The autopilot quitting on AF447, as it was designed to do after losing reliable airspeed indication, could and should have been a non-event. It left an airworthy aircraft flying straight and level in light turbulence. All Flight 447 needed was a pilot to fly it - or just let the plane fly itself, which is what planes trimmed for cruise flight tend to do in stable air, especially if their wings are kept level - but, as the cockpit voice recorder revealed, there were no pilots on the flight deck. There were two systems managers being confronted by a system that suddenly had become unmanageable.
Real pilots would have disregarded the rebellious computers going viral with flashing lights, cavalry charges, buzzers and bells, huffily announcing all the things they stopped doing for the humans aboard or required the humans to do for them. They would have let the computers crash and concentrated on flying the plane. The systems managers stopped flying and crashed with their computers.
This isn't how the French inquiry puts it, needless to say. I wouldn't put it this way in an inquiry myself. I'm exaggerating to make the point that our technology may be getting ahead of itself. If so, we may hire 466,000 systems managers of an unmanageable system in the next 20 years.
Once a pilot, now a computer
Great article, thanks.
Re the worldwide pervasive over use and reliance on automation this is well worth a look by all pilots airline training departments and managements.
This talk was given at American Airlines training centre in 1997.
How much worse have things gotten in this regard since then??? How many accidents??
Children of Magenta, well worth 25min of your time.
Re the worldwide pervasive over use and reliance on automation this is well worth a look by all pilots airline training departments and managements.
This talk was given at American Airlines training centre in 1997.
How much worse have things gotten in this regard since then??? How many accidents??
Children of Magenta, well worth 25min of your time.
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DON'T get me started. As a silly old bastard, who believes every pilot in this country should be thrown out into the bush, and taught to think for her/him self, (there is nothing like standing on a deserted runway in the GAFA and work a problem out for yourself, just you and the flies.) No comfortable Sim, no obliging LAME, just you. What you learn then, no SIM can ever teach you. Self preservation comes first, then some lateral thinking, then a decision. And you have started a basic airmanship that will take you thru your career. (If your decision is correct) You cannot build a brick wall unless you have a firm foundation, and that is the same in this career. I absolutely despair that this sort of thinking has been taken away, though the decisions of some senior QF Skippers has given me some hope when they returned to the basics under pressure, and dutifully return their bus and PAX to safety. But you can bet your hat, they were either service trained or GA trained. If you have not scared the absolute ****e out of yourself at least once, then you should not be flying commercial jets.
Whilst I agree, especially with you TG, the people 'paying the wages' and 'resourcing' the operation do not have a sufficient depth of understanding about what it takes to deliver an aeroplane full of people from A to B, and understand that 'the aeroplanes fly themselves'.
They see pilots as 'process workers' and minimum regulatory standard are probably 'excessive'.
And, if they lose a jet or two across the world - well, that's the cost of doing business.
Cynical? Maybe.
They see pilots as 'process workers' and minimum regulatory standard are probably 'excessive'.
And, if they lose a jet or two across the world - well, that's the cost of doing business.
Cynical? Maybe.
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And don't fool yourself this automation dependency will never happen in Australia. It has long been with Australia's major and regional operators already and CASA appears disinterested as long as regulatory boxes are ticked.
Anecdotal as always - but when you have a domestic airline first officer offered a visual hand flown approach into Hobart in broad daylight by the captain and replies hesitantly that he would rather watch the captain because he had never done a manual approach into Hobart (basically a joining procedure on the downwind leg), then you realise that either his line training needs to be looked at, or his self confidence. Or both. Two or three cyclic simulator sessions a year to meet CASA regulatory requirements are clearly insufficient to maintain manual flying skills; especially as they are mostly button pushing highly intricate flight management exercises rather than practicing the basics of hand flying.
One cannot help feeling sorry for today's pilots who are so welded to the automatics and the magic of the magenta line, that many have become privately apprehensive of hand flying an average jet. What an indictment and a sad reflection of today's airline pilot lack of basic manual flying skills. Crews can be constrained by company SOP, and perhaps personal laziness plays its part too. It could also be argued that training departments must bear a fair amount responsibility for the current situation apropos automation dependency. What is certain is the problem will not go away and as someone remarked earlier the Air France A340 crash is just the visible and tragic tip of the iceberg.
Anecdotal as always - but when you have a domestic airline first officer offered a visual hand flown approach into Hobart in broad daylight by the captain and replies hesitantly that he would rather watch the captain because he had never done a manual approach into Hobart (basically a joining procedure on the downwind leg), then you realise that either his line training needs to be looked at, or his self confidence. Or both. Two or three cyclic simulator sessions a year to meet CASA regulatory requirements are clearly insufficient to maintain manual flying skills; especially as they are mostly button pushing highly intricate flight management exercises rather than practicing the basics of hand flying.
One cannot help feeling sorry for today's pilots who are so welded to the automatics and the magic of the magenta line, that many have become privately apprehensive of hand flying an average jet. What an indictment and a sad reflection of today's airline pilot lack of basic manual flying skills. Crews can be constrained by company SOP, and perhaps personal laziness plays its part too. It could also be argued that training departments must bear a fair amount responsibility for the current situation apropos automation dependency. What is certain is the problem will not go away and as someone remarked earlier the Air France A340 crash is just the visible and tragic tip of the iceberg.
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Sheppey, at what stage was this offered by the Captain?
If this had been a discussion prior to the top of descent, then a mental model could have been shared, and agreement had on how the visual approach would be fine.
Despite there probably being a nice diagram in the QRH, a sharing of each pilots understanding of how the approach would be flown, at what config, at what point, and how any go-around would be flown would go a long way to ensuring a safe outcome.
TG, new pilots entering the industry may not have our background, but if we set the right tone in the flight deck, maybe we can give them the benefits of our experience in a positive manner.
If this had been a discussion prior to the top of descent, then a mental model could have been shared, and agreement had on how the visual approach would be fine.
Despite there probably being a nice diagram in the QRH, a sharing of each pilots understanding of how the approach would be flown, at what config, at what point, and how any go-around would be flown would go a long way to ensuring a safe outcome.
TG, new pilots entering the industry may not have our background, but if we set the right tone in the flight deck, maybe we can give them the benefits of our experience in a positive manner.
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then a mental model could have been shared, and agreement had on how the visual approach would be fine.
Nunc est bibendum
Airspace and approach design play a big part in this now too. How often do you get to actually do a visual circuit? For the QF 767 drivers, there is only a couple of places where you can fly a proper base and final approach let alone joining downwind a circuit altitude.
With an increased focus on the automatics, QARs, speed tolerances, and so on there is also an increasing focus on programming the FMC so that you can actually leave it all engaged for as long as possible. Training departments themselves are breeding this in so it'll be interesting to see where we're at in 10-20 years time when the current breed of new F/Os become training captains.
With an increased focus on the automatics, QARs, speed tolerances, and so on there is also an increasing focus on programming the FMC so that you can actually leave it all engaged for as long as possible. Training departments themselves are breeding this in so it'll be interesting to see where we're at in 10-20 years time when the current breed of new F/Os become training captains.
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children of the magenta line
I learnt to fly in the bush in WA and NT flying with only myself to rely on.
15 years later and I am in europe flying B737ng with 200 hr cadets.
I am a great believer in pilots being able to hand fly and this is what I do with guys once they get comfortable with jet ( about 200hrs) I then introduce raw data, ILS, then Flying vectors at night and then take the map modes off (all over a few months) most guys that fly with me can now fly raw data hand flown dme arcs to vor/ils arrivals all with just HSI! no map mode on at all and it seems to really widen their situational awareness as well.
All these guys are 200 hr guys initially and it can be taught but it needs captains who are willing to let guys do it as you may have to tell them to go around or take the controls back off of them. I have never set off the OFDM and have seen some pretty atrocious approaches but i would rather see them in a controlled enviroment than on a dark stormy night!!
If you can't fly a modern jet like it was piston twin should you really be in the seat anyway!
15 years later and I am in europe flying B737ng with 200 hr cadets.
I am a great believer in pilots being able to hand fly and this is what I do with guys once they get comfortable with jet ( about 200hrs) I then introduce raw data, ILS, then Flying vectors at night and then take the map modes off (all over a few months) most guys that fly with me can now fly raw data hand flown dme arcs to vor/ils arrivals all with just HSI! no map mode on at all and it seems to really widen their situational awareness as well.
All these guys are 200 hr guys initially and it can be taught but it needs captains who are willing to let guys do it as you may have to tell them to go around or take the controls back off of them. I have never set off the OFDM and have seen some pretty atrocious approaches but i would rather see them in a controlled enviroment than on a dark stormy night!!
If you can't fly a modern jet like it was piston twin should you really be in the seat anyway!
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10,000hr theory
The theory/rule that it take's 10,000hrs to 'master' anything from mowing the lawn to the most delicate brain surgery has been around for a while. An interesting book 'The Outliers' (Malcolm Gladwell) touches on this.
In the case of Airline flying, the focus usually appears to be on the end result i.e. the standard of landing.
If the landing is a greaser and the rest of the operation is crap, as far as I am concerned, no cigar.
All of it is important, from the moment you arrive at work early; in a well presented uniform; Briefings correct; SOPs correct; R/T correct; Professional PAs; Smooth accurate skills maintained and demonstrated; but most important, attitude correct.
If you don't like complying with the standard, then you should leave.
Young to Old, GEN X to GEN Z, from the ennui to the heat in the kitchen, when it comes down to it, some 'individuals' should not be anywhere near an aircraft.
In the case of Airline flying, the focus usually appears to be on the end result i.e. the standard of landing.
If the landing is a greaser and the rest of the operation is crap, as far as I am concerned, no cigar.
All of it is important, from the moment you arrive at work early; in a well presented uniform; Briefings correct; SOPs correct; R/T correct; Professional PAs; Smooth accurate skills maintained and demonstrated; but most important, attitude correct.
If you don't like complying with the standard, then you should leave.
Young to Old, GEN X to GEN Z, from the ennui to the heat in the kitchen, when it comes down to it, some 'individuals' should not be anywhere near an aircraft.
Capt NG,
Very well done and said sir.
A US airline yrs ago, cannot remember which one, used to do something similar in its line training with new pilots.
Cannot remember whether during the line training Captains worked up thru the automation levels starting from raw data, no moving map, fully manual flying and do it by brain etc to full FMS integration or down the other way as you are doing but the benefits for the new pilots were huge.
Taught them, (drummed into them), whichever way it was done that they could fly the plane like a piston twin with raw data and brain power with ALL the automatic everything turned off and it still flies like an aeroplane because it is just an aeroplane!!
It is NOT a flying keyboard and bunch of computer systems (or a video game), like too many designers, engineers and managers think these days!!
The rest of the goodies are there to make things easier, at the right times, NOT to be used slavishly for every last minute of flight and in every situation.
See the above video link I posted. He reiterates all that very well, along with the fact that the automatics do not know what the word "NOW" means, nor can they ever respond that way, and that too many pilots are relying on the automatics to save the day or situation when it all turns to sh.., .....errr,.... goes pear shaped.
Someone told me a long time ago to remember that any aeroplane no matter how big or sophisticated has a wing and engines and your job was to fly and mange them both first above all else.
If those 2 things were within their limitations/ envelopes and doing what they should be doing you would fly along OK.
We saw with Air France what happens when one of those 2 essential things is not.
Very well done and said sir.
A US airline yrs ago, cannot remember which one, used to do something similar in its line training with new pilots.
Cannot remember whether during the line training Captains worked up thru the automation levels starting from raw data, no moving map, fully manual flying and do it by brain etc to full FMS integration or down the other way as you are doing but the benefits for the new pilots were huge.
Taught them, (drummed into them), whichever way it was done that they could fly the plane like a piston twin with raw data and brain power with ALL the automatic everything turned off and it still flies like an aeroplane because it is just an aeroplane!!
It is NOT a flying keyboard and bunch of computer systems (or a video game), like too many designers, engineers and managers think these days!!
The rest of the goodies are there to make things easier, at the right times, NOT to be used slavishly for every last minute of flight and in every situation.
See the above video link I posted. He reiterates all that very well, along with the fact that the automatics do not know what the word "NOW" means, nor can they ever respond that way, and that too many pilots are relying on the automatics to save the day or situation when it all turns to sh.., .....errr,.... goes pear shaped.
Someone told me a long time ago to remember that any aeroplane no matter how big or sophisticated has a wing and engines and your job was to fly and mange them both first above all else.
If those 2 things were within their limitations/ envelopes and doing what they should be doing you would fly along OK.
We saw with Air France what happens when one of those 2 essential things is not.
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Is Madagascar Air France Flight Smoking Gun in AF 447 Manslaughter Investigation?
Rio-Paris airbus crash 'might have been prevented' if pilots had been briefed on previous incident - Europe - World - The Independent
The Rio Paris Crash: Air France 447
LONDON INDEPENDENT
Rio-Paris airbus crash 'might have been prevented' if pilots had been briefed on previous incident
By John Lichfield
Tuesday, 17 July 2012
A French investigating judge is examining evidence that the Rio-Paris airbus crash might have been prevented if the pilots had been briefed on a terrifying incident the previous year.
According to an online update (The Rio Paris Crash: Air France 447) to a book on the crash, which will appear in print shortly, Air France and Airbus failed to notify pilots about a crisis aboard a Paris to Madagascar flight on 16 August 2008 that bore striking resemblances to the chain of calamities which befell flight AF447 over the south Atlantic nine months later.
An American writer and aviation expert, Roger Rapoport, says the events aboard the Air France Madagascar flight – and the successful action taken by its pilot to prevent a crash – are now central to the Rio-Paris manslaughter investigation which is being conducted by a French judge, Sylvie Zimmerman.
Mr Rapoport says an independent study by aviation experts sent to the judge last week took a much tougher line on the possible criminal responsibilities of Airbus and Air France than the inconclusive final report of the French air accident investigation bureau, the BEA, the previous week. His book reveals that the experts’ criticism is based partly on events aboard an Airbus 340, AF flight 373, from Paris to Tananarive in Madagascar in August 2008.
The pilot of the Madgasacar flight lost reliable indication of his airspeed because the recorders, or pitot tubes, had iced up. Amid heavy turbulence he descended to 4,000 feet, turning off the instructions from the aircraft’s computerised guidance system or ‘flight director’.
Much the same circumstances led to the crash of AF 447 in the south Atlantic on 1 June 2009, which killed 228 passengers and crew. In that case, however, the crew lifted the plane’s nose and made a series of other calamitous misjudgements which led the aircraft to plunge into the ocean.
The BEA report suggested the crash was caused by a mixture of systems’ failure and pilot error. It did suggest, however, that the pilots may have been led into error by the computerised fight director.
Air France and Airbus were placed under formal investigation for manslaughter in March last year. Judge Zimmermann must decide whether to recommend that criminal charges should be brought against either company or both.
Mr Rapoport quotes a veteran French aviation expert as saying: “If Air France and Airbus had done the right thing and notified Airbus pilots about the specifics of this near disaster on the Madagascar bound flight, new emergency procedures and better training certainly could have saved the lives of 228 passengers and crew…”
Jacques Rocca, a spokesman for Airbus, contacted by The Independent today, dismissed these conclusions as “false… just plain wrong.”
He added: “To suggest that we failed to warn airlines or pilots that flight directors are unreliable when the pitot tubes fail is absurd. All pilots know this already.”
Mr Rapoport told the Independent: “The BEA report makes it clear that that 'the absence of any (pilot) training at high altitude in manual aeroplane handing’ and the failure of ‘feedback mechanisms’ made it impossible to apply the correct recovery procedures. The Madagascar flight was a case-book example of how pilots should react but the details were not circulated.”
A French lawyer who represents families of victims of the crash, Maitre Stephane Busy, confirmed to The Independent today that the Madagascar incident formed part of the judicial inquiry. He said: “The problem is that putting the ‘flight director’ on ‘off’ is recommended but… there is no reminder on the instruments panel. Air France and Airbus knew that this could be a problem but they allowed their aircraft to continue to fly.”
Cedric Leurquin, an Air France spokesman, said the Madagascar flight incident has been “normally analysed” and “concerned stakeholders were informed”. He added: “For the rest… Air France…adheres faithfully to the BEA's analyses published on July 5.”
Mr Rapoport’s book is an updated English language version of a book published in French last year. It went online last night and will appear in a print version shortly as “The Rio-Paris Crash; Air France 447”.
The Rio Paris Crash: Air France 447
LONDON INDEPENDENT
Rio-Paris airbus crash 'might have been prevented' if pilots had been briefed on previous incident
By John Lichfield
Tuesday, 17 July 2012
A French investigating judge is examining evidence that the Rio-Paris airbus crash might have been prevented if the pilots had been briefed on a terrifying incident the previous year.
According to an online update (The Rio Paris Crash: Air France 447) to a book on the crash, which will appear in print shortly, Air France and Airbus failed to notify pilots about a crisis aboard a Paris to Madagascar flight on 16 August 2008 that bore striking resemblances to the chain of calamities which befell flight AF447 over the south Atlantic nine months later.
An American writer and aviation expert, Roger Rapoport, says the events aboard the Air France Madagascar flight – and the successful action taken by its pilot to prevent a crash – are now central to the Rio-Paris manslaughter investigation which is being conducted by a French judge, Sylvie Zimmerman.
Mr Rapoport says an independent study by aviation experts sent to the judge last week took a much tougher line on the possible criminal responsibilities of Airbus and Air France than the inconclusive final report of the French air accident investigation bureau, the BEA, the previous week. His book reveals that the experts’ criticism is based partly on events aboard an Airbus 340, AF flight 373, from Paris to Tananarive in Madagascar in August 2008.
The pilot of the Madgasacar flight lost reliable indication of his airspeed because the recorders, or pitot tubes, had iced up. Amid heavy turbulence he descended to 4,000 feet, turning off the instructions from the aircraft’s computerised guidance system or ‘flight director’.
Much the same circumstances led to the crash of AF 447 in the south Atlantic on 1 June 2009, which killed 228 passengers and crew. In that case, however, the crew lifted the plane’s nose and made a series of other calamitous misjudgements which led the aircraft to plunge into the ocean.
The BEA report suggested the crash was caused by a mixture of systems’ failure and pilot error. It did suggest, however, that the pilots may have been led into error by the computerised fight director.
Air France and Airbus were placed under formal investigation for manslaughter in March last year. Judge Zimmermann must decide whether to recommend that criminal charges should be brought against either company or both.
Mr Rapoport quotes a veteran French aviation expert as saying: “If Air France and Airbus had done the right thing and notified Airbus pilots about the specifics of this near disaster on the Madagascar bound flight, new emergency procedures and better training certainly could have saved the lives of 228 passengers and crew…”
Jacques Rocca, a spokesman for Airbus, contacted by The Independent today, dismissed these conclusions as “false… just plain wrong.”
He added: “To suggest that we failed to warn airlines or pilots that flight directors are unreliable when the pitot tubes fail is absurd. All pilots know this already.”
Mr Rapoport told the Independent: “The BEA report makes it clear that that 'the absence of any (pilot) training at high altitude in manual aeroplane handing’ and the failure of ‘feedback mechanisms’ made it impossible to apply the correct recovery procedures. The Madagascar flight was a case-book example of how pilots should react but the details were not circulated.”
A French lawyer who represents families of victims of the crash, Maitre Stephane Busy, confirmed to The Independent today that the Madagascar incident formed part of the judicial inquiry. He said: “The problem is that putting the ‘flight director’ on ‘off’ is recommended but… there is no reminder on the instruments panel. Air France and Airbus knew that this could be a problem but they allowed their aircraft to continue to fly.”
Cedric Leurquin, an Air France spokesman, said the Madagascar flight incident has been “normally analysed” and “concerned stakeholders were informed”. He added: “For the rest… Air France…adheres faithfully to the BEA's analyses published on July 5.”
Mr Rapoport’s book is an updated English language version of a book published in French last year. It went online last night and will appear in a print version shortly as “The Rio-Paris Crash; Air France 447”.
Let me put it in Accountant speak for you.
1. They are not heartless bastards.
2. The airlines are continuously asked to pay more and more for aircraft by the manufacturer.
3. According to the manufacturer, the price of the aircraft is justified by the sophistication of it automated systems.
Answer the following Airline management question:
"Exactly how does all this expensive computer controlled automation translate into more profits for my shareholders?????????? Because if it doesn't, then I don't want it!!!!!!"
Sadly; the usual answer to that question is that it allows the airline to employ cheaper and less experienced pilots with no loss of safety.
You have already heard Alan Joyce justify engineering retrenchments and their substitution with cheap offshore labor for virtually the same reason.
Peter Abeles onced asked virtually this very question and it triggered young Sunfish to start studying for an MBA to try and understand the answer.
1. They are not heartless bastards.
2. The airlines are continuously asked to pay more and more for aircraft by the manufacturer.
3. According to the manufacturer, the price of the aircraft is justified by the sophistication of it automated systems.
Answer the following Airline management question:
"Exactly how does all this expensive computer controlled automation translate into more profits for my shareholders?????????? Because if it doesn't, then I don't want it!!!!!!"
Sadly; the usual answer to that question is that it allows the airline to employ cheaper and less experienced pilots with no loss of safety.
You have already heard Alan Joyce justify engineering retrenchments and their substitution with cheap offshore labor for virtually the same reason.
Peter Abeles onced asked virtually this very question and it triggered young Sunfish to start studying for an MBA to try and understand the answer.
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Excellent NG. My time as a F/O was not spent reading the newspapers on a long flight, it was hands on to a degree, with a usually vigilant Skipper who had no hesitation at throwing me a curly one, at 0300. That used to irritate me at times, but long ago recognised the professionalism of the man. I in turn did the same, and have at retired meetings have a former F/O say I enjoyed flying with you, I learnt from you. That does not make me anyone special, it just makes me someone who continued a should be time honored line, of never stop learning. And so it should be today, the bloody things are just as dangerous as they ever were, in the hands of incompetents, who somehow slipped thru the net, and they should be weeded out with no apologies.
The real question here is "are there statistically more crashes since advent of automation, or less?". I'm tipping that there are less. For every accident caused by lack of basic flying skills, there are probably 10 prevented by automation and improved warning systems.
Overall, I'm betting that automation has resulted in a net increase in safety.
The next phase of the evolution is to try and maintain automation proficiency alongside basic flying skill currency, all within the constraints placed on training resources. Not easy. Given the relative importance, automation proficiency will be the priority.
Now let's take what we know about automation, the quantum of training that a young airline pilot gets these days, and the perceived status of a pilot job, then apply that to the forecast requirement for pilots over the next 20 years.
It's pretty clear that we are going to see the trend continue toward a more regulated use of automation. It is the only way that the airlines are going to be able to put enough bums in seats to fly the aircraft on order.
Will there be crashes as a result; you bet, but there will be a lot less than if you allowed these low hour pilots to hand fly jet aircraft around.
I can say this from a position of being a GA pilot, a military pilot and an airline pilot. Once upon a time i could hand fly with the best of them. Now days I am struggling to do a basic maneuver. I still do them from time to time, but only when well briefed with weather and traffic conditions permitting.
As far as being able to grab the jet from the autopilot in IMC when everything is going pear shaped? I don't think so.
Overall, I'm betting that automation has resulted in a net increase in safety.
The next phase of the evolution is to try and maintain automation proficiency alongside basic flying skill currency, all within the constraints placed on training resources. Not easy. Given the relative importance, automation proficiency will be the priority.
Now let's take what we know about automation, the quantum of training that a young airline pilot gets these days, and the perceived status of a pilot job, then apply that to the forecast requirement for pilots over the next 20 years.
It's pretty clear that we are going to see the trend continue toward a more regulated use of automation. It is the only way that the airlines are going to be able to put enough bums in seats to fly the aircraft on order.
Will there be crashes as a result; you bet, but there will be a lot less than if you allowed these low hour pilots to hand fly jet aircraft around.
I can say this from a position of being a GA pilot, a military pilot and an airline pilot. Once upon a time i could hand fly with the best of them. Now days I am struggling to do a basic maneuver. I still do them from time to time, but only when well briefed with weather and traffic conditions permitting.
As far as being able to grab the jet from the autopilot in IMC when everything is going pear shaped? I don't think so.
That will be a very contentious statement I would think.
First option is to revert to basic automation modes to try and recover problem, if that doesn't work manual intervention is the final level of protection.
I will qualify that by saying this philosophy requires a solid understanding of what the aircraft should be doing in a any given automation mode so that early recognition of abnormal behaviour can be identified and a less automated mode can be selected to rectify the problem.
Gone are the days of immediately reverting to hand flying when the automatics are not behaving as expected, or at least they should be gone.
Additionally, in most modern jets, any hand flying intervention should normally be limited to establishing stable flight and re-engaging the automatics.